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Singapore is one of the most digitally connected nations in the world, but it is notorious for punitive 
media laws that restrict what journalists can and cannot publish. In addition, the government takes 
firm and astute control of media financing, reducing any ability of the mass media to operate 
independently, or as a Fourth Estate. Such an understanding of Singapore rarely interrogates nor 
traverses the boundaries of legal tools and political economy, particularly those that coerce journalists 
who operate in mainstream and online media to bend to the will of the state. 
This thesis revisits and critiques some of the established positions about Singapore's model of media 
governance. It begins with a theoretical and historical overview of media governance to locate 
Singapore's current model. It will emphasise that the government's preferred mantra of a 'social 
responsibility' media model is not universally congruent with similar models used in other societies. It 
then re-situates Singapore's media governance model by examining the development of this ‘social 
responsibility’ mindset, drawing on perspectives gathered via in-depth interviews with various 
stakeholders, including former and current journalists, activists, media academics and legal 
professionals. 
The thesis moves on to retrace Singapore's history of media governance based on a key theme that 
has emerged from the stakeholder interviews: that media governance goes beyond legal and 
economic control, but involves relationship-building between the government and media 
practitioners. This theme leads to an examination of how Singapore’s media practitioners willingly 
subscribe to the values of nation-building and social responsibility. These values are often 
painstakingly justified by the government through the use of what the thesis refers to as ‘disciplining 
narratives’, a form of public discourse that defines the norms and permissibility used to structure 
relations of social power between the government and the media. 
The thesis rounds up the analysis of Singapore’s media environment with a case study of the country's 
anti ‘fake news’ legislation, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation (POFMA) Act 
that was passed in 2019. It charts the legislation’s genealogical progress through public narratives that 
emerged as part of the public consultation process for the law. 
In its totality, this thesis proposes that Singapore’s media environment embodies a system of 
governance that depends less on tight legal strictures than it does social norms and expectations about 
the role of the media, as represented by Foucault’s concept of governmentality. It concludes by 
espousing a renewed focus on ‘disciplining narratives’ that function efficaciously and concurrently as 
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“We are completely open. We have one of the fastest internet 
accesses in the world. We have no Great Wall of the internet. You can 
get any site in the world you wish. So where is the restriction?... The 
world is a diverse place. Nobody has a monopoly on virtue or wisdom. 
And unless we can accept that and we prosper together and cooperate 
together, accepting our differences, differences in values, differences 
in outlooks, differences even in what we see (our) goals of life to be, I 
think it becomes difficult.” 




On 14 April 2015, news media in Singapore reported that two editors running The Real Singapore, a 
local social-political website, were charged under the Sedition Act for publishing seven articles relating 
to a Thaipusam festival in Singapore. Some attendees at the religious festival had played musical 
instruments, which were prohibited by law, and this led to disagreements between the attendees and 
the police during the festival’s procession. The Real Singapore subsequently published articles that 
claimed Filipino migrants lodged a police report about the music, leading to the police taking action 
against the procession participants. The authorities claimed that the articles had the “tendency to 
promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different groups of people in Singapore, namely, 
between ethnic Indians in Singapore and Philippine nationals in Singapore” (Spykerman, 2015) and 
that these articles fabricated a clash between the police and members of the public during the 
religious festival. 
Subsequently, on 3 May 2015, the Media Development Authority of Singapore (MDA, now Info-
communication Media Development Authority, or IMDA), the statutory board that governs regulatory 
and licensing issues for broadcast and online media operators, announced that The Real Singapore 
had contravened the Broadcasting Act and ordered a complete shutdown of the website (Au-Yong, 
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2015). The MDA claimed that the editors “published prohibited material as defined by the (Internet 
Code of Practice1) to be objectionable on the grounds of public interest, public order and national 
harmony” (Infocomm Media Development Authority, 2016). The regulator also claimed that the 
editors had inserted falsehoods in their articles, incited anti-foreigner sentiments in Singapore 
through the said articles and refused to fully disclose their revenue sources. The editors duly complied 
with MDA’s demands removed public access to the website. 
MDA’s actions were considered unprecedented as it was the first time that the Singapore government 
has deliberately sought to shut down a website in its entirety. However, such a draconian move 
solicited little sympathy from media observers in Singapore. Media and legal academics affirmed 
support for the government’s action against The Real Singapore, noting that the actions by the 
website’s editors have been particularly egregious and that this was an “extreme case” that 
contravened the Code of Practice and deserved firm action from the state (V. Koh, 2015). The 
FreeMyInternet movement, a collective of online media practitioners and activists that had protested 
the amendments to the Broadcasting Act in 20132 (Yahoo Singapore, 2013), raised concerns that the 
government had overstepped its authority and “exhibited inconsistency in how it approaches 
‘objectionable content’”. Even so, the group did not dispute that The Real Singapore had questionable 
editorial judgement (The Online Citizen, 2015). 
The case of The Real Singapore was significant in terms of the penalty exacted on media practitioners, 
though it was by no means the only or last instance where the government sought to place restrictions 
on online media using legal and regulatory instruments. Instances in Singapore’s history included 
Sintercom (The Independent Singapore, 2013) and Breakfast Network (C. Yong, 2013), where the 
 
1 The Internet Code of Practice was formulated by the Singapore government with no known consultation with the 
online media industry. It stipulates the permissible content for online services, but the parameters are defined broadly. 
While the emphasis of the text appears to be on public morality, homosexuality and racial and religious harmony, 
prohibited material also include the more subjective categories of “public interest”, “public order”, “public security” 




2 The Media Development Authority of Singapore (MDA) amended the Broadcasting Act in 2013, purportedly to ensure 
parity of standards between traditional broadcasters and online media. Both forms of media are regulated under the 
Act, but online media were designated under an automatic ‘class licensing’ scheme, compared to the individual license 
required for traditional television and radio broadcasters. The 2013 amendments stipulated a S$50,000 performance 
bond for websites the government specifically identify as requiring an individual license and a requirement for 
websites to remove content the government declares to be in contravention to national laws within 24 hours. The first 
website to be included under the new requirements was Yahoo Singapore. In response, independent media 
practitioners and bloggers consolidated to form the FreeMyInternet movement to protest the amendments. They 
claimed the new rules threatened the operations of independent media operators, since the government can 
arbitrarily decide to impose the new restrictions on any website they choose, hence granting too much discretionary 
powers to the authorities. They also claimed the new rules lacked consistency and transparency. 
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editors decided to shut down their websites voluntarily due to onerous regulatory frameworks. Other 
websites like The Independent Singapore and The Middle Ground received police warnings for running 
afoul of election laws (The Middle Ground, 2016; C. Yong, 2016b), while The Online Citizen faced a 
defamation suit from the Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Kurohi, 2019). These examples of the 
government’s incursions into the online space lead to questions about whether there is indeed a ‘light 
touch’ approach to regulating the internet, which the Singapore government has always professed to 
be its preferred method. This ‘light touch’ approach is typified by token censorship of morally 
objectionable content and websites, while permitting the country to tap the economic potential 
offered by the internet and stimulate an information-based economy emerging in the 1990s to 2000s 
(G. Yeo, 1999). Rather than direct intervention, such an approach uses guidelines and codes as the 
preferred practice for signalling where media entities have fallen out of line, with punitive 
enforcement used as a last resort. In practice, the ‘light touch’ governance of the internet has led to 
the symbolical banning of selected websites propagating pornography and religious extremism, 
leaving most of the internet relatively untouched (George & Raman, 2008). Actions taken thus far 
against online media in Singapore have demonstrated that the boundaries of the ‘light touch’ 
approach are highly malleable, but nevertheless in line with existing laws. 
Such a situation highlights three significant observations about Singapore’s media governance 
environment. First, the perceived righteousness of media control by the state is dependent on the 
performance of the recipient of the punishment, which is invariably based on an acceptable standard 
of journalism, rather than the severity of the state’s actions. Second, the use of severe legal 
instruments is perceived to be equally justifiable, if not more so, than less draconian measures such 
as onerous administrative processes. Third and most critically, such views are held and publicly 
expressed by learned professionals and experts, rather than regular citizens who might not necessarily 
have the ability to interpret and critique media laws and are more susceptible to state-led propaganda. 
These three observations appear at odds with Singapore’s consistently poor performance in the world 
press freedom index by Reporters with Borders – ranking it 158th among 180 countries (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2020a) – which criticises the government for its draconian laws against media 
practitioners. Such a discrepancy is worthy of query: why does the Singapore government’s continual 
infringement on media freedom continue to win the support of the population, to the extent that few 
media practitioners protest against the infringement, and those who do seldom find public support 
for their resistance? Portrayals of the Singapore government as a draconian infringer of media 
freedom does not square with the public support it receives. 
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A brief literature review, and identifying a third approach 
A clearer understanding of this situation cannot be achieved by perceiving the government’s role in 
media regulation purely as an autocratic state that flagrantly uses draconian laws to quell dissent. The 
Singapore government exhibits strong authoritarian tendencies in governing the media environment, 
but it does not do so by sheer imposition of its will over media practitioners. Instead, it subscribes 
itself to a system of legal parameters with which it seeks to govern with legitimate authority. Such 
legal instruments are generally perceived to be reasonable, albeit harsh at times, and within the 
constraints of a democracy that values the rule of law. 
Scholarship on media governance in Singapore has thus far focused predominantly on the ebb and 
flow of legal instruments against the media industry. Much has been written about why the People’s 
Action Party (PAP) government sought to control the media (Kuo & Chen, 1983; T. L. Tan, 1990) which 
usually reinforce the preference for a nation-building media industry and a rejection of foreign 
influence in the media. Such analysis generally revolves around one of two governance approaches, 
and at times a melding of both, that are deemed vital to Singapore’s proper functioning as a nation. 
The first approach revolves around the role of the media industry in ensuring political stability and 
national security. Documented accounts of this role of the media have highlighted the government’s 
professed interest in protecting the Singapore reading public from foreign influences and local 
agitators, who seek to destabilise the country and stoke racial discord by using the media as a vehicle 
of influence. This view professes that media governance has been guided by the “powerful effects 
paradigm” (Ang & Yeo, 1998), whereby the ability of the media to influence society and spark social 
unrest through media coverage of inter-racial and intra-national provides a justification for strict 
government control. The most significant and spectacular – in the sense of the public spectacle it 
generated – instances where this “powerful effects paradigm” was a key point of consideration 
revolved around the use of the Internal Security Act (ISA). The use of the ISA against media 
practitioners has been documented by historical studies (L. A. Lim, Ong, Subhan, Choy, & Tan, 2017) 
as much as by studies specific to the media environment (Ang & Lee, 2001; Birch, 1993; George, 2012; 
T. L. Tan, 1990). Accounts of the use of the ISA has noted the chilling effect the law has on Singapore 
society, primarily since the terror it cultivates “lies in the constant threat of indefinite detention and 
the immediate threat of maltreatment, torture and public humiliation” (Tremewan, 1994, p. 202) of 
those charged with inciting social unrest. Less severe in terms of the level punishment, but no less 
spectacular in the eyes of the public, are other legal instruments relating to sedition, defamation, 
contempt of court, public morality, the maintenance of racial and religious harmony, and the 
perpetration of falsehoods (H. Lee & Ansari, 2017). These other laws have been regularly applied to 
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media practitioners as a means of setting legal boundaries for how media entities are to portray public 
life in Singapore. 
The second approach revolves around the role of the media industry as an economic driver. 
Researchers have noted this approach as a development that moves away from the use of legal tools 
for negative coercion and towards a more positive cultivation of the media environment. Documented 
accounts of this role of the media highlight the government’s professed concern with the same 
influential powers of the media identified in the first approach, but with an interest to tap into its 
potential and enable a “positive role of mass media in national development” (Kuo & Chen, 1983, p. 
43). This was critical at a time when the Singapore government was trying to project the international 
image of the nation as an open and vibrant destination for foreign investment. There was thus a need 
to steer away from overt government intervention, including the use of oppressive laws to silence 
media practitioners. Observers have pointed out a less significant legal presence, epitomised by the 
deployment of “calibrated coercion” within the media industry (George, 2012) to ensure that the 
media sector remains loyal to Singapore and is constantly reminded of its ‘nation-building’ role. This 
requires a carefully structured organisational logic within media companies that dissuade them from 
taking an adversarial stance towards the government. Some of this corporate structuring is facilitated 
by the stipulated parameters of ownership built into the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (George, 
2012; T. L. Tan, 1990) but, by and large, cooperation with the government was sought more than 
compliance with the law. 
The arrival of digital technology and online media forms in the late 1990s presented a timely 
opportunity, if not a pressing need, for media governance to be less punitive and more enabling. The 
government saw the internet as part of the country's economic infrastructure, and hence a need to 
accommodate the interests of technology companies in championing the internet “as an uncensored 
platform for innovation and the exchange of ideas” (George & Raman, 2008). This essentially meant 
an openly competitive online media environment, a market ‘liberalisation’ which the Singapore 
government only permitted for the traditional media sector in 2000 (T. Lee, 2001). The same 
liberalisation was applied to the internet as an industry-friendly environment right from the beginning 
of its presence in Singapore, since mainstream media had much to gain, both economically and in 
reaching out to a larger readership, from an open cyberspace (T. Lee, 2014). This eventually led to the 
‘light touch’ approach that the government has professed towards censoring online content. Such an 
approach necessitated the use of semantics more than direct intervention: to frame online media 
practitioners “in a negative light, with the government quick to broad-brush the blogosphere as 
‘anonymous’, ‘dangerous’ and filled with ‘half-truths and untruths’” (T. Lee, 2014, p. 33). 
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I will discuss the distinct qualities of these two governance approaches in Chapter 3 where I examine 
the historical development of media governance in Singapore. It is important at this stage to highlight 
that both of these approaches are essentially attempts to make media practitioners fall in line with 
the government’s expectations about the nation-building role of the media industry. Research on 
these approaches proposes an evolutionary trend for the government to deregulate and liberalise the 
journalistic media environment, whereby the debate is one of whether such deregulation, or a refocus 
to market-based regulation, is in line with the standards used by developed countries or whether such 
efforts have led to true democratic progress in the Singapore media environment. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the use of new regulatory instruments, based on economic interests, did not lead 
to a diminishing of the government’s use of old coercive laws. 
It is at this juncture where this thesis veers away from the debate that has dominated current 
literature – specifically, progressive versus regressive, legalistic versus economic co-optation, 
economic potential versus dangerous threat to security. I contend that the two approaches to media 
governance are not necessarily opposite ends of the liberalisation-regulation spectrum, but must 
instead be seen as distinct but joint components of a broader system of governance that sees the 
Singapore government use all measures at its disposal to achieve its objectives of media control. More 
specifically, I propose that the use of coercive laws as a vehicle of fear is not in contradiction to the 
use of regulatory frameworks and policies that purport to develop the economic viability of the media 
industry. If anything, both approaches are on the same continuum of media governance. Former 
mainstream and online media editor, PN Balji, summarised this most succinctly: “The ‘light touch’ 
approach is a government invention; what has changed is the form, not the substance” (Othman, 
2013). 
Understanding Singapore’s media governance regime as a continuum, then, presents a third approach 
that encompasses the two earlier approaches. It also presents a more complete picture for why the 
government’s attempt to control the media industry has remained efficacious and pervasive, despite 
its constant deviation from its professed ‘light touch’ methods. The third approach revolves around 
the rationalisation of government intervention in the practice of journalistic media. This 
rationalisation should not be seen as aggressive public relations spin on the part of the government 
but is weaved into the lived realities of how those in the journalistic profession practice their craft. 
This rationalisation approach uses legal instruments and regulatory frameworks not as tools of 
suppression and coercion, but as critical points of justification for tough administrative action against 
media practitioners. Similarly, the same approach of rationalisation defines the parameters in which 
media liberalisation can occur – that is, liberalisation serves the national interest of Singapore and the 
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broader context of its survivability and the social mores of its citizens. It is “the ability of the political 
leadership to instil discipline and compliance within the broad, influential and expanding Singapore 
mediascape” that affirms a mode of “media governmentality” that goes beyond the imposition of laws 
or economic restrictions on the media industry, “where the shaping of citizens’ cultural conduct via 
the media is exacted and expected” (T. Lee, 2014, p. 27). Such governmentality is heavily dependent 
on “tactics of government” that require “the continual definition and redefinition of what is within 
the competence of the state and what is not” (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). Such attempts to continually 
define ‘the norm’ often require “a concern for the power of discourse (to shape the work of the 
journalist) and the ramifications of discursive practices (through framing the perceptions of the 
audience)” (Hobbs, 2008, p. 14). 
Consequently, this mode of governance based on rationalisation cannot depend purely on either the 
forcefulness of laws or the appeal to economic prudence, or even both, to keep the media in check. 
Instead, governmentality needs to appeal to the good sense of media practitioners and media users 
to adhere to certain ‘desirable standards’. The use of laws and regulations might offer an immediate 
and effective counter to media practitioners who seek to oppose the state or promote media freedom 
that runs counter to the Singapore government’s authoritarian tendencies. However, legal 
frameworks are more useful and significant as support structures for governmentality, as tools that 
the government “recasts… within this concern for the population and its optimization (in terms of 
wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efficiency), and the forms of knowledge and technical means 
appropriate to it” (Dean, 2010, p. 30). Hence, while media laws, regulations and policies often appear 
draconian in their effectiveness in restricting media freedom, their value lies in how they contribute 
to a process of rationalisation that involves the governed in the formation of a relationship of power. 
This relationship is not based on the brute force of the law, but the social interactions that exist in “a 
space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions” (Foucault, 1991, p. 58). Such a 
relationship grants legitimacy to the state, less as the enforcer of draconian legislative tools, but as 
the sovereign body with the legitimate right to deploy such legislative tools. It is this performative and 
normalising nature of legal discourses that this thesis turns to, rather than be focused on what a 
particular legal framework does. 
Governmentality and cultural hegemony 
The use of the concept of governmentality requires some unpacking. Foucault’s analysis of the way 
societies have been structured around institutions and institutionalised practices span almost three 
decades, starting from his earlier works on The Order of Things (Foucault, 2002), his analysis of systems 
of positive production in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979), to his later lectures at the Collège de 
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France. Much of his works were published and translated posthumous following his death in 1984, 
and his analyses became the basis for various fields of study ranging from bio-medical surveillance to 
sexuality studies. The application of Foucault’s work to these varying fields remains contentious, given 
that he had little time while living to provide clarity on his work, leaving much to scholarly 
interpretation and debate (Barnett, 1999; Dean, 2015; Elden, 2007; Hardy, 2010; Hobbs, 2008; King, 
2009; Pickett, 2005) as to exactly how his concepts should be applied. Given this diversity of views, my 
interest in this thesis relates specifically to the construction of normalised meaning, connecting his 
earlier works on normalised discipline and technologies of the self with the triangle of governmentality 
– sovereignty, discipline and government – explained in his later works (Foucault, 1980, 1991). 
Specifically, I seek to apply governmentality to the use of media discourses in Singapore, which involve 
the construction of meaning around the governance of the media environment. Such governance 
practices demonstrate the deployment of what I have termed ‘disciplining narratives’ – the discursive 
process that defines the norms and permissibility used to structure relations of social power between 
the government and the media. These norms in turn become the ‘rules’ with which media 
practitioners, regardless of their political inclinations, negotiate their relationship with the state and 
their readership. 
The specific mechanisms of disciplining narratives and how they embody Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality will be explained in Chapter 6. At this point, it is critical to note that disciplining 
narratives do not constitute cultural hegemony, where “the world view of the rulers (are extended) 
to the ruled, and thereby secure the ‘free’ consent of the masses to the law and order of the land” 
(Bates, 1975, p. 353). At the very least, the use of hegemonic discourse is not immediately apparent 
in the case of Singapore’s approach to media governance. It would be tempting to see this use of 
narratives as a means for the Singapore government to assert cultural control over the minds and wills 
of Singaporeans, imposed by the few in the political leadership on the masses such that they feel at 
ease giving control to the government. Perceiving this to be so is problematic on three counts, which 
I will proceed to expand upon. 
First, hegemony is achieved through “the consent of the led” and this consent produced by hegemonic 
discourse is “secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class” (Bates, 
1975, p. 352). This suggests that the state needs to have complete or near-complete control over the 
channels of information dissemination. In the realities of a digitally connected nation like Singapore, 
this is highly unlikely and impractical. It is also not desirable for the government to attain such broad 
censorial powers, given that it still wants to preserve the freedom of the internet for commercial gain. 
The diffusion of a dominant world view in hegemonic discourse also suggests that the state has 
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uninterrupted access to put its ideology across, and once accomplished, “society enters a period of 
relative tranquillity, in which hegemony rather than dictatorship is the prevailing form of rule” (Bates, 
1975, p. 355). The use of disciplining narratives in Singapore has proven to be contradictory to this 
concept, for it is typified “not as a unified apparatus, but as an ensemble of different institutions and 
practices” (Joseph, 2012, p. 36) that better aligns with Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Media 
governance in Singapore is characterised by ideological alignment rather than ideological 
indoctrination, where institutions such as the legal fraternity, civil society, academia and even the 
media industry itself are brought together to foster and develop a consensus around the state’s 
position, without which it falters in its legitimate right to govern. 
Second, hegemony conceives of resistance as being external to the state’s ideological control, which 
the state actively seeks to suppress and assert its dominance over. The approach to social discourse 
using cultural hegemony identifies resistance to the state in terms of freedom from “ideological fetters 
imposed… by the cultural organizations of the ruling class” (Bates, 1975, p. 360). The power of 
hegemony lies in the ability of the state to “be strongly positioned, not just in relation to other groups, 
but in relation to the economic, political and cultural conditions that allow it to put itself forward as 
leading” (Joseph, 2012, p. 40). This leadership role, when placed in the context of public discourse, 
requires the state to be always or mostly in the front of every aspect of public life, with resistance 
relegated to the background or even completely eradicated. Such a strong leadership role in public 
discourse is not found in the Singapore government’s approach media governance. On the contrary, 
the Singapore government has demonstrated much willingness to consult the public and civil society, 
allowing for dissent to surface, and then challenge it with its own formula of rationalisations and 
arguments. The leadership position in such public debates is potentially volatile and dynamic. The 
astuteness of the government has been evident in its ability to keep such dissent ringfenced, 
permitting resistance as “a construction that is reinforced through a particular set of social practices 
and a normative discourse” (Joseph, 2012, p. 26). This is vastly different from the working parameters 
of hegemonic discourse, where the state either blocks dissenting voices or narrowly focus on certain 
elements of public discourse that fortifies its purpose, essentially through a “control of the cultural 
organizations, of the lines of communication in civil society” (Bates, 1975, p. 363). Instead, what we 
see in the practice of disciplining narratives in Singapore was the deliberate drawing-out of dissenting 
voices among civil society, allowing resistance to become part of, even permitting it the opportunity 
to undermine and overturn the dominant discourse. Such dissent, of course, never succeeded, not 
because of suppression or censorship, but through active discourse where resistance to state-enabled, 
more so than state-led, discourses become integral to the system of governance, rather than be 
external to it (McHoul & Grace, 1993). This practice was witnessed in the conceptualisation of POFMA, 
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where public dissent was effectively channelled into the specific space of the public hearings held by 
the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods. At the hearings, critics of the law were 
challenged to pit themselves against the rationalised norms of the government, and some were drawn 
into agreement with the government’s position. 
Third, cultural hegemony tends to conceive of ideological influence as distinct from state domination, 
expressed through the use of force or repressive legal instruments. In situations where hegemony 
fails, the state would have to revert to its “coercive apparatus which disciplines those who do not 
‘consent’” (Bates, 1975, p. 353). However, this distinction between coercive dominance through legal 
apparatuses and the practice of establishing consent does not accurately describe the case of media 
governance in Singapore. The government has never wavered from its position that the laws were 
designed to be used, and invariably all the laws that were applicable to the journalistic profession 
were eventually used at some point in time. Discipling narratives never replaced the tools of coercive 
repression. Instead, they work concurrently and reinforce each other. The promise of a ‘light touch’ 
approach to internet regulation has never concealed the fact that the government retains the option 
to dish out punitive action against those who fall afoul of the laws. The very act of public discourse 
was to surface and highlight this power to discipline and punish as and when the government deems 
it necessary to do so – in effect, an ‘always touch’ approach. Within the practice of disciplining 
narratives, the government expresses its right to rule through the affirmation and alignment of norms 
to specific tactics of governance, details the consequences of deviance, and demonstrates its wisdom 
and benevolence in using such instruments. This exemplifies what Foucault described as the triangle 
of sovereignty-discipline-government (Foucault, 1991). 
These differences between hegemonic discourse and disciplining narratives might seem minute and 
trivial. However, they serve as important flag-posts for understanding the specific pervasiveness of 
power relations within Singapore’s media environment and offers different lenses through which to 
consider and observe similar practices of disciplining narratives in other parts of the world. Hegemonic 
discourse projects images of a strong and repressive state that actively suppresses dissent and 
enforces its own position of dominance, topped by the promise of negative freedom: an assurance 
that compliance will not be punished. Conversely, disciplining narratives reveals the practice of an 
outwardly collaborative and inclusive state that actively encourages alignment with its tactics of 
governance, topped by the promise of positive freedom: an assurance that alignment benefits the 
society which it seeks to govern. Indeed, what is most powerful about Foucault’s governmentality is 
precisely that it does not appear to impose by force anything that citizens are required to agree with. 
On the contrary, “individual subjects are constituted as autonomous and rational decision-makers” to 
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the extent that “the freedom and liberty of the subject is socially constructed through practices that 
reinforce rational, normalised conduct” (Joseph, 2012, p. 26). 
Understanding this critical difference between hegemonic discourse and disciplining narratives allows 
those who wish to study and make sense of media governance in Singapore an important insight into 
why the government has remained successful in imposing restrictive media laws, regulations and 
policies. Indeed, these governance tools find genuine resonance among a large swath of Singapore 
society, including the vast majority of media practitioners. It also reveals why push-back from media 
freedom advocates has lacked the efficacy needed to make significant and sustained changes to 
Singapore’s media governance model. The applicability of disciplining narratives is integral to the 
Singapore government’s attempt at building and entrenching its legitimacy among the citizenry. It is 
a legitimacy that has its base in the formation and reinforcement of social norms and values about 
how the media should behave to reach certain nationalistic and social goals. When it comes to 
governing journalistic media, this legitimacy is strengthened through paying attention to the everyday 
concerns, fears and aspirations of citizens. Consequently, any action to govern the media industry is 
seen as intrinsically tied to the media’s social responsibility towards public welfare. This social 
responsibility forms a mantra that even media practitioners are unable to disrupt and argue against, 
and in turn defines the relationship of power between the government and the media. 
The state, the media and a relationship of power 
This thesis presents an opportunity to delve deeper into the power relations between the government 
and the media and understand what accounts for and contributes to efficacious media governance in 
Singapore. It is in understanding the relationship-building process that allows for an exploration of 
broader issues in media regulation, particularly in how the government maintains its efficacy in media 
governance. In other words, rather than identify ‘solutions’ to a government’s control over media, 
what this thesis hopes to do is examine how public contention on state action is actively inscribed into 
relationships of power between the government and the media, and how these relationships are then 
repeatedly established through the process of public discourse. In view of this, it will be just as 
pertinent to look beyond structures of governance and institutions of power by examining the 
discursive process through which performative norms for media practitioners have been debated and 
affirmed. These social norms and values serve as the undercurrent with which media practitioners use 
to regulate their own behaviour, despite the constant contestation and conflict found in public 
discourse to push the boundaries of media freedom. It is a situation where the formation of social 
norms and values become essential to legitimised governance, as it creates the normalised ‘truths’ 
that “can be deployed only on the basis of a relationship of force” (Foucault, 2004, p. 53). Legal and 
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regulatory instruments, in all measure of their severity, represent an important base for a 
government’s show of force, but it is the relationship that is built around them that matters more to 
Singapore’s media governance framework. These relationships are strengthened, not with tough laws, 
but through public discourses about the rule of law. 
The Singapore government is particularly conscious about upholding the rule of law because doing so 
affirms the legitimacy of the state as much as it promotes good investment. In more democratic 
societies, governments establish legitimacy by closely following the supreme law, which for many 
societies would be a clear sent of principles, such as a Constitution, which is deemed distinct from the 
legislative laws that any government of the day can enact.3 However, this situation hardly applies to 
Singapore where the current administration under the People’s Action Party (PAP) enjoys a super-
majority in Parliament, commanding at least eighty percent of the seats in every term of office since 
the country’s independence in 1965. Holding the two-thirds majority in Parliament to amend the 
Constitution at will4 was never in doubt. It is also worth noting that the Singapore Constitution includes 
built-in clauses that affords the government discretion in passing legislation that effectively nullifies 
the protection the Constitution offers to citizens.5 
This unbridled discretionary authority means that the Singapore government can use legal tools with 
impunity against its political opponents, which might include media practitioners. However, doing so 
grants it raw power without legitimacy, since the wilful use of legal instruments would find little 
acceptance among the population. Legitimacy can only be derived if there is professed agreement 
with a higher governance framework that surpasses even the government’s legislative capacity. For 
the media environment, this framework is not the Constitution, but realised in the normalised 
parameters within which media entities – and for that matter, much of Singapore society – must value 
above all laws, regulations and codes the government can produce. These parameters are often 
 
3 The distinction between the rule of law, generally embodied in Constitutional law, and legislation was explored by 
Francis Fukuyama (2011), who noted that the will of the powerful state and the need to abide by the rule of law exists 
in a tension. Abiding by legal instruments that are generally deemed reasonable by the governed gives the impression 
that the government is kept in check from using dictatorial measures, and hence retains a legitimate right to govern. In 
turn, a government that adheres to the rule of law gives confidence among the governed that they are working within 
an environment of stable and predictable legal and economic outcomes. 
4 Basic timeline indicators from the Singapore Statutes Online show that from 1992 to 2020, the Singapore Constitution 
has been revised a total of 26 times – that is, a frequency of about once every year ("Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore," 1965). 
5 In terms of media freedom, Clause 14(1)(a) of the Constitution of Singapore states that “every citizen of Singapore 
has the right to freedom of speech and expression”. However, this is immediately circumvented by clause 14(2)(a), 
which states that “Parliament may by law impose on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it 
considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with 
other countries, public order or morality” and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide 




expressed by the government but reaffirmed and justified in the legal actions taken against media 
practitioners. They relate intimately to the existential threat of Singapore’s sovereignty as a nation, 
survivability as an economy and the sensitive social fabric of Singapore society, necessitating the 
prevention of foreign interference in Singapore’s media environment and politics. They have been 
vocalised through parliamentary debates, ministerial speeches and media interviews, regardless of 
whether the use of laws impacted online or mainstream media. They cover both the use of existing 
laws and the implementation of new laws and regulatory regimes that can potentially impact the 
practice of journalism. They tend to focus on Singapore’s perceived need for a compliant media that 
must bend towards the PAP’s nation-building agenda, while freedom of expression is cast as a 
“western ideal” that holds no place in a small and vulnerable nation (H. L. Lee, 1987). Just as 
importantly, these justifications have been played out through media channels, representing a desire 
by the government to seek legitimacy not only with the media entities it sought to govern, but with 
the broader Singapore public. 
These ‘hard truths’ about Singapore’s predicaments – economic scarcity, delicate social fabric and 
sovereign rights – have been noted in research on Singapore’s media environment, such as those cited 
above. Attempts have also been made to offer alternative solutions to the government’s prescribed 
way of running the country based on these ‘uniquely Singapore’ conditions (Loh, Thum, & Chia, 2017; 
D. Low, Vadaketh, Lim, & Thum, 2014), at times questioning whether the severity of Singapore’s 
vulnerability is exactly what the government makes it out to be. Few scholars, if any, have articulated 
what this thesis is proposing in relation to Singapore’s media environment: it is more critical to focus 
on these predicaments as constructed, refined and internalised elements that form the justification 
process, rather than as the justifications themselves. This means that they become the real and lived 
experiences of those that the government seeks to govern. 
It would be tempting to see this justification process as state propaganda meant to dominate and 
brainwash the public and enforce strict disciple among media practitioners. Reality proves otherwise. 
Indeed, much of the process of public justification – particularly for actions taken against online media 
– is conducted openly. Such a process also saw the government permit – even actively encourage – 
those who disagree with regulatory frameworks that impact media freedom to challenge the 
government’s position. Invariably, such challenges do occur. Online media practitioners and media 
freedom advocates often argue for international standards in media governance and call for the lifting 
of media censorship and intimidation. The government’s response to these challenges has hitherto  
been to assert its sovereign right to set the rules within its own shores (BBC, 2017). 
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Consequently, these opposing narratives of ‘hard truths’ versus ‘media freedom’ tend to take extreme 
positions, almost always in a government-versus-civil-society pattern. What we have witnessed, then, 
is civil society frequently contesting the government’s actions and very seldom its legitimacy in 
implementing and enforcing such governance frameworks. Indeed, challenges to the government’s 
position on media governance have thus far taken on an almost-performative façade, where duelling 
voices eventually give way to the government’s deliberately ‘rationalised’ position on securing a 
stable, prosperous and peaceful Singapore. As a result, public discourse about media laws and 
regulation have been exercises in relationship-building. Such exercises have sought to carve out 
positions between the government – generally portrayed as the benevolent caretaker of a harmonious 
Singapore – and media freedom advocates – generally depicted as self-serving, idealistic and callous 
to the sensitivities of Singapore’s fragile social fabric. These highly publicised exchanges matter more 
as practices that establish power relations between the government, the media and the people, 
constantly played out in mediated discourse, and matter less as a route for any significant deviation 
in policy intent. Such public narratives are not about creating a single dominant source of power, but 
involves a process where “the various operators of domination support one another, relate to one 
another… converge and reinforce one another in some cases, and negate or strive to annul one 
another in other cases”, but which never fails to “function on the basis of these apparatuses of 
domination” (Foucault, 2004, p. 45). 
In effect, more attention needs to be paid to developing a new framework of analysis for media 
governance in Singapore, one that encompasses the deployment of social values that normalises what 
media practitioners can and cannot do in pressing the boundaries of their craft. Such normalisations 
affirm the role of the media along certain social criteria, as much as enhances the legitimacy of the 
state to govern, such that both form a holistic relationship that entrenches a mode of operation within 
the medias industry that encourages it to disable its own freedoms. It is a relationship-building process 
that “concerns the shaping of human conduct and acts on the governed as a locus of action and 
freedom” which are ultimately “a technical means of securing the ends of government” (Dean, 2010, 
pp. 23-24). 
Research question, definition of key terms and boundaries of research 
An assessment of the relationship-building process within Singapore’s media environment needs to 
consider two notable points. First, the Singapore government faces constant international pressure 
about its media freedom standards. This pressure comes from international groups like Reporters 
Without Borders and Human Rights Watch, but also from activists within Singapore who use standards 
established by other nations and societies as a means of highlighting transgressions whenever the 
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government uses legal tools against media practitioners. In spite of its desire to protect its 
international reputation for economic reasons, the government appears immune to such pressures, 
and instead “continues to draw a certain macho pride” (George, 2012, p. 105) from deliberately 
dismissing or ignoring these protestations. Second, in addition to these pressures, the government 
also faces an increasingly vocal citizenry who have taken to the internet to voice their discontent and 
criticisms of government policy. These dissenting voices have organised themselves into amateur 
online news platforms that attempt to counter the dominance of mainstream media by offering a take 
on politics that is often critical of the government. 
In light of these two points, this thesis seeks to explore the interplay between the government and 
these pockets of online resistance to better evaluate the processes involved in governing the 
Singapore media environment. It aims to provide insights on how the government maintains its firm 
grip over journalistic media, including persistent and undeterred online media practitioners, while still 
retaining its public standing among the Singapore population as a governing body that is seemingly 
fair and just. This focus informs the central research question of this thesis: How does media 
governance in Singapore maintain its efficacy in relation to global expectations and the challenges 
of an evolving online environment? The research question and specific objectives of the research 
project will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
This thesis will make regular reference to terms that have specific applications in the context of media 
governance in Singapore. They have been identified below to provide a consistent point of reference 
for some of the analyses in this thesis, as well as to set out the scope and limitations that circumscribe 
this research project. 
Efficacy 
In studying the efficacy of media governance, this thesis will analyse the government’s success in 
asserting its dominance over the media environment in Singapore. It will examine the way media laws, 
regulations and policies have been applied to Singapore’s media environment to exact the desired 
outcomes that the government wishes for the media environment. This includes the impact of 
regulatory frameworks on the media industry in Singapore, and the establishment of an ideal situation 
in which the government can govern most efficiently. It is worth noting that governing efficacy should 
not be equated to governing effectiveness. Certainly, the use of legal and regulatory instruments 
provided the government with the most direct, punitive and effective way of controlling the media. 
However, such an approach is often done with extensive state resources; for instance, bringing 
lawsuits against independent journalists is a costly process in terms of finances and time. Although 
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online media practitioners have limited resources with which to defend themselves against the 
government, a head-on clash with dissenting voices causes potential harm to the government’s 
reputation. On the other hand, a media industry that is inclined to self-regulate based on established 
norms and boundaries allows the government a more efficacious way to govern, while entrenching its 
status of benevolence. 
Consequently, this means that research on the efficacy of media governance cannot simply focus on 
tough legal actions that silence dissent in the media industry, but must also consider the various 
processes and practices that enhance the government’s ability to govern the media environment in 
the most efficient way and with the most ideal outcomes. Such outcomes would include the 
government’s preference not to be perceived as totalitarian or excessively authoritarian, to promote 
the open market economy that Singapore’s survival depends on. It would also include the 
government’s preference to let the industry self-regulate, to minimise the government having to step 
in with direct measures, in turn minimising the impact on its resources and reputation. 
Media governance 
In view of the above understanding of governance efficacy, the term ‘media governance’ will be used 
to encompass the laws, regulations and regulatory regimes, and policy directions that have allowed 
the PAP government to control the Singapore media environment. Beyond the scope of legal 
structures, there is also a need to consider the use of public narratives by the PAP to establish the 
'proper behaviour' within the media and the formulation of certain expectations among its audiences 
for how media should behave. Such a governance framework leverages the concept of Foucault’s 
power of discourse (McHoul & Grace, 1993) that attempts to enable discipline with minimal physical 
effort (Pickett, 2005). 
The decision to take this broader approach to studying media governance stems from an initial critique 
of the current literature on media governance in Singapore, which tend to focus on either the forceful 
implementation and enforcement of the law, or the artful deployment of economic leverage by the 
government to secure compliance from the media. These positions tend to look at media governance 
from a ‘power from’ perspective, with the state as the primary actor for the use of that power. The 
inclusion of the use of social norms and values serves to provide a more comprehensive and holistic 
understanding of Singapore’s media governance ecosystem. This demands a repositioning of the 
efficacy of the government’s influence on the media environment as one that depends more on 
‘power through’. Such power is often decentralised and diffused into the everyday practices of media 
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practitioners and is far more potent and instrumental in affirming state power than draconian laws 
and regulations. 
The media 
The object of study in this thesis is journalistic or news media, with a specific focus on the online 
environment as a site of resistance to the government. The terms ‘journalists’ and ‘media 
practitioners’ will be used interchangeably, as they mostly refer to the same thing – that is, someone 
who works in the field of newsworthy content production. While there are arguments for a distinction 
between professional journalists and bloggers or web users – where ‘media practitioners’ is a more 
generic term that can refer to both – the situation in Singapore is quite different and necessitates a 
blurring of the boundaries. Much of the work done by practitioners who operate on independent 
social-political news websites, such as The Online Citizen and The Independent Singapore, are 
produced with little to no professional training. There are also semi-professional websites such as 
Mothership and multi-national outfits such as Yahoo Singapore. Collectively, these platforms offer a 
diverse representation of what constitutes ‘news media’ in Singapore as their contents remain an 
important part of what a significant proportion of Singaporeans consume as news. 
This thesis will focus on examining the practice of journalism that poses a challenge to the Singapore 
government’s long-standing desire for dominance in public discourse. These can be broadly described 
as online news platforms that have been created, developed and grown over the years to provide a 
counter to traditional mainstream media sources such as newspapers, television and radio. Traditional 
media platforms, owned mostly by Singapore Press Holdings and Mediacorp Pte Ltd, Singapore’s two 
key media conglomerates, are accepted within academic studies as being supportive of the 
government and its policies, and as crucial partners to the government in its nation-building efforts 
(Ang, 2005; Birch, 1993; George, 2012; Kuo & Chen, 1983; T. L. Tan, 1990; Tey, 2008). In opposition to 
them, independent online media platforms have often positioned themselves to be independent of 
government control, providing the necessary balance to a mainstream media heavily skewed in favour 
of the government. Such a position also means that online media practitioners deliberately push the 
boundaries of reporting on government news. This is an important distinction to make, as it does not 
mean that any media platform not owned by the two conglomerates that cover social-political news 
online are defined as ‘online media’ in this thesis. Instead, I will approach online media in terms of 
their specific approach to the practice of journalism, rather than as entities defined by their use of 
technology in practicing their profession. 
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As such, for the purpose of this thesis, online media would also not be taken to represent the technical 
platform of the internet and its various applications. The use of digital technologies as a means of 
democratic participation is undeniable, and scholars have attempted to identify and analyse the value 
of the internet as a vehicle for enlarging the political space in Singapore (Ang, 2005; Ang & Lee, 2001; 
George, 2005; Soon, 2015). However, to focus on media technology poses two risks. For one, doing so 
ventures into a field of study that is currently evolving and relentlessly expanding, making it difficult 
to contain within the scope of this thesis. For another, a focus on media technology suggests 
technology to be an enabler of democratic discourse and by extension a vital tool to challenging the 
government’s regulatory dominance. This is hardly the case in Singapore, since no journalistic 
organisation, be it traditional or online, had been able to fully harness such ‘powers of technology’ to 
fulfil its Fourth Estate role. As such, the focus of technology in this thesis will be more about examining 
the use of technology rather than technology per se, as it would be more instructive in understanding 
power relations between the state and the media. 
The online challenge and resistance 
On a personal level, journalistic media has been a topic that has always been my central interest. As a 
former digital journalist and public relations practitioner in government service, the constant contest 
between the state and journalists has not only been a matter of my close observation, but at times a 
matter of direct impact. As a media freedom advocate, I am intimately familiar with the increasing 
difficulty faced by online media practitioners and activists. Even so, this thesis in no way attempts to 
provide a solution to these long-standing issues of marginalisation and draconian state action against 
media practitioners. It does, however, seek to provide a clearer understanding of the multi-faceted 
situation that informs the governance of Singapore’s media environment. 
Despite spirited efforts by media practitioners and activists to resist state-led infringement on media 
freedom, little has improved in terms of expanding media freedoms in Singapore. Much of this has to 
do with how technology is perceived, which has technological deterministic undertones. Online media 
practitioners in Singapore often see the internet as the new frontier with which political democracy 
can flourish in Singapore. From an operational perspective, this might be applicable to some extent. 
The internet availed journalists to technology that can enhance their craft, deliver more immersive 
products, and cause disruptions to the status quo in the media industry. In Singapore, where a 
mainstream media that is sympathetic to the government holds a monopoly over public knowledge, 
such disruptions to the industry hold much democratic allure. Arguably, such perceptions are 
misguided as they seldom – and in the case of Singapore, never – achieve the liberty of a media 
industry free from government intervention and prosecution. While the practice of independent 
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journalism has offered a strong, and at times noisy, rebuke of the government and its policies, such 
resistance have been directed at legal frameworks in specific instances in time, rather than challenge 
the government’s firm and entrenched control of the media industry. For instance, proposals were 
made by a group of bloggers in 2008 (The Online Citizen, 2008a) for how the government might steer 
its regulatory approach which, among other aspects, called for greater latitude in political speech, 
clarity in the laws and when applied, for such laws to be in moderation. Few of these proposals have 
been made known publicly as having contributed to legal or policy considerations. Such unidirectional 
and overtly legalistic positioning prevents a proper conversation on the actual effects of media 
governance in Singapore. 
On its part, the Singapore government perceives the internet as a powerful tool, having the capacity 
to influence the beliefs of readers, to the extent of causing social unrest, racial disquiet and political 
instability. This “powerful effects paradigm” whereby “the media are seen as exerting a powerful 
influence on a ‘weak’ and ‘passive’ audience” (Ang & Yeo, 1998, pp. 15-16) remains a key component 
of the political justifications used to sanction stringent regulations against the media industry. The 
government has not hesitated to regurgitate these justifications when using the law to take to task 
any perceived efforts by journalists to destabilise the nation or cause social and political instability. A 
similar position has also been adopted for the internet in general, where the perceived negative traits 
of the internet are seen as reason enough to impose regulations (Ang, 2005). Past events of social 
unrest that have been said to be caused by an unbridled media have been instrumental in “justifying 
the need for the controls on the media as the unimpeded flow of ideas can sometimes have negative 
consequences” (Ang & Yeo, 1998, p. 16). The potential of the internet to cause harm had been 
galvanised by the government as justification for taking measures to prevent its abuse, despite there 
being no proven cases to date of online content causing any real civic or political unrest in Singapore. 
Such a position permits little to no leeway for the government to move away from the slew of tough 
laws and harsh rhetoric against online media. 
Consequently, too much emphasis has been placed on debilitating laws and regulatory regimes, where 
more attention should have been placed on the system of governance that encompasses the media 
environment, to the extent that even media practitioners play a role in their own subjugation. Any 
attempt at resisting the existing power structures does not dismantle the power relations, but further 
entrenches this tumultuous state-media relationship in the eyes of the public. I argue that a 
meaningful departure from these combative caricatures of the government and online media can only 
be achieved with a shift in how we perceive the system of governance to be, rather than be consumed 
by the spectacle of resistance that entrenches, not dismantles, state legitimisation and power. 
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Thesis outline – an exploration of power-relations through mediated discourse 
This thesis is an attempt to chart and uncover a more holistic approach to examining media 
governance in Singapore, which I argue must be centred on evaluating mediated public discourse. 
Such a holistic assessment has thus far been lacking in current research on the governance of 
journalistic media in Singapore. Current research undertakings tend to focus on the politics of media 
governance through laws and economics, with little attention paid to the use of discursive practices 
as a vehicle for affirming political legitimacy. More than just a practice of political showmanship, such 
discursive practices are essential in forming the backbone for political legitimacy and are critical in 
explaining the success of the Singapore government in securing its grip on the media environment. I 
will argue in the course of this thesis that while laws, regulations and policies remain significant 
components in the state’s governance armada, they do not fully explain the extensive process by 
which an affirmative media governance environment, built on public trust rather than fear, is able to 
exist. 
Chapter 2 is a detailed description of the methodology and methods used for my research, which 
involves three distinct components: primary and secondary research, and a focused case study. 
Primary research consists of a series of interviews conducted with five stakeholder groups who have 
expertise and interest in the development of the Singapore media environment.6 They include past 
and present media practitioners, media freedom activists, media academics, legal professionals and 
government officials. Securing government officials to comment on the topic proved to be impossible 
– the government was at this particular juncture preparing to implement a law against online 
disinformation, and officials were less amenable to share information about it. There is also a need to 
contend with Singapore’s Official Secrets Act, which likely dissuaded public officials from sharing 
sensitive information. Nevertheless, the in-depth interviews with 15 stakeholders proved to be 
exceedingly insightful for understanding the government’s mindset in the state-media relationship. 
This insight was provided by interviewees who held senior editorial positions in mainstream media 
organisations and have intimate and direct contact with government officials. There were also three 
individuals among my interviewees who are former Nominated Members of Parliament, who provided 
useful insights into laws passed by Parliament. Their views are collectively described, summarised and 
analysed in Chapter 5, which served as a vital focal point for how I approach my analysis of the state-
media relationship in Singapore. There was broad agreement among my interviewees that legal 
 
6 Interviews were conducted between 2 August and 1 November 2018. Ethics approval (number 2018/033) was 
granted by Murdoch University Ethics Committee on 24 April 2018. 
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instruments were not necessarily the most critical aspect of this relationship, and more attention was 
needed on the role of trust-building in the media governance framework. 
The second component of secondary research consists of two sub-components. The first consists of a 
theoretical study of journalistic governance models, detailed in Chapter 4. This chapter draws on the 
earlier Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956), and examines the various 
developments since then into more contemporary models of media governance. Referencing the 
examples of Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand – societies similar to Singapore in their own ways 
– I propose that earlier theories about media governance, even those that critiqued Siebert et al., 
often fail to account for the models found in these societies. These models are highly contextual and 
specific to the needs of individual societies, seldom aligning with prescriptive classifications. I propose 
that it would instead be more useful to understand how individual states regulate and control their 
media organisations through examining an evolution of the ‘social responsibility’ model. This social 
responsibility approach to governing journalistic media went beyond the model identified by Siebert 
et al., but encompassed a positive and performative aspect to how journalism should value itself in 
relation to the development of a society. This approach to self-governance by the media industry is 
often determined and reinforced through political speech, negotiated in public, and seeks to 
empowering media entities rather than enforce punitive laws. Understanding this model provides an 
important gateway to examining Singapore’s approach, less as punitive legalism, but as a collaborative 
approach using legal tools and social normalisation. 
This leads into the second sub-component, which is secondary research into Singapore’s history of 
media governance, detailed within two chapters. Chapter 3 is a retrospective study of the timeframes 
of media governance in Singapore, detailing the various attempts by the government to impose 
restrictive laws and regulatory regimes on media entities. This study suggests that the legal tools used 
have changed over time and bear no consistency in terms of the severity of the penalties imposed, 
despite claims of a progressively ‘lighter touch’ towards online media practitioners. Nevertheless, the 
rationalisation used to justify these incursions on media freedom has remained fairly consistent. These 
justifications tend to revolve around the need to preserve Singapore’s national sovereignty and social 
harmony, as described earlier in this chapter. I highlight that such justifications served more to affirm 
the Singapore government’s legitimacy as a benevolent state and a just lawmaker. This process of 
justification is detailed in Chapter 6, where I detail the various public narratives used throughout the 
timeframes reflected in Chapter 3. I detail a process of ‘disciplining narratives’, which I define as 
discursive practices that serve to structure social power by defining the power-relationships between 
the state, the media and Singapore society. Such narratives are not simply about the government 
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dogmatically insisting that it is right and just, but involves an extensive process of affirming state 
primacy, passing and justifying laws, and demonstrating benevolent governance. This process aligns 
closely with Foucault’s description of an integrated triangular practice of sovereignty-discipline-
government found in modern states, which he termed governmentality (Foucault, 1991). A focus on 
disciplining narratives seeks to examine the processes that enable and encourage self-governance 
within the industry and the population. Specific to Singapore, this is also the realm that contains much 
resistance and counter-narratives, which best describes the public challenges to the government’s 
attempts at regulating the media environment. 
The identification of discipling narratives, then, leads to my third and final component of research, 
which is a case study of Singapore’s Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, or 
POFMA for short, detailed in Chapter 7. In this chapter, I monitor the evolution of the public debate 
regarding POFMA through textual analysis of media articles, in an attempt to map the public discourse 
that surrounds the law. POFMA proved to be an immensely useful case study on two counts. For one, 
its occurrence during the course of this research project meant that I was able to study it in its entire 
genealogical development in real time – from the point where the law was first suggested to the 
public, to the final passing of the Act and its use against media practitioners. For another, the 
government’s decision to initiate a public consultation process provided the exact framework with 
which to examine the ‘disciplining narratives’ that contributed to the affirmation of the government’s 
legitimacy. The narrative process in this consultation exercise also served to re-surface and entrench 
the social norms and values that have been a critical component of Singapore’s media governance 
framework. POFMA’s embodiment of Foucault's concept of governmentality (Dean, 2010; Hobbs, 
2008; McHoul & Grace, 1993) through its disciplining narratives affirms the main proposition 
assembled in this thesis, which supports a holistic evaluation of media governance that goes beyond 
laws and regulations. Indeed, the case of POFMA confirms that legal instruments are but mere vehicles 
for achieving an efficacious media governance regime that is determined by state-media relationships 
of power. 
The thesis concludes with closing remarks of the use of POFMA as a law and evaluates its broader 
impact on Singapore’s media environment. My conclusion, detailed in Chapter 8, will also reflect on 
the key learning points of this research project in relation to my own perspectives about media 
governance in Singapore, and map out potential paths for future research in this specific field. In its 
totality, this thesis signals an important step forward in understanding media governance, and this 
need not be confined to what happens in Singapore. Indeed, Singapore’s implementation of POFMA 
reflects an emerging trend among governments in other parts of the world who are keen to implement 
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similar legislative tools and are equally adept at legitimising their efforts to clamp down on media 





METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND RESEARCH OUTLINE 
 
Overview – research question and the third approach 
As indicated in the introduction, the research that informs this thesis will be guided by one overarching 
research question: How does media governance in Singapore maintain its efficacy in relation to 
global expectations and the challenges of an evolving online environment? I have defined the 
parameters of the topic – such as the meaning of ‘efficacy’, ‘media governance’ and who ‘the media’ 
is – in the introductory chapter. Even so, the topic of efficacious online media governance remains 
broad and deals with various complex issues that deserve a more detailed inspection. For instance, 
the contestation between the state and media freedom advocates is not merely one of struggle and 
public debate. Instead, as I have described in the introduction, it involves a process of relationship-
building between the state and the media industry that demands the creation and affirmation of social 
norms and values that surround the media environment. These norms are not always state-dominated 
but often require active participation on the part of media practitioners and media freedom advocates 
in order to arrive at the efficacy that the Singapore government prefers. The focus of this chapter, 
then, is to provide a breakdown of the various methodologies and methods that inform the various 
chapters of this thesis. These research methodologies and methods revolve around the third approach 
identified in the introductory chapter, which I identified deviate from existing approaches: to examine 
the rationalisation of government intercession in the practice of journalistic media. Understanding 
the discursive practices that comes with this rationalisation, I argue, forms a critical component for 
evaluating the success and efficacy of media governance in Singapore. It explains why the government 
persistently keeps one step ahead of media freedom advocates and online media practitioners despite 
what appears to be ‘policy failures’ that are constantly challenged by its detractors. 
This chapter will first outline the research objectives for this thesis, which centres on providing a 
refreshed perspective of, not media governance tools in Singapore, but how such governance has 
been efficacious through Singapore’s history. In doing so, this thesis deviates from what is offered in 
current literature. As described in the introductory chapter, current research on media governance in 
Singapore tend to focus on specific pieces of legislation that target the media industry and evaluate 
these laws as an extension of state power, usually with reference to the state’s all-important ‘nation-
building’ agenda. This thesis opts to re-situate this state-centric perspective, and instead examine 
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media governance as a constructed and rationalised social reality. Consequently, this means that 
rather than examine the end-effects of laws, this thesis examines the points of public debate where 
laws are conceptualised and rationalised over the years to identify their trajectories of power. This is 
done with the view of providing a better understanding of governance processes – that is, in justifying, 
rationalising and debating on laws, regulations and policies – rather than governance tools – that is, 
the actual laws, regulations and policies that have been put in place. 
The chapter will move on to outline the methodology and methods used for this research project, 
consisting of primacy research – including expert interviews with media governance stakeholders in 
Singapore – to deepen understanding of the topic through inductive reasoning, and secondary 
research – including theoretical analysis and a case study using news articles – to broaden 
understanding for what constitutes ‘media governance’ in Singapore. The two methods that are 
critical to generating new insights on the key research question – that is, expert interviews and the 
case study on the Protection on Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) – will be explained 
in greater detail. This chapter also provides an overview of the rationale and processes involved in 
using discourse analysis as a methodological approach and how Nvivo, a qualitative analysis software, 
is used to process the data collected. It forwards the view that focusing on the discursive processes 
that inform the formation of legal structures – the effects and validity of the laws, as current research 
tends to highlight – serves to better explain the efficacy of media governance in Singapore. This 
chapter will conclude with a reflexive evaluation of my role as a researcher in the project. 
Research objectives 
The key aim of this thesis is to provide a refreshed view of media governance in Singapore so as to 
present a more holistic understanding of the various dynamics involved in governing the media 
environment, without which it would be inadequate to discuss the efficacy of directions taken by the 
Singapore government. Understanding the dynamics of media governance would provide a critical 
analysis of current efforts in media governance and offer a base upon which to project how it might 
take shape in the future. 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, research efforts on media governance in Singapore tend to 
study the issue within specific timeframes and focus on the change in governance tools within these 
periods as a reflection of change in governance approach. These views are not wrong; indeed, they 
accurately reflect a government that is adamant about maintaining political constancy and stability 
(George, 2012; Morgenbesser, 2017) and would not hesitate to change the rules as necessary, so long 
as doing so sustains this political stability. Where such analysis becomes problematic is in two aspects; 
26 
 
for one, the view that such changes as heavily dependent on environmental factors (for instance, 
media practitioners clamouring for freedom or the pressure from economic imperatives); and for 
another, the view that this change is done by the government on its own terms. Instead, this thesis 
proposes that media governance in Singapore answers to political impulses that are irrespective of 
such environmental pressures. It advances the position that media governance in Singapore is tied to 
the innate desire for establishing, not an opaque and unchallengeable legal framework for the media 
industry, but a system of compliance that grants the government legitimacy to rule. While it is right to 
claim it is the form of media governance that has changed over time, rather than its substance, there 
are still misconceptions about what this ‘substance’ really is: not autocratic control, but the 
continuous right to govern. The changes in media governance frameworks, then, are but “a play of 
specific transformations, each one different from the next (with its own conditions, rules and level of 
impact), linked together according to schemes of dependence” (Foucault, 1991, pp. 58-59) that 
continually affirm the sovereignty of the government. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to reach beyond such notions of ‘progressive’ governance for the purpose 
of complete political control. Instead, it aims to establish the significance of a continuous practice of 
governing with a consistent trajectory that requires power-negotiation, rather than a power grab. To 
achieve this aim, the rest of this thesis will seek to fulfil the following broad objectives: 
1. To provide a comprehensive and contextualised overview of media governance in 
Singapore; 
2. To examine media governance in terms of the power relations between the state and the 
media in Singapore, and within the media industry itself; and 
3. To critically evaluate the Singapore media governance model in relation to its own stated 
purpose and against standards and practices that are commensurate with a ‘global city’. 
In so doing, this thesis places Singapore’s media governance model in its theoretical space, not only 
in terms of established thought on the theories of media governance, but in practice as it relates to 
comparable models in the region. It provides a historical account of how media governance in 
Singapore has evolved over the years since its relatively short history. This historical account ranges 
from the early days of direct media repression and interventions around Singapore’s gaining 
independence from the late-1950s to mid-1960s, to the enactment of laws relating to online media in 
the 2000s. The thesis examines the effects that government incursions on the practice of journalism 
have on the media environment and media practitioners, in a bid to enlarge the critical thought that 
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has been invested in Singapore media governance, while also potentially offering a revised approach 
for studying other societies. 
Methodology 
The research design for this thesis is qualitative and presents a two-step approach towards the study 
of media governance in Singapore: investigative and projective. The first step (investigative) involves 
the assembling of information related to how the media industry and media practitioners have been 
governed and engaged by the state. From this data, the thesis seeks to identify patterns of media 
governance in Singapore and forward the proposition that it is emblematic of Foucauldian 
governmentality. The second step (projective) applies this model of governance to the current 
challenges posed by a constantly evolving online media environment and evaluates these challenges 
in relation to governance efficacy. 
The topic of media governance in Singapore currently falls short in terms of empirical data from media 
practitioners: the voice of journalists and editors from either traditional or online media have been 
mostly lacking in the analysis of media governance, which tends to focus on the actions and intentions 
of the government. Scholars such as Eddie Kuo and Peter Chen (1983), Tan Teng Lang (1990) and Ang 
Peng Hwa and Yeo Tiong Min (1998) have adequately identified Singapore’s history in terms of the 
suppression of media freedom, portrayed mainly as the government’s intervention in the industry and 
the justifications for such actions. Collectively, such studies present a progression-regression model in 
the Singapore government’s attitude towards the evolving media industry – more liberalisation of the 
media industry is seen as the government taking a more progressive stance towards media freedom, 
while more regulation is deemed to have the opposite effect. 
Such views are not wrong – in fact, these are commendable and accurate accounts of Singapore’s 
history in media governance – but tend to be reflective more than analytical. That is, they reflect what 
has occurred and usually highlight the government’s stated justification for imposing such governance 
paradigms. They also tend to reflect two principles prevalent in traditional press theories (Siebert et 
al., 1956) – the state and the industry as two actors at opposite ends of a spectrum, and the industry 
having varying degrees of power as granted by the state. They do not account for the economic and 
ideological factors at play within the media industry, such as those that relate to the media industry’s 
financial sustainability and their desire to be perceived by their audience-public in certain ways. 
This shortage in perspectives from media practitioners has been addressed to some extent by writers 
like Cherian George (2012), Chong Yip Seng (2013) and P.N. Balji (2019), former journalists who bear 
testimony to the challenges faced by media practitioners and their reactions to government 
28 
 
restrictions, be it directly or indirectly. Even so, such reactions tend to be portrayed as either a 
necessary survival strategy by the industry in prevailing against political censorship, or as blissful 
ignorance, particularly among the rank and file in the industry, towards dormant oppression from the 
state. Moreover, these perspectives not necessarily identify the dynamics within the media 
environment – that is, how economic, technological and ideological factors within the media industry 
interplay to affect its behaviour. As can be seen in the writings of George (2012) and Cheong (2013), 
we see change within the media industry (or lack of it) being driven by technology, economics and 
ideologies surrounding Singapore media and public expectations. However, these positions seldom 
examine any active role that the media industry might play in the suppression of their own freedoms 
– or for that matter, in exercising their limited freedom – which informs and further entrenches the 
media’s position in politics and public perception. 
This thesis is in part an extension of existing studies of the media in Singapore, proposing that an 
understanding of agency provides for a refreshed perspective of the discursive practices that surround 
media governance. Doing so goes beyond examining the media in terms of “their relations with power 
in society (dependent or oppositional)” but also invites considerations about “their degree of 
participation as actors in political and social events” (Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & 
White, 2009, p. 32). A clearer understanding of how media practitioners exercise freedom in their own 
governance would disrupt current perceptions of progression or regression that currently occupies 
the views of stakeholders and lend a more holistic evaluation of the topic at hand. The application of 
Foucauldian governmentality – in particular, the role of discursive practices in the formation of 
structures of power – to media governance is relatively uncharted. For that reason, this thesis seeks 
to examine the topic through inductive reasoning, whereby historical evidence will be collated as data 
and a “binding principle” based on identified “patterns, consistencies and meanings” will be drawn 
(Gray, 2014, pp. 17-18). Indeed, a historical analysis of media governance demonstrates that 
governmentality is by far more applicable as an overarching mindset that the Singapore government 
has towards the media, compared to the “powerful effects paradigm” proposed by Ang and Yeo 
(1998). This is not to say that the paradigm does not exist. Rather, reframing media governance in 
governmentality would suggest that the powerful effects paradigm forms part of the discursive 
practices, rather than the key rationale, that underlie and legitimises the Singapore government’s 
approach towards media governance. There still remains a need to explore how the Singapore 
government “mark(s) out new boundaries for socio-political discourses” and extends this to 
encompass online media (T. Lee, 2014, p. 40), as much as there is a need to examine the response 
from both traditional and online media to these boundaries. 
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To achieve this extension on current media studies about Singapore and explore the development of 
media governance techniques, this thesis will use a triangulation of methods, consisting of primary 
research to increase the depth of understanding on the topic, and secondary research to achieve two 
outcomes: provide a broad base for understanding the topic of media governance, and specific textual 
analysis to unpack the specific techniques of media governance used in Singapore. Collectively, this 
combined approach maps out a refreshed understanding of media governance in Singapore, provide 
a more holistic basis to critique its efficacy, and produce a clearer understanding of how media 
governance is realised in Singapore, which can be used for future policy formulation or research 
purposes. 
Primary research 
Primary research consists of a phenomenological approach through in-depth interviews, in a bid to 
understand the perspectives of stakeholders in Singapore’s media environment through their 
opinions, lived experiences and analysis of media governance in Singapore. These interviews seek to 
evaluate their sentiments and assist with ascertaining ground perceptions about media governance. 
As pointed out by O’Leary (2014), a phenomenological approach allows the drawing out of lived 
experiences that are meant to be descriptions of a particular situation. These descriptions provide the 
opportunity to synthesis the various views and form a coherent image of where the direction of media 
governance in Singapore is heading based on an “internal logic of the subject” (Gray, 2014, p. 24). In 
addition, interviews “can be used to confirm information from other sources, to obtain new 
information in relation to the values and beliefs of a set of people, and to help reconstruct events by 
gaining insights into processes and deliberations” (Fitch, 2015, p. 136), thus enhancing the quality of 
the topic being researched. 
Primary sources consist of 15 individuals who participated in one-on-one interviews and are 
categorised into five stakeholder groups. These groups were identified and selected for their unique 
contributions to the field of media governance. A deliberate choice was made not to focus exclusively 
on either media practitioners or government officials, the two groups often portrayed in public 
discourse as key figures in the negotiation of media regulation and laws. Instead, the decision to cast 
the net wider to consider the views of experts in other related fields is to tap on their “contextual 
knowledge” and as “complementary source of information about the target group that is the actual 
subject” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 46). The five identified stakeholder groups consist of: 
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1. The Singapore government – This group has ownership of policy directions and executor of 
various media regulations. Government officials can offer insights on the rationale and intent 
of policy decisions, which might not be expressed in the public domain. 
2. Media practitioners – This group is affected most directly by government laws and regulatory 
frameworks. Beyond understanding their perception on media laws, policy and regulations, 
this group provides a clearer understanding of the industry’s response to such regulations. 
3. Legal professionals – This group consists of a selection of those who have assisted media 
practitioners in their legal battles, as well as legal academics versed in media and 
Constitutional law. As media governance has traditionally revolved around laws, legal 
professionals at the forefront of interpreting such laws provides valuable inputs on their 
broader social impact. 
4. Media freedom activists – This group is most familiar with activities that champion media 
freedom and are often the most vocal when new laws seeking to govern the media industry 
are passed. They also possess depth of understanding of government policies as they evolve 
over time and provide varied perspectives on the issue of censorship. 
5. Academics in the field of media research – This group provides depth of analysis based on 
their expertise and longer tenure in the field of study. While many of their works can be found 
in published literature, they offer valuable insights to more recent developments relating to 
media governance in Singapore, which informs their previous or existing views on the topic. 
Secondary research 
Secondary research consists of the theoretical exploration of media governance models, and a 
practical assessment of the situation in Singapore using a collection of historical documents and public 
narratives. These public texts serve to “reveal the interests and intentions of their authors or in other 
ways uncover facts about the policy process” (Karppinen & Moe, 2019, p. 251). While it is entirely 
possible to deduce a ‘Singapore media governance model’ using, say, traditional theories of the press, 
that is not the fundamental purpose of this thesis. The theories are referenced in Chapter 4 as part of 
a broad study of possible models, but are not meant to serve as some form of “predetermined theme 
or theory” (O'Leary, 2014, p. 305). Indeed, as the analysis of the Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand 
models proves, it is near impossible to peg their media governance models to any one theoretical 
model, beyond all of them having some semblance of social responsibility factored into their usage of 
industry self-governance. The exact mechanisms, as this thesis demonstrates, are more representative 
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of adaptations unique to each society, from which certain best practices can be identified, which differ 
in the various power positions and narratives deployed by the state and the local media industries. 
Secondary sources include published books, journals, papers, speeches and news articles and 
clippings. This thesis includes media theories from the 1950s, Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
which was published in the late 1980s, and concepts relating to discourse analysis. Specific to the topic 
of this thesis on Singapore’s media governance, ministerial speeches made at public and press club 
events, journal articles and books written about the Singapore media environment, and news articles 
that cover media regulatory measures imposed by the government will be used. The time period for 
this material will range between the mid-1960s, signalling the nation’s early independence, to 2019 
during the discourse surrounding POFMA. The identification of dates is not meant to draw historical 
parallels between theory and experience or to chart a ‘progress model’ to represent Singapore’s 
efforts in media governance, but rather to study the topic as comprehensively as possible. This 
material provides for a historical grounding and establish a base from which to study the topic at hand, 
whereby monitoring the progress of media governance as it evolves through the years will allow us to 
better chart the trajectory for governing the online environment. An accurate, theoretically relevant 
and contextualised account of this evolution serves to anchor this research effort, not as some form 
of ‘established lore’ of media governance in Singapore, but as a representation of “the emergence of 
different interpretations” as they “appear as events on the stage of historical process” (Foucault, 1977, 
p. 152). 
The research conducted, as outlined above, serves to inform the key content of the thesis, which will 
be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapters. These chapters are: 
• Singapore’s history of media governance (Chapter 3) – A historical analysis to provide an 
accurate and holistic overview of media governance in Singapore’s brief history. This chapter 
charts the development of media governance approaches from 1965 after Singapore gained 
independence as a nation, to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) passed in 1974, 
and the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) passed in 2019. 
• Media governance frameworks – in theory and practice (Chapter 4) – An analysis of several 
key models used to describe media governance. This broad-ranging analysis includes a critique 
of the Four Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) and the views of 
those who have challenged the model. Examples of media governance frameworks used by 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand are included to explain the practical applications of 
these concepts. These three states have been selected for their geographical proximity to 
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Singapore, similarities in population size or economic structure, or cultural lineage. They have 
also been publicly cited by the Singapore government as models they have taken note of in 
crafting its media regulations (Leonard Lim, 2013). 
• Stakeholder insights (Chapter 5) – An analysis of the interviews conducted from July to 
December 2018 with key stakeholder groups, identified above, based in Singapore. The 
chapter draws extensively from their views to provide a consolidated analysis of their shared 
perceptions of Singapore’s media environment and POFMA, which was eventually passed in 
2019 following a lengthy public consultation process. 
• Discursive practices, disciplining narratives (Chapter 6) – An extension of the historical 
research in Chapter 3, but with specific reference to public statements of political leaders and 
a focus on unpacking the narratives that dominate public discussions on the conduct of the 
media industry. This chapter presents an analysis that focuses specifically on narratives used 
to affirm governmentality, which complements and at times exceed the importance of legal 
instruments used on media practitioners. 
• Genealogy of a law – narrating POFMA into being (Chapter 7) – This case study uses an 
evidence-based approach to examine current state-led efforts to govern online media, in the 
context of the governmentality proposition developed in the preceding chapters. Research on 
this case study focuses on textual analysis of newspaper articles that covered the debate and 
the passing of POFMA into law in 2019. 
As the one-on-one interviews and the case study on POFMA deal with new analysis of material 
previously not published, the following sections of this chapter are dedicated specifically to explaining 
how this research was conducted and the methods used to analyse the data collected. 
Expert interviews – invitation, process and analysis 
The ‘expert interview’ was chosen as a research method because the precise mechanisms of media 
governance is specialised knowledge that resides with individuals who are involved or invested in the 
governance process (Van Audenhove & Donders, 2019). They are therefore experts in their respective 
fields with a nuanced understanding of media governance. Interviews allow the interviewer to build 
trust with interviewees, probe deeper into specific items, seek clarification on issues, and encourage 
the interviewee to share such knowledge and insights, which provide for a higher quality of responses. 
It should be noted that while the approach established for this research project is centred on expert 
interviews, elements of what is often referred to as ‘elite interviews’ were also included in the 
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formulation of the interview process. This is because a number of my identified interviewees are, or 
were, directors, managing partners or CEOs of their own businesses, or consultants for other 
businesses. Three of them were former Members of Parliament, and together with the senior editors, 
it is safe to assume that they continue to move in social circles that are close to the political elite. 
These interviewees offer “perspectives and behaviours of leaders in business, politics and society” 
(Harvey, 2011, p. 432) given their “access to high levels of information” (Van Audenhove & Donders, 
2019, p. 180). Such views are critical to a better understanding of the motivations and responses to 
media governance, especially views that are not usually offered in public discourse. 
A total of 26 potential interviewees were identified and invited to participate via email to first 
introduce them to the research topic. All invitation letters, information sheets, consent forms and the 
procedure for soliciting interviewees were approved by Murdoch University’s ethics committee prior 
to the commencement of the interviews (ethics approval number 2018/033). Consent was sought for 
attribution and any wish for anonymity was recorded. Any content that could potentially identify 
interviewees who wished to remain anonymous was removed from the interview transcripts. Once 
interviewees agree to the interview and gave their consent, individual sessions were scheduled at the 
interviewees’ convenience. These interviews occurred mostly at their office or a public place of easy 
access, as the interviewees preferred. A voice recorder was used to maintain accuracy in transcripts, 
again with the consent of the interviewees. 
The interviews were conducted with mainly open-ended questions in a semi-structured interview 
format, as it is an interview style preferred by expert interviewees that lets them “explain and argue 
their answers, which often provides valuable additional information” (Van Audenhove & Donders, 
2019, p. 188). Using open-ended questions allowed the interviewees to present their own 
understanding, better define the validity of the topic under study, and “bring the qualitative aspect 
into the study, as well as to generate ideas and opinions” (Habib, Pathik, & Maryam, 2014, p. 18). 
Given that some of my interviewees are business leaders and consultants and have busy schedules, 
the semi-structured was useful in obtaining “focused responses in a short time frame” (Harvey, 2011, 
p. 434). Moreover, given the varying understandings of the different terms of reference identified for 
this thesis, semi-structured interviews allowed interviewees “latitude to articulate fully their 
responses”, since the “advantages of conversational flow and depth of response outweigh the 
disadvantages of inconsistent ordering” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). 
There is also a need to account for potential biases among interviewees that held elite status. In her 
evaluation of the history of public relations in Australia and her experience with elite interviewees, 
Fitch (2015) noted that professionals in their field, particularly if they were regarded as pivotal to the 
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documented experience in their respective fields, would tend to present a dominant narrative that 
can potentially focus too much on personal achievements and skew actual findings. This was of 
notable concern for the interviewees selected for this research effort, as many of them have vast 
experience in the fields of journalism, law and advocacy, and were more assertive during specific 
points of discussion that they felt strongly about. Fitch recommended that this can be mitigated by 
understanding “the significance of narrative accounts and the retrospective ordering of experiences 
and information” (p. 136) and to adopt “a critical stance and authorial reflexivity” (p. 141). The issue 
of strong personal narrative accounts was addressed during the interview process by using interview 
questions that focused on the issues involved in media governance rather than seek personal opinions. 
Even so, there were instances when the interviews deviated into reflections and memory. Rather than 
avoid or downplay them, these views were contextualised in terms of the specific topic being 
discussed during the interviews. The final attempt to balance these diverse and personal perspectives 
was conducted in the analysis stage of the interviews, where the differing perspectives on the issue 
of media governance were evaluated against each other to account for their subjectivity.  
Interview transcripts were sent to interviewees for verification and an opportunity to make any 
changes before data analysis. Qualitative analysis was used to study the interview transcripts. The 
qualitative approach was chosen given the degree of subjectivity in the topic – for instance, what 
constitutes ‘efficacy in media governance’ and how this can be measured, or how ‘online media’ was 
understood and defined. Such qualitative differences are even more pertinent given the diverse 
backgrounds between stakeholder groups. A qualitative study that focuses on examining nuance and 
context provides an opportunity to consider such diverse views, and aids in ascertaining similarities 
among differences. The interview transcripts have been included in this thesis as appendices (A to O) 
to serve as complete reference, given that the views of my interviewees have been important in 
informing my analysis. 
Expert interviews – limitations, issues and biases 
There are three limitations identified for the interviews that are specific to the topic at hand and 
attempts to mitigate them were as follows: 
1. Reluctance of government officials to be interviewed – In the Singapore context, this 
group also tends to be most reluctant to accept interviews on sensitive policy issues. 
Consequently, none of the identified individuals acceded to the interview request. With 
few alternatives for government officials to select as interviewees, representation of 
government officials was supplemented with publicly published government statements. 
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While not ideal, it is the next-best solution. In addition, three interviewees have served as 
Nominated Members of Parliament, and were able to offer insights on the parliamentary 
processes and thinking behind the passing of laws. 
2. Desire for anonymity – A number of interviewees preferred to remain anonymous. This 
was not unexpected, since aversion among Singaporeans towards topics that are related 
to government policy invariably increases the level of self-consciousness. As such, all 
interviews were conducted with the full understanding that interviewees have an option 
to keep their identities private for either the whole interview or parts of it where they 
deem it necessary to be anonymous. This gave them full liberty to participate in the study 
with their honest assessment and opinions, and to provide relevant and critical insights. 
3. Difficulties in coding – There were varying opinions on, and even definitions of, the key 
terms for this thesis. Lawyers, for instance, had different definitions of what constitutes 
‘media regulation’ compared to activists, who are more than likely to take a broader 
definition to include non-legal aspects of media policy. There would also be differences 
between what media practitioners perceive as the ‘online media environment’. In such 
instances, interviewees were given the opportunity to define their understanding of the 
research topic. This allows for a more nuanced understanding on the effects of media 
governance on the media industry. 
Of particular concern was the first limitation, where government officials, and even members of 
academia in Singapore, could be cautious about going on the record for the study, preferring to follow 
safe boundaries on what is and is not permissible in political dialogue. This insight is also gleaned partly 
from my personal working experience, having served as an online journalist for two years and more 
than ten years in the corporate communication outfits of various government departments. Singapore 
government officials tend to be wary of one-on-one interviews, preferring instead to defer to official 
statements. When they do accede to interviews, they often do so after a careful study of the interview 
questions to ensure that they do not ‘trip them up’. Academics are cautious about offering views, as 
they are uneasy about how their public statements will affect their career prospects. 
Given these concerns about the nature of the study and the specific statements they would be 
committed to put on the record, the interview questions were crafted as neutral as possible, to allow 
the interviewee to state and elaborate on their own perception of the issues highlighted in the 
questions and respond in a way that they feel is the least intimidating. However, as there is also a 
need to maintain a certain level of consistency between interviewees for the purpose of data 
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collection and analysis, the interview was designed with a series of follow-up questions to ensure that 
the interviews stayed focused on the topics at hand. 
Case study on POFMA – data collection 
The case study on the ‘fake news’ law in Singapore was used as a means of demonstrating and 
providing depth of understanding (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of the phenomenon underscoring the main 
theoretical concept of this thesis. While there are notable concerns about the generalisability of case 
studies, it is a method that is better suited for examining realities that are socially constructed (Noor, 
2008) – such as those found in the study of governmentality – compared to broad-based quantitative 
surveys. Moreover, this case study captures “the emergent and immanent properties of life in 
organizations and the ebb and flow of organizational activity, especially where it is changing very fast” 
(Noor, 2008, p. 1603). In particular, the use of narratives such as ‘the scourge of fake news’ and ‘clear 
and present danger’ strongly suggest the practice of ‘disciplining narratives’ – a concept to be 
described briefly later, and in full in Chapter 6 – as a concerted part of governmentality, over and 
above the use of legislative measures as a means of social control. 
It is worth highlighting the sampling methods used for the collection of news articles related to public 
narratives on POFMA, as this on its own constitutes data collection done over a duration of more than 
a year since the start of this research effort. The sampling strategy for collecting news coverage that 
relate to ‘fake news’ was guided by an interest in the discursive practices found in the POFMA debate 
as a qualitative study, rather than an interest to study the process quantitatively based on calculating 
the number or articles as an indicator of the influence of such news coverage. The data collected for 
this project, totalling 972 media articles, does not aim to be comprehensive or generalisable, but to 
be purposive in terms of having “thought through issues of how typical are they, what connects them, 
what divides them” (Rapley, 2014, p. 9) where “exploring the phenomenon is key” (p. 13). This focused 
approach is guided by the view that “a representative sample does not automatically lead to 
generalizable findings” given the possibility of “potential ‘measurement errors’” that are “connected 
to a wide array of practical problems” (Rapley, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, any sampling, large or small, 
would introduce some degree of bias due to differing selection criteria that need not be representative 
of the population (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). On the other hand, purposive sampling – selecting 
samples based on characteristics of a population and the objective of the study – would be more useful 
given that it can contribute to “the inferential process by enabling researchers to choose the most 
appropriate cases for a given research strategy” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 295-296). Therefore, 
a smaller sample size selected with the purpose and scope of the research in mind can better 
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accommodate a focused representation of the total population and allow the researcher to account 
for variables in the topic of research. 
For the specific interest of studying the media discourse on POFMA as a representation of media 
governance in Singapore, data collection and coding uses purposive sampling, which adheres to the 
following criteria: 
• Temporally limited to the duration between the announcement of the pronouncement of 
possible ‘fake news’ legislation in April 2017 to the actual passing of POFMA in May 2019; 
• Includes news announcements related to both the law itself and identification of specific 
incidents of ‘fake news’, but excludes passing mentions of ‘fake news’ or instances where the 
term was mentioned in news articles that have little relation to the topic of study; 
• Includes news reports, opinion pieces and speeches in both online media and online versions 
traditional media – that is, material published in publicly accessible media, with the intention 
of analysing the role the media plays in the formulation of public discourse on the case study. 
It should be highlighted that using online versions of newspapers is a necessity (I was not 
based in Singapore in the duration of data collection to have full access to printed 
newspapers), but in no way a limitation since there is a high degree of duplication between 
the print and online versions of traditional media publications, with very few exceptions; and 
• Minimises duplication by excluding repeated articles, such as near-similar replications of news 
reports between two sister newspapers often filed by the same journalists. 
Details about the samples and the specific results drawn for the case study will be dealt with in greater 
detail in Chapter 7, but it is useful to point out that the news articles were grouped according to their 
publishing dates, which allowed for analysis to be made regarding the different narratives used in 
different stages of the policy-making process. This approach would be in line with that outlined by 
Seawright and Gerring (2008) to allow for the charting of relationships between differing points in a 
fixed set of data, by drawing on typical and diverse samples. In the case of POFMA, the development 
of public narratives demonstrated significant shifts in the way the topic has been presented to the 
public, with emphasis on specific aspects of the legislative initiative changing over time. This approach 
to studying the data was made possible using qualitative analysis software, Nvivo. 
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Case study of POFMA – using Nvivo and qualitative data analysis 
In its most basic form, Nvivo is a software that allows the collection and coding of textual data for the 
purpose of qualitative analysis, using parameters designed by the researcher to code the textual data 
loaded into the software database. Nvivo works well as a tool to organise and analyse information 
from large numbers of interviews, but can be used for any other type of textual and non-textual 
information (Mortelmans, 2019) – in the case of my thesis, articles extracted from online news 
platforms. The interface allows the researcher to highlight parts of textual content and attribute it to 
a specific category of information, which Nvivo designates as ‘nodes’ – for instance, where a specific 
statement made by a news-maker has been used to defend the need for tough laws against online 
disinformation (see Figure 2.1 for a sample of this coding process). Such coding of data requires 
subjective input from the researcher, who has to define the values to which this data should be 
attributed to. Each piece of data can also be attributed to more than one code. The benefit of using 
Nvivo is that such coded data remains in the context of the raw data, which reduces the risk of the 
researcher being distanced from the data-set by focusing exclusively on the coded data (Mortelmans, 
2019). This is important for the qualitative approach used for this research project, as it permits 
analysis to consider the broader context of the data – for instance, whether the raw statement made 
in support of having ‘fake news’ laws was actually made as a precursor to support for alternative 
solutions such as public education. 




Once coded, the database offers various possibilities of analysing the data. For instance, the frequency 
at which certain statements or words appear can provide a useful starting point for how much 
emphasis news outlets put into describing a topic. This permits some rudimentary analysis about how 
certain statements made in media articles might command greater attention among audiences. Such 
occurrences of frequency can be represented in word clouds, generated by Nvivo (see Figure 2.2 for a 
sample of coded data that has been converted for visual representation). For this research effort, the 
word clouds generated of the entire dataset had been instrumental in providing an initial guide for 
selective coding. In their raw open coding form, these word clouds also provided insights on how 
certain words or phrases have been used to defend or reject the use of ‘fake news’ laws by different 
stakeholders involved in the debate. Collectively, such knowledge extracted from Nvivo was used to 
inductively formulate the focus areas for the study on mediated discourse about POFMA through 
“developing a matrix of cases and recurrent concepts or themes” (Herzog, Handke, & Hitters, 2019). 
Figure 2.2: Using Nvivo to generate word clouds of coded data to provide insights on how the media 
values certain statements and ideas over others 
 
The coded information in Nvivo can also be used as a base for analysis on how selectively coded 
statements relate to each other. For instance, I was able to generate comparison diagrams on how 
frequently justifications for laws against ‘fake news’ appear in the same news article as the perceived 
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threat of disinformation (see Figure 2.3 for a sample comparison diagram). Such information provides 
a point of analysis for how public discourse has been structured by news media outlets to represent 
the topic of online ‘fake news’ and offer insights on how public narratives have been skewed to justify 
the importance of government laws and policies to tackle the perceived problem. 
Figure 2.3: Comparison diagram showing relationship between media mentions of the importance of 
‘fake news’ laws and mentions of the dangers of ‘fake news’ 
 
The use of Nvivo for this research effort is detailed in Chapter 7 where I study the public narratives 
surrounding POFMA as a genealogical process. At this juncture, it is worth noting that the use of Nvivo 
as a software to aid in analysing news articles is led by inductive reasoning using observable patterns 
drawn from open coded data. This inductive reasoning informed the framework of data analysis that 
was incorporated into the selective coding of the data, which is determined by my subjective 
interpretation of the text found within each news article of the dataset and provided for a more 
detailed and refined analysis of the POFMA topic. The output of the analysis presented in Chapter 7, 
then, is to “give space to the voices of others to allow for the material to speak for itself” (May & Perry, 
2014, p. 13), such that my personal interpretation is based as much as possible on an accurate analysis 
of the data under study. 
Using discourse analysis for ‘disciplining narratives’ 
A specific part of this research effort that should be highlighted is Chapter 6 on ‘disciplining narratives’. 
As an extension of Foucault’s concept of governmentality into media discourse, the study of public 
narratives surrounding the media industry and the use of media presents an important aspect in fully 
understanding how governance is conducted in Singapore. Beyond a semiotic analysis on specific 
words used in public discussions, it would be just as pertinent to examine the statements used in 
arguing for or against media regulation and laws. Collectively, these statements become the defining 
points of media policy and serve to help the government achieve its positioning in public debates 
about how the media should be governed. 
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A study of such media statements needs to be informed by an approach in examining media discourse. 
Fairclough’s work on critical discourse analysis, and in particular to media discourses, points out a 
need to distinguish between separate orders of public narratives which collectively form a “societal 
order of discourse” (Fairclough, 1998, p. 145). But beyond looking at the technical aspects of discursive 
practices, Fairclough suggested for discourse analysis to examine the “potential protagonists and 
antagonists in struggles for hegemony in the media, or potentially in alliances and accommodations” 
(1998, p. 148). In relation to this thesis, Fairclough’s work signals the potency of legitimising media 
discourses that involves the interplay of legal and common-sense narratives, as much as the media 
practitioner’s management of the issue under study. Similarly, van Dijk opined that the media’s role 
in “remembering, storytelling and editorializing” leads to the “activation of past models, whereas 
intentions, plans, threats and announcements involve models about future events and actions” (van 
Dijk, 1998, p. 27). This process leads to the formation of a certain internal logic to public discourse 
that establishes ‘us versus them’ positions on social issues, such that “ideologies are formed and 
changed through the everyday interaction and discourse of members in societal contexts of group 
relations and institutions like the press” (1998, pp. 22-23). This relationship between the government 
as primary news-makers, the media and their intended audiences have been fairly instructive, and the 
concepts provided by Fairclough and van Dijk will form the base from which to evaluate media 
discourses on media in Singapore. These relationships will be explored further in later chapters of this 
thesis, particularly when discussing the concept of ‘discipling narrative’, but at this point it would 
suffice to identify some of the common practices used to establish such social positions in media 
discourse, particularly by researchers who have applied these concepts to their research. 
The use of public statements and discussion over time invariably have the effect of forming certain 
perceptions and opinions about an issue, and for the purposes of this research effort, this can be taken 
to include mediated discourse about the media. In citing Foucauldian principles, Fischer noted that 
discursive practices represent “the widely held and oft-repeated interpretations of social conduct that 
produce and affirm behaviours” (Fischer, 2003, p. 73). He pointed out that over time, such 
interpretations “become unreflectively taken for granted; they are scarcely noted by the actors who 
employ them. As generally accepted presuppositions, they become embedded in the institutional 
deliberations and practices that produce and govern basic societal relations” (Fischer, 2003, pp. 73-
74). Hence, more than decide meaning structures that guide and determine policy issues, discursive 
practices also serve to include and exclude what kinds of discourses enter a debate. This practice is 
observable in the debate on media governance in Singapore, particularly on the issue of POFMA but 
just as broadly applied to attempts to limit and define what concepts like ‘freedom of expression’ 
means for Singapore (Seah, 2018). Political discourse serves to inform policy debate, creating and 
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maintaining a logical narrative that sustains and reinforces a dominant policy position, or in Fischer’s 
terms, “discourse in politics is thus not only an activity in a power struggle, but also a stake in it as 
well” (2003, p. 76). 
The exact mechanics of how this is done can be realised in the creation of policy frames. The policy 
frame used to define the issue of media governance serves to draw the lines in the debate around 
media governance issues. Barbieri, in his study of the debate that surrounds cultural policy in 
Catalonia, notes that policy frames serve to apply “an organizational principle that transforms 
fragmented information into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is 
implicitly or explicitly included” (2015, p. 435). The act of framing a policy issue – that is, to present it 
in a particular way to the intended recipients as a means of structuring discussion and the provision 
of a solution – results in the legitimisation of a certain way to approaching the policy problem. In the 
context of implementing media laws, regulations and policy in Singapore, it is possible to see policy 
framing in action, particularly in the analysis of the publicised text in news discourse and political 
speeches. For instance, when it comes to defining the permissible actions of media practitioners, the 
Singapore example demonstrates “clarification and reinforcement of a policy frame” that takes place 
“through the identification and elevation of values or beliefs” (Barbieri, 2015, p. 444). 
Nevertheless, Barbieri also notes that “the difficulty of a policy discourse in legitimizing government 
action on culture is conditioned by interaction (and conflict) with alternative discourses” (2015, p. 
441). In governmentality terms, this suggests that the efficacy of media governance in Singapore 
necessitates the inclusion of contrarian voices. Rather than undo the process of building a consensus 
through hegemony, such inclusion seeks to legitimise the government’s position precisely by 
incorporating alternative discussions that are, nevertheless, still confined within the terms of 
engagement of a policy frame. This has been adequately represented in the discussion on POFMA, 
where a public consultation was called to bring the issue into the public domain, rather than restrict 
it in the political domain. Even so, it should be acknowledged that this consultation was limited to the 
terms of reference outlined in a government Green Paper, which sets to frame the issue for public 
consultation. This issue will be examined in greater detailed in Chapter 7 on the case study of POFMA. 
For the moment, it would suffice to say that all media policy and regulation changes in Singapore have 
been framed by a particular narrative that seeks to advance and legitimise a specific political position, 
mostly centred on national security and racial harmony, at times with the use of public consultation. 
The inclusion of alternative voices in the debate process, however, is not without its risks, and 
efficacious governance is also about managing the policy discussion to maximise the odds of success 
of a policy direction. McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell & Hathaway used the example of a policy debate on 
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environmental issues to provide a detailed perspective on the specifics of winning and losing 
narratives, whereby “winning groups try to restrict participation (issue containment) in a policy issue 
by limiting the scope of the conflict whereas losing groups try to widen participation (issue expansion) 
in a policy issue” (2007, p. 89). McBeth et al. also demonstrated how even when winning and losing 
positions of government and lobby groups switch during a debate, the strategies used to enhance 
these positions of winners and losers tend to remain stable. 
It is then pertinent to see how this winner-loser model in policy debates applies to the Singapore 
debate on media freedoms in general and the POFMA debate in specific, which will be dealt with in 
subsequent chapters. For now, it should be noted that the policy position has not changed – the 
Singapore government has always maintained the winning side, with activists and online media 
practitioners typically on the losing end. This has been a historic occurrence, but understanding it from 
a policy framing perspective suggests that there is a better way to appreciate how media 
governmentality works in Singapore: the government has been successful thus far in implementing 
media regulations and laws chiefly because it has not excluded alternative discussion, but by staking 
its claims in the ‘winner’s circle’ and structuring dissent around a framework that aligns firmly with its 
own policy narrative, a process that is enabling as much as it is restricting. 
Research reflexivity 
It should be mentioned that I have been privileged to be involved in many aspects of government 
communications, journalistic and media activism work, which grants me much insight into my topic of 
study, as well as a greater degree of familiarity and personal rapport with the interviewees identified. 
That said, such advantages also come with a risk of potential bias on my part – in particular, my 
partiality towards media rights and freedom – during the interviewing process and the data analysis 
phase of my research. As such, there is a need to address the issue of reflexivity, or the “turning back 
on oneself in order that processes of knowledge production become the subject of investigation” (May 
& Perry, 2014, p. 2). This is not to say that my research should be devoid of personal biases. Rather, it 
would be more realistic to incorporate such biases in research since “there is no view we can derive 
that is free from social position given our participation in the social world” (May & Perry, 2014, p. 2). 
Indeed, it would be more meaningful to “take our participation as a good starting point and learn from 
mediating between different cultures of inquiry” (May & Perry, 2014, p. 2). 
A more holistic approach would be for researchers not to focus on endogenous reflexivity – “how we 
think and act in our social and cultural milieus” – but also to incorporate referential reflexivity – which 
seeks to “render events, conditions and experiences intelligible via a meeting of points of view”(May 
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& Perry, 2014, p. 5). Consequently, the use of in-depth interviews, detailed in Chapter 5, had been an 
integral part of this meeting of views. In choosing a broad spectrum of stakeholders, I was able to 
incorporate a diverse range of perspectives on the issue of media governance in Singapore. The 
perspectives from my interviewees challenged my own perspectives on media freedom and helped to 
build the basic understanding of how media governance works. Nevertheless, it should be assumed 
that they have their own unique perspectives and need not offer insights that are more objective than 
my own (Fitch, 2015). Hence, it is more prudent to view the interviews as an exercise in managing 
reflexivity, with the view of creating a collaborative process of knowledge sharing and synergy on the 
topic under research. 
The use of news articles on POFMA helped to increase the range of perspectives on the law, 
particularly since they were drawn from a wide variety of sources from both independent online media 
and traditional media. More specifically, it was the continual process of collecting, categorising and 
analysing the data that allowed for “the repeated reading of the data in an active way searching for 
meanings and patterns”, which allowed me to incorporate my “values, interests, and growing insights 
about the research topic” (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 5). The use of Nvivo software to 
generate themes and guide the parameters of the case study also helped to confirm that the 
“interpretations and findings are clearly derived from the data” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 3) and reduced 
the subjectivity for my conclusions and interpretations. The topic of reflexivity will be revisited in the 
concluding chapter of my thesis, where I take stock of the effect my personal and former-professional 
perspectives will generally have on the research effort, my learning process and the future directions 





SINGAPORE’S HISTORY OF MEDIA GOVERNANCE 
 
Overview 
International evaluations of Singapore’s media environment tend to revolve around government 
incursions into the journalistic media industry. These evaluations tend to focus on the legal restraints 
placed by the government on individual media practitioners through defamation suits, as much as 
broader regulations and policies that have an impeded journalistic work. Reporters Without Borders, 
for instance, has consistently ranked Singapore around 150 out of 180 countries since 2013, citing 
cases where the government attempted to force journalists to reveal their sources (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2002), sued local bloggers and international publications alike for defamation (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2006, 2014), and implementing laws that attempt to clamp down on freedom of 
expression (Reporters Without Borders, 2013, 2019). Similarly, Human Rights Watch cited as 
problematic the Singapore government’s treatment of media practitioners and activists. Cases cited 
include the haranguing of freelance journalist Kirsten Han and historian Thum Ping Tjin during the 
parliamentary hearings for the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods and the subsequent 
denial of their business registration to run current affairs website New Naratif, as well as charging two 
activists with scandalising the judiciary for posts they made on social media (Human Rights Watch, 
2019). The rights group also raised concerns with specific laws, such as those for contempt of court 
and enforcing public order, that it felt were excessive, damaging towards freedom of expression and 
hindered the ability of journalists to fulfil their social role (Human Rights Watch, 2016, 2018). Such 
instances tend to portray Singapore as a hotbed of media repression, where the government is 
accused of taking an uncompromising stance towards media practitioners, thereby preventing the 
development of a media industry that aids in ensuring public accountability. 
While international rights groups tend to focus on instances of state action against independent online 
media, mainstream media also have their run-ins with the Singapore government, albeit in different 
ways that are less draconian. Instances of the government’s direct intervention in newsrooms of 
traditional media are better documented by former journalists and editors, although the number of 
such exposés are few. These accounts of state intervention also vary between editorial coercion and 
indirect control via financial influence. Cheong Yip Seng, former chief editor of the national broadsheet 
The Straits Times, gave accounts of the government’s perplexing demands whenever coverage fell 
46 
 
outside of what he termed “OB markers” – the vague and unspoken rules of engagement that restrict 
journalists when reporting on the government (Cheong, 2013). PN Balji, former chief editor of The 
New Paper and TODAY, recounted instances where journalists accused of practicing “Western style 
journalism” were deemed too confrontational towards the government and were fired or redeployed 
(Balji, 2019). A Wikileaks document published in 2011 revealed that two news workers from The Straits 
Times told United States diplomats that the Singapore government would “‘routinely call editors’ to 
ensure that media coverage of an issue ‘comes out the way they want it’”, and that the editors of the 
newspaper were “vetted to ensure their ‘pro-government leanings’” (L. Low, 2011). On the other 
hand, media academic and former mainstream media journalist Cherian George recounted that the 
government had its way of getting newspapers to toe the government’s line without using force of 
the law, but through self-censorship and “calibrated coercion” (George, 2012). 
The government’s response to foreign publications based in Singapore that were deemed to have 
gone rogue adds another layer of complexity to the charge of ‘state repression of media’. Foreign 
media remain a key component of Singapore’s status as a media hub, and errant media outlets have 
traditionally been handled carefully: allowed to practice, but with stern affirmation from the 
government that it will not hesitate to take necessary action when they fall out of line. Instances in 
the past include the Asia Wall Street Journal, which denied the government the right of reply to an 
article it published, and subsequently had its permitted circulation reduced (H. L. Lee, 1987; N. H. Yeo, 
1987b). This arm’s length approach, where the government imposes its will on foreign publications 
through appealing to its financial concerns while in all manners of appearance allow the publication 
full rein of its editorial choices, is aligned with the government’s desire to exact a level of authoritarian 
control while maintaining its international standing as a vibrant media hub (T. Lee, 2014). 
In view of these separate accounts and taking into consideration the veracity associated with a 
Wikileaks exposé, actions taken by the government against mainstream media entities generally tend 
to be non-violent and seldom involved anything more than journalists and editors losing their jobs. 
While there were instances of media practitioners being fined or jailed (H. Lee & Ansari, 2017), the 
collective approach to media governance in Singapore’s history – here, broadly taken to mean the 
laws, regulatory regimes and policies that places limits over news media operations – tend to reflect 
passive, rather than active, repression. By and large, the Singapore government seemed to have taken 
a keener interest in using legal tools against independent online media more so than mainstream 
media, and this pattern seems to align with the stronger presence of the internet as a platform for 
communication and news dissemination by mostly untrained and poorly-resourced independent 
media practitioners. It is even possible to dismiss claims of infringement of media freedom since 
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mainstream media have remained mostly unmolested in recent times and have not publicly raised 
issues with any government action that might affect their work. 
The divergent perspectives on how the Singapore government controls the media within its shores 
have two distinct positions depending on which side of the argument the issue is viewed from. From 
the perspective of media freedom advocates, the Singapore government is a totalitarian regime that 
flagrantly flouts citizens’ rights to freedom of expression by using all possible levers to manipulate the 
industry and coerce media practitioners to do its bidding (Birch, 1993; Kuo & Chen, 1983). When it is 
unable to get its way, such as with independent online media, it will increasingly resort to the force of 
law to exact compliance from media practitioners. From the perspective of the government, the 
excesses of Western influence and its values of media freedom have no place in a conservative and 
pragmatic society like Singapore. Accusations of authoritarianism are blind to the realities of 
Singapore as a democratic, vibrant and internationalised economy, coupled with the government’s 
high tolerance of free speech with a caveat of social responsibility (L. K. Tan, Hao, & Chen, 1998; T. L. 
Tan, 1990). These two dichotomous positions appear irreconcilable and constantly pitch liberal 
advocacy efforts against conservative national values, which has meant little to no development in 
the media industry’s desire to be free of political pressure. 
Such characterisations of media governance in Singapore, however, do not square with the realities 
on the ground. For one, to believe that the Singapore mainstream media industry is struggling to break 
free from regulatory control but is inhibited by the layers of governmental restrictions and financial 
control, runs counter to the comfort in which the industry operates. Indeed, it is perhaps more 
accurate to say that mainstream media in Singapore enjoys a position of market and political 
dominance that few of their compatriots around the world are privy to. Yet the leading publications 
are more likely to vouch for the existing status quo rather than use their position of dominance to 
publicly agitate for more media freedom (X. Q. Tan, 2018; The Straits Times, 1991; Veloo, 1994). For 
another, it is inaccurate to claim that recent government action against media practitioners, 
particularly those from independent online media outlets, have demonstrated a trend towards 
increasing authoritarianism. If anything, the government has demonstrated an ability to vary its 
response to contrarian media (George, 2007a; T. Lee, 2001, 2014), using stiff penalties like shutting 
down a website and defamation suits to take on specific individual website owners, but also less 
draconian measures like correction directions and warnings directed at specific website articles. Such 
variety in action suggests that the government does not always use the strongest possible method 
available in its legal and regulatory toolkit to demand compliance from media entities. Instead, a 
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broader pattern of governance can be discerned, from which the Singapore government seeks to 
encourage compliance, rather than demand it. 
Historical snapshot – from NPPA to POFMA 
To better appreciate the diversity of how the Singapore government responds to challenges by the 
media industry and to understand the process of governance, this chapter sets out to chart the 
historical development of Singapore’s media regulatory regimes, starting from the early years of the 
country’s independence in 1965 to the current era of internet governance. Specific instances of media 
regulatory regimes reside between the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) passed in 1974 to 
the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) passed in 2019. What is more 
telling about these instances, however, is not how these legal mechanisms have been applied to the 
media industry, which is often the key focus of critiques on media restrictions in Singapore (George & 
Raman, 2008; Tey, 2008; Tremewan, 1994). Instead, this chapter is concerned with the ‘thinking 
behind the laws’ – a point made by one of my interviewees that will be highlighted in Chapter 5, where 
I analysed my expert interviews – that serves as the base mindset for both the government and the 
media industry, which in turn enhances astute media governance. 
The government’s response to, and relationship with, the media changes over time, but these can be 
broadly categorised into three time periods. The first is the years following Singapore’s independence 
in 1965, where the government took an uncompromising and strong stance that included 
imprisonment as a method of control through tough laws like the Internal Security Act (Kuo & Chen, 
1983). The second period saw the development of targeted media regulatory regimes, aimed at 
managing media through control of their financial capacities, the prevention of foreign influence in 
media organisations and the heightened surveillance on media organisations (George, 2012). The 
most visible signpost for this period was the passing of the NPPA in 1974. The third period witnessed 
a greater openness and liberalisation of the media sector in Singapore, primarily resulting from the 
need for the economy to embrace the opportunities offered by a digitally connected world from the 
year 2000 (T. Lee, 2014). This period was characterised by the desire to allow greater commercial 
competition in the media sector while retaining firm political control over the media industry, which 
have been broadened in Singapore’s case to include online media. 
It is important to note that the three time periods are not necessarily time-stamped – that is, there 
are no clear delineations between one period and the next. For instance, even with the passing of the 
NPPA in 1974, which focused on governing media through their financial interests, the government 
would continue to use the more draconian Internal Security Act in 1977 to incarcerate Ho Kwon Ping, 
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a journalist with the Far Eastern Economic Review (Ministry of Culture, 1977). Similarly, the passing of 
the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act in 1994 did not preclude the use of an amended version of 
it in 2015 – by then amended and renamed as the Broadcasting Act – to shut down The Real Singapore, 
a social-political website (The Online Citizen, 2015). Instead, these periods are significant markers of 
the government’s changing approach to media governance, as a reflection of the direction that the 
Singapore government was taking in relation to developing its media industry as it evolves over time.  
Studying these periods as markers of governance approach, rather than as indicators of policy 
actualisation, serves two purposes. The first is to point out media governance in Singapore as an 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary process, while the second seeks to question if the liberalisation 
of Singapore’s media sector is indeed a “trend towards deregulation” whereby the government’s 
desire to embrace an open economy meant censorship controls would be “lifted gradually” (Ang & 
Yeo, 1998, p. 23). Indeed, in charting the three periods below, this chapter will demonstrate that in 
analysing this development in its historical totality, the Singapore government’s promise of a ‘light 
touch’ approach to media regulation (V. Koh, 2015) – whereby it professes to exert its regulatory 
influence on media practitioners only in the most extreme of circumstances – is hardly accurate. 
Instead, there is stronger evidence to suggest the practice of an ‘always touch’ approach, whereby the 
government maintains a full slate of governance levers at its disposal to tackle errant media 
practitioners. These levers include laws, industry standards and social norms that media practitioners 
actively internalise and govern themselves with. It is this ‘always touch’ approach that characterises 
the efficacy of media governance as Singapore moves towards greater online media usage, which is 
the focus of interest in my research question. 
First period – early independence and incarceration 
Research on Singapore’s media governance in the country’s early nationhood tend to describe the 
government’s uncompromising stance towards media freedom as one born of necessity and survival. 
As a nation formed from the end of colonial British rule and merger with Malaysia in 1963, followed 
by separation from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore was often characterised by its early political leaders 
from the ruling People’s Action Party as tumultuous, uncertain and struggling for survival. In its most 
extreme, basic human freedoms were seen as weapons that can be exploited to destabilise and 
destroy the fragility of Singapore society. In 1964, Singapore’s first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke 
to the National Union of Federation Students about academic freedom, where he addressed concerns 
about the government’s move to implement English education for Chinese-educated students, a 
sensitive policy decision in the past due to stronger cultural ties to the language. Lee’s concerns then 
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were fundamentally about the communist threat and its influence in Singapore through the Chinese-
educated population, or what he then termed: 
…hardened revolutionaries imbued in Marxist-Leninism, imbued with the tenets of the 
inevitability of the process of armed struggle, and the skill and ability with which they can exploit 
democratic rights of association, of travel, of freedom of speech… Whilst you and I can agree 
on all the great basic freedoms of man, you and I face this problem of how to exercise these 
basic freedoms and extend it universally without having it used against the survival of the State 
by those who cynically subscribe to these basic rights in order to exploit them to destroy the 
society that extends them these rights. (K. Y. Lee, 1964, pp. 5-7) 
Freedom of expression, by Lee’s reckoning, is a potential tool for undermining a society exacerbated 
by its small size, lack of a hinterland and precarious geopolitical position being situated among other 
Muslim-majority nations. By this reasoning, much of Lee’s political career has been to ensure that the 
media does the exact opposite: to build up rather than to destroy society. This uncompromising 
approach was to continue as the justification for when Lee incarcerated journalists. In an interview 
with NBC News in 1973, Lee responded to a query, presumably about the journalists and executives 
from the Nanyang Sian Pau who were detained in 1971 under the Internal Security Act (Ministry of 
Culture, 1971b), justifying the government’s actions as necessary for protecting the country’s 
sovereignty from Communist influence: 
Then the press must exercise some constraints because appeals to the visceral part of the 
human being – his language, his culture – that it is being threatened, that it is being destroyed 
– that does not bring about an intellectual and rational response. It often leads to violence, 
riots. It has led in the past to such violence. And the two newspapermen whom we jailed – they 
have been released and they have come clean. And they were paid danger money to write all 
this thing up. (K. Y. Lee, in Ministry of Culture, 1973, p. 9) 
Lee’s description of the clear and present threat that media freedom posed to Singapore society 
underpinned numerous laws that have an impact on media operations. Among them are the Post 
Office Act (1947), Cinematographic Films Act (1934), Undesirable Publications Act (1967), Sedition Act 
(1964), Internal Security Act (1963), Public Entertainments Act (1959) and Emergency (Essential 
Power) Act (1964) (Kuo & Chen, 1983). Some of these laws pre-dated Singapore’s independence and 
are related to issues of national security rather than media regulation, but the legitimacy of their use 
was, for Lee, unquestionable. For instance, the Internal Security Act, passed in 1963, was used against 
the Nanyang Siang Pau in 1971, allegedly funded and operated by Communist sympathisers (Ministry 
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of Culture, 1971b) to “generate communal strife and lead to political instability in Singapore” (Ministry 
of Culture, 1971c, p. 1). Similarly, Ho Kwon Ping, a Singaporean correspondent for the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, was charged and detained for pro-communist activities in the United States and 
Singapore and for using the foreign newspaper as a “vehicle to promote his pro-communist ideas” 
(Ministry of Culture, 1977, p. 1). Ho was deemed to have used his editorial influence within the 
newspaper to stoke public sentiments “to discredit the Singapore Government as ‘elitist, racialist, 
fascist, oppressive and dictatorial’” (Ministry of Culture, 1977, p. 3). Indicatively, the government 
never ceased to portray the media as a powerful tool of propaganda for unsavoury forces that reside 
outside of the country, a machinery that can disrupt and destabilise Singapore society and politics. 
It should be noted that the theme of foreign influence extends beyond the use of draconian laws like 
the Internal Security Act. In 1971, around the time of the Nanyang Siang Pau arrests, the government 
sought to close down another newspaper, the Singapore Herald, justified on similar grounds of foreign 
funding. Questioned by the government about its funding sources, the publication eventually folded 
due to a lack of local investment (Ministry of Culture, 1971a, 1971c). The law was not used in this case, 
although the close timing with the arrests of the Nanyang Siang Pau staff might have sent warning 
signals to the Singapore Herald. What is more revealing between these two episodes is that the need 
to protect Singapore’s sovereignty appears to be an underlying mentality for how the government 
deals with the media. The laws, if used, appear inconsequential to this overarching concern of 
statehood protection and expectations of the role that the media should fulfil in maintaining 
Singapore’s sovereignty. 
This ‘siege mentality’ that envelops the characterisation of the media as a destroyer of Singapore 
society did not necessarily give way to a more mellow outlook as Singapore’s economy and political 
climate changed. More noteworthy, however, is that the mindset had include a more enabling role 
for the media as a partner to the government. Media organisations were portrayed as entities that 
must subscribe to the pressing task of nation-building, which meant an “emphasis on the positive role 
of mass media in national development” (Kuo & Chen, 1983, p. 43). In addition, while it was deemed 
necessary for the media “to be pro-government and pro-State without being partisan and 
propagandist”, this “can only be competently accomplished by a press which commands 
unquestioning credibility” (T. L. Tan, 1990, p. 2), be it from the government or its readership. The 
media was often required to not just carry the government’s statements, but explain to their readers 
why certain government policies are necessary and important for Singapore’s development (Cheong, 
2013). This meant that the media’s nation-building role cannot merely be one of subservience to the 
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whims of the government, or the media will lose the credibility needed with which to steer the unifying 
national discourse that the government needed for such nation-building to take place. 
In many ways, Lee’s response at the NBC News interview in 1973 merely highlighted his desire for the 
media to stimulate an “intellectual and rational response” among the population. In his 1971 speech 
at the General Assembly of the Internal Press Institute in Helsinki, Lee expounded on the value of the 
media to Singapore as a developing economy. The role of the media was “to present Singapore's 
problems simply and clearly (to the population) and then explain how if they support certain 
programmes and policies these problems can be solved”, and “create a mood in which people become 
keen to acquire the knowledge, skills and disciplines of advanced countries” (K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 6). No 
doubt, Lee was wary that “people are affected by the suggestion of the printed word, or the voice on 
radio, particularly if reinforced by the television picture” (K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 10). But he also saw more 
value in a media industry that is “subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore, 
and to the primacy of purpose of an elected government”, to support “enough unity of purpose to 
carry the people of Singapore forward to higher standards of life, without which the mass media 
cannot thrive” (K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 13). This close inter-twining between the media, the state and the 
people in the all-important objective of productive nation-building was to become a significant 
hallmark of the Singapore government’s approach to media governance, as it sought to impose 
specific legislation for the media industry in Singapore, starting with the Newspaper and Printing 
Presses Act in 1974. 
Second period – targeted media regulatory regimes 
It would be fair to say that the spectre of foreign interference in Singapore through media entities 
formed the guiding thought behind the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) in 1974 – the first 
piece of legislation in post-independence Singapore to target media organisations, which replaced the 
Printing Presses Ordinance from the country’s British colonial past. The passing of NPPA was 
supported by ministerial statements that “the primary purpose was to safeguard the nation from 
‘black operations’ capable of subverting the social peace and harmony of Singapore” (Tey, 2008, p. 
888). The justification for NPPA bore traces similar to the cases of Nanyang Siang Pau, Singapore 
Herald and Far Eastern Economic Review, all accused of foreign interference either through editorial 
or financing means. However, the exact provisions of the NPPA in 1974 was directed at the ownership 
and management of local newspapers, allowing the government discretion to effectively decide on 
who runs a newspaper. This included regulatory provisions placed on management shares of 
newspaper companies, which carried 200 times the voting power compared to ordinary shares. In 
addition, management shares can only be issued to persons approved by the government and cannot 
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be transferred without government approval (T. L. Tan, 1990; Tey, 2008). The use of these 
management shares, normally allocated to banks and establishment figures who have a lot more to 
gain from maintaining the political status quo than to encourage the newspapers they owned to act 
as a watchdog of the government, “served as a critical mechanism for the political leadership to 
influence a newspaper's workings without directly interfering with ownership and to provide effective 
control of the board and top editorial positions” (Tey, 2008, p. 889). 
This supposed shift to a mode of regulating the newspaper industry that relied on financial levers was 
refined in amendments to the NPPA in 1986, which appeared to move the law further away from 
punitive measures of media control. The amendments in 1986 introduced a provision for the 
government to “declare any newspaper published outside Singapore to be a newspaper engaging in 
the domestic politics of Singapore”, which then allowed the government to apply local legislation to 
govern foreign publications that used to operate outside the ambit of the law, by way of gazetting 
these publications (Tey, 2008, p. 891). This governance of foreign media was to be further tightened 
in 1990, when the NPPA was amended again to include provisions that require publications based 
overseas that wish to circulate more than 300 copies per issue in Singapore to apply for a permit from 
the government. This requirement demanded that foreign publications hold a legal presence in 
Singapore, including appointing a person within the country to “accept service of any notice or legal 
process on behalf of the proprietor or publisher, and furnish a deposit for the purposes of meeting 
any liability or costs arising out of legal proceedings taken against the foreign newspaper” (Tey, 2008, 
p. 893). The 1990 amendments also restricted foreign newspapers to publishing no more than a 
weekly edition, further crimping their reach. 
In effect, the neutralisation of ‘foreign influence’ in print journalism was achieved through two 
measures. The first involved the consolidation of decision making and funding in locally owned 
newspapers towards the local political elite, who are more inclined to support the government’s 
nation-building and economic progress agenda than for their owned newspapers to operate as the 
Fourth Estate. The second involved pulling foreign media into the ambit of governance through the 
exercise of sovereignty, dictating not just their ability to operate in Singapore and the content they 
are to cover, but also imposing limits to both their publication reach and finances through circulation 
restrictions. This is with the belief that “media corporations focusing on their commercial self-interest 
would voluntarily cooperate with a government that had shown itself utterly committed to political 
stability, industrial peace and policies that favoured big business” (George, 2012, p. 32). 
It would be tempting to claim that the NPPA reflected a shift in governance, whereby cutting off 
Singapore media companies from foreign influence was done more by financial coaxing than force of 
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law. However, the passing of the NPPA and its amendments did not necessarily mean that the 
Singapore government no longer saw the need to use tough laws to reign in dissenting media 
practitioners. The 1977 case against Ho, cited above, was an indication that the government would 
continue to use any instrument at its disposal to impose restrictions on what the media can and cannot 
do. The government would also continue to take firm action against the Far Eastern Economic Review 
through libel suits in 2006 initiated by Lee Kuan Yew, by then Minister Mentor, and his son Lee Hsien 
Loong, by then the serving Prime Minister for alleging that they were corrupt (Reporters Without 
Borders, 2006). Clearly, the use of laws with more severe penalties were not off the table with the 
passing of the NPPA. 
What is more significant is the Singapore government’s mentality for taking these various steps to 
ensure that media practitioners toe the line, using whatever instrument legally possible. This mentality 
is based on an appreciation of the dual role that the media can play – the first as a potential disruptor 
of Singapore politics and society, and the second as an enabler of both the economy and a ‘proper’ 
society. In 1977, Jek Yuen Thong, then the Minister for Culture, proposed amending the NPPA to limit 
the quantity of stock that anyone can hold of a newspaper company to three percent, so as “to break 
the monopolistic control of major newspapers by a small group of people” (Business Times, 1977). 
This justification appeared progressive and pro-competition, hardly representative of a government 
that wished for state monopoly of the media. It suggested that the government was very much in 
favour of a robust and diverse media environment. However, Jek also highlighted other social 
considerations for the government’s proposal – “to ensure that the newspapers are not merely 
solvent in the accounting balance sheet, but also an asset in the balance sheet of national well-being” 
(Business Times, 1977). Jek claimed that that the ownership rules of the NPPA was “not intended to 
interfere with newspapers as an economic activity” but “to ensure that newspapers do not function 
as mouthpieces of outside interests to propagate alien philosophies and viewpoints” (Business Times, 
1977). The desire to manage the ability of newspapers to influence the public was measured against 
its value to the economy, but it was clear that such social factors weigh in more heavily than economic 
ones when the NPPA was passed and amended. 
The same can be said of Singapore’s broadcasting legislative landscape, which culminated in the 
Broadcasting Act in force today following various amendments. The conditions wrought by the 
broadcasting industry had a distinctively different effect on government regulation than the 
newspaper industry, with competition and consumer choice seeming to take centre stage in driving 
regulatory changes. However, on closer inspection, it was clear that the same concerns with political 
and cultural subversion, which dominated the passing of the NPPA, remained an underlying concern 
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for the government. The Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Act was passed in 1979 as Singapore 
transitioned from Radio and Television Singapore (RTS), then a department under the Ministry of 
Culture, to the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) as a statutory board. The aim of the Act was 
to “free RTS from the administrative and budgetary constraints that had hampered its ability to 
upgrade broadcasting services to meet the growing expectations of local audiences” (National Library 
Board, 2019). The passing of the Act was also accompanied by the government’s decision to allow for 
the provision of cable television services, which was purportedly to increase the diversity of choices 
to Singapore television users. While SBC had more leeway to take advantage of technological changes 
and improve service delivery, it was still operating under the ambit of the Ministry of Culture, with 
government officials holding key appointments. 
In October 1994, SBC was corporatised to become the Television Corporation of Singapore (TCS) and 
the reasons given by then Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo was to prepare for “a very 
different internal and external broadcasting environment – competing broadcasts from Malaysia and 
Indonesia, satellite TV, cable TV and the world of multi-media” (G. Yeo, 1994). On the surface, this 
focus on the commercial viability and competitiveness of broadcasters, at first locally and then 
internationally, might lend credence to the view that the Singapore government was becoming 
increasingly mindful of Singapore’s status as a global financial hub and the need for liberalisation 
within the media sector to plug into this global ecosystem. Purportedly, the way to keep the media 
industry politically in check was to appeal to their financial viability. As it had done through the threat 
of restricting circulation numbers for foreign newspapers, the government’s ability to withhold 
licenses from broadcasters was believed to be a key consideration for media practitioners who wish 
to push the boundaries of being a watchdog of the government (George & Raman, 2008). 
However, to subscribe to the idea that the government has opted to let positive reinforcement (that 
is, follow the rules and you will get a license) supersede negative reinforcement (that is, step over the 
boundaries and you will be penalised) runs counter to the evidence at hand. Passing specific 
regulations like the NPPA and the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation Act did not necessarily 
correlate to a reticence on the part of the government to govern media practitioners with a firm hand. 
The view professed by George – that the government left draconian powers on the shelf in preference 
for “less visible tools to prod the media this way and that” and “more behind-the-scenes controls that 
create the conditions for self-censorship” (George, 2012, p. 94) – is only partly true. The government 
has not failed to remind media practitioners that it remains firmly in control. Even as the government 
relaxed its grip on how media organisations operate, it continued to insist that it retained the right to 
dictate, or at the very least put pressure on, what journalists should and should not write about. Both 
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Cheong and Balji, former editors of the country’s leading newspapers, have recounted instances of 
editors getting calls from ministers to take them to task for articles that do not meet their expectations 
(Balji, 2019; Cheong, 2013). The broadcasting industry faced even more direct intervention from the 
government. The majority of such incursions by the government revolved around instances where 
radio stations made remarks that were deemed lewd or morally offensive. However, a radio news 
presenter was found to have contravened the Radio Programme Standards and Censorship Code in 
2002 when she injected “personal remarks and observations” into news bulletins, which the 
authorities claimed failed to present the news “in an objective, accurate and balanced manner” (Lydia 
Lim, 2002). These incursions appear to be directed not only at the content that media practitioners 
produce, but in setting certain expectations about how journalism should be performed as well. 
Moreover, these expectations are not simply directed at specific journalists and editors but are often 
expressed as standards for the profession as a whole. For instance, in addressing the Singapore press 
club in 1987, then Minister for Communications and Information Yeo Ning Hong noted that the success 
of newspapers in Singapore was dependent on “a core of able, dedicated and responsible journalists 
concerned about high standards of professionalism and committed to the survival and success of 
Singapore” (N. H. Yeo, 1987a, p. 1) while decrying the ills of Western concepts of media freedom. Yeo 
also voiced support for the NPPA on grounds that it will help to raise newspapers, especially foreign 
publications, to “higher standards of objectivity” (N. H. Yeo, 1987a, p. 5) which invariable meant giving 
the government the right of reply to criticisms published about it or its policies. Even with the 
transition to its second Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1990, who was to usher in a more 
consultative style of government, Singapore was to retain many of the limits set by the state on the 
‘proper’ behaviour the media should exhibit. This was affirmed by Leslie Fong, then the chief editor of 
the national broadsheet The Straits Times, when he noted that “laws and political culture are such 
that the Government, with a vast array of powers at its disposal, will not countenance the press taking 
any determined stand against it on any issues that it considers fundamental” (The Straits Times, 1991). 
Fong’s remarks are particularly significant as he noted both legal and cultural factors are at play, hence 
signalling that it is not merely the negative reinforcement of restrictions, but also the positive 
reinforcement of guiding principles that affect how media practitioners do their work.  
Similarly, changes to broadcasting regulations were always accompanied by affirmations of the role 
of the media industry, one that is always tied to the state and what the state expects of it. When the 
broadcasting industry was overhauled in 1994, along with the passing of the Singapore Broadcasting 
Authority Act, there was some unease that foreign broadcasters will be restricted through the Act’s 
licensing framework, as the amendments gave the government the right to ban foreign broadcast 
57 
 
services and to withdraw the license at any time. The government attempted to assuage concerns 
about censorship by claiming that foreign media companies “know the intent of these regulations, 
which is that we don't want pornographic, incendiary material to come in” and insisted that the 
government will regulate the industry with a “light touch” approach. (The Straits Times, 1994b). The 
government also assured that it will only use its powers to act against content that “prejudices the 
public interest or order, national harmony or offends against good taste or decency” (The Straits 
Times, 1994a). The shift to a commercial model of Singapore’s broadcasting industry, therefore, was 
designed “to meet the need of more choice and to respond to a livelier market but without losing all 
control”, and that whichever company that runs the local broadcaster, “as far as the ministry is 
concerned, should remain friendly pro-establishment organisations” (The Straits Times, 1994d). 
Such a positioning of the media industry by the government might appear contradictory, as it 
attempted to assure media practitioners that the government intends to give them free play in 
producing content to maximise their commercial viability, yet ring-fence content by suggesting a set 
of social standards for what they must adhere to. In reality, there never was an intent to set apart the 
commercial viability of media platforms from their role as responsible nation-builders, in the belief 
that “commercial news media’s commitment to press freedom was less steadfast than their desire for 
profit” (George, 2012). If anything, the two are one and the same in the government’s line of 
argument, which meant the media will succeed precisely because it adheres to the government’s set 
standards of responsible journalism, which excludes serving as the Fourth Estate to hold the 
government to account for its policies. It was also clear that the passing of specific legislation, while 
seemingly to enhance the commercial competitiveness of the media industry, was also meant to set 
boundaries of social and political, rather than regulatory, permissibility. The media was expected – 
even encouraged – to uphold social and political norms, rather than be concerned about the limits of 
the laws and regulatory regimes, on the premise that their ability to understand and adhere to these 
norms would steer them clear of falling afoul of the laws. Concerns about the ‘OB markers’ (Cheong, 
2013), the undefined rules of engagement that could potentially trip up journalists who tried to press 
the boundaries of permissibility too much, was brushed aside. Instead, a government official 
denounced the call for greater clarity on these rules of engagement as “contradictory for journalists 
to want more freedom and clear boundaries” and affirmed that the growing goodwill between the 
government and the media would resolve these unclear boundaries (The Straits Times, 1991).  
This concept of setting social and political standards, then, need to be top of mind when evaluating 
the next period of Singapore’s media industry evolution, where the media sector was further 
liberalised, and then challenged by the emergence of independent online media. This supposed 
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liberalisation continued to bear the double purpose of encouraging commercial success and fulfilment 
of the government’s nation-building status quo, but to move towards liberalisation also contains state-
define boundaries of journalistic standards and societal duty. However, the third period is also notable 
in its shift towards emphasising performance boundaries, albeit vague ones, which are not necessarily 
tied to legal limits or commercial imperatives. Liberalisation, like regulatory regimes, became a vehicle 
through which stricter governance can be exercised through means that are intertwined less with laws 
and commercial interest, but more with socio-cultural benchmarks. This emerging position was, to a 
great extent, born of a need to respond to the challenges of the online media environment. 
Third period – liberalisation and openness 
In 2000, the Singapore government made what many would consider a bold move to liberalise the 
media sector by expanding the scope of competition between the two mainstream media companies. 
Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), which had until then controlled all the newspapers in the country, 
and the Media Corporation of Singapore (Mediacorp, the successor to the SBC after various re-
organisation efforts), which had until then owned all the radio and television stations, were granted 
licenses to operate both print and broadcast platforms. The purpose for the move was for both media 
conglomerates to “build on their core business and develop new capabilities so that they can better 
extend themselves on to the Internet” (Y. S. Lee, 2000, p. 3). This move was made in the face of 
competition from foreign media sources with increased mindshare among readers in Singapore due 
to the availability of the internet and developed telecommunications technology. Liberalising the 
media sector was portrayed as a means to enhance the competitiveness of the local mainstream 
media players and, by extension, also provided a boost to the economy. For instance, the liberalisation 
effort also included expansion for digital television in Singapore, where the government encouraged 
“players from both the software and hardware industries to seed partnerships with our local 
broadcasting industry to develop innovative services for digital broadcasting” (Y. S. Lee, 2000, p. 5). 
This liberalisation attempt was short-lived and all but fell apart in a few years. By 2004, SPH and 
Mediacorp have merged their television channels, with Mediacorp owning 80 percent of the shares. 
In return, SPH owned a 40 percent share of the TODAY newspaper, started by Mediacorp, while 
shedding one of its newspapers by merging it with TODAY (Burton, 2004). In essence, the liberalisation 
attempt returned to what it was before, with two distinct media conglomerates each operating 
predominantly in either the newspaper or broadcast sector. The government was quick to claim that 
the de-liberalisation was due to commercial imperatives, that “the idea of media competition had 
been launched when the Singapore economy was doing well, but growth has since slackened” by then 
(Burton, 2004). Indeed, both SPH and Mediacorp would continue to downsize their media operations, 
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with SPH reporting drops in annual profits, TODAY shedding its printed product in favour of an online-
only version, and both media conglomerates conducting significant staff retrenchments in 2017 and 
2019 (Channel NewsAsia, 2017; The Straits Times, 2017b, 2019). 
Clearly, the government’s attempt at liberalising the media sector in a bid to make it more competitive 
and “encourage local players to aggressively embrace the Internet” (Y. S. Lee, 2000, p. 3) has not led 
to a concurrent growth of these players. While observers have noted that these cut-backs do not 
necessarily signify a drop in the quality of the products offered by the media conglomerates (Channel 
NewsAsia, 2017), the viability of the mainstream media industry to conduct business as usual had 
gradually been reduced. Thus, it is worth questioning if the government-endorsed liberalisation served 
its purpose of preparing mainstream media for the digital media age, or simply to enter the digital 
market to plug a then-unknown gap of emerging online news platforms. As Garry Rodan suggested, 
the attempted liberalisation could well be about “preserving and extending the commercial viability 
of government-owned domestic media organisations in the face of technological change” as a means 
of shoring up mainstream media’s local attractiveness and credibility with local audiences (Rodan, 
2003, p. 509).  
In spite of the limited growth of the established mainstream media industry, the internet offered an 
opportunity to enlarge the media landscape in the late 1990s to early 2000s. This was undertaken by 
amateur media practitioners who have grown distrustful of the news produced by mainstream media 
outlets and sought to produce alternative content that does not always align with the government’s 
preferences. The first to enter the fray was Sintercom, set up in 1994 to offer coverage on Singapore’s 
sub-cultures, social activism and alternative politics (The Independent Singapore, 2013). In 2001, the 
Infocomm Media Development Authority, then known as the Singapore Broadcasting Authority, 
responded to this development by requesting the editors to register Sintercom as a political website 
(George, 2007b). This meant that the website owners would have to undertake not to receive foreign 
funding nor publish content that contravenes the government’s position, as well as declare the 
personal particulars of the website owners to the government. Failure to register or abide by these 
rules risk attracting a shutdown order under the Broadcasting Act. Sintercom would subsequently shut 
down voluntarily following the registration, in protest of the risk of having to practice self-censorship 
in lieu of the registration requirements (George, 2013a; The Independent Singapore, 2013). It was also 
not the only website made to go through this registration process. Non-governmental organisations 
such as Think Centre, MARUAH, Open Singapore Centre, Singaporeans for Democracy and online news 
website The Online Citizen have been gazetted as political organisations and their websites labelled as 
political websites, with the last three de-gazetted only in 2018 (The Straits Times, 2018a). 
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This registration process had allowed the government to impose restrictions on independent online 
media, which former Minister Yeo had described as a “fiendishly difficult area” when the Broadcasting 
Act was first passed (George, 1994). With the new regulation, the government was able to retain its 
claim of allowing the media industry to develop and exploit the economic benefits of the internet 
without appearing to inhibit its political potential. The government saw the usefulness of the internet 
as a “key economic infrastructure for their ‘Intelligent lsland’ masterplan” and acknowledged that it is 
“treated globally as virtually synonymous with the information technology revolution” (George, 2012, 
pp. 161-162). This did not, however, necessarily mean that the government gave online media the 
leeway to do as it pleased, “to tolerate a lesser degree of political control online than they were 
accustomed to offline” (George, 2012, p. 163). Indeed, the cases that followed Sintercom meant that 
the Singapore government faced a rougher ride in its attempts to reign in an online media that 
continued to test political boundaries, yet never quite fall afoul of the laws directly. Such difficulties 
have forced the government to become even more astute in its response. 
Notable media practitioners who have tested and trespassed the government’s vague limits on 
political speech include novelist and political commentator Catherine Lim, a well-known author and 
well-published critic of the Singapore government under Lee Kuan Yew’s premiership. Lim penned a 
commentary in The Straits Times in September 1994 to criticise the second Prime Minister, Goh Chok 
Tong, for being out of touch with the needs of the people in the pursuit of effective governance (C. 
Lim, 1994b). Lim was to repeat her criticism of the government again in December 1994, in another 
commentary criticising the government’s passing of a bill to raise ministerial salaries as demonstrating 
“the growing alienation of the people by the Goh Chok Tong Government” (C. Lim, 1994a). 
Lim’s commentaries drew rebuke from the government, first by a Member of Parliament who refuted 
Lim’s claim of a “great affective divide” between the government and the people as erroneous given 
the government’s persistent track record at the polls (Koo, 1994). Lim’s take on the ministerial pay 
issue was also criticised by Goh through his press secretary, who rebuked Lim by asserting that “the 
Prime Minister remains committed to consultation and consensus politics” (The Straits Times, 1994c). 
Lim was to receive a further chastisement by then Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo 
who insinuated that her commentaries were “boh tua, boh suay” – a Hokkien dialect term which 
means being disrespectful (The Straits Times, 1995a). Goh himself took a more confrontational tone 
to the issue, by claiming in Parliament that “If you land a blow on our jaw, you must expect a counter-
blow on your solar plexus”, that “he could not allow his authority to be undermined by ‘writers on the 
fringe’” and “challenged those who wished to comment regularly on politics to enter the political 
arena” (The Straits Times, 1995b). 
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Another example that demonstrated the government’s sensitivity towards critique of its policies was 
Lee Kin Mun, popularly known by his blogger moniker mrbrown, who published a satirical commentary 
in 2006 on his column with TODAY, titled “Singaporeans are fed, up with progress!” (K. M. Lee, 2006) 
The commentary took a stab at the government’s ‘growth at all cost’ mantra, which Lee suggested 
was having a negative impact on the cost of living among ordinary citizens. His satirical critique drew 
a swift rebuke from K Bhavani, the press secretary to the Minister for Information, Communications 
and the Arts, who accused him of “distorting the truth” about the government’s ability to manage the 
cost of living and denied the suppression of information to citizens. Bhavani criticised him for his 
“polemics dressed up as analysis” and for writing a piece that is “calculated to encourage cynicism and 
despondency” rather than solve the issues raised (Bhavani, 2006). More significant was Bhavani’s 
grouse with his apparent transgression by crossing what appeared to be a sacred boundary of 
mainstream media: 
mr brown is entitled to his views. But opinions which are widely circulated in a regular column 
in a serious newspaper should meet higher standards… It is not the role of journalists or 
newspapers in Singapore to champion issues, or campaign for or against the Government. If a 
columnist presents himself as a non-political observer, while exploiting his access to the mass 
media to undermine the Government's standing with the electorate, then he is no longer a 
constructive critic, but a partisan player in politics. (Bhavani, 2006) 
It should be noted that both Catherine Lim and Lee Kin Mun suffered little more than the loss of their 
newspaper columns at The Straits Times and TODAY, respectively. While not belittling the loss, the 
action taken against Lim and Lee are far less severe compared to the incarceration faced by journalists 
in Singapore’s earlier history, or the various lawsuits that were levelled against media practitioners 
who came after these two writers. What is more telling is their similarities: both writers were criticised 
for crossing two boundaries. The first was that they crossed into mainstream media platforms with 
their criticism, which the government firmly maintained as sacrosanct in their role of ensuring public 
confidence in the government. The second was that they crossed the boundary into partisan politics 
by ‘commenting on the fringe’ and must therefore bear the full brunt of the government’s robust 
political response. 
Neither of these boundaries are legally enforceable. The NPPA and the Broadcasting Act do not forbid 
newspapers and broadcasters from including bloggers among their ranks, and ironically it is the 
government’s prompting for mainstream media to embrace the digital realm that prompted both 
media conglomerates to experiment with alternative writers and the blogging style. Hence, it is more 
accurate to say that the government’s attempt to police these boundaries is done chiefly through 
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managing public expectations as a means of setting standards for the media entities to police 
themselves. Mainstream media are expected to maintain a certain level of decorum set by the 
government, to report on politics more than critique it. Such attempts to set social and professional 
norms are more likely to be subject to challenge by those most determined to push the state-defined 
boundaries of ‘permissible speech’. However, managing public expectations, rather than enforcing 
discipline among media practitioners through laws, is no less a powerful tool for the government, as 
it allows “the binding of all state activity to a system of norms legitimated by public opinion (a system 
that had no gaps, if possible), already aimed at abolishing the state as an instrument of domination 
altogether” (Habermas, 1991, p. 82). 
In essence, the liberalisation seen in Singapore’s media regulatory environment from the late 1990s 
needs to be evaluated in its duality: the liberalisation of the regulatory sphere, together with the de-
liberalisation of the social and political sphere, where one cannot do without the other. The two 
activities form a seamless tapestry woven by the government that allowed it to lay claim to progressive 
politics while achieving or maintaining social discipline through narrative means. In effect, this meant 
that “a speech peppered with ‘openness’ and other liberal declarations could be seen as amounting 
to nothing more than a public relations statement to project Singapore as a mature, progressive and 
creative society to the rest of the world” (T. Lee, 2008, pp. 171-172). In line with this public relations 
perspective, it becomes necessary to also examine the potential for promoting this mantra of 
openness in instances where the government does the opposite – that is, when it speaks of the need 
to regulate and curtail, rather than be ‘open’ and ‘liberal’ towards the media industry. 
Such a situation arose in 2013 when the government attempted to extend the Broadcasting Act to 
cover independent online media. The amendments centred on getting news websites that cover 
Singapore news and current affairs to obtain an individual license should their monthly readership 
exceed 50,000, subject to the government’s discretion. Websites licensed as such – the first of which 
was Yahoo Singapore (Chiu, 2013) – would have to pay a S$50,000 performance bond, declare the 
personal information of all personnel responsible for publishing content on the website to the 
government, and to subscribe to a 24-hour take-down clause for any content that is “found to be in 
breach of content standards” (Media Development Authority, 2013a). The government claimed the 
amendments were necessary to “ensure greater parity for news providers across traditional and 
online media platforms” (TODAY, 2013).  
The claim of wanting to ensure parity is highly problematic, as applying the same regulatory regime to 
all websites did not necessarily mean that all licensed websites have the same rights and privileges. 
For instance, the government amended the Parliamentary Elections Act in 2010 to include a Cooling-
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Off Day – the eve of polling day – that prohibited campaigning by political parties, including those 
conducted online. This ruling stipulated that online publishers, such as those managed by opposition 
parties and independent news websites, were not permitted to report on an election on Colling-Off 
Day and polling day, with the purported aim of giving voters time to rationally think through the issues 
raised during the campaigning period, before casting their votes. Mainstream media, including 
newspapers, television and radio station and the websites they operate, while having far greater 
outreach and influence than independent online platforms, were exempted from the law (Singapore 
Government, 2015). Also, access to government media releases and briefings require a media pass 
issued by the Ministry of Communications and Information, and this pass is generally made available 
only to journalists from mainstream media. The government also appears to have a practice of not 
answering queries from independent online media (Seow & Sim, 2016). Hence, the amendments to 
the Broadcasting Act in 2013 was perceived by online media practitioners as an extension, rather than 
a realignment, of this bias. 
The government was immediately challenged by the online community for the amendments to the 
Broadcasting Act. A group of digital journalists and bloggers who came together as the FreeMyInternet 
movement protested what they perceived to be the government’s poor grasp of how online media 
works, attempting to pass a law that did not adequately consult those who can potentially be affected 
(namely, independent online website owners), and misinforming the public about the law’s similarity 
with those in other countries (Choo, 2013; Wong, 2013c; Yahoo Singapore, 2013). A protest was held 
in Singapore’s Speakers Corner and bloggers participated online by blacking out their websites for the 
day of protest (Wong, 2013a). The protest was to no avail, as the government eventually passed the 
amended Act amidst a debate in Parliament, insisting that it will maintain its ‘light touch’ approach 
towards regulating the internet (Wong, 2013b). That said, the government demonstrated restraint in 
using the Broadcasting Act against online media practitioners. From 2013 to 2020, one more website, 
Mothership, was requested to apply for an individual license (Aripin, 2014), while another website, 
The Real Singapore, was forced to shut down for contravening the code of conduct stipulated under 
the Broadcasting Act (Au-Yong, 2015). While FreeMyInternet raised concerns at each of these 
incidents, there was very little pressure put on the government to rescind its decisions. On the 
contrary, the government continued to insist that the use of the Broadcasting Act was appropriate, 
particularly in its handling of The Real Singapore (as highlighted in the introduction of this thesis) which 




In reality, the sparing use of the Broadcasting Act does not reflect the government’s promise of a ‘light 
touch’ approach to regulating the internet. Online media practitioners were to continue facing 
government legal action, such as The Independent Singapore, which ran afoul of the Cooling-Off Day 
regulations and had their editors interrogated by the police and their electronic equipment seized for 
investigation (C. Yong, 2016b). Terry Xu, chief editor of The Online Citizen, was charged for criminal 
defamation for publishing an article that alleged corruption in the government (Baharudin, 2018). Xu 
was also sued by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong for publishing another article that alleged Lee misled 
his father in order for the government to gain control of Lee Kuan Yew’s house (Kurohi, 2019). The 
elder Lee’s house was deemed of heritage value to the government and worthy of conservation (R. 
Sim, 2017), but Lee’s siblings have claimed that he wanted to preserve the house to leverage his 
father’s political capital for his personal gain (The Straits Times, 2017a). Xu, freelance journalist Kirsten 
Han and Yahoo Singapore would continue to be taken to task by the government through POFMA 
(Channel NewsAsia, 2020). The details of POFMA and the various actions taken by the government to 
discipline independent media practitioners – in both the use of the law and the public consultation 
mechanism that surrounded it – will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
At this point in the chapter, it would suffice to say that the government has opted to use different 
laws as the situation calls for to nullify the challenge posed to its authority by online media 
practitioners. In charting the development of media regulatory tools over the three periods identified, 
the pattern that emerges suggests that the government’s decision to use legal instruments is premised 
less on media practitioners falling afoul of legal boundaries – indeed, the cases cited through the three 
periods all did, but with varying degrees of consequences to their transgressions. Instead, it appears 
more likely that the government chose to take action when media practitioners fall afoul of socio-
cultural expectations that are not always codified clearly in the laws, but are inscribed in politicised 
expectations of journalistic conduct that demand adherence to national loyalty. That the government 
has continued to take such an approach in the supposedly more ‘liberal’ times of the internet suggests 
that greater attention needs to be paid to how it uses such laws, rather than focus on whether it has 
reneged its promise of the ‘light touch’ approach or if specific regulatory regimes have been abused. 
Opportunistic justification 
In tracing the three periods in Singapore’s history of media governance, two governance 
characteristics can be discerned. The first is that the Singapore government has opted to be 
opportunistic in its governance approach: where there is an opportunity to assert a position of 
dominance over the conduct of media practitioners, be it a case with or without legal consequences, 
the government would step in. The government has never truly liberalised the media sector, in the 
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sense of allowing media practitioners greater leeway in pushing the boundaries of permissible speech. 
As mentioned earlier, the Singapore government has maintained an ‘always touch’ approach, rather 
than a ‘light’ or ‘heavy touch’, and this has been applied equally to both mainstream and online media. 
However, this opportunism does not apply to every case, as the government only responds under 
certain conditions. These conditions are determined by political expedience rather than a desire to 
put every dissenting voice in its place. The government’s ‘OB markers’ continue to be undefined and 
vague and there is political value to leaving it so, since “once the OB markers became more visible, 
they could be contested more strategically” which in turn could mean a need for “greater transparency 
and political accountability” on the part of the government (C. K. Tan, 2007, p. 189). Conversely, 
keeping the boundaries unclear allows for the government to define and redefine them at will based 
on certain overarching principles. The examples given throughout all three periods suggests a certain 
pattern in this scripting of fluid boundaries: that they revolve around the sovereignty of the state – 
the government responds when its right to rule is threatened and relaxes when it is not. This 
sovereignty is further divisible into two categories: public confidence in the government, and the 
disruption of social stability. The categories are not arbitrary, as they are indicators of the strength of 
the state as much as they are defined at will by the state. 
This brings us to the second characteristic of its governance methods: the government is always eager 
to provide justifications for taking action against media practitioners, based on its own definition of 
permissibility. The categories of public confidence in the government and social stability are by no 
means clearly demarcated, and the government needed to take pains, at every attempted incursion 
by media practitioners to undermine its legitimacy, to explain why the transgression warranted a 
respond. Critics would argue that this is the government’s way of showcasing Singapore as a global 
media hub in spite of the lack of media freedom, to affirm its rationale for acting against errant media 
practitioners for the purpose of maintaining political stability, and even necessary in ensuring the 
financial rights of media investors. While this is true to some degree, the key rationale is still related 
to sovereignty: the government needed to demonstrate to its own citizens – or at least the majority 
of them – that it is worthy of their vote and patronage. Appearing petty and vindictive towards every 
single criticism that appears in the media would not win public confidence, while explaining 
government action as rational and even beneficial for citizens assures success in garnering public 
support. This approach is aligned with the concept of a benevolent and trustworthy government, 
which was identified by my interviewees and will be detailed in Chapter 5. 
Arguably, this rationalisation of sovereignty has been a regular feature in each law, regulatory regime 
or policy the government has passed or implemented that can potentially impact the freedom of 
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citizens. However, this practice is particularly important for the tools that govern media entities. The 
government’s suspicion of the media, including the mainstream media outlets that it can best control, 
has been an unwavering feature of Singapore’s media governance history, and this is evident from the 
various run-ins with the newspapers, attested to by Cheong and Balji. The potential of the media to 
influence public opinion has been a constant concern of the government, and this concern has become 
a focal point in the government’s attempt to not only discipline errant journalists but also to get 
journalists and the public alike to agree with its position of what a socially responsible media 
practitioner should do. Establishing this position not only affirms the government as benevolent but 
also allows it to take firm, even draconian, measures against certain media practitioners who are 
portrayed as not only critical of the government but detrimental to public interest. Indeed, as Foucault 
asserts, “What makes the presence and control of the police tolerable for the population, if not fear 
of the criminal? This institution of the police, which is so recent and so oppressive, is only justified by 
that fear” (Foucault, 1980, p. 47). Critics of the Singapore government would assert that there is a 
climate of fear among the population that dissuades them from speaking up against the government. 
On the contrary, I argue it is more likely that there is a climate of fear among the population that too 
much media freedom would undermine national stability, the ability of the government to govern, 
and consequently the prosperity of the nation. 
The fear of having too much media freedom is actually an enabling rather than a debilitating sentiment 
for citizens and media practitioners alike. It allows both these groups to actively support the 
government in its harsh stance against the media industry, in the belief that the government would 
only take to task those who are seen as ‘the enemy of the state’, ‘the troublemakers’ or ‘the other’ 
who deserve such a treatment. Yet this method of self-governance is only possible through the 
rationalisation of sovereignty – in other words, it requires the government and the media to 
participate in public discourse to relentlessly affirm this belief, such that it becomes normalised as the 
national psyche. Such an effort at rationalisation requires a detailed charting of the public narratives 
used during the various opportunities the government had to justify its governing powers for the 
media industry, which I will undertake in the next chapter. 
Civil society and resistance – regulation pushback 
At this point, it is worth deliberating on the role that media freedom advocates have played in the 
development of Singapore’s media governance model, to evaluate the impact that media 
practitioners, using international benchmarks of media freedom, have on the efficacy of media 
governance. Large-scale protest events by media practitioners that potentially challenged state power 
are rare, the last being in 1971, and even so the issue was less about media freedom and more about 
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‘bread and butter’ issues like getting a fair wage (Mesenas, 2013). The passing of the Newspaper and 
Printing Presses Act in 1974 would effectively see the end of such protests, which only returned with 
the advent of the internet and the growing presence of independent online media. Another notable 
case, in addition to the FreeMyInternet protest in 2013 mentioned earlier, was the movement by the 
Bloggers 13 group in 2008. The group raised a number of policy issues when the government was 
perceived to be increasing its encroachment on the internet when it attempted to extend existing 
legislation and standards for mainstream media to the online environment (The Online Citizen, 2008a, 
2008b). These efforts did not produce the outcome that media freedom advocates desired, as the 
government did not budge on its position on tightening regulations on the internet or using laws 
against media practitioners. 
Arguably, closed-door sessions between media freedom advocates and the government might have 
led to some development in enlarging the space for freedom of expression compared to what open 
protest and advocacy can achieve, However, it is worth noting the analysis put forth by Tan Chong 
Kee, one of the founders of Sintercom, when he recounted the genesis and closure of the website with 
respect to the government’s tolerance on dissent, which Tan called the “state tolerability index” (STI) 
(C. K. Tan, 2007). By Tan’s reckoning, the government can vary its response to dissent to be more 
tolerant when public criticism falls within its comfort zone for an open and engaged society, or be less 
tolerant when such criticism begins to cast doubt about its ability to govern. Perceived openness leads 
to an upward shift in Tan’s index, where people feel more at ease to publicly engage a government 
that they perceive to be more open, while perceived intolerance, such as when the government 
clamps down on free speech, has the reverse effect of making the public more reserved in their public 
comments. Tan described the dynamics of this shift in the STI as one that the state is mindful of 
managing carefully and at arms-length to itself: 
If the state tries to suppress free speech to prevent the public from discovering the 
discrepancies, it would just lead to a state-induced down-shift of the STI curve. The only way 
for a talked-up curve to stay up is when self-censorship prevents complete sharing of 
information in public debates, so that it becomes difficult to uncover discrepancies… A talked-
up curve cannot remain up forever, and will eventually result in a voluntary down-shift. To 
prevent the voluntary down-shift, the state can clamp down and trigger a less costly state-
induced down-shift instead. The fear generated from a state-induced down-shift will then fuel 
self-censorship. With self-censorship in place, the state can again begin the process of talking 
up the curve. (C. K. Tan, 2007, p. 180) 
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Tan’s evaluation of the state of free speech in Singapore using the STI suggests two critical points. 
First, the desire and ability of media freedom advocates to push the boundaries of permissibility have 
played, and will always play, a secondary role to how the government defines that permissibility. Much 
as it is tempting to see free speech in Singapore as a contest between the government and advocates, 
it is more important to view this contest as one that the government is keen to shape, and have 
successfully shaped, to its own expectations. This expectation includes standards of what the 
government feels comfortable to concede as permissible, rather than some universal benchmark that 
advocates prefer. These standards of permissibility also remain fluid over time depending on what the 
government, not society, demands. Nevertheless, it is crucial for the Singapore government that the 
public and advocates alike align with these standards. What such a model of governance achieves is a 
“mechanism by which the exercise of political power can be modelled and rationalized according to 
the exercise of freedom by the governed” to establish “a kind of norm or standard for both the 
government and being governed” (Dean, 2010, p. 143). 
The second point of note is that the management of this permissibility is achieved through a “talk-up” 
process. While the government’s actions, such as using the law to bring dissenting individuals to task, 
can keep criticism in check, that is not what the government intends. Veering too much into draconian 
action will cause the public to lose faith in the government’s promise of an open society, just as they 
would lose faith in empty promises without real progress in consultative governance. Instead, it is 
more accurate to say that the government seeks to maintain a delicate equilibrium of dissent, to 
ensure that it can encourage open engagement that stays within defined limits – an interplay of 
opposing forces within defined and agreed-upon parameters. This limit is achieved through discourse, 
such that dissent is “‘positioned’ within any struggle only as a consequence of the existence of a 
struggle for power” (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 84) and participants are immersed in “a field of total 
visibility where the opinion, observation and discourse of others would restrain them from harmful 
acts” (Foucault, 1980, p. 153). Thus, just as vital – if not more vital – to the legal clamp-down process 
is the discursive talk-up process, which allows the government to affirm its dedication to openness as 
much as define the permissibility of public criticism. 
It is important to understand the role of independent online media in this variable, if somewhat 
contradictory, landscape that typifies Singapore civil society. Given the lack of activism and 
investigative reporting emanating from mainstream media, online media practitioners often assume 
an advocacy role when it comes to media freedom issues. This advocacy role is most apparent in the 
way The Online Citizen had positioned itself in the past – rather than seek to provide a more balanced 
perspective than mainstream media, which was accused of being pro-government, one of the 
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website’s editors have claimed that “we are the balance” (George, 2012). This advocacy role by 
independent media practitioners can also be seen in movements like Bloggers 13 and FreeMyInternet, 
where online media practitioners actively campaign for greater media freedom and clarity in media 
regulation, at times on behalf of their mainstream media counterparts. This role is supplemented by 
the preference for independent media practitioners to represent the views and causes of opposition 
politics and other civil society groups, which dominate the coverage found in most independent media 
platforms. 
Such acts of resistance, however, are seldom significant in establishing an enlarged space for media 
freedom, much less expand the space for alternative social-political discourse. For one, the lack of 
attention paid by mainstream media to media freedom advocacy pushes such matters to “the lunatic 
fringe” (Chang, 2011), subservient to national survival issues of political and economic stability. For 
another, the allocation of space for such advocacy is always subject to the limitations placed by the 
government on what ‘civil society’ means. Terence Chong (2005) identified a deliberate effort by the 
government to narrow the scope of civil society to “civic society” – advocacy groups and efforts, even 
if they are genuinely generated from the ground up and not government-created, that are formed 
with government approval and benefit from government patronage. These efforts tend to be 
conservative, non-controversial, non-combative and mostly de-politicised, imbued with the 
overarching criteria of alignment with the government’s focus on “survival, nation-building, and the 
need for state-society partnership” (Chong, 2005, p. 284). This emphasis on a de-politicised media 
industry is of particular importance to the government, as any attempt by the media to push for 
broader influence is viewed as a challenge to its political mandate (H. L. Lee, 1987; K. Y. Lee, 1971). As 
such, anything that challenges state power and pushes the state’s boundaries on media freedom tend 
to be dismissed and labelled by the government as anti-social at best, treasonous at worst. This means 
that advocacy for media freedom is more often hampered by a perceived inadequacy of its merits, 
achieved through limiting its visibility and validity in popular discourse by both mainstream media and 
the government, rather than any direct legal and regulatory threat. 
In light of this deliberate cycle of establishing norms for journalistic practice, clamping down and then 
redefining the norms through discourse, we can begin to see that the advocacy for media freedom in 
Singapore have always existed under the auspices of the government. From Catherine Lim’s carefully 
crafted criticism of the government’s policies; to the open confrontation of Bloggers 13 and the 
FreeMyInternet movement; to the various incidents of testing legal boundaries by Sintercom, The 
Online Citizen and The Independent Singapore – all these contests subscribe to the same model of 
‘permissible resistance’ that is shaped through the actions and public deliberations of the Singapore 
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government. The government has continuously refined and repositioned its standards, to which 
advocates have either protested or reacted in defiance to. Resistance is directed at a law, for instance, 
but never at the government’s legitimacy in implementing that law. For instance, while advocates 
might argue against the government’s specific action in restricting funding to media entities, few 
would protest the government’s rationale of the need to prevent foreign influence in the media 
industry though funding, even if the definition of what constitutes ‘foreign funding’ is seldom clearly 
defined by the government. Hence, while attempts have been made at redefining or proposing 
alternatives to media laws and regulatory regimes, such attempts have generally not gained the same 
traction as the government’s justification for the need of restrictions proposed and implemented. 
In effect, independent media practitioners have engaged in a struggle to call out injustice to laws and 
regulatory regimes, when the government had mostly already justified them. Such a method of 
pushing back added little value to the cause for media freedom, since “resistance is more effective 
when it is directed at a ‘technique’ of power rather than at ‘power’ in general” (McHoul & Grace, 1993, 
p. 86). An example of this is the purported ‘success’ in the ability of activists to draw the attention of 
international media and non-government organisations to how the Singapore government has 
infringed on human rights (Gomez, 2005), but this position has already been undermined by the 
government’s established and generally accepted position that Singapore follows a different path 
from international standards (BBC, 2017; H. L. Lee, 1987). The ability to justify its indifference towards 
media freedom, by downplaying rather than directly countering resistance, explains why the 
government can ignore such international criticisms with impunity (C. Yong, 2014), yet still maintain 
credibility within its shores and beyond. 
Conclusion 
The Singapore government’s practice of clamping down on media freedom has been well established 
since the country’s independence in 1965. Identified in this chapter through a detailed, yet not fully 
complete, navigation of three notable periods in Singapore’s history of media governance, it can be 
seen that Singapore has moved from the early days of strict restrictions on media freedom to more 
sophisticated tools of specialised media regulatory regimes. This shift is paralleled by a move away 
from the incarceration of local journalists and blatant censorship of foreign newspapers through 
circulation restrictions, towards attempts to enhance the viability of local mainstream media while 
maintaining levers of control. This was to give way to a third period of purported openness and 
liberalisation with the growing internationalisation of the media industry and the allure of the benefits 
the internet could bring to Singapore’s economy. However, it is inaccurate to see this as the hallmarks 
of a government that is growing more progressive and understanding of the need for media freedom 
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and greater participation by citizens in society, even if for the benefit of economic gains. Indeed, this 
chapter has demonstrated that far from taking a ‘light touch’ approach to regulating the media, the 
Singapore government has consistently maintained an authoritarian stance over the media industry, 
changing its methods of governance but never wavering in its intended outcome: a docile media that 
can only challenge state authority within certain permissible boundaries. 
Such efficacy in governance, however, cannot be achieved by using only brute force against errant 
media practitioners. Instead, the government understands that to affirm its power, it needs to affirm 
its legitimacy with the media organisations it seeks to control, and by extension the wider population 
of media consumers. It achieves this by setting boundaries of permissibility, but constantly seeks to 
justify its position – one that is founded primarily on the need for national security, public confidence 
in the executive, and the welfare and future of Singaporeans. Such a practice requires it to be 
opportunistic, to respond to appropriate moments of transgression by media practitioners and use 
them to affirm its right to govern – to some extent through fear of force, but to a much larger extent 
through reason. Such a practice can only be achieved by a dedicated and artful use of public discourse 
to convince the public and encourage alliance with its ideals and standards. These narrative practices 
need to be further unpacked to understand their full effect on the Singapore public and media 
practitioners. They are dealt with broadly in Chapter 6 on ‘discipling narratives’, but more specifically 
in Chapter 7, which details the case study of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation 
Act (POFMA). 
It is also worth considering the parameters in which such narratives can take place. As highlighted in 
this chapter, the Singapore government prides itself in adhering to international norms and standards 
in how the media industry in governed. While it is inclined to dismiss media freedom as an ‘excess of 
the West’, the government nevertheless seeks to position itself as a credible player that abides by 
international rules and conduct. The next chapter seeks to examine some of these international 
standards, particularly in the conceptualisation of media governance models that have been used in 
other societies. It will highlight how the Singapore government has embraced the fluidity offered by 
the ‘social responsibility’ model for its own media industry. While this model varies significantly from 
similarly termed governance approaches used by other societies, the adoption and adaptation of the 
social responsibility mantra enhances the state-media relationship that enabled the government to 
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Overview 
Singapore prides itself as a country that respects the rule of law. Lauded internationally for its 
corruption-free and efficient public service and methodical bureaucracy, the Singapore government 
has persistently made it a point to manage – some might say micro-manage – most aspects of its 
citizens’ lives. This approach galvanised the Singapore government to create a variety of laws with 
which to govern the social, cultural and political choices of citizens – from the purchasing of a home 
according to racial quota to the sale of chewing gum and what you can and cannot publish online. The 
ruling People’s Action Party has staked its political future on an intricate network of laws and policies, 
with the belief that a nation governed by strict and effective laws would serve as an attractive magnet 
for foreign investors seeking to take advantage of a clean and orderly business environment with 
minimal disruptions to ‘business as usual’. This dedication to every aspect of Singapore life has won 
Singapore either praise for astute governance or criticism for being a nanny state, which its political 
leaders across generations have unabashedly embraced (Y. N. Lee & Tan, 2017; Teo, 2015). 
Transplanted into how the government manages the media in Singapore, this approach has meant 
that the government has been equally unapologetic about taking a hard stance towards punishing 
media entities and practitioners who fall out of line with its ideals of what a media platform should 
and should not do (H. L. Lee, 1987; K. Y. Lee, 1964, 1971; Ministry of Culture, 1973). The constant 
refrain is that the Singapore media plays a nation-building role, which invariably means that its job is 
to explain government policies to readers rather than challenge them (Kuo & Chen, 1983; T. L. Tan, 
1990). This mindset and approach to media governance was explained in detail in Chapter 3, where I 
pointed out that achieving such pervasiveness of governance meant a persistent use of laws and 
regulatory regimes. Doing so has ensured that Singapore is seen by the international community as a 
functioning democracy where the rule of law is maintained (Birch, 1993; George, 2012; C. K. Tan, 
2007). 
This legal-centric approach to media governance led both local and international non-government 
organisations championing freedom of expression to criticise the Singapore government for its heavy-
handed approach towards journalists and media organisations, particularly in using laws to quash 
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dissent (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2018; MARUAH, 2018). The common 
thread running through these criticisms of the Singapore government has been its implementation 
and use of unjust laws to prevent media practitioners from criticising its policies and actions. The overt 
attention paid to the use of laws and regulations is not unexpected. As the government has pitched 
itself to the international community as a lawful and legitimate government, it would equally suffer 
damage to its reputation if this adherence to the rule of law is found wanting. However, the 
government has been adept at brushing off such criticisms, insisting on its sovereign right to dictate 
the politics of Singapore and how its media should be governed (H. L. Lee, 1987). To an extent, even 
the mainstream media is mostly agreeable with the government’s position, making a case for a form 
of journalism that does not necessarily align with the liberal or ‘Western’ ideals of free expression. 
Indeed, a senior news writer once affirmed that the media should “support authority, and do not 
emphasise bad news”, but at the same time state as an inalienable fact that “Singapore needs a press 
whose views as well as its news are trusted by most people” (Veloo, 1994). 
This situation of conflict reveals an interesting paradox. On the one hand, the Singapore government 
appears genuinely interested in abiding by the laws and regulations that it has created for the media 
industry, but is just as dismissive of international criticisms that points to faults in this armour of 
defence. This dismissiveness is supported by the same media organisations that many such 
international criticisms were attempting to defend, in a bid to re-imagine the values of a socially 
responsible media industry. As such, a closer examination is necessary for what media governance 
actually means in Singapore, to better understand how it is realised not simply in terms of the laws 
and regulatory regimes that restrict media freedom, but how the values of a responsible media are 
internalised by media entities such that they align with Singapore’s media governance framework. 
Chapter in brief – a critical reflection of media governance 
To attain a better appreciation of media governance as a concept and how it applies to Singapore, this 
chapter will begin with an assessment of existing media governance frameworks, pivoting off the Four 
Theories of the Press by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956). As this work is fairly dated, other 
critiques that challenged or supplemented Four Theories will be included in my analysis. To note, the 
interest in such media governance theories is not about finding a model that describes Singapore’s 
approach to media governance – indeed, none of the four models, nor any of those proposed by their 
detractors, fit exactly Singapore’s way of governing media entities. I will also examine the comparative 
relevance of Four Theories to Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand. Similar to Singapore in some 
ways yet vastly different in their political climates, the media governance models used in each of these 
three societies also do not typify any of the models proposed by Siebert et al. or their detractors, but 
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instead embody specific characteristics. These characteristics become a useful base for comparison to 
Singapore as they demonstrate commonalities in how each society understands the concept of media 
governance. My interest in studying these different models is to better understand how media 
governance has been conceived of over time and arrive at a foundational understanding of how 
scholars generally perceive the relationship between states and their media organisations. The 
objective of undertaking a brief comparative study is not intended to pit one society’s context against 
another, but to inform our understanding of the role of media governance in any polity. This would in 
turn proffer a clearer perspective of how media governance is conducted in Singapore – one that has 
less to do with its political environment, which Siebert et al. were inclined to see as the main 
contributing factor in determining media governance in any society, and more with the social and 
cultural environment in which Singapore media entities exist. 
My analysis that emanates from studying these media models will point to a conclusion that 
contradicts commonly held beliefs about Singapore’s media governance framework. These beliefs 
tend to revolve around analysing media governance in terms of the smorgasbord of laws, regulations 
and policies that Singapore media practitioners have to abide by. Instead, I propose a need to examine 
the system of governance that encourages the formation of self-governance, where the media 
practitioners impose restrictions, either formalised in codes and standards or informally as best 
practices, on themselves and each other. While it is tempting to view such self-governance on the part 
of media entities as self-censorship out of fear of the authorities, such fear seems to have little 
purchase in how media entities in Singapore readily prefer to see their non-combative stance towards 
the government as a testimony of their credibility in the eyes of the public (J. Ong, 2018a). What needs 
to be examined, then, is the concept of ‘social responsibility’ in Singapore’s media environment. This 
concept is neither an exact reflection of the model defined by Siebert et al. nor of societies that have 
adopted similar terms for their media governance model. Instead, Singapore’s ‘social responsibility’ 
media model perpetuates a system of self-governance that is enhanced by an understanding – 
developed by the government and negotiated with the public – about what media entities should 
stand for, which is then projected onto the public. 
However, such understandings do not exist in situ or as some underlying natural value of media 
governance. Instead, and drawing on the works of Michel Foucault in his analysis of power and 
governmentality, I will argue in this chapter that these understandings are built on layers of implied 
knowledge that allows the Singapore government to have a relatively hands-off approach to media 
regulation that works on “the relation between power and knowledge, the articulation of each on the 
other” (Foucault, 1980, p. 51). This is done in a way that provides for efficacy in administering media 
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regulations, which is predicated on normalised expectations about the media ecosystem and 
strengthened through self-governance by both citizens and media entities. 
The rest of this chapter will seek to provide an interpretation of governmentality and to overlay it 
briefly on the Singapore media ecosystem. I will propose that state-media power needs to be 
understood less in terms of actors and their specific actions, and more as a system of practice that 
encourages active and willing participation from all parties involved to maintain relationships of 
power. Media governance, then, is less about exercising laws and more about enabling such a system 
of practice.  
It should be noted that the intention of this chapter, in applying Foucauldian governmentality to how 
we understand media governance, is not so much about adopting or grafting a specific theory to a 
lived social development. On the contrary, it is the reverse: the observation of occurrences within that 
media environment draws distinctively close parallels with Foucault’s concept of dispersed power 
relationships. There remains a polarised debate in Singapore between its political leaders who tend 
to portray media as an entity committed to national development at the behest of a benevolent 
government, and media rights advocates who tend to see media as the compliant (or at best unwilling) 
mouthpiece of an authoritarian regime. Either of such views are incomplete, as they do not account 
for a desire among the political elite to not simply assert control over the media with violent and 
legalised measures, but through an active process of garnering public conviction of the government’s 
right to such means of control. Similarly, viewing the media as reluctant propaganda mouthpieces of 
the government ignores the level of agency and willingness they have in establishing a system of 
governance that appeals to the realities, created or otherwise, of their role in Singapore society. 
Four Theories, and a contemporary re-evaluation 
In its time, Siebert, Peterson and Schramm’s (1956) Four Theories of the Press offered a compelling 
snapshot of how the media systems of the world were organised. The four broad theories – 
Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist – were not so much ‘theories’ 
as they were categorisations of how media around the world can be viewed in relation to the political 
environment in which they existed. The Authoritarian model, for instance, was representative of the 
media found in countries where media organisations were limited to large monopolies that have 
restricted and elitist ownership frameworks that resided mostly with the state. The media in these 
countries were more inclined to “support and advance the policies of the government in power so 
that this government can achieve its objectives” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 18). In contrast, the Libertarian 
model portrayed a media that was free from state intervention and served more as a watchdog of the 
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government. Informed by principles of freedom and democracy, the governments that accompany 
such media systems were more likely to adopt a capitalistic approach and preferred private ownership 
of media entities. Where the state intervenes with Libertarian media was on ethical and moral grounds 
of protecting “the reputations of individuals” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 54) and “to protect society, or at 
least some parts of it, from lewd and indecent publications” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 55). The Social 
Responsibility model, then, sought to plug the gaps in the Libertarian model, where the free-wheeling 
approach of large market-focused media organisations were found lacking. This was due to the 
development of professional standards in the journalistic industry that were meant to be a counter to 
the lack of moral standards and increasing privatisation of media organisations. Governments 
championing the Social Responsibility model, while fundamentally democratic, would intervene in 
media operations to ensure the media upholds “general welfare, sincerity, truthfulness, impartiality, 
fair play, decency and respect for the individual’s privacy” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 85). The last of the 
four, the Soviet Communist model, can be viewed as representative of the media system in the now-
defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This model described the media as “instruments of 
social change and social control, in a tightly unified, closely drawn frame of reference” that are 
“instruments of serious purpose” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 116). The role of the state in the Soviet 
Communist model was to actively organise media organisations, even using forceful means, such that 
it was inclined to galvanise the public to support the political leadership. 
While the above is a brief and reductive description of the Four Theories, it highlights severe 
limitations to the four models that Siebert et al. envisioned. Contextually, Four Theories was written 
in a period of transition. The Cold War between the democratic, liberal and capitalistic United States 
and the communist and socially restrictive USSR provided much of the background for the Libertarian 
and Soviet Communist models proposed. The Social Responsibility model was also influenced by the 
Hutchins Commission, a post-Second World War body studying moral obligations of journalism as a 
craft, which published its findings in 1947 (Christians et al., 2009). In that particular time frame, Four 
Theories made sense, but such a model is hardly representative of the media environment today, not 
only because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but because the boundaries drawn between 
governments and media entities are often not as clear cut as what the four models describe them to 
be. To be sure, Siebert et al. did not claim in Four Theories that they would be clear and undisputed 
models that represent media environments around the world. Indeed, they have explained that the 
media “always take on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it 
operates”, and hence “reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and 
institutions are adjusted” (Siebert et al., 1956, pp. 1-2). This suggests that Four Theories would have 
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been better read as a malleable and adaptable concept that seeks to reflect the relationships between 
governments and their media environments, dependent on fluid social and political structures. 
It was this need to constantly re-imagine the state-media relationship that led to more recent critiques 
of Four Theories by various authors, who have penned their analyses as either a ‘revisiting’ or a 
‘beyond’ re-contextualisation of Four Theories. Nerone and Berry (1995), for instance, identified the 
key conceptual problem with Four Theories as one that unrealistically adheres to principles of classical 
liberalism, in which societies are “divided into individuals versus society or the state” (Nerone & Berry, 
1995, p. 21). They noted that Four Theories wrongly assumed that “we have freedom of the press if 
we are free to discuss political matters in print without state suppression” (Nerone & Berry, 1995, p. 
22). Their contention was that Four Theories neglected to consider other factors at play, such as 
commercial market forces, that can influence how the media sees itself and how it relates to both 
political forces and the audience. Yin (2008), on the other hand, criticised Four Theories as being “built 
primarily on Western perspectives” (Yin, 2008, p. 5), ignoring the diversity of media models that can 
be found in Asian societies, making it impossible to “pigeonhole the vastly diverse Asian media 
systems into the four press categories” (Yin, 2008, p. 6). In her critique of Four Theories, Yin also 
dismissed the common categorisation of Singapore’s media under the Authoritarian model. She noted 
that through the “heavy influence of Confucius’s teachings, governments regard themselves both as 
parents and as rulers”, and this became a key ingredient that guided the Singapore government’s strict 
handling of the media, so that it “extols cooperative and harmonious relations” within society (Yin, 
2008, p. 21). Yin used this matrix of a unique Singapore – a representative democracy steeped in 
Confucianism and a media governance approach built on survivalist instincts and the drive for 
economic prosperity – as a definitive point to argue that Four Theories cannot possibly encapsulate 
the Singapore media model. 
Both Yin (2008) and Nerone & Berry (1995) did not provide an alternative model to Four Theories, but 
instead opted to dismantle the possibility of any model for understanding media governance models. 
Christians et al. (2009) similarly did not propose any normative theories of the press. Instead, they 
opted to present a new methodology to split up the three grouped components – philosophical beliefs 
of normative traditions, political modes of government, and the perceived roles of the media – found 
in Four Theories. Each of these components could then be used to evaluate, and hence provide a better 
understanding of, state-media relationships represented across different societies without ascribing 
to them a fixed category or model. Ostini and Fung (2002) proposed a two-dimensional approach to 
evaluating media systems: structural considerations about whether a society is more democratic or 
authoritarian, and professional considerations about whether media practitioners value themselves 
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as conservative or liberal. This approach provided a two-by-two matrix with which to evaluate and 
place media governance practices within individual societies, emphasising empirical analysis of how 
the media within societies report on specific events. Nordenstreng (1997) came closest to Four 
Theories by proposing five paradigms – liberal-individualist, social responsibility, critical, 
administrative and cultural negotiation – as a means to describe media systems. Nevertheless, he 
cautioned against attempts to pigeon-hole media systems using these paradigms, since “each national 
media system and individual media – even each individual journalist – shares more than one paradigm, 
and that typologies serve the purpose of analytical distinction and not totalizing labels” 
(Nordenstreng, 1997, pp. 107-108). 
Problems in going beyond the Four Theories of The Press 
The study of media governance models by these analysts were based on their own critique of those 
who have attempted to present alternatives to Four Theories, such as those proposed by earlier critics 
like Denis McQuail, William Hachten, Robert Picard, Herbert Altschull, John Merrill and Ralph 
Lowenstein. Collectively, these analysts sought to deviate from the earlier critics by incorporating at 
least one of three elements in their analysis. The first was the decisive move away from normative or 
theory-centric prescriptions towards evidence-based descriptions of media governance. This element 
was the most prevalent in Yin’s (2008) analysis, who dismissed the possibility of fixed ‘theories’ acting 
as any definitive media system given a diversity of media systems that corresponds to the number of 
distinct societies in which they exist. In a similar vein, Ostini and Fung noted that “normative theories 
lack explanatory power in that they are based on how things should be and do not necessarily relate 
to how things are” (2002, p. 45). The second element was the shift towards a greater consideration 
for the commercial situation or the political economy in which media entities exist. Both Yin (2008) and 
Nerone and Berry (1995) considered this to be an important element in how media models should be 
described. In particular, Nerone and Berry noted the importance of examining “not just of state 
intervention but also of market forces and ownership ties and a host of other material bonds” when 
attempting to determine media freedom in a society (1995, p. 22). The third element was an 
exploration of the level of agency that media entities have within the societies they operate, 
particularly on matters of self-determination and identity-formation. Normative theories that focus 
excessively on structural issues tend to ignore “the individual journalist’s autonomy, professionalism, 
and enduring values” (Ostini & Fung, 2002, p. 46). Christians et al. (2009) attempted to detail this 
sense of agency, noting that “the media do not operate in a societal vacuum but are continually 
engaged with other social actors as well as with their audiences”, and are hence “differentiated in 
terms both of their relations with power in society (dependent or oppositional) and of their degree of 
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participation as actors in political and social events” (2009, p. 32). The third element of agency, then, 
has a perceptible link not just to the regulatory imposition of social responsibility directed at media 
organisations and practitioners, but also reflects development within the industry as a recognition of 
professionalism. 
These three elements account for a more diverse appreciation of media governance than Four 
Theories. However, they are not entirely accurate for every circumstance of the media in every society, 
and certainly do not account for discrepancies that can be found within each element, particularly in 
how they have been expressed in relation to examples of media systems in modern societies. For 
instance, the first element of moving away from normative prescriptions serves to widen the 
definitions of media systems and enhance understanding about the intricacies of their operations. 
However, methods such as that offered by Yin (2008) suggests that leaning too far over could lead to 
excessively narrow classifications – for instance, Singapore’s supposed model of ‘Confucius survivalist-
pragmatism’ – that become so unique that they are inconsequential as points of analysis or 
comparison to other societies. Yin’s broader descriptive approach to Asian media also run the risk of 
reducing analysis of media governance to a matter of ‘culture’, which by itself is a multi-layered term 
that deserves further unpacking. The second shift towards commercial consideration adds another 
important element to the equation of media governance, but only barely considers the possibility of 
influence from political elements that have an impact on such commercial considerations. For 
instance, while regulatory action does have a direct impact on how media entities act, they also have 
an impact on how media entities are funded. This refers not just to direct funding of media entities by 
governments, such as through public service journalism arrangements, but in how governments can 
indirectly exert pressure through commercial entities that in turn fund media entities. Such is the case 
that can be made for Singapore’s media funding model (George, 2012; T. L. Tan, 1990), as elaborated 
in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Even less specific are instances where mere regulatory management affects 
how media funding is realised, where a government’s involvement through regulatory regimes 
appears at arm’s length from, but with substantive impact on, journalistic operations. The many 
variables within such economic influences means that applicability to individual societies would be 
subject to isolated conditions found within those societies. 
Of greater interest in this chapter is the third element – the shift towards the agency of media entities 
and the related expansion of the social responsibility model. Siebert et al.’s idea of a socially 
responsible press system was based on a response by the media to a demand “for informing and 
guiding the public in an intelligent discussion” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 29). This demand emanates from 
a growing distrust of powerful commercial media run as businesses and a growing professionalism in 
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schools of journalism, whereby the government is seen as “the only agency strong enough to make 
sure that freedom can operate effectively” (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 95). This suggests that while there 
was some degree of agency from the media industry in conceptualising the concept of a social 
responsibility, the execution and enforcement of a socially responsible media system was still centred 
on political power. By comparison, Ostini and Fung’s (2002) two-dimensional approach to evaluating 
media systems described the media’s professional standing as one that emanates from individual 
media practitioners and entities that “internalizes a positive view of education and training for the 
work, special requirements for entering the occupation, and the concept that the occupation has 
autonomy and self-regulation” (Ostini & Fung, 2002, p. 47). In using social responsibility as one of his 
five paradigms, Nordenstreng described the exercise of journalistic freedom as one that is closely tied 
with a “social conception of the good” whereby “news becomes an agent of community formation” 
(Nordenstreng, 1997, p. 108). This suggests that newer re-assessments of the Social Responsibility 
theory in Four Theories placed an increased emphasis on self- and citizen-centric-governance, as 
compared to the state stepping in with codes and guidelines to ensure the media fulfils its social 
responsibilities and counter decreasing trust in media entities, as suggested in Four Theories. 
Placed in the context of Singapore’s media system, these three new elements offer a clearer 
understanding of the paradoxes that inform Singapore’s media governance model. It is clear that the 
traditional approach taken by the government towards media governance has eschewed the Fourth 
Estate role of the media. This open disdain for the right of the media to hold the government to 
account has been emphasised by the founding Prime Minister (K. Y. Lee, 1971) and the Singapore 
public service (Ministry of Culture, 1971c), and then reiterated by his son, the third Prime Minister 
(BBC, 2017; H. L. Lee, 1987). The Singapore government would also in the same breath emphasise the 
imperative for media entities to operate as viable commercial entities, rather than be involved in 
politics (Ministry of Communication and Information, 2013; Ministry of Culture, 1971a). This position, 
paradoxically, appears to be vacillating between Siebert et al.’s Libertarian commerce-centric model 
and Authoritarian state-building model. Analyses of the media industry in Singapore over the years 
suggest a strong inclination to emphasise its supposed ‘uniqueness’, with a unique blend of economic 
imperatives and racial-religious imperatives that warranted firm control by the government over 
potentially wayward media that can wreak political discord among its population (H. L. Lee, 1987; K. 
Y. Lee, 1971; T. L. Tan, 1990). However, the same strict standards did not appear to have been applied 
to independent online media, since the government had attempted a far less draconian attitude 
towards governing cyberspace, preferring an ideological form of control that emphasises the need for 
bloggers to be ‘educated’ and ‘responsible’ (T. Lee, 2014). 
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The use of commercial levers, while an important component in governing mainstream media entities 
through political patronage by advertising business entities (George, 2012), is almost non-existent in 
the case of independent online media. Where both mainstream and online media face a common 
constraint is in the government’s emphasis on the need for the media in Singapore to exercise social 
responsibility. This definition of ‘social responsibility’ takes on different forms: a top-down, values-
based and near-aspirational conceptualisation for mainstream media, and a citizen-centric 
conceptualisation for online media, mainly through the emphasis of a Code of Practice (George, 2012; 
T. Lee & Lim, 2004; Rodan, 2003). Even so, these characterisations of ‘social responsibility’ are not left 
as mere standards with which media entities can use to govern themselves, but backed by punitive 
laws on internal security, the incitement of religious disharmony and defamation that have a direct or 
indirect impact on media practitioners. 
This paradoxical approach of ‘hands-off’ regulation that is backed by punitive laws deserves some 
unpacking, and it will be useful to first look at how these three elements – a non-normative approach, 
a recognition for commercial imperatives, and an inclination towards a social responsibility 
conceptualisation of media systems – apply to societies outside of Singapore. In the next section, I will 
briefly examine the cases of Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand. Such a comparison serves not to 
highlight how different Singapore’s media governance model is from other societies, but to 
demonstrate that they are all fundamentally different, even if they revolve around the same terms of 
use. Recognising such variations then necessitates a more nuanced approach in understanding the 
relationship between the state and its media. 
Cases of Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand each offer a different base of comparison to Singapore. As 
Singapore’s nearest geographical neighbour, developments in Malaysia’s political and media 
landscapes have significant impacts on Singapore. The development of independent news websites in 
Singapore, for instance, was inspired by the success of Malaysiakini, the news platform that played a 
critical role in fomenting Malaysia’s political diversity (Liu, 2014). While the politics and economic 
directions of the two countries have diverged since separation following independence from the 
British in the 1960s, their shared history meant that underlying stigmas of race and religious 
sensitivities continue to run in both societies. These stigmas have been used by both governments as 
justification for implementing draconian laws. The competitiveness between the two societies in vying 
for top position as an information technology hub led to media policies that attempt to balance 
between market liberalism and state control over media content (George, 2006). In contrast, Hong 
Kong and Singapore are politically different societies. While Hong Kong is seen to have liberty without 
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democracy, whereby citizens fight for their rights even if they seldom get to vote for the political 
leaders of their choice, Singapore is perceived to be a democracy without liberty (Han, 2019). 
However, both societies are similar in their economic models, seeking to be a hub for attracting foreign 
investors, and are susceptible to the fear of loss in foreign investment should their media industries 
decide to defy their politically prescribed ‘nation-building’ duties. This has not, however, prevented 
the development of an open media environment in Hong Kong. On the other hand, New Zealand is 
significantly different from Hong Kong, as it uses a similar Westminster parliamentary system that 
bears a closer resemblance to Singapore than Hong Kong’s status as a Special Administrative Region 
of China. However, the media in New Zealand has considerably greater freedom and diversity than 
those in Singapore, with 20 newspapers serving a similar population size compared to Singapore’s 
nine (Ministry of Communication and Information, 2020; Roy Morgan Research, 2019). In sum, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand are ideal examples, each in their own ways, for a comparative 
analysis with Singapore in terms of their media systems. They each embody aspects of the three 
elements that counter Four Theories, which I discussed earlier: a shift away from normative theories 
given the diversity presented by each of these societies, a re-focus of media governance on 
commercial factors, and the relevance of agency by media entities. 
Notably, the media systems in Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand have one thing in common: a 
press council that operates, or at least appear to operate, outside of government influence. The use 
of press councils hint of the re-envisioned social responsibility media model that emerged from 
critiques of Four Theories, where autonomy, self-regulation and standards imposed in the interest of 
the greater social good (Nordenstreng, 1997; Ostini & Fung, 2002) serve to determine how media 
organisations see themselves and govern their own behaviour. However, this cursory observation 
belies significant differences in how the individual governments and societies perceive and demand 
social responsibility in their media organisations. For example, the New Zealand Press Council, formed 
in 1972 as an independent non-government organisation, was responsible for upholding standards in 
the industry, taking in complaints from members of the public and passing verdicts in instances where 
standards have been contravened. The formation of such an organisation points to a high level of 
media independence and self-regulation that formed the expectations of New Zealand society (Ellis, 
2005) about the acceptable behaviour of media organisations. 
There also appears to be much public caution in New Zealand about commercial ownership of media 
outlets, perceived to be detrimental to news coverage and public discourse (Myllylahti & Hope, 2011). 
These concerns were matched by reticence on the part of media organisations for the government to 
be involved in the regulatory process. In 2012, the New Zealand government called for stricter controls 
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on online media in the wake of the Leveson Inquiry in the UK (New Zealand Law Commission, 2012). 
This led to a swift rebuttal from the Newspapers Publishers’ Association, which affirmed that “one of 
the critical functions of the news media in a democracy is to act as a watch dog on government” and 
that this remains “a powerful argument for ensuring the state does not have any censorship powers 
over the news media” (Newspaper Publishers’ Association, 2012, p. 3). Rather than wait for the 
government to implement new regulations to manage online content, the industry initiated a self-
regulatory body for online media (Online Media Standards Authority, 2013, 2014), which eventually 
merged with the New Zealand Press Council (Online Media Standards Authority, 2016). 
The case of Malaysia is significantly different. The media in Malaysia have been traditionally owned 
by entities that were proxies of or related to the ruling United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) 
government (Lewis, 2006; Seneviratne, 2007). There have been calls since the 1970s for the 
development of an independent press council to serve as a mechanism for checking on media 
organisations. The purpose of the council was to ensure that the rights of citizens were upheld, that 
journalists were made to follow ethical practices, and to repeal laws that inhibit the practice of the 
craft (Hasim & Merican, 2002). With the launch of the country’s Multimedia Super Corridor in 1996, 
the Malaysia government’s desire to tap into the possibilities offered by the internet – not different 
from Singapore’s approach – led to the development of a techno-nationalist approach to governing 
the media (Leong, 2014; Lewis, 2006). An emerging online media that can potentially break away from 
the traditional media ownership structures had to contend with the government’s insistence that 
technology must be harnessed for the purpose of nation-building (Lewis, 2006). This insistence, by 
default, gave greater weight to political and social stability instead of independent media discourse. 
Yet to maintain a semblance of hands-off governance over the internet and attract investors, Malaysia 
passed the Communications and Multimedia Act in 1998 that led to the creation of the Malaysian 
Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC). This supposedly independent Commission 
was meant to be “a “forum” that will act as the mechanism to formulate and implement developed 
codes of practice for the communications and multimedia industry” (Seneviratne, 2007, pp. 89-90). 
The independence of the MCMC had been questionable, as the exact use of the governing body was 
not necessarily neutral nor industry-centric. Indeed, the government had directed the MCMC to 
investigate Radio Free Sarawak during the 2011 Sarawak state election in a bid to silence the station 
and its sister website Sarawak Report from probes into government corruption (Liu, 2014). The 
UMNO-led Malaysia government would continue to use various laws and regulatory mechanisms, 
including unverified hacking attempts (Liu, 2014; Sani, 2009; Seneviratne, 2007) to attack media 
entities, especially those owned or supported by their political opposition. It was not until January 
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2020, after the 2018 general elections that saw UMNO lose power, that the Malaysian Media Council 
– an election promise by the Pakatan Harapan coalition – was fully formed. MMC had representatives 
from media companies across both mainstream and online channels and from local and foreign 
publications and journalist associations. The Council was charged with “coordinating the guidelines, 
ethics and reporting, as well as act as the body to handle complaints and feedback” (Borneo Post 
Online, 2020) about lapses in these standards. 
By comparison, the Hong Kong Press Council (HKPC) was formed in 2000 after the handover of the 
region from the United Kingdom to China. The Hong Kong government was seeking to impose stricter 
penalties on the media for privacy breeches and proposed the formation of a press council in August 
1999 through the Subcommittee on Privacy of the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission (Yan, 2016). 
HKPC was formed with the purpose of instituting an independent self-regulatory body to fend off 
attempts by the state to legislate its own council, which would include a representative from the 
government. Instead, HKPC consulted four journalist groups and devised a code of ethics with which 
to hold journalists accountable – in a way, similar to how the Online Media Standards Authority in 
New Zealand came about as a response to government action. HKPC was to have three objectives: “to 
defend press freedom; to promote the professional and ethical standards of local newspapers; and to 
deal with public complaints arising from the acts of the members of the industry related to intrusion 
into privacy” (Yan, 2016, p. 15). To a certain extent, the formation of the body was the result of a 
combination of factors, including the high regard that Hong Kong citizens have for media freedom, 
and the converse suspicion towards state censorship (Schidlovsky, 1998). 
In spite of such efforts to fend off state encroachment on media freedom, HKPC faced issues that 
impacted its credibility and effectiveness to serve as a self-governing body. In September 2001, the 
Council campaigned and submitted a Bill to the Hong Kong government seeking legal protection and 
greater powers to take action against errant media practitioners, but was not passed due to concerns 
that the government would use it to suppress media freedom (Yan, 2016). HKPC also suffered from 
reluctance by some of Hong Kong’s larger media outfits to join as members and had issues with 
ensuring discipline even among its existing members. On the other hand, it was the Hong Kong 
government that has instituted access to online media to cover government events, on the pretext 
that it would “ensure professionalism in reporting and for digital outlets to provide regular, original 
news to the public” (Cheung, 2017). While this provided for a more balanced state-media relationship 
that increases state engagement with all media types and levels the playing field between online and 
mainstream media outlets, the move also placed greater responsibility among online media 
practitioners to perform to standards that are usually determined by the government. 
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While all three cases of Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand can claim to exhibit the social 
responsibility model of media governance, as envisaged by critics of Four Theories (Christians et al., 
2009; Ostini & Fung, 2002), they all work in fundamentally different ways, have different commercial 
models and have varying degrees of autonomy given to media practitioners in forming the conditions 
where self-governance can occur. Malaysia deployed a model that had the semblance of self-
regulation, but the media operates in an environment where the supposedly independent body takes 
instructions from the state and the media entities themselves are owned commercially by political 
interests. It was only with political change, and hence by popular vote, that an independent regulator 
made up of practitioners was instituted, and even then, still subject to uncertainties in direction due 
to Malaysia’s volatile political climate. Hong Kong’s media environment had a slightly different origin, 
where citizens view that a mostly commercially owned media industry needs to be kept in check. 
However, it was pressure from the government that led to the formation of an independent press 
council, and even this body encountered difficulties with its regulatory functions as public suspicion 
remain about government interference. New Zealand’s self-regulating body for online media was also 
formed in response to government pressure, in an environment of commercial media players and 
strong support for media responsibility. Its trajectory for self-governance, compared to Hong Kong’s, 
has been more affirmative in granting independence to media entities, in spite of a similar mistrust in 
government interference with a free press. 
It is important to point out that where all three examples coincide is in how media governance is seen 
as a constant negotiation of state-media relationships, a process that ascribes values and norms for 
how media entities are expected to operate within those societies. While the demands of citizens or 
media audiences play an important part in how media entities perceive their own role, these 
perspectives are also informed by how each government presented a case for social responsibility in 
their media industry, which in turn led to the formation of norms about media governance – either 
for or against tighter regulation – and a response from the industry. As can be inferred from the 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand examples, the formation of expectations about what a ‘socially 
responsible media industry’ means played an important role in creating the governance model of each 
society. As well, the definition of what ‘social responsibility’ means in each society is highly contextual 
– for Malaysia, a socially responsible media was one that can navigate the balance between national 
interests and citizen rights, while for Hong Kong and New Zealand, there is a greater compulsion for 
the media to be socially responsible to citizens. In addition, the case of New Zealand demonstrated a 
desire within the media industry to uphold professional standards of journalism by maintaining 
independence from the government to fulfil its watchdog role. Hong Kong media appear to have the 
additional responsibility of fending off commercial interests. In other words, a ‘socially responsible 
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media industry’ is a socially constructed and normalised reality that is designed to evoke unique values 
that are deemed important to the society in which they operate. These values are internalised by the 
industry either formally as stated core values and ethics, or informally in the way the journalistic craft 
is practiced. Where the cases of Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand differ is in the level of inputs 
and influence that the government has in the definition and negotiation of these values, but 
nevertheless become the normalised realities in which media entities operate. 
Wither Singapore’s media governance model? 
Studying the case of Singapore provides a contrasting view of what this normalised reality means, and 
it is worth pointing out the significance of this concept of ‘social responsibility’ in Singapore’s media 
governance lexicon. The Singapore government has persistently demanded that media entities – be 
they local mainstream media, local online media or foreign media – practice their craft “from the point 
of view of responsibility” (Lui, 2009). This sense of responsibility has been centred on the need for a 
nation-building media that refrains from sensationalism (T. L. Tan, 1990) and builds a collective goal 
and national values among citizens (Birch, 1993; George, 2007a). This vision of a nation-building media 
“continues to be a major part of the economic philosophy which drives the policies in the ‘new’ 
political order” (Birch, 1993, p. 25) and has continued as a tradition in how the government negotiates 
its relationship with the media today. This does not mean, however, that the Singapore government 
would automatically reach for tough laws to keep media practitioners on the path of this social 
responsibility agenda. There are two reasons for this. For one, the government prefers to promote the 
media industry as a viable commercial sector (Ang & Lee, 2001), an important ingredient in its plans 
for becoming a vibrant global media hub (T. Lee, 2016). Such an agenda fits poorly with the image 
projected by censorship and tough legal action (T. Lee, 2001), since media entities that are supposed 
to thrive in an open and vibrant media environment. For another, the definition of this social 
responsibility model was built on fluid and debatable cultural norms. The media in Singapore was 
called upon to champion social cohesion, but attaining such cohesion ranged from sensitivity to racial 
representation in news reports to avoiding confrontation with the political leadership (Cheong, 2013), 
not all of which were bound by legal parameters. Instead, media governance was based much more 
on encouraging media practitioners to internalise certain values and ‘good practices’ that, rather than 
function on principles about media freedom or professional conduct, revolved around a set of broad 
political expectations that also gave the media industry sufficient leeway to develop commercially. 
Notably, Singapore never developed a self-regulating body for its news media industry. In addition, 
while the government instituted numerous laws to govern the media (Ang & Yeo, 1998; T. L. Tan, 
1990), any usage of these laws is empathetically couched as a ‘last resort’ measure. More crucially, 
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the Singapore government preferred to deploy codes of conduct for mainstream media (T. L. Tan, 
1990), and subsequently for online media (George, 2012; T. Lee, 2014) when adoption of the internet 
and its related technologies increased in the country. These codes of conduct became guiding 
principles with which media practitioners govern themselves, although such a self-governance regime 
is not necessarily the product of agency among practitioners. This self-governance is also not as benign 
as it appears to be, as severe penalties – including the blocking of access for websites – can be applied 
to media entities that do not follow these codes. 
It is also worth noting that one key principle guiding the media governance models found in Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and New Zealand was the reference to the role of media in championing public interest – 
a term not uncommon in Singapore. However, this role in the Singapore media centres on educating 
and informing the public (T. L. Tan, 1990) and is skewed towards a state-derived definition of what 
‘public interest’ means. The media’s role is directed more at forming public interest, rather than 
reflecting it (H. Lee, Lee, & Lim, 2020). Such a process of defining public interest seeks to “constitute 
us as citizens by offering us processed insights into an array of significant domains – economic, 
political, scientific and so forth – through which democratic choices and opinions can emerge” (Goode, 
2005). The media fulfils its public interest role by producing an engaged and participatory citizenry 
through the formation of different identities, allowing them to make meaning of their social and 
political environments “from which to think about the problem of democracy in the modern world” 
(Garnham, 2007, p. 203). However, such constructions of ‘the public’ and concepts of ‘publicness’ and 
‘public participation’ cannot “reassert views about ideological control by powerful interests” (Craig, 
2004, p. 55). Instead, to affirm understanding of what public interest means among media 
practitioners and citizens, it is necessary for these values to evolve from “confrontation of the role of 
power in the formulation of situated alliances, which are always open to contestation” (Craig, 2004, 
p. 55). Such confrontations can be found in resistance through counter-narratives, particularly in the 
online media environment. 
The Singapore media governance model, then, is inherently contradictory and provides a unique 
opportunity to rethink the models present in other societies. While the Singapore government 
maintains strict laws that can curtail media freedom, it is equally forceful in insisting that the media 
industry finds its own way through a code of conduct, even if such a code is heavily prescribed by the 
state. It is adamant that the media needs to reflect the public interest, but rather than directly dictate 
who or what this ‘public’ constitutes, the government actively cultivates and negotiates the formation 
of a national identity based on particular national values. Hence, media governance in Singapore does 
not emanate simply from an interplay and contestation of professional self-identification by the media 
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industry, government influence, market influence and citizen demand. Nor does it rely purely on the 
imposition of strict legal inhibiters to keep media entities in check. Instead, Singapore’s media 
governance model is one that emanates from a negotiation of social values and norms between the 
government and the media industry, whereby “a strategic manoeuvre must be countered by an 
opposing manoeuvre; a set of tactics must be consciously invented in opposition to the setting in place 
of another” (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 84). In this negotiation, the free market of the media industry 
is assumed to be a necessary component of media sustainability, but also a threat to these values, and 
citizens as media consumers are portrayed as the prize in the battle between values and the lure of 
the market. It is at once a paternalistic stance and an empowering one, whereby the media industry 
is deemed to be capable of such deep social influence of, not just public opinion, but identity 
formation. 
Governance, the public interest and a system of power 
The study of media governance in Singapore is thus characterised by power, but not of the traditional 
power-over influences that underpin Four Theories. As conceptualised in traditional and even revised 
media theories, power in the media is generally deemed to be centred on individual actors, often 
perceived as a struggle between the government of a particular society and private actors – 
specifically, the media owners and practitioners who operate in those societies. In contrast, a close 
inspection of the Singapore media environment would reveal that this contestation of power between 
the state and media practitioners does not apply. Instead, the use of power in Singapore’s media 
ecosystem is mostly diffused and even collaborative, where the state and media practitioners actively 
participate in fostering a system of governance – in effect, “immersing people in a field of total 
visibility where the opinion, observation and discourse of others would restrain them from harmful 
acts” (Foucault, 1980, p. 153). Whilst some media practitioners, especially those who work in 
independent online media, are wont to challenge perceived state power, few appear capable of, or 
even interested in, challenging an entrenched mode of governance built on social norms. These social 
norms contribute towards the formation and entrenchment of a ‘social responsibility’ mindset that in 
practice rarely involve media practitioners beyond the initial conceptualisation and agreement of 
norms. It is upon this conceptualised ‘social responsibility’ that Singapore’s media laws and regulations 
are built. This process represents a systematic layering of meaning-making, not of legislative forms, 
but of “the law of existence of statements” that depends on “their correlation with other previous or 
simultaneous events, discursive or otherwise” (Foucault, 1991, p. 59). Laws become emblems of 
intrinsic and irrefutable values that govern the Singapore way of life, or how Singapore society is 
organised. Perceived in this way, it becomes difficult, even impossible, to see validity in arguments 
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that accuse the government of using laws to constrain media practitioners and organisations, when it 
is social constraints that are really doing the work. 
It is quite clear that the theoretical foundation of media governance in Singapore cannot be based on 
either traditional or revised press theories. A comprehensive understanding of Singapore’s media 
environment cannot be achieved by conceiving it as a model of governance, but rather a system of 
governance. This demarcation goes beyond semantics. Such a system of governance involves the 
negotiation (between the government and the media) of norms and values (that underpin the idea of 
‘social responsibility’), the pitting of components against each other (for instance, the commercial 
value of media entities versus media freedom) and the formation of established truths (as seen in the 
prescribed necessity of laws and regulatory regimes). This system of relationships determines the true 
exercise of power between the Singapore government and the media, constituted not as some form 
of over-bearing power of visible authority, but as power born of an intricate system of meaning-
making and relationship-building. As Foucault would describe it, such “mechanisms of power… 
reaches into the very grain of individuals” such that it becomes “a synaptic regime of power, a regime 
of its exercise within the social body, rather than from above it” (Foucault, 1980, p. 39).  
In so far as Singapore’s media governance is based on a process of relationship-building and meaning-
making, such governance is inseparable from the discursive process that informs and defines it. By 
discourse, I do not refer simply to the spoken words in arguments undertaken by the government to 
explain norms and laws. Spoken words are important, but they do not gain meaning unless they are 
intimately linked to “the institutional apparatuses and their technologies (or techniques), such as the 
systems of thought, the rules, the institutions, and the things, which together comprise particular 
‘discursive formations’” (Hobbs, 2008, p. 10). In other words, media governance in Singapore is 
achieved not only through the enforcement of laws, but through an active process of relating the 
actions of media practitioners with expectations. These constructed and negotiated expectations, 
expressed through public discourse, include nationalistic values of a country under constant siege, the 
commercial ‘realities’ of a small media market, and the importance of upholding a rules-based society. 
These are the established emblems of Singapore society that feed into and inform the formation of 
media laws and regulatory regimes, and serve as guiding principles for how the media in Singapore 
perceive themselves and define their social value. Details of this process of value-formation will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, but it is important to note here that this process differs from the negative 
imposition of laws and regulations. Rather, this process demands the creation of “the densest and 
most complex field of positivity” (Foucault, 1991, p. 65), in the sense that it that affirmatively grants 
the state a rationalised legitimacy and the media a positive autonomy. 
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It is this positivity that lends the most powerful and efficacious element to Singapore’s media 
governance system. A governance system that relies on positivity has no need for exacting laws and 
punishment to keep subjects in check and behaving properly. A repressive network of tough laws, as 
is often used to describe the state of media governance in Singapore, would require the government 
to constantly keep tabs on media entities and bring the laws to bear whenever a media practitioner 
steps out of line. Conversely, a system of governance based on a co-operative normalisation of values 
deemed to be intrinsic to those governed serves to “produce the cultural forms and social 
stratifications we have come to recognise as features of our society” (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 82). 
Such a system of governance takes significant effort to set up, as it requires a concerted effort to 
connect social, historical, commercial and legal elements, all as “part of a system of correlations with 
other practices” (Foucault, 1991, p. 70). Once established, such a system of governance is at its most 
productive and efficacious, as it operates through auto-regulation (T. Lee, 2001) on the part of media 
practitioners, whereby “the subject must come to work upon himself, always be watchful for deviance 
in his thoughts and actions; a power relation must become characteristic of his relations with himself” 
(Pickett, 2005, p. 14). In this system of governance, the government expends less effort to ensure 
media practitioners abide by laws, since they have already internalised a negotiated and agreed-upon 
system of values that transcend laws. What is established in this internalisation is not the threat of 
power, but a coherent and rationalised network of power relations. 
Critically, this network of power relations is not imposed by the state at will but requires an on-going 
effort by the government to ‘connect the dots’ such that it makes logical sense to the media 
practitioners it seeks to govern. Such an effort is not about “a sort of grand underlying theory” but “a 
space of dispersion… an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships” (Foucault, 
1991, p. 55). The Singapore government, for instance, saw no profit in holding the media industry to 
an established understanding of ‘social responsibility’ or a widely accepted foundation of ‘appropriate 
behaviour’ for media practitioners. Rather, as I have pointed out above, it is more interested in 
forming its own standards, which it can then apply as a ‘unique’ interpretation of media governance 
for a ‘unique’ nation (H. L. Lee, 1987; K. Y. Lee, 1964, 1971; Ministry of Culture, 1973). Such an 
application is also not constant. It evolves as the government sees befitting the situation, according to 
the developing role of the media industry, or when there arises a need to present the country on the 
international front. Keeping up with the evolving requirements of governance and linking the system 
to ‘realities’ requires that such a system is repeated – even lauded – at every opportunity and 
constantly tweaked to maintain its relevance. The rationalisation of collaborative power, unlike the 
one-off demonstration of coercive power, is relentless “in its conditions of formation, in its serial 
modification, and in the play of its dependencies and correlations” with the aim of establishing “a 
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describable relationship with a set of other practices” (Foucault, 1991, p. 64). The attempt to describe 
this collaborative state-media power-relationship has been an entrenched practice in Singapore over 
decades since the country’s independence in 1965. It involved an elaborate and painstaking process 
of not merely taking media practitioners to task using punitive laws, but a protracted attempt to 
explain, rationalise and argued-through a process that is best described as ‘discipling narratives’, a 
concept that will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. 
It would then logically follow to ask: if the imposition of force on media practitioners is not as prevalent 
as the discursive practice that grants it credibility, why then would it not be possible for media 
practitioners to re-establish a new narrative for a difference kind of governance, particularly given the 
liberative qualities of the internet? Such a view must be tempered by four realities. First, the use of 
discourse and a mode of governance does not naturally lead to a retraction of punitive mechanisms. 
In the case of Singapore, its media laws remain firmly on the table, and the government has exercised 
only a modicum of measured reluctance in using them (George, 2007a). Second, the freedom of the 
internet is always circumscribed by the laws of the land upon which media practitioners operate, and 
governments have seldom been known to relent on regulating the internet merely because of the 
perceived impossibility of the task (Ang, 2005). Third, the rationalisation of power, leveraging different 
components of social realities has a ‘lock in’ effect on the subject that it is designed to govern. The 
expression of the ‘reality’ of a small nation under constant siege from foreign media, for instance, 
prevents any dissenting voices in Singapore from speaking out in any form that does not automatically 
appear treasonous. In effect, the rationalisation of power “perpetually creates knowledge and, 
conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (Foucault, 1980, p. 52). Fourth, resistance 
in such a normalised system of governance is mostly incapable of breaking out of the system, because 
such a system needs, more than denies, resistance. As Foucault has noted, “the analysis of power-
mechanisms has no built-in tendency to show power as being at once anonymous and always 
victorious” but is dependent on “establishing the positions occupied and modes of actions used by 
each of the forces at work, the possibilities of resistance and counter-attack on either side” (Foucault, 
1980, pp. 163-164). In view of these four realities, any resistance offered by media freedom advocates 
and media practitioners, particularly if they do not challenge the network of power relations, would 
merely contribute to the affirmation of different sides of those power relations. 
The limitations of resistance in a rationalised, normalised and legitimised system of governance is a 
key point of study in Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality (Foucault, 1991). Hence, the 
concept of resistance – in particular, how independent online media in Singapore has or has not 
successfully challenged the system of media governance – requires further examination. The 
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Singapore government’s persistent and constantly evolving narratives about the social, economic and 
legal factors that mandated a firm hand on the media industry needs to be evaluated against the 
counter-narratives from independent journalists and media freedom advocates. These interactions 
and the narratives they produce reveal how the actors within the Singapore media environment – 
media practitioners, experts in their respective media-related fields and the government alike – 
understand and negotiate, produce meaning and assert influence within that same environment. An 
analysis of these narratives provides a better understand about how they contribute to the working 
of power relations between the government and the media, and will be a key theme in the rest of this 
thesis. 
Conclusion 
As I have argued in this chapter, the traditional models used to assess and categorise the way media 
is governed in a society are inadequate in describing Singapore’s media environment. While 
traditionally seen as authoritarian, if not branded as such by international bodies and media freedom 
watchdogs, the government has persisted in framing Singapore’s media governance model as one that 
is supported by free market ideals and built upon foundations of social responsibility. Critics of the 
traditional Four Theories of the Press have also expanded on the perceptibly limited scope of these 
normative theories, opting instead for more descriptive approaches that account for specific local 
conditions within each society. These revised descriptive approaches also called for more attention to 
be paid to the commercial factors at play and the agency that media organisations have in determining 
their environment of governance. Even so, my brief analysis of Malaysia, Hong Kong and New Zealand 
demonstrate that considering these variables do little to provide an affirmative way of categorising 
media governance within these societies. Instead, they offer a problematisation of how we should 
understand ‘media governance’ – not as a model, but as an integrated system of contesting factors 
which is reformed and renegotiated over time. This integrated system of media governance is always 
centred on the dynamics of power relationships between the government and the media. 
Using this revised mindset to analyse Singapore reveals a more complex system of media governance, 
where the state plays an active part in encouraging media practitioners to positively contribute 
towards establishing certain social norms and expectations of how a socially responsible media should 
and should not behave. These social norms are not created by the government, nor are they enforced 
by the government upon grudging journalists yearning to practice their craft professionally. Instead, 
media governance in Singapore is characterised by a process of negotiation between the government 
and the media that defines the values with which self-governance can be attained by the industry. 
This self-governance is not achieved by following laws and regulatory regimes imposed by the state or 
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through codes of conduct agreed by the industry, although these exist, but by the willingness on the 
part of media practitioners to subject themselves to the constructed ideals of a co-operative media. 
Any resistance to those ideals works within or against four factors – the constraints of laws; the effects 
that those laws have on technologies of communication; the normalised threat of being seen as ‘the 
other’; and most importantly, the necessary participation of resistance within a system of governance. 
Such a system is constantly reinforced at every opportunity by the government to describe and state 
the rules of the game, in a systematic attempt to enhance a rationalised legitimacy to govern. Such a 
system embodies what Foucault sees as a negotiated process that defines the conduct of those 
existing within that society, which he calls ‘governmentality’. Media governance in Singapore, then, is 
not about laws, regulations and the strong state, but about participation, a negotiation and the 
legitimacy of the benevolent state. This approach to governance will be used to provide a deeper 
understanding of the specific rationalities that exist in Singapore’s media environment. 
To achieve this understanding, the rest of this thesis explores perceptions of various stakeholders in 
Singapore’s media environment, querying what they understand to be intrinsically important and 
functional to the governance of the media industry in Singapore. It then charts the specific narratives 
used to encourage discipline among media practitioners, and the genealogy of a specific law that 









This chapter provides insights from stakeholder interviews to address gaps in the current research 
literature on media governance in Singapore. Current research tends to focus predominantly on 
progressive-versus-regressive and state-versus-industry perspectives. Such research has been useful 
in documenting the ebb and flow of legal instruments against the media industry, but tend to evaluate 
governance efforts as a state-led demand for the media industry to affirm political stability and 
national security, or to serve as an enabler or driver for Singapore’s economy. They are also limited in 
providing insights on the actual response by media practitioners, particularly independent digital 
journalists, towards such governance efforts. More recent accounts by former journalists (Balji, 2019; 
Cheong, 2013; George, 2012) have provided some pivotal insights on the agency of news workers in 
facing government infringement on journalistic freedom. Even so, they are mostly anecdotal accounts 
and seldom go beyond describing such instances of infringement to discuss the deeper implications 
and effects on media governance, which is the key focus of this thesis. 
In attempting to build upon and probe deeper beyond the cause-and-effect and infringement-leading-
to-censorship approaches that typify these accounts, I conducted interviews with key stakeholders of 
Singapore’s media industry to gain a clearer and more diverse understanding of the elements at play 
in Singapore’s media governance environment. The interviews provide a refreshed and more holistic 
picture of how key stakeholders in Singapore view media governance and the complex power relations 
between the Singapore government and the media. These views go beyond the current analysis of 
media governance efforts that are believed to centre on legal enforcement and economic co-optation. 
These insights reveal how governance evades simplification, since “regulatory governance has a 
formal as well as an informal side”, prompting a need to account for “the challenges of regulatory 
policy and administration (that) are embedded in traditions and practices” (Christensen, 2011, p. 108). 
Through these stakeholder interviews, my research reveals how perspectives of media governance 




Three key areas of interest were examined in the interviews with these stakeholders. They are: 
1. To better understand the current state of the media industry and where stakeholders see it 
heading in the future; 
2. To obtain specific views about the development of Singapore’s ‘fake news’ legislation, now 
known as the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) that was 
passed in May 2019. As the interviews were conducted in the second half of 2018, the POFMA 
case study provided a top-of-mind example for the stakeholders to focus on and presented an 
opportune discussion point on the law’s potential implications on the development of state-
media relationships; and 
3. To ascertain the challenges that online media pose to the media industry and the political 
status-quo.  
These three areas of interest are particularly relevant to my research objective, which was to provide 
a holistic understanding of the various dynamics involved in Singapore’s evolving media governance 
environment and to examine its efficacy. The stakeholder interviews were significant resources “to 
confirm information from other sources”, particularly in relation to my discourse analysis on the news 
articles about POFMA, and “to obtain new information in relation to the values and beliefs of a set of 
people” (Fitch, 2015, p. 136) such as the differing position on perceptions of different stakeholder 
groups. Insights from my interviewees were also instrumental “to help reconstruct events by gaining 
insights into processes and deliberations” (Fitch, 2015, p. 136), especially those that revolve around 
the Singapore government’s evolving position on media regulation over time. In this regard, the 
interviews enabled the triangulation of data sources – with governance and media theories and data 
analysis of news narratives – to provide a deeper analysis of the topic at hand. 
The interviews were analysed through the lens of stakeholder analysis, where I specifically focused on 
the remarks made that were the most pertinent to the three key areas of interest to my research 
topic, indicated above. The use of stakeholder analysis was informed by “the importance of dialogue 
and deliberation” on the part of stakeholders, where “the process of engaging others, and through 
listening to the voices of others” allowed me to ascertain shared perspectives on the topic of my 
research, which in turn uncovered “expert knowledge and group consensus” (Flew & Lim, 2019, p. 
541). To ascertain these shared perspectives, views expressed by the interviewees were captured in 
the interview transcripts, uploaded into Nvivo, a qualitative analysis software, and categorised into 
themes that relate to the interest of this research project. 
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Sampling for interviews, anonymity and exclusions 
The objective of the interviews was to find out the views that five stakeholder groups had about the 
current and future state of Singapore’s media environment, particularly the role played by legal and 
regulatory regimes in its continual evolution. These stakeholder groups were closest in work and 
interest to the development of Singapore’s media governance environment – government officials, 
journalists past and present, media rights activists, media academics and legal professionals – and are 
“interconnected with the principal problem owner” (Kivits, 2011, p. 323) – namely, media policy-
makers. Rather than attempt to interview prominent leaders of large organisations – that is, those 
with status and power – the selection of interviewees focused on “those who have established their 
reputation by publishing in the relevant literature” or those “who are active in the corresponding 
associations and organizations” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 50). On the subject of media governance in 
Singapore and in relation to the research interests of this thesis, such spheres of expert reputation 
tend to revolve around closed-door policy consultation with academia, legal professionals and senior 
journalists, and open lobbying from non-government activist groups. The selection of interviewees 
was hence informed by “specific research interests and simultaneously through the social 
representativity of the expert” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 50) as much as “the social relevance of (their) 
knowledge” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 52). 
It was anticipated that not all who were approached would agree to be interviewed given the 
sensitivities associated with discussing government and legal issues in Singapore. To address this 
concern, a total of 20 interviewees were originally identified in the hope of securing at least 10 
interviews. To increase the chances of participation, anonymity was offered to all interviewees. In 
total, 26 interview requests were eventually sent, to make up for the lack of response from two 
stakeholder groups in the original target list – that is, government and current mainstream media 
journalists. Advice from an interviewee was also taken into account in expanding the list of 
interviewees: current junior journalists might not have personal encounters with government 
restrictions, while longer-serving current and former editors would be able to provide more extensive 
and accurate viewpoints on relations between the government and the media, given their vast 
experience in the field. This advice proved to be decisively useful, as interviewees who have served 
senior editorial roles provided by far the most significant insights on state-media relations. Of the 26 
requests sent, 15 agreed and were finally interviewed. Of these 15 interviewees, five opted to be 
anonymous and one respondent, from a non-government organisation dealing with human rights, 
opted to provide an institutional response via email. This was expected given my prior experience 
working with this NGO and understanding their preferences regarding interviews. 
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The purpose of granting anonymity to interviewees was to allow those who were more cautious about 
sharing their views on government policy – such as government officials, academia and journalists 
from mainstream media – an opportunity to share their views candidly without the anxiety of being 
identified. Of the five academics interviewed, two requested anonymity. A current editor and a former 
editor also opted to be anonymous, possibly given their close connection with government sources at 
the time of interview. Another current editor declined the invitation but was willing to meet to discuss 
the topic without being formally recorded or quoted. The views from this meeting will not be recorded 
in this thesis, but were useful in corroborating the views shared by other interviewees. 
The offer of anonymity proved to be irrelevant for government officials. Of the five government 
officials approached, only one responded – initially with the promise of an institutional response, but 
subsequently deferred to published statements made by the government department. All the other 
four either did not reply or declined to participate. The negative response was not unexpected, given 
the sensitivity of the subject of research, and possibly due to my previous role as an online journalist, 
which is generally viewed unfavourably by the government. In retrospect, options to increase 
government representation could have included approaching former government officials, or working 
through side channels or friends-of-friends. Neither of these methods, however, are ideal on ethical 
and practical grounds. Former government officials would not be up to date on developments in a 
rapidly developing media governance environment. Using side channels – for instance, asking a friend 
who is a Member of Parliament to informally propose the interview to a Minister – runs the risk of a 
lack of transparency in processes. It is probable that the Minister might not be fully aware of the scope 
of the interview or might declare it to be a background meeting that cannot be recorded. Such an 
interview would also likely take longer to secure than the duration earmarked for fieldwork. 
For each of the identified five stakeholder groups, interviewees were selected based on my knowledge 
of their current or past work expertise. It should be noted that they need not stay solely within one 
stakeholder group, as many of them have previous working experience that cuts across stakeholder 
characteristics. While this means that there is no way to clearly define their specific experience, it has 
produced many diverse and multi-faceted interviews from those who drew on their varied 
experiences to reflect on the freshly emerging media governance issue. The interviewees are listed in 






Table 4.1: List of interviewees, brief profiles and index of transcripts 
Named 
interviewees 
Stakeholder group(s) Occupational profile Interview 
transcript 
PN Balji Former and current 
media practitioner 
Currently: Media consultant and columnist with 
Yahoo Singapore 
Former print journalist with various mainstream 
media publications in Singapore 
Former chief editor of online news website The 
Independent Singapore 
Appendix A 
Cherian George Media academic, 
former media 
practitioner  
Currently: Professor, Department of Journalism 
at the Baptist University of Hong Kong 
Former media academic at Nanyang 
Technological University of Singapore 
Former print journalist 
Appendix B 
Kirsten Han Current media 
practitioner, civil 
society 
Currently: Freelance journalist  
Former chief editor of New Naratif 
Former editor of online news website The Online 
Citizen 
Appendix C 
Braema Mathi Civil society, former 
media practitioner 
Currently: Visiting Senior Research Fellow at 
Penang Institute 
Founder and former president of human rights 
advocacy group MARUAH7 
Former president and vice-president of various 
NGOs in Singapore 
Former print journalist and editor for 
mainstream publications 
Former Nominated Member of Parliament 
Appendix D 
Viswa Sadasivan Former and current 
media practitioner 
Currently: CEO of Strategic Moves Pte Ltd, editor-
in-chief of Inconvenient Questions 
Former broadcast journalist and producer at 
Mediacorp 
Former Nominated Member of Parliament 
Appendix E 
Eugene K.B. Tan Legal professional Currently: Associate Professor at School of Law at 
the Singapore Management University 
Former Nominated Member of Parliament 
Appendix F 
Kevin Tan Legal professional Currently: Adjunct Professor at the Faculty of Law 
at the National University of Singapore 
Appendix G 
Martino Tan Current media 
practitioner 
Currently: Managing editor of online news 
website Mothership  
Former social media manager for Prime Minister 








7 ‘Maruah’ means ‘dignity’ in Malay, Singapore’s national language. The NGO adopted the name to signal that human 






Stakeholder group Current occupation Interview 
transcript 
Activist Civil society A human rights advocacy group based in 
Singapore 
Appendix J 
Media academic Media academic A Singapore university Appendix K 
Media academic Media academic A Singapore university Appendix L 
Former editor  Former media 
practitioner 
Various mainstream news publications in 
Singapore 
Appendix M 
Senior editor Current media 
practitioner 








The occupational profiles of the anonymous interviewees listed in Table 4.1 have been kept brief and 
limited. This is to ensure that their request for privacy is fully respected. Their full credentials would 
have identified them as significant individuals in their fields who have made public their views about 
the media environment, usually as part of their organisational affiliations. Their choice to remain 
anonymous, however, provided useful insights into some of their personal views and concerns about 
the media environment that they have not made known in public, but which were vital to this thesis. 
Among the potential interviewees, two individuals who have experienced the brunt of legislative 
actions more intensely than most other media practitioners were deliberately not invited to 
participate, although they would be able to offer significant insights to my research, They are Terry 
Xu, chief editor of The Online Citizen and Kumaran Pillai, publisher of The Independent Singapore. Both 
Xu and Pillai were close friends and colleagues during my time as an editor of The Online Citizen. Given 
our close working relationship, it was felt that it would have been an impediment to the impartiality 
of the research and hold a high risk of confirmation bias on a subject that we personally share many 
common views on. 
Data collection – conduct of interviews 
The interviews were conducted in a three-month period between 2 August and 1 November 2018, 
with the first requests for interviews sent out on 22 July and the last transcript confirmed on 28 
November. Two interviews were conducted through Skype as the interviewees were not in Singapore 
then. All other interviews were conducted face-to-face to ensure recording accuracy, maximum 
interactivity and for nuances in speech to be captured. It should be noted that these two Skype 
interviews “should not be seen as a ‘second-best’ option to face-to-face interviews” (Harvey, 2011, p. 
435) and were in fact important in increasing participation given the limitations of geography. Their 
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participation in the research was significant given their long-standing and diverse roles as former 
journalists, a media freedom advocate (Braema Mathi) and an established media academic (Cherian 
George). The bulk of the interviews were concluded before the publishing of the report by the Select 
Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods on 21 September 2018, which summarised the findings 
of the Select Committee on the public hearings held in March to April 2018. The timing had little 
variance on the inputs of those interviewed after the release of the report. In responding to follow-up 
emails I sent to them after the release of the report, interviewees either had no additional inputs or 
noted that the report affirmed, rather than altered, the views they originally held about the public 
hearings and the direction of POFMA. 
Stakeholder views were sought through five broad questions (see Appendix P for the list of questions), 
although the actual questions asked during the interviews varied from interviewee to interviewee, 
depending on how much prompting they needed between questions. For instance, most academics 
preferred to move systematically from one question to the next and provide answers methodically. 
Activists and former journalists, on the other hand, tapped on their depth of experience and 
viewpoints and moved easily between the sub-topics identified through the five questions, especially 
when they perceived their answers to different questions were interlinked. Viswa Sadasivan, a former 
broadcast producer, appeared to have given careful thought to all five questions and was ready during 
the interview with a rich and strongly interweaved narrative that connected all the interview 
questions, requiring very little prompting from me. Such narratives were expected when using 
interviews as a research method, given that interviewees often perceive the issue discussed through 
their own varied experiences, which in turn provides “a greater opportunity for respondents to 
organize their answers but within their own frameworks” (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). As 
such, the five broad questions were deliberately crafted to be open-ended, broad-based thought-
prompters rather than to be precisely followed. My function as an interviewer was to adjust my 
interviewing style to best suit those of the interviewees, to serve as a facilitator for surfacing the 
richness embedded in their thoughts about Singapore’s media environment, more than to actively 
seek specific responses. This is important for getting high quality content that allows for the 
interviewees to “productively and effectively answer questions in their own ways”, which then 
required a means of categorising their views such that a sufficiently structured and coherent 
perspective can be amalgamated from this diversity (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 675). In the end, 
all interviewees managed to address the three key areas identified in my thesis. 
The original time allocated was 45 minutes per interviewee, but most interviews exceeded this target 
time. All interviewees noted at the conclusion of the interview that they did not mind the extra time. 
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This could be attributed to two factors. The first factor was that there is some familiarity with them 
emanating from my past work as an online journalist, where I interacted with them in their position 
as either newsmakers or fellow journalists from other publications. I was also acutely aware that a 
number of my interviewees, particularly the current and former journalists, knew me as a fellow 
(albeit former) journalist who was equally invested and involved in issues of media freedom as they 
were. Reflexively, this familiarity prompted informal and candid sharing based on a background of 
shared understanding for Singapore’s media environment. This was evident from a number of 
responses that were punctuated with statements of the “you know what I mean” and “you know my 
earlier views on this” variant. To ensure that such assumed views were eventually verbalised and 
captured in the transcript, I used ‘connecting’ statements such as “you mentioned earlier that…” or 
“can you share a bit more about…” to maintain the clarity of their views. In retrospect, I did little as 
an interviewer to prevent or dissuade them from this tapping on this familiarity. The majority of these 
interviews were conducted in the context where “the interviewer is seen as a co-expert… a colleague, 
a partner with equal status, someone with whom the expert can exchange knowledge and information 
about the specialist field in question” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 58). Such sharing led to high quality 
information that leaned the interviews towards the “interactive model” that is shaped by “the basis 
of various indications and pre-existing knowledge, and also of the experience of communication as it 
takes place during the interview itself” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 57). This store of knowledge aided 
in the critique and extension of the current literature on Singapore’s media governance system. 
The second factor that contributed to my interviewees’ willingness to spend more time in the 
interview was that the developments in Singapore’s media governance regime were becoming 
somewhat of a consternation to them, as they perceive these developments to hamper Singapore’s 
social-political progress. As such, they were more willing to spend time to talk about the topic, with 
some taking the opportunity of the interview to verbalise their concerns and to string their own 
thoughts and narratives together. The positive and unexpected outcome was that the expert 
interviews were less exploratory and more focused. This quality helped my research in terms of 
theory-generation as they created “a theoretically rich conceptualization of (implicit) stores of 
knowledge, conceptions of the world and routines, which the experts develop in their activities and 
which are constitutive for the functioning of social systems” (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 48). These views 
proved to be invaluable to the development of the concepts explored in this thesis and will be 
addressed in this chapter. 
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Ascertaining themes for analysis 
There was significant diversity in the opinions offered by interviewees based on their personal 
understanding of the research topic. Some examples of differences include their perception of what 
“public perception of the media in Singapore” entails, as well as differing interpretation of common 
terms like “regulation”, “online media” and “media freedom”. This occurrence was anticipated before 
the commencement of my fieldwork, given their diverse backgrounds and experiences. Care was taken 
during the interviews to get interviewees to specify what they meant in their terms of reference. To 
facilitate analysis, I attempted to establish some pattern from the interviews that can guide the 
development of themes from which to study my three key areas of interest for this research project. 
To that end, a word cloud was generated from the 15 interview transcripts (see Figure 4.1). Stem 
words (for example, “think” and “thinking”) and words used to describe similar concepts (for example, 
“legislate” and “law”) were merged to present a strategic grouping of terms and reveal emerging 
themes among the stakeholders’ views. 
Figure 4.1: Word cloud overview of interviews using Nvivo, merging stemmed and generalised words 
 
This grouping of terms produced a useful overview of the terms that interviewees used that better 
reflect shared sentiments. For instance, temporal words like “change”, “current”, “event”, “activity” 
and “happening” suggested interviewees’ concerns with an evolving media environment that, coupled 
with concerns about the quality of journalistic work and government intervention, tend to reflect 
negatively on journalistic freedom and professionalism. Words that relate to legislation – “acts” and 
“laws” – while significant, were not mentioned as frequently as works like “state”, “government”, 
“information” and “connected”. 
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The emerging patterns from this analysis of semantic relations between terms used suggests a 
different view that most of my interviewees have compared to common perceptions about the 
importance of legal instruments in media governance. Rather than focus on the debilitating effects of 
government actions in curtailing media freedom (as proposed by media freedom advocates) or 
highlighting a need for a nation-building media industry (as proposed by supporters of strong 
government regulation), my interviewees displayed a distinct lack of emphasis that the government 
seeks to control the media by force, suggests that a lot more than laws are at play. For those who saw 
a place for laws, their views were predicated on the Singapore public’s trust in a government that is 
generally seen as benevolent and would not overtly abuse its authority. These non-legal actions taken 
against media practitioners involved the use of community and outreach efforts to coax, rather than 
enforce, discipline among media practitioners. This approach is not dissimilar to the broader definition 
of media governance proposed by Puppis, where control of the media goes beyond regulatory regime 
and instead focuses on “a new way of describing, explaining, and criticizing the entirety of forms of 
rules that aim to organize media systems” (Puppis, 2010, p. 139), without discounting the ability of 
governments to actively manage such systems. In essence, the interviews collectively confirmed the 
possibility of an alternative governance model that goes beyond a state-led legal framework. This 
perspective is refreshing, given that the interviews were conducted soon after the end of the POFMA 
debate, where laws were promoted as essential in governing the media environment. 
From this overarching view, together with a close reading of the interview transcripts, two broad 
themes were identified as congruent views among interviewees – 1) the increasingly tightened media 
environment through legal, economic and social levers that allowed less room for exercising 
journalistic freedom; and 2) a general deterioration in government-media relations, for both 
mainstream and online media, that was not directly affected by regulation and legislation. Both 
themes provided insights for this thesis, as they closely relate to media governance and how this was 
often not done through direct regulations in Singapore. 
Theme 1: A tightening media environment that goes beyond laws 
There was agreement among all 15 interviewees that the space for journalistic freedom and freedom 
of expression in Singapore was shrinking. Media freedom activists and those versed in legal issues 
pointed to the fact that the Singapore government has implemented a vast array of laws that have 
been, and will continue to be, used to stifle freedom of expression. Most interviewees were able to 
point to various pieces of legislation, such as the Sedition Act, Protection from Harassment Act (POHA), 
Newspapers and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) and defamation laws, that are in place to restrict what 
the media can and cannot publish. Some have also included mention of legislation like the Public Order 
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and Safety (Special Powers) Act (POSSPA), which while do not relate directly to journalistic media, 
impacted on how journalists, especially those relying on digital channels, operate and need to be on 
their guard when publishing content (Rashith, 2018; Reporters Without Borders, 2018). This view was 
also partly reinforced by the common view among interviewees that legislation against ‘fake news’ 
was a given, even before such legislation has been tabled in Parliament, although opinions differed as 
to what form such legislation would take and who specifically they would target. The term “tightening” 
was used among some interviewees to describe the overall situation, but it should also be noted that 
this term was just as easily used to describe the shrinking of space for democratic public discourse, 
suggesting that interviewees see a close relationship between the media, the public and the overall 
political climate that discourages critique. This was not unexpected, since many of the prohibitive laws 
cited, such as POSSPA and defamation laws, apply equally to both media practitioners and everyday 
citizens (Abu Bakar, 2018; Baharudin, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2018; Seow, 2017). 
Interviewees also noted that restrictions on the media do not always relate to stronger legislation and 
the government’s use of laws to stifle media practitioners. Views on stricter controls also included 
three other supporting views. The first view was that, compared to laws, the broader economic 
environment that determines the sustainability of both mainstream and online media have a stronger 
role to play in limiting media freedom, although it was clear that each media platform faced different 
challenges in this aspect. The second view was that, beyond legal control and economic restrictions, 
media restrictions also include the less tangible factors of self-surveillance by media practitioners and 
their audience. This practice has been referred to as the “chilling effect”, but a chilling that most of 
those affected would find reasonable to accept as the norm. These factors also reinforced notions of 
the vague boundaries that surround what is generally seen as ‘permissible political speech’ in 
Singapore, popularly coined “OB markers”, which are narrowly focused on a specific set of topics for 
public critique. The third view was that such tightening was inherently problematic for media 
governance, given the appetite of a more discerning citizenry, the unique challenges of the online 
environment, and the need for the government to maintain its legitimacy. Each of these three 
supporting views are discussed separately below. 
Surviving the broader economic environment 
Interviewees were generally able to draw a distinction between legal restrictions placed on 
mainstream media versus the mostly non-legal restrictions placed on online media. A former editor 
pointed to “a very sophisticated cultivation and co-optation of media, and placing people within media 
organisations” that allowed the government to control mainstream media organisations, and hence 
what they publish, at arm’s length without being seen to intervene directly in editorial decis ions. 
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Freelance journalist Kirsten Han noted that such co-optation “is systemic – even if they don’t invoke 
the laws to shut you down, these laws allow them to entrench this power into the very structure of 
that media publication itself” (See Appendices C and M). 
The concept of media co-optation is not particularly new. In his published works, Cherian George 
noted that in addition to using repressive laws to silence journalists in the days of early independence, 
the Singapore government also introduced legislation to promote restraint among media practitioners 
in criticising the state, and enhances this by rewarding media organisations “who are prepared to 
partner the PAP in its nation-building movement” (George, 2012, p. 99). This system of reward, or 
reward-and-punish to be more exact, is achieved through “threatening non-renewal of its publishing 
licence, or withdrawing government advertising, or denying contracts for the publisher’s other 
business interests… Journalists who know that their publisher would be powerless to resist the loss of 
his publishing permit might self-censor rather than put their careers at risk by acting in ways that 
jeopardise the publisher’s relation with the government” (George, 2012, p. 108). 
While co-optation of mainstream media by the government was seen as an entrenched practice, the 
same cannot be said of online media, given the technological difference of the internet from 
traditional print or broadcast, and the fact that most online media outfits in Singapore operate outside 
of the economic environment of mainstream media. This should not be taken to mean that online 
media cannot be regulated, since “law and governments abhor regulatory vacuum”, whereupon a 
government “that deems a law quaint or outdated should amend the offline law, rather than attempt 
to create an exemption for the internet” (Ang, 2005, p. 5). Invariably, this concept of adapting 
regulation to the media under scrutiny has been a policy option of choice in Singapore, where the 
government regulates online media “depending on the function in which the internet is being used. If 
it has broadcast components, then broadcast regulations apply mutatis mutandis to the broadcast 
functions. If it is used as an online newspaper, then newspaper rules apply mutatis mutandis” (Ang, 
2005, p. 174). A current editor with mainstream media explained that the government’s desire to 
control online media cannot possibly use the same levers that were used on mainstream media. “If 
the government had its way, it would want to control online media in the same way it controls print 
media. The instincts are exactly the same. But obviously it knows it can’t – it’s a very different animal, 
the servers may not be in Singapore, or it’s a totally different medium, so you can’t replicate the 
controls you had with mainstream media in the online world. But it doesn’t mean that they will then 
throw their hands up in the air and say this is impossible, I can’t do it, I give up” (See Appendix N). 
This difference in approach between mainstream and online media could be attributable to the 
inherent cost involved in policing the online environment, particularly given the technical factor of the 
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internet. As noted by law academic Kevin Tan: “With the internet, the regulators realised fairly early 
that it was an impossibility to regulate the internet, or to regulate it without tremendous cost – in 
terms of manpower and resources you put into the process, but also in terms of the economic costs 
that you might suffer.” K. Tan pointed to instances where the government’s restrictions on specific 
channels have led to loss of revenue due to the filtering of financially beneficial information together 
with politically detrimental information. “If you target specific channels, you throw out the good with 
the bad, and there is a lot that comes through it, and the state acknowledges it as well” (See Appendix 
G). 
In a situation where the government cannot choose to filter specific types of information completely, 
a more strategic way would be to use economic means, but not as pointedly as that established for 
the control of mainstream media. “Business is controlled by a certain group and type of people who 
are generally very pro-establishment,” said lawyer Eugene Thuraisingam. “If you are seen as critical of 
the government, it is very difficult for you to get into that circle, or to get business from that circle.” 
However, Thuraisingam noted that such business practices are not tied to government regulations or 
intervention: “It’s just an informal thing… the people who are critical, you are not going to be viewed 
favourably by the establishment or by the government. Although there are no legal steps taken against 
you, there will be a clear reluctance shown when trying to do business with these people.” 
Thuraisingam’s point was echoed by former editor PN Balji, who shared about the financing difficulties 
he experienced as editor of The Independent Singapore: “Where the businessmen are especially 
dependent on the government for contracts and money, who would want to go against the 
government? If you support independent media, which will be seen as anti-government – why would 
they put their money there?” In a similar vein, media academic Cherian George expanded on this point 
relating to media financing: “I think the problem for the likes of The Online Citizen or The Middle 
Ground and so on have been economic sustainability more than legal. The government’s actions can 
raise the cost of doing business, so to speak, by tying up groups in legal battles now and then, or 
putting then on the defensive, but I don’t think it is really an existential problem. The main existential 
problem is still financial sustainability” (See Appendices A, B and I). 
The need to be financially viable and sustainable has an immediate impact on both mainstream and 
online media players. For mainstream media, the threat is less about the severity of going out of 
business, as some interviewees believe that the government would think of means and ways of 
supporting it financially, be it through direct or indirect intervention. For online media in Singapore, 
financial sustainability is about survivability – “those who survive cannot professionalise, those who 
professionalise cannot survive, because the overheads are just too high,” said Han. Concerns with how 
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funding affects an online media outlet’s professionalism was further exacerbated by Balji, who pointed 
out that “without the money, it would be no use. It would then be done by people who – I know it is 
an unfair phrase – shoot from the hip.” Balji pointed to instances where he perceived online 
publications, in an attempt to gain traction over social-political issues, went overboard and gave up 
on sound investigative journalistic practices in order to get a story out fast. This lack of professionalism 
has also led online media practitioners to abandon basic fact-checking. This was a view shared by Han: 
“A lot of the sites that struggle for a viable business model find it really problematic, and it pushes 
them to do clickbait articles and sensationalise or editorialise stories that might turn out to be 
misleading, or it pushes them to do things where they just lift from social media.” Financial constraints 
also meant that there was a limit to how much online media can compete with mainstream media. K. 
Tan noted that a mainstream media publication like The Straits Times remained “an omnibus kind of 
media” that most Singaporeans will still subscribe to because it offers everyday news that no online 
publication can match. (See Appendices A, C and G) These views point to a developing situation in the 
media system in Singapore, where an increasingly hybrid media environment has led to perceived, 
even expected, biases in the professionalism and values embraced by traditional versus modern media 
practitioners. Such a situation is problematic given the “complex set of relations in any given context: 
what is accepted as ideal, as the norm, and how practices negotiate their coherence with norms or 
their rebellion against them” (Witschge, Anderson, Domingo, & Hermida, 2019, p. 656).  
From the views made by interviewees, it was evident the issue of financial sustainability had a greater 
bearing on what online media can operationally do, more so than regulatory restraints. The lack of 
funds prevents online media outlets from professionalising and competing meaningfully with 
mainstream media, to the extent that it restricts the growth of online media. Nevertheless, this 
limitation on finances is not merely a matter of free-market forces, but also has to do with how the 
business environment is shaped by the government such that it naturally tilts away from favouring 
online media, or the media platforms that are generally perceived to be adversarial towards the 
government. While embroiling online media entities in legal battles that take a toll on their finances 
might be a way of limiting their growth, the use of the media financing environment – which involves 
donors, sponsor and advertisers – would appear to be an easier tool of control for the Singapore 
government, in terms of both monetary expenditure and publicity management. Not only does the 
government avoid the costly process of actively monitoring and pursuing media entities using legal 
means, it also avoids having to deal with negative publicly associated with an oppressive regime that 
clamps down on dissenting voices.  
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None of the interviewees specifically questioned the development of this mode of governance via 
financial constraints that depends on assumed political tolerance of media platforms. However, it is 
indicative from their responses that the use of the economic environment to constrain the 
development of independent media would not be possible without establishing social norms about 
journalistic professionalism and assumed political patronage. As indicated above, Han highlighted the 
double-bind of journalism having to choose between professionalism and failing, or succeeding 
financially but lacking in professionalism. In addition, Balji cited the risk of business owners changing 
their minds about funding The Independent Singapore for fear of losing their government contracts. 
(See Appendices A and C) Establishing these norms are also not possible working purely from within 
the economic sphere; it requires the government to demonstrate publicly, either through the use of 
legal restraints or narrative practice, to establish social relationships that determine the acceptably of 
media outlets among the business community and the broader reading public. This consequently has 
an impact on journalistic practice, which involves a lot of guesswork by media practitioners to stay 
within the lines of patronage, which interviewees invariably refer to as “self-censorship”. 
Self-surveillance – indirect effects of laws 
The concept of self-censorship in Singapore is not new. Gomez (2000) described the process of how 
individuals in Singapore refrained from speaking out on political issues or in support of opposition 
politics and encouraged others to do likewise. This refrain, he analysed, was based on a sequence of 
developed fear. “It takes place as a result of fear linked to political consequences, social conditioning 
and political immaturity. What is political and what is not, being ambiguous, is often arbitrarily defined 
by the individuals concerned” (Gomez, 2000, pp. 55-56). Gomez also indicated that, while the process 
is undocumented, this self-censorship can be ascertained through anecdotal evidence and verification 
by those “affected by the censorial process” (Gomez, 2000, p. 55). 
This self-censorship process was similarly reflected by my interviewees. What was significant was that 
my interviewees perceived this self-censorship process as being aided by a deliberate attempt to 
define boundaries of permissibility that are less ambiguous than what Gomez claimed. One academic 
pointed to a distinction between direct and indirect regulation, where the direct effect are instances 
where the laws have been exercised to curb dissenting voices, while indirect measures are instances 
where the laws might not even be used, but the media and the public choose to refrain from 
expressing themselves to align with the passing or use of regulation. “The indirect way in which 
regulations work would then send certain signals to the users of technology, which sometimes may 
lead to certain amounts of self-censorship, where it may cause people to be a bit more deliberative 
and more careful with what they say online,” said this academic. This view was also confirmed by the 
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human rights group, Think Centre. “To-date, two individuals have been taken to task and charged for 
writing social media posts which could be deemed to risk lowering the reputation and challenge the 
impartiality of the judiciary,” said the NGO, referring to the public prosecution of activist Jolovan 
Wham and opposition politician John Tan.8 “These charges are widely seen as warnings against the 
posting of incendiary remarks online regarding the judiciary regardless of the level of risk or malicious 
intent” (See Appendices L and O). 
While these examples refer to individuals exercising limits to their personal freedom of expression, 
interviewees also noted a similar trend among media practitioners. “We are deeply under seizure by 
a lack of understanding of these freedoms because state powers operate that way, and the rest 
operate in fear of upsetting the system due to how the NPPA or Broadcasting Act can be used,” said 
Braema Mathi, president of Singapore-based human rights NGO, MARUAH. This pervasive concern 
with the after-effects of running afoul of the laws goes beyond the actual execution of the law against 
offenders, but by the mere presence of stating the boundaries that such laws impose. In reference to 
‘fake news’ legislation, another media academic pointed out that should there be laws that allow the 
government to remove ‘fake news’, “the law and the pronouncements of these kinds of inappropriate 
content will essentially have more of a demonstrative effect rather than necessarily being able to 
remove the content from cyberspace.” This limited effect of a ‘fake news’ law is due to the 
impossibility of complete removal given the viral nature of the internet. Law academic Eugene Tan 
also pointed out that such reservations among media practitioners about ‘fake news’ legislation would 
take place regardless of the severity of the penalties. “I don’t think we will have it like the German 
NetzDG9 law that will have such punitive fines and penalties,” he said. “But we will have responsible 
publications, whether online or offline, that will be even more cautious with what they might not be 
able to verify” (See Appendices D and F). What was identified in these interview responses was 
markedly different compared to Gomez’s assessment of an arbitrarily defined uncertainly. It is self-
censorship that is rooted in actual legal limitation, even if no actual legal restrictions apply. For 
instance, being issued a correction direction under POFMA does not immediately mean an illegal 
 
8 On 27 April 2018, Wham posted on his Facebook page that compared the independence of Singapore’s courts with 
Malaysia’s. The government charged him with contempt of court, whereupon Tan posted on his Facebook page that 
the government’s actions proved Wham to be right. Tan was subsequently charged for contempt of court for those 
remarks. (Lum, 2018) 
9 Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, popularly known as NetzDG, came into effect on 1 January 2018. The law 
requires social media platforms to remove posts that have been identified by the German government as illegal. They 
are to do so within 24 hours or face fines of up to 50 million Euros 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/05/tough-new-german-law-puts-tech-firms-and-free-speech-in-
spotlight). The law has been criticised for forcing social media platforms to block content excessively in a bid to self-




statement has been made. Nevertheless, the mere action of the state red-flagging potentially illegal 
activities will prompt media practitioners to be more circumspect in voicing out. 
However, interviewees also supplemented this with another view: that media practitioners need not 
seek to censor themselves as a negative response to laws and their implications, but as a positive 
response to a cultural adaptation of the government’s position on the role of the media, which is a 
more pertinent practice with mainstream media. The current editor interviewed noted that “the nitty 
gritty of the law affects us less than the thinking behind them, which shapes the government’s 
response to whatever they see in the papers. I think those are more significant markers and has a real 
effect on the way the press operates in Singapore.” The editor highlighted that this ‘thinking behind 
the laws’ was set up by Singapore’s former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, most notably at his speech 
to the International Press Institute in Helsinki in 1971 (K. Y. Lee, 1971), which the editor surmised to 
contain two key thrusts – that the media has a nation-building role by informing the public accurately 
about government policies, and the media is not a watchdog of the government as espoused in 
Western democracies. This belief, that the political expectations of the media mattered more in media 
governance than direct legal intervention into newsrooms, was shared by the former editor 
interviewed. “It is really the culture and climate that they manage to build over the years, which is the 
more problematic thing right now. If we can settle that, then maybe we can go and talk about those 
last-resort (regulatory) measures” (See Appendices M and N). 
The cultivation of a culture of compliance towards state agenda would apply to mainstream media, 
but a different tactic was noted to be used against online media. The former editor noted that the 
Singapore government would generally opt to “ignore the online environment, from an official point 
of view” while still retaining the option “to take on some aspects of online reporting or columns if they 
feel that it has really overstepped the boundaries”. Han also pointed out an extension of this approach, 
where online media practitioners are simply not granted the right to practice standard journalism 
through “the lack of access to information, to press releases, to press conferences, lack of recognition 
that they are doing journalism.” This denial of access is done by not issuing online media practitioners 
with official media passes that allow journalists to attend government events, media conferences and 
press huddles. While the denial of access seems to be specifically targeted at online media, Han also 
noted that mainstream media have been similarly treated through the “stonewalling” of journalists, 
when the government simply refrains from answering their questions. (See Appendices C and M) This 
dual strategy of stonewalling and refusal of access present challenges to media practitioners and 
impede their work of verifying facts. As a result, many journalists resort to erring on the side of caution 
by publishing from official lines and government-issued media releases. Such a strategy appears to 
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play into the normalised psyche of what it means to be a professional journalist more than as a 
deliberative and direct censorship method. 
In essence, while the presence of laws might be a direct cause of journalists censoring themselves out 
of fear, there is also a detectable trend of them exercising a certain degree of judgement based on, 
not imposition of law, but an unspoken expectation of what the government wants. This is 
represented in the ‘thinking behind the laws’, identified by the current editor, that affects the ‘culture 
and climate’ of journalistic practice, as noted by the former editor. (See appendices M and N) For 
mainstream media, this revolves around an internalised understanding, where practitioners truly 
believe that the state expects the media to be docile towards the government of the day by assuming 
a non-confrontational role, to the extent of agreeing with it as the natural course of action for a media 
entity seeking to be professional. In this way, self-censorship is not nearly as efficacious as the self-
surveillance by media practitioners, “a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by 
interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance 
over, and against, himself” (Foucault, 1980, p. 155). Media practitioners impose on themselves the 
values of the state, internalised as a corporate-cultural practice of what the media should and should 
not do, which subsequently defines editorial practices, and more importantly, editorial principles, that 
align with the status quo. 
For online media, the lack of access to information works in a similar fashion, whereby practitioners 
actively refrain from using information that they cannot verify with the government. While the 
government is aware that it can never fully control online media the way it can with mainstream 
media, this does not stop them from exercising power over them through the denial of information 
that is critical to journalistic work. The use of laws is not nearly as efficacious as an exercise of power 
that is dependent on who retains the most information and control how such information is used. This 
concept aligns with Foucault’s critique of a government’s desire to accumulate and control knowledge, 
to the effect that the act of creating and managing such knowledge enhances the effects of power 
(Foucault, 1980). In the Singapore context, the desire by the media to professionalise or to remain 
professional means that it is better to avoid publishing information that is unsubstantiated by official 
sources, rather than risk being labelled as sensationalistic. Any deviation from these established norms 
of professionalism – for instance, when a journalist chooses to challenge an information blackout by 
publishing without an official statement from the government – meant that media practitioners risk 
being called out for peddling untruths or attempting to subvert the government. The double-bind 
difficulty of the situation – information denial and the pressures of running a poorly-resourced 
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independent online news outfit – presents a serious difficulty for most online media practitioners 
(Balji, 2016). 
The combined factors of a tightened economic environment and a culture of self-surveillance has led 
to the creation of a media industry that is willingly more circumspect in editorial policy to favour the 
government. It is important to note that such an approach to governance is neither unilaterally applied 
to all media channels, be they mainstream or online, nor is it as obviously coercive through the 
execution of laws and regulatory regimes. Instead, Foucault points to a measured and strategic form 
of governance that is clearly attributable to how Singapore controls the media environment, whereby 
“the good governor does not have to have a sting – that is to say, a weapon of killing, a sword – in 
order to exercise his power; he must have patience rather than wrath, and it is not the right to kill, to 
employ force, that forms the essence of the figure of the governor” (Foucault, 1991, p. 96). Instead, 
to attain good governance, Foucault suggested that a government must have two qualities – wisdom, 
which he refers to “the knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and should be attained, and 
the disposition of things required to reach them”; and diligence, which is earmarked by “the principle 
that a governor should only govern in such a way that he thinks and acts as though he were in the 
service of those who are governed” (Foucault, 1991, p. 96). It would be fair to say that the Singapore 
government has managed to gain wisdom when governing media given its ability, intentional or 
otherwise, to identify the limits of governance with different media types, and to then strategically 
deploy means that are most appropriate to different media platforms. However, the principle of 
diligence appears to be less efficaciously deployed. Interviewees have identified areas where the 
Singapore government’s attempt to control the media, particularly through the narratives surrounding 
the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods, presented inherent problems not because 
they were ineffective, but because they call into question the intent and benevolence of the 
government. 
Tightening of media restrictions inherently problematic for governance 
The heavily publicised and mediated narratives surrounding the Select Committee on Deliberate 
Online Falsehoods presented unique challenges that prompted doubt among interviewees about the 
government’s intent in having a ‘fake news’ law. Questions were raised about whether the state was 
keen to protect citizens against the ‘scourge of fake news’, or if it was more interested in maintaining 
its own political hegemony. Such criticisms did not come just from interviewees publicly known to be 
critical and suspicious of the government’s exercise of power – namely, online media practitioners 
and human rights activists. These views were similarly held by those more inclined to give the 
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government the benefit of the doubt – namely, mainstream media practitioners, legal professionals 
and academia. 
At the time of the interviews conducted before December 2018, the precise direction of POFMA was 
yet unknown to the interviewees. However, many shared concerns about the lack of clarity in how 
‘fake news’ is defined, particularly at the conclusion of the Select Committee hearings. Han pointed 
out that “it is troubling that they are not upfront with defining what it is they want to exercise power 
over, because it keeps people afraid and vague over what they can and cannot do.” Interviewees 
expressed concerns that the eventual use of legislation would be used to silence the government’s 
critics rather than to maintain racial and religious harmony, as it was originally purported to do. “In 
the recommendations that the Select Committee has made, the clarity of definition of what you mean 
by falsehoods and false news is still very arbitrary,” said Mathi. “What is a deliberate online falsehood? 
Until today, they are refusing to define it,” said Han. “They keep saying it is possible to define, so 
define it now! But they don’t want to, and it is very troubling that they are going to keep it so loose, 
because how would we even know that we are on the same page on what we are talking about?” A 
human rights activist also expressed scepticism about the actual threat that disinformation pose to 
Singapore. “Until now, they haven’t been able to show what are the real threats to Singapore,” he 
said. “They get all these witnesses to talk, but when we read the news about what these witnesses 
said, we are still not convinced that Singapore faces this threat” (See Appendices C, D and J). 
Vagueness in legislative or policy directions not only makes the government appear less credible, but 
also makes its authority open to challenge. Balji pointed out that such vagueness in laws meant that 
the government’s authority can be challenged by those concerned with fair and just application of the 
laws. “Can the government be taken to court? I think they should,” he said. “How can it be for only 
one party? And (the government) not giving the full information – would that be fake news as well?” 
Similar concerns were raised by the managing editor of Mothership, Martino Tan, who pointed out 
that the vagueness is particularly troubling when it comes time to implement the laws. “While most 
of us can agree with the very narrow interpretation, can we all agree with a potentially vague 
definition of that narrow interpretation in the future?” The former mainstream media editor 
interviewed pointed out concerns with “laws that are too open-ended and too discretionary” as they 
“have been changed to tilt the balance of power towards the executive”, which then raises suspicion 
towards the government in how it would use, or even abuse, those laws. “Once you have a fake news 
law, I think it immediately loses its utility in some respects, because people will look at it as an attempt 
to manage the narrative or even to suppress inconvenient discourse or dissent rather than, say, to 
deal decisively with an issue that impacts upon racial and religious harmony, which might be what the 
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use of the fake news law was intended to deal with in the first place,” said E. Tan. “It has this 
homogenising effect, whether it is sedition, race, language and religion, or falsehoods, they all get 
lumped together. Any fake news law would then more likely be seen as an instrument that any 
government of the day can instrumentally use for its own particularistic ends” (See Appendices A, F, 
H and M). Thus, while vague laws that are open to interpretation at the point of use allows the 
government excessive discretion in their application, such vagueness also prompts suspicion of abuse, 
which does not help the government if it wishes to be seen as credible and legitimate. 
Similarly, implementing a ‘fake news’ law along vague terms, while allowing the government more 
latitude in tackling ‘online falsehoods’, does not necessarily lend itself to efficacious governance. Law 
academic E. Tan pointed out that the Select Committee process suggested that the government’s 
approach to the issue has been “over-diagnosed and over-prescribed”. He explained that over-
diagnosis meant the government has “deliberately or otherwise, exaggerated a threat that may not 
be so serious where there is a clear and present danger”. “If you over-diagnose, you might have large 
segments of society perhaps believing that nothing is to be trusted, and that to me is a bigger 
problem,” he said. Conversely, E. Tan took over-prescription to mean that “the cure might be worse 
than the disease” which is worrisome because “in the end, you may take away the ability of the 
average Singaporean to discern and judge where the truth lies… If as a society we rely on the 
government to tell us what to believe and not to believe, then we are in trouble. What it means is that 
if people don’t believe in the government anymore, when they say, let’s suppose, something is black, 
people will interpret it as white.” E. Tan’s views, aimed at cultivating an active and engaged citizenry, 
suggested a need for the government to take a more nuanced position on legislation and how it is 
used, so as to cultivate a public that can place greater trust in its legitimacy. (See Appendix F) 
Interviewees also shared their views about the intent of the Select Committee, and two media 
academics were encouraged by the government’s decision to convene the panel to engage the public. 
“Because of this whole online disinformation and the Select Committee, and the mobilisation of a 
huge swath of stakeholders, I think one of the significant effects of the process was the recognition 
that this was a problem that everyone must take ownership,” said one media academic. “Of course, 
some critics said it is for show,” opined another media academic. “But for us to do our job and 
contribute to the process, we want to think that it is set up to do what it is supposed to do, and that 
there is a possibility of the process making a difference” (See Appendices K and L). 
Even so, the use of a Select Committee need not always be indicative of a government that is willing 
to be open in consultation. Law academic K. Tan noted that “the Singapore government uses these 
kinds of committee for all sorts of things, not just for censorship. I think that is their way of gaining 
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some form of legitimacy for the policy that is being articulated. But at the same time, it is also a very 
weird form of elitist democratic display.” M. Tan expressed concerns that the process of consultation 
designed for POFMA was not intended to be a genuine platform for soliciting views. “While they had 
those interactions, there was a sense that… perhaps they have already made up their minds.” 
Suggestions were made that the hearings were an attempt at establishing legitimacy using narratives. 
“There is no doubt that the Select Committee, which was PAP dominated, wanted to put forth a 
certain narrative even as it sought to solicit a variety of expert views and layman perspectives,” said 
E. Tan. “I know the typical description is that of a blank slate – they welcome diverse views, and it is 
the representors who define the narrative. But if you look at the line of questioning that was taken 
and those asked to give evidence, they obviously wanted to put forth a certain narrative… My view is 
that the Select Committee was really there to create a consensus that something needs to be done” 
(See Appendices F, G and H). 
Despite the government’s perceived attempt to create an affirmative narrative through the hearings, 
some interviewees were sceptical about the legitimacy of the Select Committee, particularly given the 
conduct of Committee members during the hearings, which in turn reflected negatively on the 
government’s purported interest in tacking an issue of national concern. The bulk of these views were 
informed by the session involving Thum Ping Tjin, a historian who claimed in his submission that “‘fake 
news’ is not a problem in Singapore — with one major exception… That is the politicians of Singapore’s 
People’s Action Party” (Thum, 2018, p. 4). Thum’s claim led to a six-hour debate with Committee 
member and Law Minister K Shanmugam, who questioned his research and his academic position at 
the University of Oxford, which human rights group MARUAH had called “a process of intense 
interrogation” (Y. Low, 2018). 
Regardless of the accuracy of Thum’s submission, interviewees generally felt that the Select 
Committee’s conduct was reproachable and led to suspicion about the government’s intent. “I felt 
that the Select Committee, in certain instances, were not fully respectful of how people have put 
themselves out to share what they wanted for Singapore,” said Mathi. “I felt that there was an offline 
approach to the mandate to try to make one of them admit to certain things that was not part of the 
mandate.” Mathi’s views were shared by the former editor: “I was very annoyed that the Select 
Committee seemed more intent on turning it into an interrogation than a proper solicitation of 
feedback… This is a feedback role, so I’m a bit puzzled as to why they chose to see it (necessary) to 
debunk your points when it should have been more to seek understanding.” M. Tan took issue with 
how “such a narrow way of questioning doesn’t allow our own interpretation of the laws to be 
addressed fully”, and Han identified an attempt by the Committee to force-fit participants into fixed 
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parameters of the ‘fake news’ issue. “It felt very much like they already had a conclusion and it was a 
cross-examination to pigeon-hole you into either agreeing or at least caving in to that conclusion,” she 
said. George extended this view by drawing parallels with the broader economic environment that 
inhibits the growth of the media industry. “That’s what I find alarming about the Select Committee 
process – not that the process itself was so out of the ordinary, but it is taking place in this context 
where for someone like Thum Ping Tjin, the signal being given is that he is declared as an enemy of 
the state,” said George. “There are serious consequences outside of the state, even outside of politics 
and within his profession. In that sense, this is extremely problematic” (See Appendices B, C, D and H). 
Indicatively, while the Singapore government had attempted to use strong narratives and consensus 
building to affirm its legitimate right to rule and pass laws on the ‘fake news’ issue, such a dedicated 
and painstakingly crafted effort need not necessarily work as desired if it is unable to demonstrate the 
integrity of its intention as one that benefits the governed. The specific case of the Select Committee 
hearings reflected the inadequacies that Foucault has identified in his concept about the art of 
governance, whereby “the objective of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect 
the principality, but with this last understood to mean not the objective ensemble of its subjects and 
the territory, but rather the prince’s relation with what he owns, with the territory he has inherited or 
acquired, and with his subjects” (Foucault, 1991, p. 90). Foucault’s analysis of ‘the prince’, broadly 
construed as the sovereign ruler who appears interested in imposing authority but who in reality is 
interested in establishing legitimacy, aptly reflects the Singapore government and its approach 
towards media governance. Merely asserting a narrative to establish sovereignty – the right to rule – 
without considering the interest and response of those the government seeks to govern is not only a 
negative demonstration of modern democracy, but an inadequate and ineffective way of governing. 
Foucault noted that “in the art of government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards 
and a downwards direction’, in which upward continuity refers to how the government governs itself 
and its assets, while downward continuity is established by the policing of the governed. In the case 
of the Select Committee hearings, the government’s attempt to only establish downward continuity 
through gruelling hearings and forceful narratives, without first moving upwards to establish its own 
standards, led to the scepticism reflected in the views of my interviewees. 
The eventual effect that POFMA would have on the government’s legitimacy and efficacy in media 
governance is discussed in Chapter 7 and summarised in Chapter 8, the concluding chapter of this 
thesis. It is worth noting at this juncture that at the conclusion of the interviews, all my interviewees 
appear to express some degree of concern about the weakness in governance that was revealed 
during the Select Committee hearings that preceded the eventual passing of POFMA into law. To my 
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interviewees, this has less to do with the government not demonstrating sufficient power through a 
show of force, but rather that it demonstrated force with little attempt at demonstrating reason. It 
became clear from the interviews that the Singapore government needed to build an enabling 
relationship with the media, rather than pin it down with disabling laws and regulations. Such a 
relationship needs careful and painstaking cultivation, and if done right, would help to affirm its 
legitimacy among the media industry it seeks to govern. The discussion of the next theme examines 
this relationship and considers the positions of both mainstream and online media in their relationship 
with the government. 
Theme 2: Public trust and the degradation of government-media relations 
The Singapore government’s close working relationship with mainstream media is not a new theory. 
Cheong Yip Seng, former chief editor of The Straits Times related many instances in his book, OB 
Markers, where the government has demanded compliance from the national broadsheet (Cheong, 
2013). Cheong detailed how former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew would berate journalists and editors 
when they failed to meet his standards, but would nevertheless take pains to explain, on most 
occasions, his high expectations for the newspaper. The key take-away from Cheong’s biography is 
that, no matter how unreasonable the demands of the government for how The Straits Times ran their 
stories, the government always had an interest to engage with the media and explain its position. 
For some interviewees, this approach by the government towards mainstream media – strict but 
appearing completely reasonable – formed the base standard for how the government has engaged 
with media outlets over the years. “The press, as (Lee Kuan Yew) sees it, must help the citizens who 
were readers of the papers understand the realities facing a vulnerable, struggling third-world city 
trying to make it in this part of the world,” said the current editor. “The media has an educational role 
in doing that. It is not a watchdog of the government, meaning he doesn’t want to see newspapers 
campaigning on issues, all the time taking on the government as they do in the West.” In the editor’s 
opinion, this mindset continues to be the modus operandi for how the government today relates to 
the media. There is also a sense from my interviewees that maintaining this role of the media is an 
uneasy balancing act that cannot be over-done. “On the one hand, it needs to project a sense of 
openness and semblance of democracy to attract foreign investors to set up shop here and not to 
alarm those who are already here that we are turning into a police state,” said Think Centre, “and on 
the other hand to come up with even more creative solutions on how to tackle criticism. This careful 
calibration of the noose around civic space is extremely delicate.” Such delicateness would be 
negotiated between the state and the media, rather than enforced, but that is not to say that it is any 
less forceful. “This culture of control sitting on you is very severe,” said Balji. “You will be totally 
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inclined to believe in them, to give their point of view. And sometimes, they have very good 
arguments, so it is not difficult to be convinced by them” (See Appendices A, N and O). 
However, while Cheong might have highlighted a long history of such negotiations, my interviewees 
expressed concerns that the same political acumen of negotiating with media practitioners might not 
be a regular and prominent feature in the current administration under Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong, nor the administration that will come after Lee’s retirement, commonly dubbed Singapore’s 
‘4G leadership’. The reasons for this inability, as identified by my interviewees, can be broadly 
summarised into two factors. The first points to a political leadership that is uncertain about its own 
position regarding media relations. The second points to evolving rules of engagement that concerns 
a more discerning public. 
Political leadership not engaging the media as they should 
Interviewees generally recognised that the Singapore government saw the need to retain its 
legitimacy to govern and was dependent on the media to enhance this legitimacy among the voting 
public. “The determination on the part of the government to at least maintain some level of credibility 
means that (mainstream media publications) will not degenerate into propaganda mouthpieces,” said 
E. Tan. “The day that they do means that the government has lost the plot.” This view was echoed by 
the former editor. “We need to build a consensus around something in the media… Whatever it is, 
your package still needs to gravitate around something, get a consensus, that huge thing that people 
can all rally around. You can’t do that if people can see that the mainstream media is under your 
thumb.” The state’s ability to maintain this legitimacy is also dependent on its ability to exercise the 
right levels of control through media laws and regulations. “State intervention is also important – the 
government has a role to protect vulnerable individuals in society,” said the human rights activist. “I 
wouldn’t say that just because I gave the government this kind of power, it is bad. The question is 
what kind of government we have now, and the extent to which laws reflect the views of stakeholders 
and society” (See Appendices F, J and M). 
Notably, most interviewees were less convinced that the Singapore government is exercising the 
appropriate levers of control over the media. While one media academic felt that the government has 
been constant and consistent in policing publications and public expression through OB markers that 
relate to race, language and religion, other interviewees noted that the specific nuancing in using 
these laws proved more revealing and worrying. “If you have a government that is democratic, then 
we wouldn’t be in a situation where we are so scared of what they can do, or that they will use it to 
clamp down on us,” said the human rights activist, who was also of the view that “the democratic 
119 
 
process of building institutions and trust, and developing a critical citizenry, is troublesome and might 
work against (the government). So it is not in their interest, and getting very blunt laws to deal with it 
is the best solution.” Former broadcast producer Viswa Sadasivan elaborated on the close relationship 
between media control, free expression and public trust in the government. “People are terrified to 
put their views across. This is not healthy on several fronts… because in any society where the 
mainstream media is not viewed as a credible source of information, the entire society pays a price. 
When it comes to a crisis issue, an existential threat to the nation, the government of the day needs 
to have a platform to communicate with credibility” (See Appendices E and J). 
Sadasivan’s point on public trust in the government was a key focus in his interview, but it was also a 
sentiment shared by other interviewees. The former editor pointed out that the government holding 
too much power is akin to “basically trying to guess that they will exercise it responsibly… I don’t think 
laws should be in the book and then I have to depend on your promise”. Sadasivan also pointed out 
that “if (the government) want to recover public trust, you need to demonstrate that legislation is not 
being used as a tool to muzzle alternative voices.” He made a specific reference to the Administration 
of Justice Act, passed in 2016 and used against activist Jolovan Wham and opposition politician John 
Tan in October 2018 (Lum, 2018). “It had a very negative effect on the ground, and people started 
asking why there is a need for something like this. When something like that is introduced, people 
start asking if the government has something else in mind.” While neither Jolovan Wham nor John Tan 
can be considered journalists, actions against non-journalists would just as likely have an impact on 
journalists. “Because it is so entrenched that sometimes, even when there is no fence, we think that 
there is a fence,” said Han. “But that gets perpetuated, amplified and reinforced when the leadership 
also does all these petty things. Every time they exert force, they reinforce the idea in people’s mind 
that there is a fence, which perpetuates self-censorship” (See Appendices C, E and M). 
On the other hand, the government’s willingness to allow more freedom in journalistic practice – a 
process that requires careful and sensitive calibration of legal frameworks with a good appreciation 
of the more altruistic goals of journalism – would grant the government more affirmation from a polity 
it wishes to win over with conviction. “We are not saying that there should be no rules and regulations 
– no country can function that way,” said Sadasivan. “Hopefully, instead of hard rules and regulations, 
we can have conventions, codes of conduct, code of engagement, you know, where everybody signs 
off on a certain code. But if there is no signing off, and there is no clear understanding of why and 
where the shifts are taking place, and when the goalposts keep shifting, public trust ends up being the 
victim.” The loosening of political space for critique was a point echoed by Han: “To improve, the 
media need to be braver, but in the long run what we do need would be that change in the politics. 
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We need a government that isn’t so controlling and authoritarian that they would want to interfere 
or intimidate” (See Appendices C and E). Interviewees concurred that a demonstration of efficacious 
media governance is not congruent with the government’s unfettered right to use legal instrument. 
Instead, it is heavily dependent on a balance between laws and, to some extent, engaging with the 
media on their terms. 
Interviewees pointed out that such a mode of engagement with media practitioners requires the 
government to recognise and accept critical journalism as an affirmation to healthy political 
governance, rather than as an impediment to political control. “The Singapore model works well in a 
situation where the government is benign and enlightened,” said E. Tan. “Benign in the sense that it 
leaves it to the media professionals to go about their jobs professionally and doesn’t make media 
outlets become propagandistic. Enlightened, in that they know that if a media outlet loses credibility, 
people are not going to consult and turn to it.” This suggests that the legitimacy of the government is 
intimately tied with the credibility of the media it governs, which need not mean the media has to be 
subservient. “The more accommodating the media is (to diversity of opinion), the more credible it will 
be, because it will not just sound like the government line,” said K. Tan. “The facts will still be there, 
the opinions will differ because there is always more than one way of looking at an issue.” Sadasivan 
shared this view by relating to state-media proximity. “Basically, it is not to say we don’t want to 
support you, but we need a certain distance for us to support you during difficult times. It is a twisted 
argument in some sense, but I can’t be close to you if you want me to speak up for you” (See 
Appendices E, F and G). 
In addition to their critique on the government’s relationship with mainstream media, interviewees 
also expressed dissatisfaction about the government’s relationship with online media, albeit for 
different reasons. Sadasivan was of the view that the political far-left positioning of independent news 
websites like The Online Citizen and The Independent Singapore made it difficult for the government 
to engage them. “They are talking to people in online media that they feel are aligned. So they are 
talking to Mothership. They are certainly not talking to TOC and The Independent. But that is 
understandable – TOC and, to a lesser extent, The Independent, they don’t expect it, they have 
established themselves.” However, as M. Tan revealed, even that courtesy afforded Mothership was 
highly limited. “I felt that sometimes, the regulators do not enter that relationship on the basis of 
trust. They are wondering who these people are, are they Singaporeans, why are they doing this?... If 
you are a site like Mothership where I think the government can appreciate our influence, then they 
will tend to maybe over-interpret every single thing that we write. There is that sense of unease, 
nervousness” (See Appendices E and H). 
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Several interviewees perceived that political leadership’s inability to engage with online media stems 
both from the reluctance to trust online media practitioners and the fundamental difference in how 
online media are typically perceived to be in opposition to mainstream media practitioners, with 
whom the government has a relatively better working relationship with. Online media practitioners, 
given their distance from the political elite, are able to practice a different kind of journalism that 
many interviewees do not dispute to be of value to society. “I see these platforms as being valuable, 
because they do highlight certain social political issues and remind young people that… there are 
deep-seated social issues that we as citizens need to think about for the long road,” said a media 
academic. But it is also precisely this ideological difference that increases political wariness of online 
media. “Some politicians may not even have an understanding of media in general, in the sense the 
Western concept of the media being the Fourth Estate,” said M. Tan. (See Appendices H and K) This 
point echoed what the current editor believed to be a fundamental disdain among the political 
leadership about the media being a watchdog of the government.  
There is broad concurrence among my interviewees that the Singapore government needs to be more 
circumspect in how it relates to the media industry and engages with media practitioners. The 
excessive use of laws to control media practitioners might exact compliance from them in the short 
term, but erodes government legitimacy in the long term. It is the “creation of new institutional forms 
and practices that included representative governments, the creation and legitimation of a public 
opinion to which rulers had to respond and means of publicity, such as a press, all of which increased 
social transparency” (Garnham, 2007, p. 204). It is telling that many of those interviewed would not 
deny the need for legal constraints on the media, but they also appear to subscribe to the concept 
that “a society without constraints is unimaginable”, although “the more such constraints have been 
democratically arrived at, the better” (Pickett, 2005, p. 108). 
State-media relationship and a more discerning public 
The finessing of government-media relations must also consider the government’s relationship with 
those governed – in this case, Singapore citizens, from whom the government derives its legitimacy. 
The media becomes a vital cog in securing this legitimacy, not merely as a propaganda mouthpiece to 
affirm the government’s position, but as a platform to engage and convince citizens. “(Mainstream 
media companies) take the view that the mainstream media must increasingly shape public opinion, 
particularly when the average Singaporean has a variety of alternative media sources right now and 
may even dwell in their echo chambers,” said E. Tan. “Because of that, the (mainstream) media 
companies face the challenge of remaining credible as purveyors of information and opinion so as to 
ensure their commercial viability.” This view was echoed by the current editor, who believed that in 
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spite of the limitations placed on mainstream media, its credibility lies with readers, not by pandering 
to the government. “The mainstream media operate within a certain context, and they internalise 
what is allowed and what is not, and what would go over the OB markers, and try to have the ball in 
the fairways. But they also believe that they need to serve their readers. It is a commercial enterprise, 
and they know that if the readers don’t find the paper useful for them because it is not credible or 
whatever, then they will stop reading it.” This was particularly the case with the internet, because 
“when people have a variety of sources, and if they are dropping products by these two companies 
because they don’t find them credible, that is also going to affect the companies as well,” said E. Tan. 
(See Appendices F and N) 
Hence, media governance becomes a delicate balancing act of, on the one hand, ensuring that the 
media retains its credibility, and on the other hand, building a close relationship with the media to 
ensure it is mostly sympathetic to the government and its policies. In the historical context of 
Singapore’s media industry, such a balancing act meant that laws and regulation have a diminished 
role to play. For E. Tan, it was more critical that the original media architecture remains largely intact 
– “the idea of two dominant players providing some degree of competition; that the media does not 
see itself as the fourth estate but having instead a nation-building agenda; the need to ensure these 
two entities are not only credible and reliable by the public but also seen to be so. That they may be 
more inclined towards the government in their editorial slant is less of a concern, where people don’t 
regard them as rubber-stamping mouthpieces or completely propagandistic.” Such an approach 
requires due consideration be given to the self-actualising needs of the reading public, and on this 
count, some interviewees were of the view that Singapore’s media industry is simply not meeting the 
mark. In analysing the success of mainstream media, the current editor felt that the commercial 
success of the newspaper and broadcast industry does not necessarily reflect its ability to fulfil its 
social function. “We have a more educated and literate population, a more mature society… So 
considering all that progress and development in Singapore, and looking at the quality of mainstream 
media, I would say that it has not upped its game as you would hope it would as society progresses 
and develops.” This has partly to do with the stonewalling of both mainstream and online media. 
“There is no winner – both mainstream media and online media are not getting the information they 
ought to, or they are getting generalised answers when it comes to mainstream media,” said Mathi. 
This was a view that Han agreed with: “Stonewalling a journalist is not just the journalist’s problem. 
There is a wider impact of not being able to get access to information. It matters to you because you 
are the one not getting the information, if we are being stonewalled and are not able to bring things 
to your attention” (See Appendices C, D, F and N). 
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Should the government choose to conceive of the media purely as a propaganda tool to advance its 
nation-building agenda, it will create a disconnect between the itself and the media as much as 
damage the media’s credibility with citizens, in turn risking damage to its own public credibility. At 
least ten out of the 15 interviewees suggested that should the Singapore government choose to 
tighten its grip on the media, the impact on a citizenry that is disengaged from what they see as a 
propagandistic state media might actually harm the government’s trust-building efforts. Interviewees 
mentioned that government intervention in the media industry has led to a diminishing quality of 
what both mainstream and online media produce, to the extent that the media can no longer be useful 
as a credible source of information, much less a nation-building tool. “Because of how the media is 
tightly controlled over the years, scepticism and suspicion have built up against local mainstream 
media as alternative sources of news become more readily available,” noted Think Centre in its 
interview response. Mathi also believed that that the government’s decision to limit media freedom 
has led to readers doubting the reliability and credibility of any specific media source. “We are not 
really getting that much reporting because the space is restricted,” she said. “We are also not getting 
that kind of brilliance very often when it comes to opinion pieces. So we have become, as readers, the 
nomads. We are constantly shifting to find alternative sources on the same stories so that we can get 
a better understanding of what is going on.” K. Tan agreed that this nomadic readership impacts the 
broader issue of governance that goes beyond the value of good journalism – “I think it has to be a 
state-based question – in other words, is this good for Singapore? I would think of it holistically, as 
opposed to whether it is good for a newspaper company” (See Appendices D, G and O). It would 
appear that, rather than affirm the trustworthiness of mainstream media, and by extension the 
trustworthiness of the government, media restriction has led to the opposite, to the point of possibly 
diluting the public legitimacy of the government’s voice on matters of public interest. 
The erosion of legitimacy might not necessarily be resolved by the diversity of political coverage found 
in online media. Think Centre cautioned against seeing the presence of alternative independent media 
as a purely positive development of a more discerning public, since it has also led to “some media 
houses sensationalising or putting forward non-objective viewpoints to allow readers to feed their 
scepticism of mainstream media. Due to limited alternative media exposure, readers who grow 
suspicious of mainstream media tend to buy in more easily to media houses purporting to offer a 
different view, regardless of whether it can be measured for factual accuracy and truth.” Such 
extremism found in online media is also hurting the public’s ability to think rationally about 
government policy, a view that the former editor was concerned about. “You need that end because 
this end is like that. But it’s not balance, it’s a division! …(If) they are at extreme sides, how would they 
be able to come together to argue?” (See Appendices M and O) 
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From the insights gained from these stakeholder interviews, we can expand on current perspectives 
and understandings about media governance and the role of the media in Singapore. The inter-
relationship between the government, the media and the public has significant implications on 
governance, since the media “engage with the problem of societal complexity, constituting new 
modes of interaction based on visibility: media personnel occupy the specialist role of selecting, 
processing and producing vast networks of symbols and significant information (they are gatekeepers 
and agenda setters), discursively interrogating decision makers (they serve as advocates), and making 
accessible the world ‘out there’ (or, rather, selecting segments and constructing versions of it)” 
(Goode, 2005, pp. 93-94). The media also serves a public-sphere role, acting as the intermediary 
between the public and the government to allow the public to formulate judgement about 
government policies and decisions.  The media, in effect, constitutes us as citizens participating in the 
governance process. 
However, this process of creating public participation is not always open and democratic, for “it is the 
discursive practices of the journalist which have the power to ‘make true’ particular regimes of truth, 
that see the journalist participating (although perhaps unwittingly) in the ‘government’ of modern 
society” (Hobbs, 2008, p. 12). The media does not simply reflect the political environment to citizens, 
but actively shape and constitute citizenship. In Singapore, the government recognises the immense 
value of the media as “systems of thought to regulate and control society, those that make true 
discursive formations which might have very little actual validity” (Hobbs, 2008, p. 14), but it cannot 
possibly seek to bend the media to its will through laws and regulations. In fact, most interviewees 
were of the view that laws seldom come into play as a means of coercing media entities and 
practitioners, since “function of law as a coercive technique of sovereignty has been displaced and 
reinscribed in its role in normalizing power” (Dean, 2010, p. 141). Instead, it is the government’s ability 
to build a relationship based on trust and understanding for its nation-building role that allows it to, 
not coerce, but convince the media of its position. It is “a rationality and technology of government” 
that encourages “the participation of the governed in the ‘governmental economy’” (Dean, 2010, p. 
143) and to get them to support a certain “economy of truth” (King, 2009, p. 302). Doing so requires 
the Singapore government to carefully negotiate its boundaries with the media, and through the 
media, its relationship with the public. 
What interviewees found concerning was what they perceive to be the government abandoning the 
relationship building process with the media. This has led to what interviewees perceive to be an 
urgent need for the government to renegotiate its relationship with the media, particularly 
mainstream media as it is seen by most interviewees to have the greatest impact on how the public, 
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in turn, relates to the government. This urgency is, in no small part, attributable to the presence of 
online media, regardless of how much it has actually contributed to public discourse. “I think (online 
media) has made the people and the government think about whether the news they are getting from 
official media is something they need to find ways to tweak.” said Balji. According to Sadasivan, this 
renegotiation is already taking place. “There is kind of a quiet uprising within the editorial groups 
within The Straits Times. They are saying that this relationship cannot go on. It doesn’t mean that we 
are going to be anti-government, but it is in the best interest of the government for us to renegotiate. 
I think the conversations are happening. I know for a fact that some of the influential ministers are 
already talking to these people, initiated by the SPH leadership… I think there are people within 
government who are beginning to question whether this relationship is really in the best interest” (See 
Appendices A and E). Sadasivan’s insight appears to be shared by the current editor, who in his parting 
remarks during the interview appeared to have affirmed this renegotiation: 
Even though the fundamental thinking (of the government) has not changed with respect to the 
media, their role and how they operate, obviously the whole environment has changed. I feel 
they need to manage it in a different way. But to do that, you need a very deep understanding 
of the media and how it operates – what are the really important issues, how media in Singapore 
can be successful, thrive, retain the journalists, what motivates them and all that. You need to 
have that deep understanding. I don’t think there is that deep understanding in government 
today, and that is a big problem. They need to develop that relationship with people in the 
media, and through that relationship develop that understanding, and find a way of establishing 
maybe a new relationship, a new way of looking at media, and taking in the changes that are 
happening in Singapore society and the challenges that are facing mainstream media. (See 
Appendix N) 
Conclusion – a relationship renegotiated? 
The expert interviews conducted for this thesis have established a number of themes and sub-themes 
relating to the evolving media governance environment in Singapore, emanating from my analysis of 
the collective views of my interviewees. At this juncture, it is worth revisiting the research question 
for this thesis, considering these themes and sub-themes. In a more restrictive media environment 
where trust between the government and the media is gradually eroding, the government’s tactics to 
maintain efficacious governance, particularly as it seeks to rein in independent online media, becomes 
more complex. As outlined in the sections above, the views gathered from my interviews suggests a 
concurrence among stakeholders of the Singapore media environment that legal instruments have 
limited direct impact on the practice of journalism. Nevertheless, laws remain potent tools in sending 
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signals to the media industry and the broader reading public. The use of laws serves a more critical 
function in signalling what the government expects of media practitioners, establishing the boundaries 
and requirements of the media’s ‘social responsibility’, as outlined in Chapter 4. Laws also form part 
of the broader governance framework, such that any media organisation that has run afoul of the law 
cannot operate within the ambit of an economic framework that is heavily skewed towards the 
political elite. Journalists need not even break the law – just the mere association with ‘anti-
government’ tendencies is sufficient to dissuade advertisers and investors. This close association 
between the legal and economic environment, and how it has been entrenched through displays of 
preferred conduct has been detailed in Chapter 3. 
My interviewees offered valuable insights that aided in completing the analysis offered by current 
literature, which tends to suggest that the Singapore government uses legal and economic 
instruments to either coerce or co-opt media practitioners into submission. Contrary to such analysis, 
there is broad concurrence among my interviewees that the government sees no benefit in a 
completely docile and subservient media industry, and this preference need not necessarily be tied to 
its desire for Singapore to be seen as an open and democratic country on the international stage. 
Instead, my interviewees revealed that the government prefers for the media to have some degree of 
autonomy, so that its credibility is maintained and it can best carry messages of nation-building to the 
reading public with conviction. To achieve this balance of compliance-without-conformity, the 
government is at pains to build a relationship of trust with the media, such that it is able to maintain 
its function as a conduit between the state and the people. 
However, my interviewees are less confident that the Singapore government is inclined to engage 
online media practitioners in this relationship-building process. Online media differs from mainstream 
media in terms of its funding models and editorial practices, and are generally indifferent to the 
government’s demands for ‘quality journalism’. Interviewees have pointing out that the government 
is less adept at understanding and negotiating with online media as it has done with mainstream 
media. Some interviewees have pointed out that the public debate leading to the eventual passing of 
POFMA into law suggests that it intends to use its treatment of online media as a demonstration of its 
power. This demonstration is less about the government’s desire to suppress disagreeable media 
practitioners, but more about an extension of its statehood – its sovereignty to dictate the terms of 
engagement with the media – by setting, even re-defining, the standards by which the media are 
expected to be socially responsible. Such actions do not necessarily mean that the government has 
lost control over both the media landscape and its own public legitimacy. For one, the government 
has established a long history of dominance over the media, and in view of the refreshed perspectives 
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offered by my interviewees, the next two chapters will turn towards re-evaluating this history from 
the perspective of relationship-building. Chapter 6 will detail the discursive practices that enhance this 
relationship-building process, while the case of POFMA will be discussed in Chapter 7 as an example 
of this process, conducted within the confines of passing one law. The case of POFMA demonstrated 
that, while the government’s excessive dependence on legal restrictions risked breaking the trust it 
has amassed with the media industry, such excessive use of legal instruments need not lead to any 






DISCURSIVE PRACTICES, DISCIPLINING NARRATIVES 
 
Overview 
The Singapore government has demonstrated a strong desire to justify legal actions taken against 
media practitioners. From the early days of independence, when the Internal Security Act was used 
against journalists allegedly for doing the bidding of foreign powers through to 2015 when it 
attempted to shut down The Real Singapore for publishing seditious content, the government has not 
failed to let the Singapore public know its reasons for taking firm action against media practitioners. 
It can be argued that the need to justify the use of draconian laws were necessary given the challenges 
of national security in the past, and the increased level of public scrutiny brought about by the ubiquity 
of online and social media in the present. This argument has some merit, particularly since the 
government has been encouraging citizens to use information and communication technologies to 
advance the country’s economic growth (T. Lee, 2008, 2014). This economic impetus also meant a 
need to assure citizens that their foray into online content creation comes with safe harbour 
provisions that enable their creativity on one hand, yet keep a strict control over permissible content 
– usually of a political nature – on the other. 
Such reasons for public safety and economic prosperity have resonate with citizens, but more needs 
to be done to account for a much longer history of media governance in Singapore that witnessed the 
use of public justification – and not always with economic rationalities – for the government’s actions 
against practitioners from both mainstream and online media, regardless of the severity of the 
punishment. Tracing this development demonstrates two purposes for the painstaking effort taken by 
the government to justify its incursions into the media environment. The first was to project the 
government’s public legitimacy for taking tough actions against media entities. The government is 
shown to be resolute in using its powers, yet reasonable in doing so to protect the interests of citizens. 
As far as possible, such incursions must also be done openly and democratically using the most 
appropriate laws it has on hand. The second purpose was to project the transgressor’s deviance as 
insidious attempts to undermine Singapore’s peace and public order, which is founded on national 
cornerstones of religious and racial harmony, economic and political stability for nation-building 
purposes, and at times public morality. This narrative has found support even among those critical of 
executive overreach. For instance, among those I have interviewed for the purpose of this thesis, 
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reference to ‘The Real Singapore case’ in 2015 was usually met with the view that its editors deserved 
the verdict they received. At the least, these interviewees acknowledged that the case was unique 
enough for the government to take action. These norms, values and standards of journalistic quality 
set the parameters for a ‘socially responsible’ media, and have an impact on how media entities 
conduct themselves in response to their public service duties, to the extent that transgressors 
automatically face public rebuke from the government when they fall short of such standards. 
This chapter seeks to provide an understanding of the practices of dialogue, collaboration and 
resistance found in public discourses that occur during periods where the media attempted to 
challenge the political status quo. Its key proposition is that the efficacy we find in how the media is 
governed in Singapore is dependent less on either legal or economic imperatives, but more on a 
concerted and holistic effort in public justifications using such imperatives as raison d'être. No doubt, 
laws and regulation play a dual role in enforcing compliance and describing, even dictating, the cultural 
norms of a society. However, it is the ‘disciplining narratives’ – discursive practices that define norms 
and permissibility and structure relations of social power – played out in the elaborate public 
justification of government action against media entities that affirm the Singapore government’s right 
to govern. With the emergence of the online media industry in Singapore, such narratives are 
increasingly subject to challenge by practitioners and activists, but it is also the case where the 
government’s response to these challenges form normative structures that deliberately extract and 
manage such contests to power, affirm the dominant narrative and increase the government’s 
legitimacy to rule. Such tactics are reminiscent of Foucault’s portrayal of governmentality and 
technologies of the self that citizens and media practitioners alike are asked to practise as part of their 
social conduct. 
Historical snapshot – political narratives 
Since the nation’s independence in 1965, the Singapore government has had a challenging 
relationship with the news media industry, as detailed in Chapter 3. The decade following Singapore’s 
independence witnessed a strong push by the state against media entities that failed to align with its 
national development agenda, which requires a compliant press. Practices used to exact such 
compliance include incarcerating journalists and curtailing the circulation of foreign newspapers. The 
government was publicly unapologetic in taking them to task, an approach that reflected the 
trademark style of authoritative governance by Singapore’s first Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. This 
approach was to give way to a supposedly more consultative government led by his successor, Goh 
Chok Tong, where the media was encouraged to play an active part in nation building. Goh 
relinquished the Premiership in 2004 to Lee Hsien Loong, the son of Lee Kuan Yew. The younger Lee’s 
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assumption of the post was followed by the infancy of the semi-professional online news industry in 
Singapore, led by individuals and groups not within the control of mainstream media organisations 
and were hence less reserved about raising opposition to government policies, including those relating 
to media regulation. Consequently, there is a perceptible increase in the number of legal tussles 
between the younger Lee’s administration and online media practitioners. Lee’s government was the 
first to order the shutdown of a website, The Real Singapore, and the Prime Minister himself has been 
a claimant in three defamation suits. Blogger Roy Ngerng was sued for defaming the Prime Minister 
when he published content in 2014 on his blog, The Heart Truths, that allegedly suggested Lee had 
misappropriated Singaporean’s pension funds by allowing his government to channel them to a 
sovereign wealth fund run by his wife (W. Sim, 2015). Blogger Leong Sze Hian was charged with 
defamation for sharing an article on his Facebook page, without embellishment, in 2018 that alleged 
Lee was under investigation for a money laundering scandal in Malaysia (Tham, 2020b). Chief editor 
of The Online Citizen Terry Xu was charged with defamation for an article he published in 2019 that 
quoted allegations by Lee’s siblings about his attempt to mislead his father to gain possession of the 
elder Lee’s house (Kurohi, 2019). 
Given that the legal and regulatory approaches have been detailed in the last chapter, this section will 
focus on the different narrative approaches used, to provide clarity on how the government 
attempted to justify to the public the actions taken against media entities. While the changes in 
approach are gradual and contain some degree of overlap in the specific legal and non-legal methods 
used to keep media entities in check, they can be broadly classified into the same three periods used 
in the previous chapter – early independence and incarceration, targeted media regulatory regimes, 
and liberalisation and openness. The focus of this chapter is on the third period, as the dynamics of 
the online environment in that period best demonstrates the push-back by online media practitioners 
against the government’s incursions on media freedom. Instances in the first two periods that help to 
explain the shifts in narratives over time and culminated in the current use of narratives as a tool of 
governance in the third period are detailed in their respective sub-sections. 
First period – early independence and incarceration 
The first period of media regulation in Singapore is broadly represented by Singapore’s early 
independence: from the early 1960s to the time just before dedicated laws that were directed at the 
media were passed in the mid-1970s. In this period, the public controversy surrounding The Singapore 
Herald in 1971 makes for a useful case to examine the narratives used by the government to express 
its attitude towards the conduct of media entities, in the period of early independence when it was 
negotiating its relationship with the media. On 19 May 1971, the Ministry of Culture issued a 
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statement detailing the financial standing of The Singapore Herald, specifically pointing out how the 
newspaper has consumed approximately $4.5 million in funding and was in financial debt and how 
such funds came mostly from foreign sources (Ministry of Culture, 1971a). The government made clear 
that the decision to foreclose The Singapore Herald was not due to any wish to censor the paper for 
its criticism of Singapore politicians or government policies, but for the fact that the paper was 
bankrupt. The government issued separate statements that emphasised this point: 
This is not a question of the freedom of (the newspaper’s founders and owners), both Singapore 
citizens, to speak up as Singaporeans. The question is what foreign money is going in to hire a 
lot of foreign personnel, to run a losing newspaper. (Ministry of Culture, 1971a, p. 3) 
The real issue is not freedom of the press. It is whether foreigners, including an ex-Chief Minister 
of a foreign government, and currently a high-ranking diplomat in its employ, should occupy a 
commanding position from which they could manipulate public opinion in the Republic. No 
government can allow this. (Ministry of Culture, 1971c, p. 2) 
Indicatively, this somewhat strident position adopted against the foreign media based in Singapore 
was not unreasonable to the point where Singapore can be accused of being a totalitarian state. If 
anything, the Singapore government took great pains to justify and explain why it found it necessary 
to take action against media entities that did not meet its criteria for how the media should behave in 
Singapore. In the month following the case of The Singapore Herald, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew was in Helsinki speaking at the General Assembly of the International Press Institute. Lee 
excoriated the excesses of the “Western” media, consumed by its focus on ratings and viewership, 
while also criticising China and the then-Soviet Union for tough censorship that “sealed off their 
people from the outside world” and the “heavy price” that such censorship held, leading to “drab 
uniformity” (K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 2). He continued to criticise the poor quality of purchased Western 
entertainment that has pervaded the media of developing countries, leading to negative influences 
like social unrest, “drugs, free love and hippieism” (K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 4). He noted the decline of post-
colonial newspapers that “were, by and large, unenthusiastic about independence in colonial times” 
(K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 5) but gave way to anti-establishment views once independence has been 
established in former colonies. Into this chaos and self-seeking media environment, Lee placed 
Singapore: 
What role would men and governments in new countries like the mass media to play? I can 
answer only for Singapore. The mass media can help to present Singapore's problems simply 
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and clearly and then explain how if they support certain programmes and policies these 
problems can be solved. 
More important, we want the mass media to reinforce, not to undermine, the cultural values 
and social attitudes being inculcated in our schools and universities. (K. Y. Lee, 1971, p. 6) 
In effect, Lee was cognisant of the utility of Western media in developing countries, but his ethos has 
been one of managing the ills of liberalisation that came together with Western media, while still 
tapping on the economic benefits of opening Singapore to the West through communication 
technology. His approach to doing so involved providing semantic barriers to media freedom as a 
‘foreign value of excess’, while insisting on Singapore’s sovereign right to protect its people’s cultural 
heritage and good Asian values. The argument, while partly to justify the actions against The Singapore 
Herald – which was not mentioned in Lee’s speech, but fielded during his question-and-answer session 
for the Helsinki event – should be seen more as a dedicated effort to justify a governance regime that 
sought to protect its citizens from the evils of foreign media, and simultaneously affirm Singapore’s 
position on permissible media behaviour. Meanwhile, Lee was steadfast in promoting Singapore’s 
model of media governance as the ‘moderate middle path’ that sits precariously between liberal ideals 
of free access to information and political censorship, not as a choice but as a necessity. 
The government’s use of foreign influence and manipulation as justifications for actions against media 
entities in Singapore has been a consistent theme in public discourse, which is repeated in newer 
regulatory regimes and laws. The spectre of foreign influence, to this day, plays strongly to a political 
psyche of sovereignty and serves to cast transgressors in a treasonous light. Even so, what followed 
from 1971 was the development of specific regulatory regimes that, while decidedly targeted at 
foreign media based in Singapore, had the effect of defining journalism within Singapore’s shores, 
both in terms of what the local media can and should do in its role as a nation-building press, and how 
the industry itself should be structured to maximise the fulfilment of this role. By coincidence or by 
design, the narrative of political interference by foreign media was to set the tone for the next stage 
in Singapore’s media governance, when specific regulatory regimes that targeted news media 
operations were passed.  
Second period – targeted media regulatory regimes 
The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) passed in 1974 – with the Printing Presses Ordinance, 
a colonial-era law left by the British, as its predecessor – was the first Act of Parliament in post-
independence Singapore that was specifically targeted at governing media organisations. The NPPA 
sets out specific rules for newspapers operating in Singapore, such as how a newspaper was to be 
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registered with the government and the licensing of such news production entities. The Act has been 
amended over the years and these amendments have been deemed as a means for the government 
to tighten its control over media organisation. The most significant aspect of the NPPA that has a 
perceptible control over the editorial directions of newspaper companies is in empowering the 
government to dictate their shareholders. This ruling is a decidedly neo-liberal approach that ensures 
newspapers comply with the nation-building agenda of the state without the government having any 
direct censorial inputs to daily editorial decisions (George, 2012). By dictating that the majority 
shareholders must be approved by the government, the NPPA effectively ensured that the financial 
levers to newspapers are held by those most interested to maintain the political status quo, with very 
little intervention needed by the government. 
The regulatory powers afforded by the NPPA are decidedly less draconian than the incarceration 
method used against journalists in the last period, but the Singapore government would persist in 
justifying the NPPA whenever it was used or amended. The theme of foreign interference played out 
consistently in the government’s rationalisation for implementing these regulatory strictures. For 
instance, the use of the NPPA in 1976 to revoke the printing permit for the Radiance, a student-led 
newspaper by the Singapore Polytechnic Chinese Language Society, was prefaced on the need to 
clamp down on foreign communist influence on the publication, although scant details were given 
(New Nation, 1976). Similarly, the decision in 1986 to amend the NPPA to tighten restrictions on 
foreign media was accompanied with a speech by Senior Minister S Rajaratnam at the Foreign 
Correspondents Association of South East Asia dinner held in Singapore, and again by Yeo Ning Hong, 
the Communications and Information Minister, at a Singapore Press Club event, to allay concerns that 
the move would affect Singapore’s status as a regional printing and publishing hub. Yeo cited the 
government’s insistence that newspaper owners will do what is necessary to keep their business. The 
speech was complete with remarks that pointed out the qualities and standards that newspapers must 
have if they wanted to publish in Singapore. This included the need to “ensure that no biased report 
or distortion is allowed to tarnish the reputation and credibility of their papers and in turn affect their 
circulations”, and a warning that “those who seek to malign (Singapore’s) key institutions, or to 
undermine our political, social, and economic stability, will find us uncompromising in the defence of 
our national interests and our national integrity” (The Straits Times, 1987, p. 9). Likewise, Rajaratnam 
derided the self-importance that foreigners who practice “James Bond Journalism” hold in their right 
to keep the public informed, likening it to a “licence to destroy the reputation of leaders and 
governments in Southeast Asia with impunity” (Rajaratnam, 1986, p. 3). He castigated this practice as 
a disease that is fortunately small in influence. He cited Singapore’s track record in hosting foreign 
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publications to prove that the country is not biased against the foreign press and justified the 
amendments to the law as a means of safe-guarding Singapore and the integrity of the news business. 
Such attempts at public justification are not only defensive or reactive – for instance, when the passing 
of new regulation or the use of a law against a media practitioner draws international criticism. They 
have also been used proactively when Singapore’s leaders found it necessary to explain or convince 
critics about the intrinsic merits of its tough stance against media practitioners who do not subscribe 
to its standards of practicing journalism. This approach continued when then Minister for Trade and 
Industry, Lee Hsien Loong, who would go on to become Prime Minister of Singapore from 2004, 
addressed the World Congress of Newspaper Publishers in Helsinki in 1987. Lee dismissed the value 
of the media serving as the Fourth Estate, where their unbridled power to hold public officials to 
account have granted them excessive privileges that they have then abused. He contended that the 
government’s right of reply in responses to criticism from foreign publications based in Singapore must 
be upheld, particularly given Singapore’s vulnerability to foreign agitation, the need for nation building 
and political stability to be prioritised, and the need to maintain its national values (H. L. Lee, 1987). 
This same argument has been reiterated many times over since by Lee and other ministers. Clearly, 
the Singapore government was not interested in having its way with media regulation, but also 
ensuring that, for one, its actions were justified and aligned with the country’s position as an open 
economy and, for another, that its nationalistic rationale would find resonance with media 
practitioners based in Singapore and foreign critics alike. 
While the NPPA was the first of many other laws that were added or amended to the government’s 
slate of laws that specifically targeted media operations, the key points used to justify these regulatory 
regimes – the need to protect Singapore’s sovereignty, and the enabling of a bustling cosmopolitan 
media hub – remain recurring narratives in other media laws that followed the NPPA. These narratives 
were intrinsically tied to the well-being of Singaporeans, to the extent that media regulation, no 
matter how draconian as perceived by liberal media freedom advocates or how much excessive power 
it gives the government, would always be argued to be positive. As Lee noted in Helsinki, the 
prerogative of the Singapore government was: 
…to fulfil the aspirations of its people, and accomplish the goals they have set for themselves. 
It must do this within the ambit and the circumstances which a country finds itself in, including 
the traditions of law and government which it has inherited. (H. L. Lee, 1987, pp. 3-4) 
Media regulation is therefore seen as a necessary step to protect a vulnerable new nation-state, while 
enabling its citizens to take full advantage on the open global communications network. Within this 
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narrative frame, news media practitioners are designated an important role, both as an active player 
in the global media landscape and as the protector of Singapore’s national institutions of multi-
culturalism and political stability (Kuo & Chen, 1983; T. L. Tan, 1990). The requirements of this role 
involved taking the government’s lead in defining media content, which invariably means having to 
report on the government’s position on matters of national importance, while also preserving the core 
tenets of Singapore’s cultural heritage, such as racial and religious harmony. In this framework, media 
freedom and the role of the media as a government watchdog are strongly discouraged and must give 
way to the imperatives of national harmony, political stability and economic good sense. 
To this end, the political conceptualisation of the ‘Singapore media consumer’ contains distinct 
pastoral overtones. The government was portrayed as having an obligation of moral duty to protect 
its citizens from internal strife and to ensure their self-development and growth. Such citizens, it 
argues, can only be produced through a media industry that respects the rule of law and political 
stability, and will in turn advocate for such model citizenship. To some extent, the dangers commonly 
associated with the broadcasting industry and an open economic and media environment – the 
degradation of personal morality and cultural values (K. Y. Lee, 1971) – always reside at the edges of 
the conceptualisation of economically productive citizens. This creates a tension “between a legal and 
political subject with rights and obligations, encapsulated in notions of the citizen, and the living 
individual who is the target of pastoral power, a being who is both obedient and needful” (Dean, 2010, 
p. 93). Arguably, this tension could be the result of a government trying to navigate a distinctive role 
for the media that highlights the danger of its negative influence on morality while playing up its 
positive potential for political influence. However, there is little reason to believe that such tensions 
are contradictory or undermine the government’s position on the proper conduct of journalism. 
Instead, I argue that the tension is deliberately constructed to narrate citizens as participatory 
elements of the nation-state who are cognisant of their moral duties to a patriarchal government, 
evident in the Catherine Lim and mrbrown affairs identified in Chapter 3. This interweaving of a 
socially-conscious and productive citizenry, which the government encourages the media to foster 
and promote, would be enhanced and further blurred in the third period of media governance. 
Third period – liberalisation and openness 
The move to liberalise the media sector in the early 2000s was arguably the most financially open 
period in Singapore’s news media environment. This period saw the granting of newspaper and 
broadcast licenses to the two major media companies – Singapore Press Holdings the core newspaper 
conglomerate, and Mediacorp the core broadcaster. The liberalisation was purported to allow active 
competition between the two, and by extension more content that pushes the boundaries of 
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journalistic freedom. However, this was not to be. For one, the supposed liberalisation was couched 
mainly in market, not content, terms. Singapore Press Holdings and Mediacorp were encouraged to 
cross platforms as a means of enlarging their market share, more than to go head on in a bid to offer 
more content that might be beyond the political comfort zone of the government. Market competition 
does not necessarily mean that liberalisation must come with media freedom, and this approach has 
never been paradoxical for the Singapore government (George, 2012). The desire to tap into the 
opportunities presented by global media and communication networks while maintaining a 
conservative approach to how media entities operate have been laid out even before the 
‘liberalisation’ in 2000, evident in the speeches by ministers to media practitioners as early as 1991. 
In his speech to the Press Club in 1991, then Acting Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo 
spoke at length about the preservation of Singapore’s way of life amidst growing pressure from 
external influences. Using the analogy of an open flask of whisky that is constantly being diluted when 
it is dropped into a swimming pool, Yeo highlighted the need for Singaporeans to retain their sense of 
identity. His solution: 
We need distilleries in the bottle itself, so that even as whisky is seeping out, new whisky is 
produced. These distilleries are the institutions in our society which transmit culture and values, 
the family incubators, schools, temples, mosques and churches, National Service, Parliament, 
the statutory boards, big and small Singapore companies, coffeeshops, clan associations, 
museums, the local mass media, and so on. At every moment, they secrete the essence which 
keeps us Singaporean. (G. Yeo, 1991, p. 4) 
For Yeo, local media was more than a tool for nation building; it was also a centre for producing and 
maintaining Singapore’s cultural ballast. While acknowledging the need for Singapore to increase its 
presence and economic foothold overseas, the media was also called upon to internationalise, not 
just to develop its own market, but also to expand on its pastoral role of keeping Singaporeans rooted 
to Singapore. Yeo’s call for local media to “build up the information infrastructure” was meant to “feed 
the Singaporean core, not just in Singapore, but worldwide” (G. Yeo, 1991, p. 10). Hence, the 
internationalisation of Singapore’s media industry was not just a neo-liberal approach to governing 
media practitioners, where financial imperatives trump the desire for exercising journalistic freedom. 
It was also about how media can become a part of governing the population, including Singapore’s 
diasporic communities around the world. 
Yeo’s concerns with the local duties of media outlets in an increasingly globalised media environment 
was to continue in his address to the Asian Newspaper Publishers Convention in 1995. Expounding on 
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the challenges of an increasingly multi-media world, Yeo appeared to seed the direction that 
Singapore’s media environment was set to take, where “the newspaper industry is being submerged 
into a larger and less structured multi-media industry” (G. Yeo, 1995, p. 5). However, Yeo also warned 
of “an exciting period of human history and an age of intellectual uncertainty” with “conflicts of all 
kinds, maybe even wars and revolutions” (1995, p. 6). Yeo proposed a way to survive and thrive in this 
brutish and inter-connected world: 
To do that we have to organize ourselves in a flexible way, be alert to international competition, 
stay close to the changes taking place in local communities and network with others in the 
world. Human networks which straddle diverse markets and cultural areas are growing in 
importance. They enable their members to profit from knowledge arbitrage. (G. Yeo, 1995, p. 
7) 
Even in their expansion into global media competition, the Singapore political perspective is that the 
media needs to ‘think global and act local’ by rooting their focus on national cultures while taking 
advantage of the business opportunities that globalisation presents. This approach continues to 
pervade the government’s mindset as it sought to respond to the digital media ecosystem. In 2000, 
the decision to liberalise the local media sector meant that the Singapore Press Holdings and 
Mediacorp were encouraged to take advantage of digital convergence and the internet to develop 
new content, seek out overseas partnerships, tap on international talent pools and increase audience 
share. However, the ring-fencing around local news media production would continue, in spite of the 
government granting licenses to the two local media giants to let them enter each other’s markets. 
Minister for Information and The Arts Lee Yock Suan, when addressing international and local media 
players at BroadcastAsia 2000, the annual broadcasting event in Singapore, was to set the tone for 
this liberalisation. Amidst the “new opportunities” that digital media presented, Singapore was to be 
“mindful of the need to retain (its) identity and cohesiveness as a nation” whereby the media “have a 
unique role to play to contribute to nation-building” while “keep up with the competition or lose their 
relevance” (Y. S. Lee, 2000, p. 2). The increased exposure would not affect Singapore, since “the 
regular reporting on Singaporean affairs for the Singapore audience has to be done by Singaporean 
media” (Y. S. Lee, 2000, p. 3). Lee also attempted to corral the political issues that liberalisation posed: 
The challenge posed by the new technology and convergence is not technology per se, but 
availability of quality content. We need more and better content. The Singapore audience 
prefers local content.  With SPH and MediaCorp competing in both old and new media, they will 
be better able to hold our local audience with attractive local content. (Y. S. Lee, 2000, p. 3) 
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This desire to maintain the ‘quality’ of the media went beyond advocating the production of local 
content, but the entire social-political value system to which media entities must subscribe to and play 
an active part in maintaining. The media was encouraged to maintain this political status quo, because 
of the intrinsic relationship between the media and Singapore’s political leadership. 
This mindset was to pervade the government’s navigation of online journalism as the use of online 
media platforms for political expression gained steam. Such platforms included Sintercom, founded in 
1994 but closed in 2001, and The Online Citizen, founded in 2006 and still operating today in 2021. 
Addressing the Singapore Press Club in 2009, then Acting Minister for Information, Communications 
and the Arts Lui Tuck Yew acknowledged the inherent challenges brought about by independent 
online media, but maintained that mainstream media must adhere to the core of “credible and trusted 
journalism” while using new technology to expand its reach: 
The new media advantage is speed, immediacy, prepared to serve a niche segment, providing 
opportunities for everyone who wants to be a journalist or broadcaster. They would like to 
believe that they are representing what people want to say, to hear, to do or want the 
establishment to do on their behalf… How do we hold the ground that we have so painfully 
gained over the many years of credible and trusted journalism? Tempting though it might be, 
the solution is not to import new media technology into print or into the mainstream media. 
Not their approach, not their practices, not their standards. (Lui, 2009) 
The vagaries and ‘poor quality’ of independent online media, in opposition to what mainstream media 
has produced, was portrayed by the government as a blight to the journalistic profession and must be 
avoided at all cost. On the other hand, mainstream media was to persist in enhancing its reach by 
leveraging technology, while defeating independent media by maintaining their much-vaunted 
‘quality’ and not pander to the ills of “representing what people want to say” (Lui, 2009) and what 
they expect of the government. 
In effect, the Singapore government was adamant that the threat of foreign content would not wreak 
havoc on local cultural sensibilities and insisted that internationalisation, if coupled with sound media 
governance, would enable local media practitioners to level up their ability to further protect the core 
of Singapore society. This attempt to define the limits of media freedom based on social and cultural 
expectations of media practitioners in a globalised news media industry would continue, most recently 
in the public debate surrounding POFMA, which will be discussed in the next chapter. It is important 
to note at this stage that the use of such narratives is not a recent development, nor is it the refined 
practice of a government more in tune with the globalised media environment. It is a persistent 
139 
 
practice in Singapore’s governance model, using narratives to legitimise action against media 
practitioners as much as showcase an ‘enlightened’ government that appears to exercise political 
prudence for the benefit of its governed population. There also appears to be a wedge that the 
government intended to drive between ‘good quality’ mainstream media journalism and the ‘lunatic 
fringe’ (Chang, 2011) of online media practitioners. Such a distinction effectively drives a “division 
between those who are capable of bearing the responsibilities and freedoms of mature citizenship 
and those who are not” (Dean, 2010, p. 171). The ultimate goal of such narratives was to encourage 
the government’s ‘preferred’ mainstream media to maintain its submissiveness to the government’s 
nation-building and cultural-affirming agendas, but also serve as a foil to the challenges of online 
media.  
To clarify, the development of the governance methods described above – from the use of draconian 
laws for internal security and treason to the commercial opening-up of the media sector – should not 
be equated with progress towards greater media freedom in Singapore. For one, laws are still used 
regularly to clamp down on errant media practitioners, and in the 2000s these tend to be those who 
practice their craft online. The charges laid against The Real Singapore in 2015, mentioned earlier, was 
one of many prominent examples where laws were used against journalists. Equally prominent cases 
include personal defamation lawsuits taken by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong against critics, such as 
blogger Roy Ngerng (W. Sim, 2015) and Terry Xu, the chief editor of news website The Online Citizen 
(Kurohi, 2019). The practice of justifying such legal actions continued in these cases. In the case of Xu, 
for instance, the Prime Minister’s Office claimed Xu had not only “spread false and defamatory 
allegations against him”, but also attacked “his fitness to hold office as Prime Minister and to lead the 
Government” (F. Koh, 2019). Punitive legal instruments have not been abandoned in lieu of public 
rationalisation – in fact, public rationalisation has been used to justify the use of laws. While narratives 
have been used to justify the passing of various legislative tools as a means of establishing the 
government’s sovereignty as well as provide a guide for journalistic performance, they are equally 
potent as a means to affirm and round-up the government’s position when such laws are eventually 
used. 
A clearer documentation of this practice of public justification can be found in the case of the 
amendments to the Broadcasting Act in 2013. The amendments stipulated that websites with a 
monthly readership in excess of 50,000 would need to have their editors registered with the 
authorities, provide details of monthly revenue and, when deemed necessary by the government, to 
put in a S$50,000 performance bond. The conditions also stipulated that any content published by 
websites are subject to take-down notices within 24 hours should it publish anything that is “found to 
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be in breach of content standards” (Media Development Authority, 2013b). The revised ruling sparked 
a protest among bloggers and online news practitioners for its vague terms and onerous requirements 
(Wong, 2013a), which led to one such news website closing down voluntarily within a year of the 
amendments (J. Tan, 2013). However, then Minister for Communications and Information Yaacob 
Ibrahim insisted that the new measures were necessary: 
Really, what we want to do at the end of the day is to protect the interest of the ordinary 
Singaporean. As long as they go online to online news sites to read the news, I think it is 
important for us to make sure that they read “the right thing” – in so far as what has transpired 
yesterday, if there was an event was it reported accurately, this was said by so-and-so and what 
have you. (BBC, 2013) 
Ibrahim was to continue defending accusations of government overreach during a Parliamentary 
question-and-answer session about the amendments. Claiming that the amended regulations “adhere 
to a set of content standards which are no different from existing standards under the Internet Code 
of Practice and Class Licence”, he insisted that “the (Media Development Authority) has shown itself 
to be balanced and restrained in the exercise of its powers to regulate online content” and that “it has 
never used them to order the removal of content that is critical of Government policy or Government 
ministers” (Ministry of Communication and Information, 2013). He surmised that “concerns that the 
Internet will be stifled are thus far-fetched and will prove to be unfounded in due course” (Ministry of 
Communication and Information, 2013). 
Ibrahim would continue supporting the amendments to the Broadcasting Act even as he was stepping 
down from his ministerial portfolio in 2018. The background for the Broadcasting Act then became 
less benign as it was used to shut down The Real Singapore in 2015, which validated the earlier 
concerns among media freedom. However, Ibrahim he pointed to the necessity of the law as a means 
of advancing the government’s mandate: “If you are reporting on Singapore, we have to hold you 
accountable just as I hold the mainstream media accountable for their reporting. You can criticise the 
Government, but you must give us a right of reply” (Jagdish, 2018). In practice, this ‘right of reply’ 
basically means that the offending publication has to carry the government’s side of the story – usually 
an opinion piece from the concerning ministry or, in the case of foreign publications, Singapore’s 
ambassador in that particular country – without modification or editorialisation. While the same 
courtesy was not extended to The Real Singapore, the ‘right of reply’ narrative serves to lend credence 
to the government’s insistence that it does not curtail media freedom, but is merely doing what is 
necessary to protect Singapore’s reputation. 
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Charting this pattern of attributing socio-cultural values to the media, and then expecting media 
practitioners to abide by these valuers, brings us back to the end of the third period of Singapore’s 
media governance history in the last chapter, where I presented the need to step back from seeing 
media governance as progress or evolution from a ‘heavy touch’ to a ‘light touch’ approach on the 
part of the government. When the critique on governance is focused on the narrative practices that 
surround the media industry and even journalistic standards, it becomes apparently clear that no such 
‘progress’ exists. Instead, the intensity of governance remains, while variations to the parameters of 
conduct that media practitioners are expected to abide by are narrated and publicly rationalised. In 
the three periods identified above, these parameters have varied between the sovereign need to 
protect the nation from foreign influence, creating an economically and politically secure state, 
establishing social and cultural norms, and diligently maintaining the quality of journalistic practice. 
These expectations were seldom articulated in isolation – in fact, they do not need to. The strength of 
governance resides in the ability to use narratives heterogeneously, “where expressions of difference 
are not subsumed by expressions of unity, where desires, emotions and bodily aspects of 
communication are granted legitimacy and their centrality to communication in public life is fully 
recognised” (Craig, 2004, p. 55). Such legitimacy goes beyond the use of legal or economic constraints, 
as it affirms a “reason of state” that becomes “the means of increasing the state forces while 
preserving good order” (Dean, 2010, p. 108). Governing through narratives, then, encourages the 
media to grant legitimacy to the state, while empowering itself to participate in, and thereby have a 
stake in controlling, the governance process. 
Why narratives – full circle, or has it never changed? 
The government’s use of narratives as part of the governance process is a consistent practice, starting 
from the time when The Singapore Herald was accused of foreign funding in 1971, to the shutting 
down of The Real Singapore in 2015. These narratives must be seen as an extension of the 
government’s desire to remain credible in the international arena, or risk being called a despotic 
regime that uses harsh and unreasonable means to silence its critics. The shifts in how regulatory 
regimes are used do not necessarily reflect a change in the style of governance. Instead, they identify 
the Singapore government as one that is becoming more aware of the challenges of an increasingly 
complex communication environment, brought about first by Singapore’s attempt to globalise its 
economy, and then by the arrival of the internet as a multi-directional communication tool. The 
narratives used, as demonstrated above, show that the Singapore government is keen to find a 
balance between these challenges and its own desire to maintain control over political discourse. 
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However, the persistent and widespread coverage of such narratives in local media also suggests they 
do more than appease international criticism about its brand of authoritarianism. As with the layers 
of justification used for its various laws and policies that both inhibit and enable media practitioners, 
the government desires to rationalise its authority among the governed – in other words, the “creation 
of new institutional forms and practices that included representative governments, the creation and 
legitimation of a public opinion to which rulers had to respond and means of publicity” (Garnham, 
2007, p. 203). In effect, the reality of the use of the law is never divorced from the perception of the 
rule of law, and such narratives are invariably used to convince media practitioners and citizens alike 
that their government is just and reasonable. In that sense, the actual punishing of errant media 
practitioners become secondary or a means to achieve the primary goal: the governance of the 
Singapore media environment. 
As such, there is a need to rethink some of the current perceptions about media governance in 
Singapore. These include the belief that the government tends to be more flexible with independent 
media because it wishes to remain an open economy tapping on all the benefits of the internet; the 
belief that expectations of mainstream media are always higher than independent online media; and 
the belief that the prudent use of laws gains the government credibility. These beliefs are not wrong, 
but incomplete when considering the role that public narratives play in forming expectations among 
media practitioners, and the public more broadly, about the ‘ideal’ Singapore media environment. 
Two considerations must be examined to complete this understanding. 
The first consideration is that all three beliefs stated above tend to portray the government as holding 
the rod – a powerful leader and strict disciplinarian that will not hesitate to use force, coercion or 
enticement on media practitioners to achieve political goals. In reality, the case of Singapore proves 
this to be a vastly inadequate description of the government or its governance methods. In the 
instances discussed above of governing media through narratives, there is a clear pattern of deliberate 
discursive efforts undertaken by the Singapore government to ensure that the public and media 
practitioners agree with its actions and decisions. Beyond explaining its policy position, legal actions 
taken against media practitioners are always accompanied by expositions of the transgressing act. 
These expositions set the tone for media practitioners as much as provide pseudo-guidelines for the 
reading public for what they should expect from a media outlet operating in prosperous and 
harmonious Singapore. Doing so builds “a climate of auto-regulation” where “the preference to err 
on the conservative side gives the government and its statutory bodies immense power to craft new 
rules, laws and codes to tighten its already tremendous grip on social, cultural, ideological and political 
power” (T. Lee, 2001, p. 37). Denouncing media practitioners for falling short of such national 
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expectations, then, not only justifies the use of state power but also allows the government to 
elaborate on broader goals that affirm its long-term cultural dominance, rather than brutally enforce 
its political one. The aim of such elaborate discourse is to refer “behaviour to norms, and it is exercised 
by positively governing conduct rather than constraining an essentially free individuality” (Barnett, 
1999, p. 378). In effect, media practitioners are asked to guide their own behaviour and expectations 
of what kind of media freedom Singapore should have, and in turn participate in and contribute to the 
formation of this environment through their practice of the craft. 
Such freedom, then, underpin the second consideration – that media practitioners are restrained by 
strict government boundaries, even unseen ones, that inhibit their ability to practice journalism. 
Contrary to this belief, governance through narratives allows journalists to practice their craft in a way 
that is enabled, not inhibited, by the government. There is no doubt that legal action taken against 
media practitioners can inhibit journalistic practice – the threat of incarceration and heavy fines that 
these laws come with can potentially have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. However, these 
penalties are never far from the expression of a set of standards that has been applied to and expected 
of all media, mainstream or online. In that sense, the meticulous effort of justifying government action 
is not just about affirming the government’s right to rule but in providing assurance, whereby “(t)he 
search for policy-relevant facts is not unimportant, but it takes a back seat to storylines that offer 
social orientation, reassurance, or guidance” (Fischer, 2003, p. 103). This public assurance is not just 
about the government having bragging rights in the international community as having successfully 
navigated between economic productivity and free speech. It is also about making sure that media 
practitioners believe they do have a high degree of free speech, only if framed in the terms stipulated 
by the government. 
While laws are used as a means of punishment, public justifications serve the purpose of affirming 
social conduct. Taking the likes of The Singapore Herald, The Real Singapore and The Online Citizen to 
task using laws of varying severity does not simply aim to disgrace the errant individual, as it would be 
“a great expenditure of violence… which ultimately only had the force of an example” (Foucault, 1980, 
p. 155). Rather, it is politically more economical to mark out “new boundaries for socio-political 
discourses, or re-enacting gestural politics” (T. Lee, 2014, p. 40). Creating such boundaries serve to 
achieve “the cultivation of a well-disciplined, hardworking, morally-minded, technology-savvy and 
well-tempered or regulated politically compliant citizen” (T. Lee, 2014, p. 38). For media governance, 
this “cultivation” encourages both the public and media practitioners to view transgressors as 
fundamentally harmful to society, and to expect media to behave in certain ways that are congruent 
with the government’s broader narrative of social harmony, economic progress and political stability. 
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This long-drawn process of punishment, justification and reassurance takes the form of disciplining 
narratives. It is a holistic process that extends beyond the draconian laws that the Singapore 
government has used against errant media practitioners who refuse to abide by its nation-building 
agenda. It also goes beyond “calibrated coercion”, which George (2012) describes as a process where 
journalists and editors are encouraged, rather than forced, to self-censor and maintain the political 
status quo to avoid running afoul of laws or upsetting the economic equilibrium of the media industry. 
Instead, disciplining narratives serve to cultivate a disciplined and productive media, not through force 
or threats, but through persuasion and relationship-building. Disciplining narratives work in 
opposition to the punitive powers and censorial potential often ascribed to laws and regulations. Such 
narratives – expressed when laws have been used, but even more so before any laws have been used 
or even passed – are deployed not to frighten or discourage participation in online media. They rely 
on social orientation instead of fear, which seek to affirm public perception and understanding about 
the ‘realities’ of the Singapore media environment, how they are to respond to contrarian voices and 
how they should participate. In effect, we witness in such narratives the triangle of “sovereignty-
discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism 
the apparatuses of security” (Foucault, 1991, p. 102). This security, as Foucault would describe, relates 
not only to the legitimacy of the state to govern but also involves the well-being and positive 
productivity of a population that is adept at governing itself – what is popularly referred to in 
Foucauldian terms as the ‘conduct of conducts’ (Dean, 2015). 
Indeed, the Singapore government’s deft use of disciplining narratives transcends laws. It might be 
fair to say that the use of laws cannot exist without the complementary use of disciplining narratives. 
From the examples cited in this chapter, instances of actual transgressions – for example, when a 
media practitioner is accused of defaming the government – were always followed by a clear and 
unequivocal explanation for why the law is used and how the government is justified in using it. 
Moreover, while the use of laws asserts the state’s sovereignty over its population, it is disciplining 
narratives that define that sovereignty, without which the state’s attempt to use laws would not have 
the legitimacy it needs for efficacious governance. For that reason, various attempts by the 
government to pass new unpopular laws that have been publicly perceived to infringe on media 
freedom are always backed up with rationalisation. In fact, it is in deploying disciplining narratives 
when no laws have yet been broken that governance is most effective – less effort is expended in 
building the image of a guardian, compared to the effort spent in defending the image of a tyrant. The 
disciplining function of these narratives have become a refined art of governance in Singapore’s policy-
making and policy-enactment processes. They involve setting boundaries of transgression – even if 
they are vague ones – that media practitioners are discouraged from crossing, while assuring that their 
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cooperation in staying within said boundaries would benefit society at large. It is a process that 
encourages media practitioners to take part in the government’s effort at creating a productive and 
‘ideal’ society. 
It is also worth pointing out that the success of using disciplining narratives in Singapore hinges heavily 
on two principles that Foucault has identified as quintessential to governmentality – wisdom (full 
knowledge) and diligence (interest for the population) (Foucault, 1991, p. 96). As the examples above 
have demonstrated, the Singapore government has full knowledge of the media practitioners they 
have taken action against. For instance, the government was able to clearly state the financial status 
of The Singapore Herald and identify the webpages where the editors of The Real Singapore have 
contravened the Sedition Act. The amendments to the Broadcasting Act, in requiring editors to declare 
their details and funding sources, is an exercise in amassing knowledge. This attention to detail serves 
two purposes: to project surveillance as a means of encouraging self-monitoring, and to project the 
government as being in control. The government also takes full advantage of a well-oiled publicity 
machinery to get its points across, making sure that its preferred version of the ‘facts’ are fully 
presented in media reports. These ‘facts’ are invariably accompanied with a demonstration of 
diligence – for instance, Minister Ibrahim’s justification for the amendments to the Broadcasting Act 
as necessary steps to ensure citizens benefit from “reading the right thing”. In so doing, disciplining 
narratives not only affirm that the government is rational and measured in the actions it takes, but 
also sets the parameters for which any challenge to its power can be realised. This approach is most 
telling in the case of POFMA, where those who have been issued take-down orders have to file their 
case in court and provide evidence to refute the government’s claims (Kurohi, 2020a). The burden of 
proof shifts to the accused rather than the government as the accuser, who is invariable seen as being 
in the know and acting for the benefit of the population. The interplay of state wisdom and its diligence 
to the welfare of the people, established through the use of narratives, entrenches this relationship 
of power.  
Such incredible odds stacked against transgressors lead us to consider if it is possible to push back 
against disciplining narratives. Over the years, both civil society groups and independent media 
practitioners in Singapore have attempted to secure what they perceive to be a shrinking space for 
media freedom. The challenges posed by online media practitioners in attempting to upset the 
political status quo were certainly disruptive to the government’s established social order, but the 
more pertinent question is whether such attempts have eroded the government’s efficacy in 
governing the media environment, which points us back to the research question of this thesis. It is 
worth noting that an exercise of governmentality can only be countered effectively using the very 
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principles of governmentality identified, or it would be little more than empty gestures in a well-honed 
governance machinery. 
Civil society and resistance – are there counter-narratives? 
The prevalent use of online platforms in Singapore to disseminate alternative messages has been a 
significant change in the way civil society conduct public discourse. More established independent 
news websites like The Online Citizen have made it an editorial standpoint to champion alternative 
voices, providing more coverage to these voices that critique the government’s social policies. The 
Online Citizen has also been actively doing investigative stories that question government authority 
and processes, such as the case of Benjamin Lim who committed suicide following police investigation 
into a claim of molestation against him. The Online Citizen had alleged that the investigation process 
by the police, such as questioning him in his school without the presence of his parents or a counsellor, 
had led to 14 year-old Lim’s death (Xu, 2016). The website’s coverage on the case was subsequently 
criticised by the government for containing falsehoods (Seow & Sim, 2016). 
Besides challenging the government on policy grounds, independent online media have also tested 
the boundaries of specific laws against media entities. Both The Middle Ground and The Independent 
Singapore have contravened the Parliamentary Elections Act during a by-election in 2016. The Middle 
Ground published an article featuring interviews with voters, which was deemed to be publishing an 
electoral poll during the campaign period, a practice that was banned under the Parliamentary 
Elections Act. The editor and publisher were issued a warning in lieu of prosecution (C. Yong, 2016b). 
For the same by-election, The Independent Singapore published an article on the eve of polling day, 
which was banned under the Parliamentary Elections Act amendments in 2010 that imposed a 
Cooling-Off Day, which prohibited campaigning by political parties to let voters think through the 
campaign issues. The editor and publisher were questioned by the police, had their homes raided and 
their mobile phones and computers confiscated (The Middle Ground, 2016; C. Yong, 2016a). While all 
of them were let off with a warning, the use of the law for Cooling-Off Day violations raised concerns 
from segments of society about the extent of police powers and equal application of the law, since 
“those who were reported for similar violations in the past did not undergo lengthy interviews or face 
searches and seizures of their personal equipment” (J. Y. Ng, 2016). 
Such challenges to state power against media practitioners have increased with the increasing use of 
online media. Not only is there a championing of alternative voices in society, but there is also an 
increasing interest to push back against the government for encroaching on what is generally 
perceived to be the freer online media space. Online media has lent weight to activism and activist-
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led causes (H. Lee & Ansari, 2017), such as those lobbying for the repeal of the death penalty and the 
decriminalisation of consensual sex between homosexual men. However, while significant inroads 
have been made in expanding freedom of expression, it is worth evaluating if such efforts do create a 
significant change in media governance for the benefit of the media industry. There is a need to avoid 
being overly critical of such efforts at media freedom advocacy – in practice, there is very little that 
civil society and advocates can do against a government that has a super-majority in Parliament to 
pass any law it wishes. However, as ascertained earlier, the power of the Singapore government is not 
merely expressed in laws, since much of its legitimacy comes from disciplining narratives that grants 
it the right to pass and use those same laws. What needs to be evaluated, then, is the effectiveness of 
advocacy in countering these narratives. 
It is notable that the instances of resistance against government incursion into the independent media 
space tend to be reactive rather than proactive. For instance, the FreeMyInternet movement in 2013 
was organised in response to the announced amendments to the Broadcasting Act. The key contention 
raised was the legislation’s vagueness and the potential overreach that the law allows the state 
apparatus to clamp down on online dissent (The Online Citizen, 2015; Wong, 2013a). The same 
approach was taken in countering POFMA in 2019, where advocates raised concerns about the law’s 
potential overreach and the broad-ranging powers granted to the government (Abbugao, 2019; 
Stolarchuk, 2019). However, it is just as notable that the government appears to have anticipated 
these concerns and was ready with responses that discredited criticisms and the critics of both laws. 
In relation to POFMA, the government claimed that detractors to the law were “crying wolf”, insisting 
that the law received broad support from citizens (Tong, 2019). When Breakfast Network, the 
predecessor of The Middle Ground, decided to close in 2013 due to the onerous declaration process 
of the amended Broadcasting Act (C. Yong, 2013),  the Media Development Authority insisted that its 
closure had nothing to do with censorship but the technical requirement of registration. MDA stated 
that the “registration is not intended to crimp the growth of any media outfit, and registered sites 
could still receive bona fide commercial revenue, including from foreign advertisers” (The Straits 
Times, 2013). MDA also refuted claims by the website owners that the registration procedure was 
onerous (W. Tan, 2013). 
Hence, while the resistance against media governance by local independent media is spirited and at 
times outright defiant of government orders, such resistance tend to be piecemeal and reactive, 
always subject to the processes and agenda set by the Singapore government. Since the state is better 
resourced and more adept at justifying its position and demonstrating its service to ‘public interest’, 
such resistance tends to be portrayed as uninformed at best and recalcitrant at worst, done on the 
148 
 
part of activists with negative intentions. In essence, push back from media freedom advocates against 
government regulation do not sufficiently surface “the points at which regimes of government meet 
forms of resistance and counter-conducts that can reveal and embody possibilities for doing things 
otherwise” (Dean, 2010, p. 49). Such attempts at pushing back were invariably subject to the 
constraints already set by the government, including both the parameters of debate and the potential 
solutions. In this way, such resistance is always subject to restricted rules of engagement and 
asymmetrical information, in which the Singapore government will always have an upper hand. More 
critically, throughout all of Singapore’s history of independent media operations, there have been no 
proposals successfully made for governance frameworks that run independently from the state, in 
order to provide a distinct alternative that can compete directly with the government’s model, yet 
embody the goals of media freedom that advocates seek. 
It should be noted that the POFMA debate saw media freedom advocates raise some alternative 
governance models, and this specific narrative process will be covered in the next chapter. The case 
of POFMA also demonstrated that disciplining narratives might not always proceed as the state 
desires. For one, the comfortable relationship the Singapore government has developed with 
mainstream media to encourage it to fulfil its nation-building role cannot be transplanted to a more 
adversarial independent online media. In spite of the limited reach of alternative news websites in 
Singapore, the internet has indeed “opened up spaces in which people can make their own decisions, 
form their own movements, and reach their own objectives” (Pickett, 2005, pp. 48-49). Such 
challenges continue to put pressure on the government’s narrative, even if the possibility of a 
sustained and publicly acceptable counter-narrative has yet to be realised. For another, the use of 
relationship-building as a governance approach meant that the government needs to put in the same 
effort with online media. As highlighted by my interviewees, this effort to build trust has diminished 
with the current administration, and POFMA has been a critical juncture in highlighting this 
inadequacy in governance. Whether the state’s disciplining narratives have been useful in maintaining 
its governance efficacy will be an important point of evaluation for the POFMA case study. 
Conclusion 
It is necessary to be cautious about viewing resistance from independent media and media freedom 
advocates as being capable of upsetting the status quo, much less undo the power relationships that 
have been established in Singapore society, given the historical pervasiveness of the state’s popular 
narrative that entrenches the image of the benevolent government among the population. The state’s 
narratives tend to have a normalising effect on members of the media industry, who are repeatedly 
encouraged to view any transgression as harmful to the body politic. Such normalisation effectively 
149 
 
means that counter-narratives are “never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. Rather, it is 
more like the opposite: states of power are continually engendered or incited on account of the 
potential counter-powers which coexist with them” (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p. 84). Indeed, the art of 
governance not only allows or tolerate dissent and counter-narratives, but requires such alternative 
views as a counterweight to strengthen the legitimacy of the state. 
Where counter-narratives work best is in disrupting the government’s disciplining narratives, which 
can be achieved only through dismantling the existing structures of discourse that normalises state 
power through practices of sovereignty-discipline-government that affirm the need for state power, 
while simultaneously constructing and encouraging a productive population. Such counter-narratives 
would ensure that “the positions occupied and modes of actions used by each of the forces at work” 
are made visible to the public, and “the possibilities of resistance and counter-attack on either side” 
can then effectively function (Foucault, 1980, pp. 163-164). Disruptions to these disciplining narratives 
have proven to be difficult to achieve because the Singapore government regularly shores up new 
regulations and policies to respond to what it perceives as ‘new’ threats. These threats are presented 
as novel and hence requiring new approaches and laws, meaning those who wish to counter them 
generally adjust their narratives into the new frame of reference. However, these disciplining 
narratives essentially feed into the same discursive structures that continue to affirm the 
government’s seemingly unquestionable right to govern the media. 
In effect, while media freedom activism in Singapore is effective in pushing back against the narratives 
surrounding laws, they are less efficacious in countering the disciplining narratives of governance. 
While there remains a need to pay attention to specific laws and regulations imposed by the 
government, it is no less critical to examine the narratives that affirm, normalise and even create these 
governance regimes. This must then be followed by an examination of whether counter-narratives 
adhere to and reinforce the status quo that limit their own freedom or are able to disrupt the 
dominant narratives to define new modes of governance. The next chapter will outline a genealogy of 






GENEALOGY OF A LAW – NARRATING POFMA INTO BEING 
 
Overview 
In May 2019 the Singapore government passed the Protection from Online Falsehoods and 
Manipulation Act – better known by its acronym, POFMA – with an overwhelming majority of 72 to 
nine votes in Parliament. The result was not surprising, particularly given the ruling People’s Action 
Party’s (PAP) strong parliamentary majority, which guarantees that any law it wishes to pass would 
receive little resistance from parliamentarians. The global context surrounding POFMA also facilitated 
its speed – at time of passing, countries around the world have been mired in controversies of ‘fake 
news’, with the proliferation of disinformation campaigns being named as the cause for the Brexit 
vote in the UK (Bell, 2016) and the populism and electoral victory of Donald Trump in the US (Solon, 
2016). The public mistrust towards technology companies, in particular social media giant Facebook, 
meant that laws like POFMA would find minimal resistance and would require very little convincing 
on the part of the government. The government’s claim that POFMA was meant for punishing 
technology companies for not taking firmer steps against the spread of disinformation, and to protect 
Singapore’s democracy, social and racial harmony and confidence in public institutions, fit intimately 
with this global narrative. 
In actual practice, the process of passing POFMA into law proved just the opposite, as the consultation 
effort and debate surrounding the eventual passing of the law was mired with questions about the 
government’s intentions. The law germinated from an initial proclamation by Singapore’s Law 
Minister K Shanmugam in April 2017 that the government was “seriously considering” a law to tackle 
‘fake news’ given the inadequacy of its laws at that time (Au-Yong, 2017). Shanmugam affirmed this 
again in June 2017 by stating that such a law would be a “no-brainer” (Seow & Salleh, 2017). Hence, 
it came as a surprise to many when the government decided to convene a Parliamentary Select 
Committee in 2018 to study the issue and seek feedback from experts and the public (Chan, 2018). 
The unusualness was compounded by the fact that the Singapore government has traditionally passed 
laws at will with little public consultation. The level of participation in the public consultation process 
also exceeded any previous Select Committees convened by the government, attracting 167 written 
submissions, from which the Committee invited 79 individuals for public hearings (Channel NewsAsia, 
2018b, 2018c). As the public hearings for the Select Committee wore on, it became increasingly clear 
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to observers that the consultation process was not as consultative as it was originally expected to be. 
The Select Committee was accused of being excessively confrontational towards some participants 
and for misrepresenting their views in the evidence published after the eight days of public hearings 
(Y. Low, 2018; Yahoo Singapore, 2018; Yusof, 2018). 
The eventual tabling of the Bill for POFMA in Parliament in April 2019 faced even stronger opposition, 
with certain Members of Parliament, academics, activists, journalists, members of the technology 
industry and international organisations voicing discomfort with the law because of its vague 
terminology and the excessive powers it granted the government (Stolarchuk, 2019). In particular, 
these individuals raised concerns about how the law would clamp down on free speech and diminish 
the ability of reporters and researchers to publish data that contradicted the government’s version, 
hence “creating a self-serving law that can be abused to quash critics” (Tham, 2019). The government 
insisted that POFMA would not affect academic research, that the courts was the “final arbiter” of 
falsehoods, that the definitions sought for were already in “established jurisprudence”, and that the 
law actually promotes freedom of expression rather than inhibit it (Ho & Kwang, 2019; Mokhtar, 
2019a, 2019c). To counter what was perceived to be over-arching and excessive powers placed in the 
hands of the Executive arm of the government, critics of the law requested for various safety 
measures. These included establishing an independent council to access falsehoods instead of the 
government, more powers to be vested in the courts, more consultation with stakeholders before law 
was to be passed, and for the government’s assurances to be reflected in the letter of the law rather 
than subsidiary legislation (the latter which can be amended without parliamentary consent). 
The final Act passed in May 2019 varied little from the original Bill, and granted all Singapore ministers 
broad powers to first decide if statements made online were facts or falsehoods. It gave government 
ministers the liberty to issue ‘correction directions’, which require the owner of the false content to 
post government-approved statements together with the original statement to declare it to be false, 
or demand a complete removal of the content. Content owners have a right to appeal – first to the 
minister issuing the order and then to the courts – but must first comply with the directions. The 
debate on law concluded with Law Minister Shanmugam criticising detractors, specifically members 
of the main opposition Workers’ Party, for “using “stock phrases” and their limited understanding of 
the laws” to “get people misled” (Mokhtar & Lim, 2019). Collectively, the development of the POFMA 
debate suggests that, far from forcing a law through using its super-majority in Parliament and the 
public mistrust against social media platforms, the Singapore government chose instead to go with a 
protracted public engagement exercise, even welcoming dissent. While the final result was a law that 
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granted excessive and immediate powers to the Executive, the extensive consultation process 
suggested that the government was more invested in the POFMA debate than the POFMA law itself. 
Why must POFMA be a genealogical study? 
In view of the parliamentary debate and public discussion around POFMA, it would have been 
tempting to view the entire consultation process as redundant or for show, and the accusation that 
the law was essentially fait accompli (Bowyer, 2019) seemed to be an appealing argument. Several 
interviewees I spoke to for my research, detailed in Chapter 5, also reflected this view. The public 
accusations levelled at the Select Committee consultation process, coupled with the “no-brainer” 
claim, suggested that the government had already decided that a law was inevitable and had intended 
all along to arm itself with a formidable tool to protect itself from public criticism and encourage self-
censorship in online conversations. Others have also accused the law of being a “cluster nuclear 
bomb” or the “Infinity Gauntlet10” (Y. K. Ong, 2019; Stuart, 2019), an overpowering tool for the 
government to complete its attempt to supress all forms of free speech in Singapore through a single 
stroke of masterful policy genius. The purpose of the Select Committee hearings and parliamentary 
debate were called into question as little more than publicity stunts to project the façade of a 
consultative government, masking a deliberate attempt by the Singapore government to enhance its 
governance regime over the online media space specifically, and freedom of expression in general. 
The legislative regime of POFMA was criticised as an attempt to affirm and tighten the Singapore 
government’s grip on power (V. Lee, 2019).  
Yet the full public discourse leading up to the eventual passing of POFMA needs to be evaluated in 
greater detail to understand why a government used to shoe-horning the most draconian of laws in 
Parliament had decided on this path of protracted public engagement that lasted almost two years, 
from the “no-brainer” proclamation in June 2017 to the final passing of the law in May 2019. This 
chapter will move away from popular criticism of the law indicated above, and argue that, far from 
holding eight days of Select Committee public consultations and two days of parliamentary debate as 
a show of make-believe public consultation, the use of public discourse, played out incessantly in 
national media, served a more pervasive purpose of public discipline through both the punishment of 
dissent and the identification of social norms. I argue that this deliberate narrative process, not the 
 
10 The Infinity Gauntlet is an item found in comic books published by Marvel, and subsequently featured in movies by 
the Marvel Cinematic Universe. Infused with the energy of six fictional Infinity Stones, the Gauntlet can be used to wipe 
out half of all living creatures in the universe. The Infinity Gauntlet thus is perceived to be a weapon of mass 
destruction with immense power wielded by just one user. 
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law itself, is the true vehicle that invests power in the Singapore government, rather than serve as a 
mere tool to demonstrate its power. 
As explained in Chapter 6, the use of narratives as a means of governing the Singapore media 
ecosystem has been a long-standing practice of the Singapore government. This practice does not 
nullify the use of laws to suppress media freedom; indeed, it has not, as laws are still used regularly 
to clamp down on dissenting voices that oppose government policies and actions. The use of 
narratives was meant to support laws, to the extent that without these supporting narratives, laws by 
themselves become meaningless in achieving efficacious governance. While laws can achieve 
compliance, it is narratives that achieve governance. The limited impact of laws was also a sentiment 
echoed by some of my interviewees, as highlighted in Chapter 5. The use of narratives, particularly 
through media channels themselves, served to attain two outcomes: for one, the legitimisation of the 
government’s right to govern, and for another, the establishment of certain norms and expectations 
for how media entities operating in Singapore should behave and what the Singapore population 
should expect of them. 
It is worth noting that this long-standing practice of governance developed over time, and the POFMA 
debate is neither a stand-alone narrative devoid of connections to Singapore’s broader social and 
political climate, nor a simple extension of existing governance regimes. The POFMA debate drew on 
existing norms relating to the permissible boundaries and expectations of using media as a platform 
for communication in Singapore, yet in its deliberative process established new norms that relate to 
the ‘new problem’ of ‘online falsehoods’. POFMA was not just a law, but a representation of what 
Koopman has termed “depth problems” that are “lodged deep inside of us all as the historical 
conditions of possibility of our present ways of doing, being, and thinking” (2013, p. 1). Hence, 
approaching the POFMA debate using genealogy as an analytical framework provides the opportunity 
to uncover the underlying belief systems that informs how Singapore society understands media 
governance. A genealogical approach permits an examination of how the debate evolved over time 
within the broader climate of Singapore’s media governance system, as much as build upon and 
enhance that same system, as it “articulates strange singularities by fashioning concepts that make 
visible linkages, assemblages, and networks, particularly with an eye to their overall coherence” 
(Koopman, 2013, p. 4). 
The analysis of POFMA in this chapter is less concerned with the legal development and more with the 
discursive development of the law. As a media researcher rather than a legal one, my expertise and 
interest is in how POFMA was argued into formation and the power relations used and enhanced in 
this formation. The aim of my analysis is therefore not to examine the intricacies of the legal language 
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and power-influences of the law itself. There is little doubt that the exact wording of the law vests an 
incredible level of authority in the Singapore government that allows them to dominate media usage, 
even to the point of determining the meaning of ‘truth’ and ‘falsehoods’. However, the tendency to 
view POFMA as an all-powerful law risks pigeon-holing the Singapore government as “one group with 
a set of interests defined by its own social position” that “dominates or exploits some other group” 
(Bevir, 2010, p. 428). Instead, what I seek to do is to provide a genealogy of POFMA as a means “to 
signal the presence of multiplicity and struggle” (Bevir, 2010, p. 428). There is little merit in critiquing 
POFMA as a debilitating law that must be removed or revised, without first pointing out the socio-
cultural environment that allows POFMA to exist. In this environment, even if POFMA no longer 
existed, new laws would still be passed using the same socio-cultural rationalities that led to POFMA, 
permitting other debilitating laws. Examining POFMA’s narrative development seeks to problematise 
“discursive formations” that “manifest as a generalized knowledge (savoir) or as one of the multiple 
“operationalized” specific knowledges (connaissances) that ‘orbit’ around the savoir” (Hardy, 2010, p. 
72). 
A genealogy of POFMA also serves to unravel the multiple layers of meaning and meaning-making that 
underpins Singapore as a society and determines the understanding that citizens have towards media 
use. These layers are often taken for granted and propagated as the historical ‘hard truths’ that 
Singapore must abide by and factor into policy-making if it wishes to survive and excel in what the 
government claims is an increasingly hostile media environment. Hence, the genealogy of POFMA is 
one that “discloses the contingent nature” of rationalised social realities that “subjects the self to the 
endless play of events, dominations and the exteriority of accidents” (Spiegel, 2001, p. 10). In effect, 
POFMA is not a law so much as it is an embodiment of Singapore’s established and constantly adapting 
social realities towards media production and consumption, which are vital aspects of journalistic 
practice. 
Indeed, a closer examination of the public discourse surrounding POFMA demonstrates precisely why 
viewing the law as a linear projection of political power and dominance by the Singapore government 
on media practitioners is futile, inaccurate and ignores the agency involved in the law’s narrative 
process. Not only was POFMA stitched together using a broad variety of justifications and arguments, 
it was also subjected to challenges and criticisms that threatened to undermine the dominant 
narrative. The relentless contestations to the law meant that the government had to constantly adapt 
its narrative to counter opposition to the law. However, this constant adaptation to counter-narratives 
did not prevent the government from attempting to maintain a persistent ‘golden thread’ in its 
defence of the law. This defence was entrenched in a long-standing mantra of Singapore as the 
155 
 
vulnerable state, a narrative that has been used consistently throughout the nation’s history, but now 
reimagined to fit the modern threat of ‘fake news’. It typified a systematic approach to governance 
that was based on a carefully crafted narrative that leveraged and build around core concepts of 
fundamental national identify – that is, those pertaining to racial and religious harmony and 
sovereignty. These core concepts were then publicly juxtaposed against challenges to state authority, 
particularly those emanating from media freedom advocates against the government’s position 
against ‘online falsehoods’, which were classified as positions that either lack knowledge, were 
unpatriotic or socially destructive. In this constructed battle, villains (in the battered image of social 
media giants like Facebook and activists) and allies (in the visage of selected knowledgeable individuals 
from Singapore and other countries that have also attempted to tackle disinformation through legal 
means) were included in the narrative to strengthen the government’s positioning. Maintaining this 
narrative thread aided in establishing certain social norms for how citizens should respond to ‘online 
falsehoods’, and how they should understand freedom of expression. The golden thread leads to the 
normalisation of social values that affirm and legitimise the government’s power, even without the 
use of force that it has availed itself to through the passing of POFMA. 
This chapter is not meant to provide a direct solution to the ‘problem of excessive power’ epitomised 
by POFMA. Admittedly, this might be a perception given in the latter part of this chapter where I deal 
with the response of activists and independent journalists to critique the effectiveness of their 
protestations against POFMA. Instead, the inquiry presented in this chapter is intended as a genealogy 
of problematisation, rather than one of vindication or subversion (Koopman, 2013). Rather than 
present the social norms that surround POFMA as social fixtures that must be overcome to attain 
some form of liberation from powerful oppression, the genealogical study in this chapter aims to 
present norms as “the particular slice of the past that best explains the relevant actions and practices” 
(Bevir, 2010, p. 427) that resulted in POFMA. This is not to say that this chapter exists in a vacuum of 
social action, but only that it seeks to “make manifest the constitutive and regulative conditions of the 
present as a material for thought and action that we would need to work on if we are to transform 
that present” (Koopman, 2013, p. 18). The genealogy of POFMA presented here must thus been seen 
as “a tactic, deployed to put into play the forms of knowledge (savoirs) thereby engaged, as a result 
of which they are ‘desubjugated’ and rendered free” (Spiegel, 2001, p. 11, emphasis in original). 
However, the freedom achieved here is not from the perceived repression of POFMA as a law, but the 
freedom to understand and deconstruct the social norms and traditions that inform POFMA as a 
system of governance. 
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Political discourse surrounding legislation against ‘fake news’ sought to affirm certain socio-cultural 
practices (Fairclough, 1995). Collectively, these practices encourage the formation of specific social 
‘truths’ that allowed the Singapore government to legitimise its actions and exercise decentralised 
control (Dean, 2010) that works through consensus, rather than repression. Rather than suppress 
alternative views, the POFMA debate was really an attempt to draw these alternatives out alongside 
the norms widely understood as ‘the truth’ by Singaporeans, “the actual history and effects of various 
beliefs and practices, including purportedly transcendental or universal ones” (Bevir, 2010, p. 430). 
Such a practice seeks to encourage Singaporeans to “prereflectively… organize what they experience 
by those values and truths” such that “they very likely will not see or will refuse options to those 
organizations and their meanings” (Scott, 2009, p. 353) that run contrary to the established norms. 
This practice has the effects of justifying the government’s actions towards the media, be it in passing 
the laws or conducting its consultation process leading up to the law. This legitimisation is not taken 
as a given; instead, it is earnest sought from the public. The result is a discursive practice (Foucault, 
1991) that normalises the exercise of power and marginalises dissent and resistance (Foucault, 1980), 
while giving the semblance of an open and rational – and hence legitimised – approach to governance.  
The discourse surrounding POFMA can thus be viewed as a legitimising effort by the Singapore 
government that “situates all knowledge in the space of representations, and by scanning that space 
it formulates the knowledge of the laws that provide its organization” so as to “superimpose all 
knowledge upon a representation from whose immediacy one never escapes” (Foucault, 2002, p. 
261). The use of genealogy to study POFMA is an attempt to examine “how a set of discursive and 
non-discursive practices come into being and interact to form a set of political, economic, moral, 
cultural, and social institutions which define the limits of acceptable speaking, knowing, and acting” 
(Anaïs, 2013, p. 125). The effects of the POFMA debate, rather than the law itself, are thus more 
significant in the social norms it entrenches and the legitimacy it negotiates for the government. 
Revisiting research question and methodology 
If the genealogy of POFMA is about an all-encompassing structure of narratives based on pre-
established representations of Singapore society, it then begs a return to the original question that 
informs this thesis: how media governance in Singapore maintains its efficacy in relation to global 
expectations and the challenges of an evolving online environment. It would be tempting to answer 
this question by referring to how the government has used narratives to forcefully silence its critics by 
persistently portraying them in a negative light to the public. However, the case of POFMA suggests 
that while the government maintained an upper hand in dominating public discourse, this dominance 
was not entirely at the expense of those who challenged its authority. Advocacy efforts never 
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managed to nullify or even delay the passing of POFMA into law, but highlighted concerns and issues 
that allowed deeper scrutiny into the government’s intent for POFMA. Where these efforts have fallen 
short, I would argue, is in their inability to formulate a narrative that rivals the focus and simplicity 
that the government used, making use of an established system of representation both within the 
confines of the POFMA debate and leveraging the established norms from Singapore’s governance 
history. 
To understand the deployment of this system of representation, this chapter will trace the progress 
of debates and narratives that surrounded POFMA through four identifiable phases, paying particular 
attention to how these narratives, played out in media coverage, evolved and changed over time. It 
will then shift focus to the two phases of the debate – the start and the end – that exhibited the most 
significant points of narrative evolution in how both sides – that is, the government and those 
opposing POFMA – established their positions in the debate and argue for or against legal instruments. 
I will then draw out specific articles from these two phases to exemplify the difference. Such an 
analysis reveals that this progressive narrative was an attempt to affirm the legitimacy of the political 
leadership in defining what constitutes ‘truth’ in Singapore society, with the view of marginalising 
dissent and opposition that attempted to challenge its political might, yet never eradicating them 
completely. The eventual passing of POFMA into law, hence, should be seen as an ancillary result more 
than the desired effect. The desired effect has already been fully played out over the duration of two 
years as a carefully structured disciplining narrative, executed through media discourse. 
To better examine this disciplining narrative, this chapter will focus on media coverage of the POFMA 
debate. The use of media discourse analysis to study the debate on POFMA seeks to reveal the “(often 
concealed) power dimensions of language” and provide “critical insights into dynamics and 
contestations informing competing constructions of complex categories” (Rajah, 2017, p. 485), which 
underpin the discussion of legal issues in Singapore. Such discourses point to how media entities 
themselves can be seen to be taking certain positions on the issue, which help to define their 
relationship with news-makers and position them as active players in public discourse, rather than 
mere loud-hailers in the power struggle. Hence, analysing media narratives provides an understanding 
of media in shaping public opinion (Fairclough, 1995) and how news-makers use the media as a means 
of reaching out to their intended publics, affirm norms and determine order within societies, and serve 
as the arena for conflict and establishing alliances (Fairclough, 1998; van Dijk, 1998). 
The melding of discourse analysis and genealogy is understandably problematic, as there are 
fundamental differences between the two approaches. Genealogy draws data from a wide variety of 
sources and examines the relational aspects of discourse. In comparison, discourse analysis as a 
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method draws from a more specific range of data and examines the temporal or sequential aspects of 
discourse (Anaïs, 2013). The use of both approaches in this chapter, however, is premised on the 
specific parameters of what I wish to study: the interplay of disciplining narratives surrounding the 
POFMA debate as they vary over a specific time frame that represented the most heavily contested 
period of the debate. Using both approaches, then, allows me to at once explore the qualitative 
diversity of POFMA narratives, yet use discourse analysis to limit the interest of the study to media 
narratives. In addition, I will also demonstrate how such disciplining narratives link to values and 
norms that lie outside of the POFMA timeframe. Such links point to the relatively longer history of 
media governance practices, identified in Chapters 3 and 6. In using this mixed approach, I wish to tap 
on the complimentary aspects of genealogy and discourse analysis. For instance, both approaches are 
aligned towards the examination of discourses that uncover “symbolic meanings associated with oft-
repeated words and phrases” (Anaïs, 2013, p. 128). Using Nivivo to code the statements made in 
media articles allowed precisely for the identification of such repeated terms that contribute to the 
normalisation of certain social values that relate to ‘fake news’ and POFMA. 
Moreover, the analysis of discourses obtained from such coding of terms, while situating each 
utterance in its own time and space, provides a holistic picture of the progress and development of 
narratives over time. Doing so allows for the problematisation of the supposed ‘logic’ that underpins 
the present acceptance and understanding of POFMA, making evident the “polymorphism of the 
elements, relationships, and reference domains” found within the POFMA debate (Ferreira Neto, 
2018, p. 12). For instance, the examination of narratives about the threats of POFMA reflected a 
change in how this threat is articulated in media discourse. While the content and tone of these 
discourses evolved, they point to a certain pattern of argument and legitimisation of particular 
positions, a “historical analysis” that seeks to explain “how it has transpired that the present has come 
to be accepted as inevitable or natural” (Rostis, 2010, p. 3) as a “history of the present” (Anaïs, 2013, 
p. 126). This historical analysis provides a perspective of how the public understands POFMA not 
merely as it was uttered at the time of its conception, but in the broader historical context of media 
norms in Singapore. It is hence a combined approach that informs the rest of this chapter: the 
qualitative cataloguing and coding of media articles using discourse analysis to assist in the uncovering 
of descent, or “lineage in thought” (Hardy, 2010, p. 77) and a genealogical approach to analyse how 
such discourses emerge as, not a critique of a law, but an understanding of how power relationships 
are established between the state and the media. 
159 
 
Four phases and the Nvivo data set 
Nvivo, a software used for qualitative data analysis, was used to collate the media reports and to 
identify and code themes that occurred in relation to the topic of disinformation. These reports 
included a full range of articles, such as news reports of government announcements, commentaries 
and editorials by media outlets on the issue of ‘fake news’, and news reports about those who have 
suffered from the effects of ‘fake news’. Media articles were collected from eight English media 
sources based in Singapore, representing articles from both mainstream and online media, which 
represent the sources of current affairs news that are the most read in Singapore from each sector. 
The publications identified are listed in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Media sources in Singapore used for collating news coverage on ‘fake news’ 
Mainstream media publications Online media publications 
The Straits Times 





The Online Citizen 
The Independent Singapore 
 
These eight publications do not by any means exemplify the full range of media sources that covered 
the POFMA debate. For instance, no print versions for mainstream media publications were used, 
since these were generally word-for-word reproductions of what appeared in the news websites of 
these newspapers. To prevent double counting, near-repeat articles that have less information – first-
to-post articles that were eventually supplemented with repeated articles that contained updates, 
more information or added paragraphs – were excluded. Replica articles between sister publications, 
such as those shared between The Straits Times and The New Paper and between Channel NewsAsia 
and TODAY, were also excluded. Television and radio broadcasts were excluded, as including these 
would require continuous monitoring and transcribing, and therefore not practicable given the 
resource limits of this research effort. In any case, leading news broadcaster Channel NewsAsia 
generally releases near-verbatim transcripts of their news broadcasts on their website that are more 
accessible for data analysis. Vernacular publications in Mandarin, Malay and Tamil were excluded, as 
the language skills needed to accurately and effectively translate these publications were not 
available. It has to be acknowledged that the variety of these vernacular publications, while not as 
pervasive in reach as English publications, do contain nuanced foci in their coverage that is specific to 
their target audiences, which unfortunately cannot be included given the time and funding limitations 
of this research effort. 
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The media articles were sourced using a Google news alert with “fake news Singapore” as the search 
parameter, and the data from this search result was augmented by following links within these 
articles. It should be noted that the data collected was not meant to be comprehensive, particularly 
since they were mostly done online from my location in Australia, but they were representative of the 
key thrusts of the various publications in Singapore, in so far as they relate to the issue of ‘fake news’. 
To minimise researcher bias in the creation of the data set, I excluded opinion pieces I wrote as a 
contributor to The Independent Singapore. However, news reports on the Select Committee hearing 
where I participated as a member of a panel of online media practitioners were included, with care 
taken to exclude the views I expressed during the Nvivo coding process. The collected data set totalled 
972 media articles (n=972), which were divided into four distinct phases of media discourse that 
spanned the duration of Singapore’s media coverage on combating disinformation from April 2017 to 
May 2019 (see Table 7.2). 




Duration Event markers Overarching narratives 






First public mention by 
the government that it 
is looking to legislate 
against disinformation. 
Conceptualising the problem 
Media narratives generally 
portrayed disinformation as a 
serious national security 
problem for Singapore that 
needed legal intervention. 
This key narrative was 
interspersed with a diverse 
slate of views about non-legal 
means of countering 
disinformation, which was 
still predominantly portrayed 
as a threat. 
Open coding of media 
articles (n=149) in Phase 
One produced key terms 







The day before the 
commencement of 
public hearings for the 








public hearings for the 
Select Committee on 
Deliberate Online 
Falsehoods. 
Drawing lines, digging deep 
trenches 
Media narratives revolved 
around the Select Committee 
hearings, where the 
government sanctioning 
certain view-points while 
discrediting others. Free 
speech advocates also took 
issue with the conduct of the 
hearings, which were 
deemed to be combative and 
non-consultative. 
Open coding of media 
articles (n=256) in Phase 
Two produced key terms 
such as “government”, 
“select committee”, 
“information” and “Thum”. 
Phase Two also witnessed 
a distinct transition to 
from “fake news” to 
“online falsehoods”, while 
“government” grew in 
frequency – from n=890 in 





Final media coverage of 
the processes and 
controversies resulting 
from the hearings for 
the Select Committee 








State of ‘normalising’ 
media discourse 




the publishing of the 
Committee’s findings 
and recommendations 
on 19 September 2018. 
Consolidation and extension 
Media narratives continued 
to draw on the narrative of 
threats played out in the first 
two phases, but are more 
focused on elevating 
disinformation to a national 
defence threat. Much 
attention was also paid to 
Facebook and its inability to 
combat the circulation of 
falsehoods on its platform. 
Open coding of media 
articles (n=255) in Phase 
Three produced key terms 
such as “government”, 
“Facebook” and 
“national”, with a wider 
frequency of distribution. 
Notable increases in 
frequency are “Facebook”, 
from n=394 in Phase Two 




Announcement that a 
Bill for a law to counter 
disinformation would 





Protection from Online 
Falsehoods and 
Manipulation Bill was 
tabled in Parliament. 
A benevolent government 
criticised 
Media narratives centred on 
the Bill and the debate that 
arose from its passing into 
law. The government and its 
over-reach of power 
remained the key point of 
contention, with much 
attention focused on the 
right given to Ministers to 
declare a statement as false. 
Advocates for media freedom 
in both Singapore and 
overseas petitioned against 
the Bill while the government 
defended the law as a 
measured and surgical tool 
against disinformation. 
Open coding of media 
articles (n=312) in Phase 
Four produced key terms 
such as “government”, 
“minister”, “Bill”, “law”. 
“Power” emerged as a new 
high-frequency term 
(n=1452). Notable 
increases in frequency 
include “law” – from 
n=858 in Phase Three to 
n=2687 in Phase Four – 
and “government” – from 
n=1836 in Phase Three to 




Two weeks after the 
closure of debate on 
the Protection from 
Online Falsehoods and 
Manipulation Act. 
 
Phase One – conceptualising the problem 
Phase One was identified as the period from 3 April 2017, when the Singapore government first 
indicated an interest in taking firm action against disinformation (Au-Yong, 2017), to 13 March 2018, 
just before the Parliamentary Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods begin public hearings 
to solicit public feedback on the issue. In media coverage, this phase proved to be the most varied in 
terms of the positions taken on the issue of disinformation, as the government switched from calling 
it “fake news” to “deliberate online falsehoods” – the latter term remained the key term of reference 
for much of the Parliamentary hearings and subsequent debate. A word cloud (see Figure 7.1) based 
on media articles in Phase One (n=149) was generated using open coding with the word frequency 
function in Nvivo: identifying the 1,000 most frequently used words that are at least three letters long 
and grouping them by synonyms. This word cloud provided a succinct overview of the key narratives 
that were used in the initial justification phase for POFMA. 
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Phase One contained some key recurrent narratives that cemented the government’s position and 
paved the way for not just laws to tackle disinformation, but the direction which debate on the issue 
was to be conducted. These key narratives, emanating mostly from the government, can be identified 
from the open codes in the word cloud at Figure 7.1, evident from prominent keywords like 
“government”, “law”, “information” and “education”. They centre on the dangers of disinformation, 
the need for laws, how the government is best placed to tackle disinformation, and suggestions for 
how individuals can avoid being deceived by disinformation. Media articles also covered the opposite 
– how the dangers of disinformation might be overstated or not as the government presented them 
to be, and why laws are not always useful or necessary. These opposing narratives were usually voiced 
by media freedom advocates and academia who expressed their diverse opinions, particularly in 
proposing alternatives to laws. Solutions proposed to counter disinformation include greater public 
education efforts, the prompt provision of information from the government to citizens to establish 
and build trust, and creating independent bodies to assess disinformation (J. S. Ng, 2018; Seow, 2018; 
C. Yong, 2017). 
Figure 7.1: Word cloud of media articles in Phase One (n=149), 
containing at least three letters with terms synonymised
 
From this word cloud generated from the Phase One data set, it was possible to discern a number of 
broad themes. Using the Nvivo word cloud assisted with the initial process of data analysis, to “actively 
engage with it by searching for patterns of meaning” (Herzog et al., 2019, p. 392). Patterns drawn from 
the Phase One data set pointed to a focus on evaluating the threat of ‘fake news’, the necessity of 
legislative tools to counter this threat, and the role of the government in this process. From these 
patterns, five broad themes were identified, summarised in Table 7.3, that recurred throughout the 
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media articles from the eight identified sources. These identified narrative themes became a recurrent 
trend that represented the direction of the debate that was to follow in the subsequent phases of 
media coverage, and provided the foundation for “the gradual development of labels and their 
application to segments of potentially relevant data” (Herzog et al., 2019, p. 387) for the purpose of 
this genealogical study of POFMA. The themes were used for charting the progress of these narratives 
across all four phases to provide some level of consistency in analysis. Specific phrases and terms 
published in the media articles were then matched to each of these themes and selectively coded 
using Nvivo. 
Table 7.3: Thematic analysis of media articles during the initial stages of the POFMA debate 
Sample statements or terms in media articles Identified 
theme 
What it represents 
“made allegations with the ‘potential to create friction 
among the races’” 
“foreign countries, foreign agencies, people sitting 
outside of Singapore using it to either destabilise our 




anything negative that can 
potentially arise from the 
spread of ‘fake news’. 
“heavy responses can actually strengthen conspiracy 
theories” 
“incentivise proactive behaviours among social media 
users when it comes to fighting falsehoods online” 
Threats 
countered 
Statements proposing to 
reconsider the threat of ‘fake 
news’, or proposing solutions 
that are less draconian than 
legislation and regulation. 
“Under our current law, there are limited remedies to 
deal with these falsehoods” 
“powerful internet platforms and social media companies 
to be regulated” 
Laws for fake 
news 
Statements expressing the 
need for legislation to fight 
‘fake news’. 
“new laws created could be used to silence government 
critics” 




Statements indicating that 
laws could be detrimental or 
have the reverse effect 
against ‘fake news’. 
“important to hear from as diverse a range of participants 
as possible, so the committee can come up with the most 
holistic solution to the problem” 
“the Government has been "studying this problem for a 
while" and (the Select Committee) can examine this 




Statements vouching for the 
government as the most 
appropriate party to take 
action, or the value of the 
Select Committee in its 
appointed task. 
 
The identified themes demonstrated that the POFMA debate, particularly in the initial stage, allowed 
for a broad variety of views to be aired. However, this did not necessarily mean that alternative views 
presented by free speech advocates were able to successfully establish a position of dominance such 
that they could effectively challenge the view presented by the government. For instance, narratives 
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about the threat of disinformation, which the government has identified as online content that 
undermines Singapore’s democratic institutions and racial and religious harmony, were not 
challenged directly – that is, most did not debunk the need to tackle disinformation based on these 
conditions (Seow & Salleh, 2017). There was broad recognition that disinformation is a problem for 
Singapore, with a minority of news reports voicing the concerns of those who opposed the 
government’s position or who believed in a need to rethink the government’s assessment of the 
threats (Salleh, 2017). Where opinions differed was chiefly in how these established threats were to 
be addressed and whether legislation was in fact a necessary or ideal solution. 
In effect, Phase One was a period where the problem of ‘fake news’ was defined, even before the 
Select Committee meant to identify and address the threat was convened. This problem revolved 
around Singapore’s vulnerability as a multi-racial and multi-religious nation, whose open economy 
allowed for malicious actors from overseas to enter and undermine its social cohesion and breed 
discontent amongst its population. This framing of the problem was a proven mantra for ensuring 
broad public support, as it touched on a core mentality among the population – that is, Singapore as 
an economically and socially fragile small nation-state that other nations are always ready to bully – 
that few would dare to dispute. It is also not a novel approach, since drumming up the ‘siege mentality’ 
has been a persistent practice in Singapore’s political history, as detailed in Chapter 3. This approach 
was replicated for POFMA, where the government positioned itself as the best party to implement 
affirmative legislation to counter the alarming national threat of disinformation. This position was 
predicated on evidence that was visually accessible or appealed to primordial fear, but did not 
necessarily result in the fulfilment of the threats identified in the narrative. Examples of such evidence 
included a collapsed roof of an apartment block that misdirected a police investigation, allegations of 
‘plastic rice’ and ‘halal pork’ sold at a supermarket, and a low public turnout at the funeral of a former 
President (Lam, 2017). More significantly, the rational – or more accurately, rationalised – deduction 
of this established position of ‘a state under threat’ is to render impotent any solution that does not 
emanate from the powerful state. 
The nationalised threat of disinformation and the implied nationalised solution became the master 
frame (Barbieri, 2015) for discussing disinformation, which guided the progress of the POFMA debate 
throughout the other three phases. The government was able to achieve state legitimisation by 
appearing to encourage “the construction of alternative policy frames” that “can be interpreted as a 
call for policy change” (Barbieri, 2015, p. 441). Nevertheless, this approach never deviated from its 
policy objective, and in fact guided detractors who are wary of government powers to “reappraise 
their own views on culture and reconstruct diagnoses, prognoses and motivations to act in the cultural 
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arena” (Barbieri, 2015, p. 442). Media coverage of the debate, aided by a constant stream of 
information from the government and the spectre of an issue that was deemed to be of national and 
international importance, served to entrench the primacy of the government in the debate. 
Leading into the Select Committee public hearings, Phase One is best seen as a critical step in setting 
the tone of the debate and consultation that the Singapore public could have with the government. 
In spite of the variety of solutions to combat disinformation, the master narrative remained: ‘fake 
news’ is a clear and present danger to the sovereignty and security of Singapore, and hence the 
government is best placed to provide a solution using laws. However, rather than present a dogmatic 
government that is only intent on having its way, Phase One narratives indicate that the government 
understood the need to seek public legitimacy for what was proving to be a fairly complex problem, 
and also appeal to the good judgement of specific members of society that it needed buy-in from. This 
was coupled by the repeated idea, amplified by media, that the Select Committee would consult 
widely with experts from diverse fields (Ariffin, 2018; Yuen, 2018). However, the scope of this 
consultation only permitted the contest of solutions, not the definition of the problem itself. From 
that vantage point, Phase Two became a platform from which to draw out these solutions and served 
chiefly to present the government as the leader – and main solution-provider – in the fight against 
disinformation. 
Phase Two – drawing lines, digging deep trenches 
Phase Two was identified as the period from 14 March 2018, signalling the first hearing of the Select 
Committee in Parliament, to 7 May 2018, where the last news report was made in relation to the 
controversy that arose from the hearings, which centred on the unhappiness voiced by members of 
civil society about the way the hearings were conducted. Phase Two coverage focused on the 
exchanges during the hearings, where a diverse representation of stakeholders – academics, activists, 
lawyers, mainstream and online media practitioners – gave evidence to the Select Committee in 
Parliament. Similarly, a word cloud was generated from Nvivo for media articles published during 
Phase Two (n-256). It was immediately apparent from the open coding results (see Figure 7.2) that 
the general directions for Phase Two when compared to Phase One was significantly different in terms 
of the increased diversity of significant keywords. 
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of word clouds between media articles in Phase One (left, n=149) and Phase 
Two (right, n=256), containing at least three letters with terms synonymised
  
Media articles on the Select Committee hearings in Phase Two can be broadly classified into two types 
of coverage. The first type highlighted the government’s agreement with experts who presented on 
the dire situation of online falsehoods in Singapore and hence a need for more aggressive legal 
mechanisms to tackle the scourge. The second type highlighted calls for more measured approaches 
to tackle disinformation that do not hinge on legal tools, which the government mostly disagreed with. 
Words like “law” and “information” grew in frequency compared to other words used, signalling a 
more intense contest between having laws to counter disinformation versus the need for the 
government to be more proactive in informing citizens, including through the formation of non-
partisan “fact checking” bodies. By comparison, the value of public “education” and information 
literacy, which formed an important component of Phase One discourses about alternative solutions, 
have faded in significance in Phase Two. There was also more attention paid to the threats of 
disinformation to Singapore, although these views were less specific to Singapore than those 
expressed in Phase One. Threats were drawn mainly from the experiences of other countries such as 
Ukraine and Indonesia – both of these countries had representatives from disinformation-busting 
organisations giving evidence at the hearings. They centred on broad issues like how concerted 
disinformation “operations” were posing a threat to “national security” and eroding “trust in 
governments” – all significant keywords that have grown in prominence in Phase Two’s word cloud. 
The overtly legalistic and state-centric tones of the hearings served to affirm the government’s primal 
position as the organisation best suited to tackle what was presented as a severe problem, of which 
legislation is a necessary tool. 
A disproportionately high amount of coverage on the hearings (12.5%, n=256) was given to the hearing 
session between Law Minister K Shanmugam and historian and managing director of New Naratif 
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Thum Ping Tjin. Thum’s hearing was criticised by human rights group MARUAH as an “intense 
interrogation” by the Select Committee members and for being excessively confrontational (Y. Low, 
2018). In his written submission, Thum cast doubt on the severity of the threat of disinformation in 
Singapore, and had instead claimed that the ruling People’s Action Party government was responsible 
for spreading falsehoods. Thum had cited his own historical research on Operation Coldstore, a 
security operation in February 1963 where the PAP government arrested and detained the key 
members of the then-opposition party Barisan Socialis under charges of a conspiracy to overthrow the 
government and enforce a communist state. His paper was scrutinised and questioned by Shanmugam 
for six hours, the longest single session among all the hearings. Thum’s ordeal ended with Shanmugam 
accusing his research as “not scholarship, but sophistry” (N. Yong, 2018), in an attempt to dismiss 
Thum’s claims and discredit all that he has proposed. 
The spectacle of Thum’s ‘interrogation’ appeared to have dominated public discourse about the Select 
Committee hearings in Phase Two, and this significant development deserves some unpacking. 
Shanmugam’s uncompromising stance towards Thum led to accusations that the government was 
merely using the Select Committee hearings to brow-beat opposing views into submission, or to 
“intimidate and instill (sic) fear into anyone who contradicts the official government narrative” 
(TODAY, 2018b). However, Shanmugam’s clarification much later would reveal that the session went 
beyond criticising Thum. He claimed that Thum was unable to hold his own research to account, that 
“if you can justify what you said, then how can you be bullied?” (Stolarchuk, 2018). Shanmugam also 
insisted that the value of the session has future value – those who “read the transcripts… will then 
assess for themselves whether his views are credible or not credible” (Stolarchuk, 2018). The purpose 
of the session, then, was not just to establish the truth of the issue or to intimidate detractors, but to 
discredit those who disagree with the government’s position on ‘fake news’. Thum was further 
discredited when the Select Committee chair, Charles Chong, claimed that he instigated and 
engineered a petition among other academics to support him after the hearings (TODAY, 2018a). 
Thum was also not the only one who received an interrogation. Freelance journalist Kirsten Han and 
chief editor of The Online Citizen Terry Xu were also questioned mercilessly by parliamentarian Edwin 
Tong for their previous publications, which Tong sought to establish as containing falsehoods (J. Ong, 
2018b). Similarly, Shanmugam’s questioning of Facebook’s vice-president of public policy for Asia-
Pacific, Simon Milner, forced him to admit that the company had been remiss in its handling of the 
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Cambridge Analytica11 issue (Tang & Chia, 2018). From these examples, it can be seen that Phase Two 
held significance for the POFMA debate beyond serving either as a demonstration of government’s 
desire for consultation or as a platform for flexing its authority. Such a demonstration of authority did 
happen, but the ultimate success of the Select Committee as a tool of governance was to establish 
certain boundaries that entrenches certain social and political positions. On one side, the government 
was presented as forceful, assured, assertive and fully engaged with the necessary task of protecting 
Singapore. On the other side, technology companies, activists and independent media practitioners 
were cast as deceitful, feeble, self-seeking and a potential stumbling block to Singapore’s quest to 
combat the scourge of ‘fake news’. The government was effectively able to “attach meanings to other 
actors in terms of the positions assigned or attributed to them in the dominant or counter-discourses” 
such that “ideas that do not draw on or interact with the available discourses will be dismissed as 
strange or irrelevant” (Fischer, 2003, p. 83). Extended further, these disciplining narratives serve to  
draw boundaries of permissibility and culpability, a practice of “constructing and maintaining the 
alliances necessary to sustain the equilibrium” (Fischer, 2003, p. 78) of what constitutes ‘correct 
speech’ or ‘appropriate engagement’ in Singapore society. The public is invited through media 
discourse to align with the government’s position, demarcating them from the disagreeable – even 
recalcitrant – minority who do not. 
Ultimately, the key thrust of Phase Two was to affirm the government’s primal position as the body 
most suited to take on the scourge of ‘fake news’, and to do so by implementing legal frameworks. 
The formation of this position was the result of a decisive attempt by the government to identify 
deviant behaviour among participants at the Select Committee hearings. The purpose of identifying 
such deviance, however, was not primarily to silence them or downplay their importance, as some 
critics of the Select Committee hearings have suggested (TODAY, 2018b; Yahoo Singapore, 2018; 
Yusof, 2018). Instead, such public spectacles sought to draw out the various arguments and weave a 
narrative that established certain norms. In the case of the POFMA debate, this key narrative was 
about the right of the government to take firm action against disinformation. This right was justified 
on grounds that social media corporations cannot be trusted, online media practitioners are actually 
 
11 Cambridge Analytica is a British political consulting firm that was involved in allegedly mining data illegally from 
Facebook users. This data was subsequently used to support the 2016 campaign of former US President Donald Trump 
and the 2016 campaigns for the United Kingdom referendum to leave the European Union (popularly known as Brexit). 
Such assistance generally involved targeting voters with messages to support the identified campaigns. Facebook was 
accused of not doing enough to stop the falsehoods generated by these campaigns on its platform, and instead to 
profit from the process used to extract such data from its users. The core issue of the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
remained one of Facebook’s supposed indifference towards data privacy (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
facebook-privacy-massachusetts/facebook-may-have-to-disclose-some-app-records-in-privacy-probe-massachusetts-




contributing to the problem, while the government, with its firm grasp of statecraft and pastoral duty 
towards the welfare of citizens, is best placed to lead the agenda against this threat. Alternative views, 
even if they appear to be providing a robust competition to the government’s views, were not able to 
compete with this key narrative because the debate itself was a “melding of these components into a 
persuasive narrative structure that provides orientation more than specific pieces of information” 
(Fischer, 2003, p. 103). Rather than silence dissent, the Singapore government needed to put 
contrarian voices in the public domain for consideration, if only to discount or eliminate them in the 
formulation of its intended legal framework to combat disinformation. This drawing out of alternative 
views was to continue into Phase Three, which witnessed a persistent discrediting of such alternative 
voices. 
Phase Three – consolidation and extension 
Phase Three was identified as the period from 8 May 2018, after the last report directly related to the 
Select Committee hearings were published, to 31 March 2019, when the government announced that 
it will table legislation in Parliament aimed at tackling ‘online falsehoods’. Media articles in Phase 
Three (n=255) focused on consolidating some of the earlier arguments made during the Select 
Committee hearings and included a number of reports of grounds-up initiative to help citizens manage 
disinformation. As can be perceived from the open codes in Figure 7.3, there was a marked difference 
from Phase Two as Phase Three shifted back to earlier narrative elements of Phase One, where more 
emphasis was placed on re-exploring the various threats of disinformation, as well as solutions other 
than laws. “National security”, the undermining of “elections” and the erosion of “trust” in institutions 
were substantively highlighted in media reports as threats, while the need for “public education” and 
the need for the government to provide more “information” were re-iterated as key issues. 
Figure 7.3: Comparison of word clouds between media articles in Phase Two (left, n=256) and Phase 




Two dominant narratives stood out in Phase Three. The first dominant narrative was a perceptible 
shift to Facebook as a topic in the discussion on disinformation, which is more significant than that 
seen in Phases One and Two, representing almost two times the number of mentions in the other 
phases (see Figure 7.4). This increase in coverage can be attributed partly to the increased attention 
being paid to Facebook around the world as it attempted to answer queries from different 
governments about disinformation in its platform (Petroff, 2018). The media covered the participation 
of Singaporean parliamentarians at one such international forum in London (Channel NewsAsia, 
2018a). Facebook was featured in news reports when it set up a regional hub in Singapore to counter 
the disinformation threat (Channel NewsAsia, 2019b; Sin, 2019). Facebook was also criticised by 
Shanmugam for refusing to take down an alleged falsehood by a local website (The Online Citizen, 
2018). Analysed as a whole, such discourse indicated an assertion that Facebook cannot be trusted to 
take down disinformation spread on its platform, hence making political intervention through laws 
inevitable. 
Figure 7.4: Media mentions of “Facebook” from Phase One to Four
 
The second dominant narrative was a natural continuation from the first two: the increasing 
importance of the Singapore government and laws to tackle the threat of ‘fake news’. This view was 
supported by social acceptance of the state’s responsibility in implementing and enforcing laws, 
whereby it assumed the role to protect citizens from foreign threats (Ho, 2019; F. Sim, 2019). The 
severity of the disinformation threat and the diminishing credibility of technology companies 
compounded the problem and gave greater authority for the government to act. The narrative of state 
power is further enhanced by the ability of the government to marshal resources to counter such 
threats, when it announced that tackling the spread of falsehoods would be a component of its budget 
allocation for national defence (Mahmud, 2019). The public affirmation of the government as the 
authoritative figure in the formation and execution of legal frameworks is part of a long-standing 
practice of governance in Singapore, where “state discourse has constructed “citizenship” in terms of 
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compliance: citizens are instructed to be dutiful and subordinate to the knowing and authoritative 
state” (Rajah, 2017, p. 486). 
Phase Three, then, was not merely a summary of the Select Committee hearings in Phase Two, 
although such elements were included within the news coverage as contextual points of reference. 
Phase Three served to consolidate the government’s authority and expertise, and then extended its 
dominance into Singapore society. This dominance was given support since it was supposedly 
impossible to trust the private sector to govern itself for a matter of immense national gravity, thereby 
requiring government intervention. In ascribing power relations between the government and the 
governed – be it untrustworthy technology companies, a vulnerable citizenry in need of protection, or 
even the concept of democracy itself – the POFMA debate represented “civil prudence”, with a 
primary role of ensuring “obedience and discipline as conditions of a well-ordered state and taught 
the individual to regulate emotions and subordinate himself politically” (Dean, 2010, p. 105). What is 
vital to note is that at Phase Three of the POFMA debate, no law had yet been passed, and any in 
consideration were technically inconsequential to the debate. More accurately, “the function of law 
as a coercive technique of sovereignty has been displaced and reinscribed in its role in normalizing 
power” (Dean, 2010, p. 141), to the extent that when the law was eventually broached and passed in 
Phase Four, it became difficult for detractors to argue against its necessity. 
Phase Four – A benevolent government criticised 
Phase Four was identified as the period from 1 April 2019, when the Protection from Online 
Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill was first tabled in the Singapore Parliament, to 22 May 2019, two 
weeks after the law was passed following two days of debate in Parliament. Media articles in Phase 
Four (n=312) revolved around the debate in Parliament at the reading of the Bill. Coverage across both 
mainstream and online media highlighted the support for and opposition to the law voiced by the 
government and other stakeholders. As can be observed from a word cloud comparison between 
Phases Three and Four (see Figure 7.5), in terms of the variety of terms used in media coverage, Phase 
Four contained more repetitions of a narrower number of key terms. This signalled a narrowing of the 
debate, similar to the approach observed in Phase One. However, the tone and context of the 
narratives in Phase Four were significantly different from those of earlier phases, and the media 
discourse in this final leg of the POFMA debate centred on two dominant narratives. 
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of word clouds between media articles in Phase Three (left, n=255) and Phase 
Four (right, n=312), containing at least three letters with terms synonymised
  
The first dominant narrative emanated from statements issued by the Ministry of Law and the 
interviews given and op-eds written by various ministers in support of the law (Tong, 2019). This was 
matched by concerns raised by stakeholders – academics, activists, technology companies, media 
practitioners – that the law gave unnecessarily extensive powers to the government, which were in 
danger of abuse (Stolarchuk, 2019). These two positions accounted for largely similar terms used 
throughout the debate. There was an increased media focus on the “government” and “ministers” 
due to unease about the extent of “powers” given to these individuals. Concerns were raised about 
how ministers could use the law to clamp down on free speech, whereupon the government 
attempted to provide assurance that such concerns were overrated and that its powers were 
restricted through oversight by the “courts” (Ho & Kwang, 2019). The need for the law was barely 
disputed – for instance, the opposition raised by three vocal Nominated Members of Parliament 
(NMPs) were aimed at tweaking the specific terminology of the Bill and how the government should 
allay concerns and criticisms by codifying its public assurances into the letter of the law. The three 
NMPs even concurred that they saw a need for the law (Mokhtar, 2019b). 
The second dominant narrative centred on the definition of offence under the law. Concerns were 
raised that the scope of offence under POFMA was too broad and gave the government too much 
discretion to call anything ‘false’ and use that to silence its critics. The government maintained that 
online users will fall afoul of the law only if their online content matched a set criterion of offence, 
which included matters of national security and safety, foreign relations, and the “diminution of public 
confidence in public institutions” (H. Ng, 2019). Collectively, these issues were categorised as matters 
of “public interest”. Of these, the last criteria – ‘fake news’ that leads to a diminution of public 
confidence in public institutions – drew criticism from detractors of the law, as it was seen as giving 
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the government unbridled power to “treat fair criticism as threats to the state institutions” (George, 
2019) whenever such criticism portrayed the government in a negative light. 
The contesting narratives in Phase Four were decidedly polarising. The government was placed at one 
end of the spectrum as the knowledgeable administrator versed with legal doctrine and 
accommodating towards the concerns of the electorate. It was portrayed as taking needful risks to 
protect most Singaporeans and would be held accountable by the people through two institutions: 
the legal system that serves as a check and balance on the executive, and democratic elections. At the 
other end of the spectrum were the detractors who were split into two further categories. The first 
category refers to those who were deemed by the government to have valid concerns: lawyers and 
NMPs who voiced out about the specific wording of the legislation and seeking checks and balances 
to prevent executive overreach. This group was portrayed by the government as having “no 
substantial disagreement on their proposals – between what they have set out… what the Bill 
provides, and what the Government intends to prescribe further” (Shanmugam, 2019) in subsidiary 
legislation to the Bill. The second category refers to those who were deemed by the government to 
have invalid concerns: local and international human rights groups, independent media practitioners, 
technology companies, the parliamentary opposition and, to some extent, academics. According to 
the government, this group suffered from a poor understanding of the Bill or had concerns that were 
exaggerated and unfounded. This group was portrayed by the government as being the minority and 
did not reflect the popular sentiments of most Singaporeans – a “small group crying wolf” (Tong, 2019) 
who were being deliberately disruptive to achieve their own agendas. 
This is not to say, however, that the government chose to ignore the concerns raised by the second 
category of detractors. The government’s response to such disagreements over POFMA was in fact 
directed specifically to address these concerns raised in an attempt to limit the scope of these 
concerns. The government was able to segment these concerns and provide a response to each, even 
if these responses might not sufficiently address the concerns raised. For instance, Shanmugam 
provided a five-point rebuttal to the various accusations levelled against the law, although each 
response was effectively a direct refutation of the concerns raised. On accusations that the law gave 
too much power to the government to declare a statement false, he responded that POFMA has 
“narrower terms” than other laws, without clarifying if these other laws would cease to be in use after 
POFMA has been passed. On accusations that POFMA would have a chilling effect on free speech, 
Shanmugam maintained that “not all forms of speech are worthy of equal protection”. On accusations 
that the definition of ‘public interest’ was too wide, Shanmugam reiterated that public interest was 
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not the only criteria for using POFMA, with the need to establish falsehood as the second criteria, 
without providing any clarity on a narrower definition of ‘public interest’ (A. Lim, 2019). 
Findings from my inductive analysis of Phase Four narratives suggests a deliberate effort by the 
government to narrow the scope of opposition facing POFMA, to structure it into addressable 
components and manage its influence, rather than to eradicate such opposition completely. Rather 
than show an uncompromising government bent on implementing a law and using its authoritative 
powers to do so, the POFMA debate demonstrated the Singapore government’s desire to at least 
appear consultative and accommodating, while nullifying the concerns of those whom they claim are 
risking Singapore society and its institutions to achieve selfish gains. This flexibility, while tenuous in 
establishing a stronger narrative, has allowed the government to establish a compelling case on the 
need for POFMA, securing a policy win where “competing policy narratives incorporate strategies such 
as identification of winners and losers, framing who benefits and who sustains costs in the policy 
conflict” (McBeth et al., 2007, p. 90). Even more critically, this policy win was not the result of the 
government silencing dissent and using legal instruments against detractors, but in enabling a 
discursive process that, while skewed in its favour, would have left no doubt about its authority. 
However, securing this policy win was not the government’s only desired outcome from the POFMA 
debate. As the discourse analysis above showed, the POFMA debate provided an opportunity for the 
government to ‘showcase’ public dissent and its own ‘tolerance’ for it. Criticisms of the law were 
granted a public airing, but always within the confines of what was permitted by the government as 
justifiable concerns, or dismissed as irrelevant or harmful to Singapore society. There was little 
question that the government had maintained narrative dominance over the POFMA narrative, even 
if it was not always in full control of specific segments of the debate. What was more crucial was that 
its authority was affirmed through the process of segregation rather than the government’s own 
position on either side of this segregation. The government’s legitimised power emanated from its 
perceived wisdom in being able to distinguish the ‘us’ from the ‘them’, the permissible from the 
unacceptable, the rightfulness in upholding the law from the wrongfulness in malicious action bent of 
exploiting disinformation for selfish gain. From this wisdom, the demonstration of diligence by the 
government, to “only govern in such a way that he thinks and acts as though he were in the service of 
those who are governed” (Foucault, 1991, p. 96), was established. In the case of POFMA, this was 
done through an affirmation of the government’s supposedly diminished powers in a law that had 
“clear oversight mechanisms” that vested power in Singaporeans through their electoral vote (Ho & 
Kwang, 2019). The POFMA debate was a demonstration of “a kind of political a priori” where 
“questions of how we govern and are governed are reduced to the problem of how the dominant 
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group or sovereign state secured its position through legitimate or illegitimate means” (Dean, 2010, 
pp. 36-37). It is the process of legitimisation, rather than actual legitimacy, that affirms the 
government’s power. The identification of dissent and allowing it to be presented in public served the 
purpose of creating disciplining narratives, as discussed in Chapter 6, which defined norms and 
permissibility and structured relations of social power about POFMA. Hence, that the government 
appeared arrogant and domineering over contrarian voices did little to undermine its legitimacy, so 
long as it could demonstrate that its actions were needful in the service of the public interest. 
Disciplining narratives – POFMA as contestation 
The examination of the four phases of the POFMA debate is useful in providing a general overview of 
the evolution of the public discourse surrounding the law, and how this in turn establishes the norms 
with which the public and critics of the law are supposed to use to navigate the debate on POFMA and 
disinformation. A closer examination of how this process was played out in mediated exchange would 
serve to highlight instances where specific master narratives were expressed and affirmed while 
permitting narratives of contest by critics of the law. In this section, I examine the themes identified 
earlier in this chapter and highlight how they varied between Phases One and Four using selective 
coded data from these two phases. The beginning and end phases were chosen because they were 
unlike Phases Two and Three, which were overt attempts at disciplining contrarian voices and 
Facebook  – or what was accused to be “an exercise in political theatre” (The Online Citizen, 2019). A 
close examination of Phases One and Four offer the advantage of charting the genealogy of POFMA 
in two distinct time periods where contestations against state power were more prominent. This 
meant that there was generally a greater urgency among narrative actors to connect with established 
norms to affirm their position of legitimacy. In this way, the study of Phase One and Four provides for 
the “fashioning (of) concepts that make visible linkages, assemblages, and networks, particularly with 
an eye to their overall coherence” (Koopman, 2013, p. 4). Such an analysis demonstrates that 
governmentality depends not just on spectacular punishment – or in the case of POFMA, public 
chastisement – but also the persistent reinforcement of norms through discourses of rationalisation. 
This persistent reinforcement can be seen in the narratives that were used to associate threats to 
laws. Comparison diagrams generated from Nvivo based on selectively coded statements in Phase 
One media articles can be used to show this relationship. In Figure 7.6, the top chart shows the number 
of media articles that contained statements supporting the use of laws together with statements 
articulating the threats of ‘fake news’. The bottom chart shows the number of media articles that 
contained statements supporting alternatives to laws together with countering the threats of ‘fake 
news’. As shown in Figure 7.6, statements mentioning the use of laws were more consistently linked 
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to statements that highlighted threats, as compared to statements that reject the use of laws linked 
to statements that provide a reassessment of threats. 
Figure 7.6: Comparison diagram of Phase One selectively coded narratives for statements supporting 
the use of laws (top) and statements that reject the use of laws (bottom)
 
The contrast between the two positions of the POFMA debate – that is, those supporting the need for 
legal tools versus those refuting the need for legal tools – becomes more pronounced when the same 
comparison diagram is generated with selectively coded statements from Phase Four (see Figure 7.7). 
In this comparison diagram, it is clear that while statements supporting the use of laws persistently 
appear with statements about the threats of ‘fake news’, the opposite was the case for statements 
denouncing the use of laws and statements seeking a re-consideration of the threats. This means that 
the case for using laws was more closely rationalised with the threats of ‘fake news’, almost always 
backed up by a mention of one or more of these threats. In comparison, those who advocated for no 
laws to be used or for POFMA to be reconsidered were not able to justify this adequately with an 
accompanying reference to ‘fake news’ as a non-threat. Instead, these arguments relied almost 
persistently on declarations of POFMA as an inherently bad law – for instance, that it was “too broad 
and provided for future abuse by future governments” (Ho & Kwang, 2019) – without connecting such 
arguments with the broader environment of threats. The causal link between the issue of ‘fake news’ 
to the solutions offered by both sides of the debate point to a situation where “winning groups try to 
restrict participation (issue containment) in a policy issue by limiting the scope of the conflict whereas 
losing groups try to widen participation (issue expansion) in a policy issue” (McBeth et al., 2007, p. 
89). Put in this perspective, advocates for alternatives to laws likely found themselves on the 
defensive, unable to draw points of rationalisation to support their case. 
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Figure 7.7: Comparison diagram of Phase Four selectively coded narratives for statements supporting 
the use of laws (top) and statements that reject the use of laws (bottom)
 
The affirmation for POFMA becomes more evident when examining the selectively coded narratives 
for and against the use of laws in Phase Four (see Figure 7.8). The government was able to put forth a 
number of benefits for POFMA – the need to respond “decisively” given the speed at which ‘fake news’ 
can spread, how the law protects freedom of speech by focusing on statements of fact rather than 
“opinions”, and how “power” is vested in the “courts” as the final arbiter of falsehoods. By 
comparison, the arguments against the law, while based on a broad swath of issues, was heavily 
centred on the excessive “powers” given to “ministers” to be the first arbiter of falsehoods. This 
perspective is not technically wrong. Among the six criteria of offence identified in the Bill for POFMA, 
the “diminution of public confidence in public institutions” was a clear deviation from the key 
narratives of national vulnerability – the impact of disinformation on racial and religious harmony and 
sovereignty – identified since the beginning of the debate. It was around this criterion that the 
arguments against executive overreach were established. However, this concern was symbolically 
nullified by the government’s repeated insistence that POFMA is less draconian than other laws 
already in use, and has a “clear oversight mechanism” to prevent abuse by the government (Ho & 
Kwang, 2019). This oversight was to be achieved through a court appeal against a government-issued 




Figure 7.8: Comparison of word clouds between Phase One selective codes on the need for laws (left) 
and Phase Four selective codes for countering laws (right) 
  
It is also through this approach of allowing dissent and countering it – either directly or indirectly – 
that the Singapore government was able to elicit support for POFMA. At the same time, it is able to 
acknowledge that “there are concerns but that’s restricted to a smaller group”, who are then 
dismissed for their lack of knowledge and “don’t realise” the supposedly positive aspects of the law 
(Ho & Kwang, 2019). This position of authority is further cemented by the political practice in 
Singapore where the state “demarcated ‘law’ as a narrow domain of knowledge and activity”, which 
is difficult to challenge since this domain “discursively subordinate(s) ‘law’ to power” (Rajah, 2017, p. 
489). 
It might be convenient to dismiss the entire POFMA debate as a pseudo-consultation exercise, 
orchestrated purely for the government to push through a law it wants while paying lip service to 
alternative views. But the analysis of the discursive process of the debate, from beginning to end, 
points to a different reality. Rather than silence or downplay alternative views to the law it wanted, 
the government actively sought to include as many of such views as possible. Doing so is not a practice 
in diluting concerns, although this might have happened in practice. Instead, encompassing a diversity 
of views enhances rather than deters control of the narrative, a practice of “integrating rather than 
simply dominating subordinate classes to win their consent” (Fischer, 2003, p. 78). This consent, 
however, is not won by default merely through engagement in a consultation process. Rather, consent 
is achieved through discourse – in the case of POFMA, an extensive media discourse – that actively 
constructs “the ‘storylines’ that symbolically condense the facts and values basic to a belief system” 
(Fischer, 2003, p. 102). Such discourse establishes norms and social values, creating expectations for 
how the parties involved in the policy-making process should behave – in effect, disciplining 
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narratives. The public consultation process does not lie external to this disciplining process, but is 
integral to it, granting the government an enhanced public legitimacy not just through the act of 
consultation, but in the open and highly contested rationalisation of its position (H. Lee et al., 2020). 
Such rationalisation need not necessarily be elaborate or forceful, but often came across as 
statements to affirm existing power structures. For instance, Shanmugam was able to state matter-
of-factly that “when it comes to what’s in public interest and what is the right remedy, those are – 
based on previous case law, based on established precedent – matters for the executive” (Ho & 
Kwang, 2019). It is precisely this rationalised legitimisation that allows the government to claim 
dominance over the POFMA debate and assert its position of knowledge and benevolence. 
Conclusion – the POFMA genealogy as narrative evolution 
It should be noted that towards the end of the debate, media coverage of the POFMA debate was 
significantly divided between mainstream media and online media, with a clearly skewed intent by 
mainstream media to play down criticism of the law, and by online media to increase emphasis on 
concerns about the law (Abbugao, 2019; Stolarchuk, 2019). It is also worth pointing out that within 
weeks of POFMA coming into effect, the law was invoked several times to quash dissenting views 
made online against the government, with a number of these directed at independent online media. 
Such use fuelled earlier unease expressed by those who oppose the law as evidence that the 
government has created the law only to use it against its critics (J. Lim, 2020). Collectively, these 
occurrences signify instances where the media discourse on POFMA could either erode or fortify the 
government’s legitimacy and change public sentiment. Unfortunately, the continual development of 
POFMA as an issue would not be adequately discussed in the space of this chapter, and it would be 
worth reviewing such discourses separately. Instead, what informed the analysis in this chapter was 
the genealogical process of the media narratives that surrounded the POFMA debate. At the very 
least, this chapter provides a useful outline of the methods and approaches used, combining 
genealogy and discourse analysis, which can be extrapolated to study the development of POFMA and 
other laws or policies that receive much public debate. 
Charting the progress of media narratives as they evolve through the four distinct phases of the debate 
on POFMA pointed to a deliberate attempt by the Singapore government to affirm its legitimacy in 
implementing the law through persuasion. This was clearly not a government adamant about having 
its way at all cost, but one that believed in the legitimising effect that public discourse would have. 
Moreover, this legitimising process was hardly done with force and impudence. The government 
appeared cognisant that laborious and time-consuming public discourse allowed it to dictate through 
the media all the knowledge that it wishes to bring to bear to support its exercise of power. In doing 
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so, it was able to define POFMA as credible and beneficial to the nation, while side-lining opposing 
views as fringe and destructive to society-at-large. The POFMA debate demonstrated a practice of 
disciplining narratives, identified in two aspects. For one, it successfully identified for discursive 
punishment certain individuals who voiced concerns about POFMA, whereby contention to the 
government’s preferred position is publicly vilified and desecrated as deviant and anti-social 
behaviour that puts Singapore society at risk. Such narratives were directed at online media 
practitioners, big tech representatives and some academics in Phase Two of the POFMA debate, and 
the political opposition, academics and activists in Phase Four, those who were ‘crying wolf’. For 
another, it encouraged public perception towards positive action, by taking personal responsibility to 
fighting against the ‘common enemy’ that is ‘fake news’, one such action being to support POFMA, or 
even challenge the government in court if a miscarriage of justice is suspected. 
It would be wrong to see this legitimising effort as either arbitrary or inconsequential to a properly 
functioning democratic process. The genealogy of POFMA demonstrates governance at its most 
efficacious: a precise and deliberate attempt to steer public discourse in a specific way that supports 
the government’s position and desires. This process involved a dedicated effort in defining the limits 
of the debate by exercising knowledge that only the government has full control of, decisively 
identifying ‘the other’ in public opposition to its own position, while demonstrating benevolence and 
prudence in the exercise of its coercive power. This narrative also faced challenges by a broad swath 
of society – legal experts, academia, activists, practicing journalists and the technology industry. Even 
so, it would be more appropriate to view such challenges as rambunctious, rather than robust. That is 
because these groups, even with the aid of an independent online media that gave more voice to their 
concerns, have thus far been unable to extricate themselves from the disciplining narratives that have 
already been pre-defined by the Singapore government. Such disciplining narratives continually 
describe and reinforce norms about the ‘right’ way to participate in public discourse and engage the 
government, as much as they set the precedence for the ‘right conduct’ of ‘professional online media 
practitioners’ who have been a core component of the POFMA debate. 
The POFMA debate, more so than the law itself, demonstrated the efficacy of media governance that 
has thus far eluded research that focused on legal and economic restrictions. It exemplifies the use of 
disciplining narratives to establish, not just the master frame of the debate on ‘fake news’, but the 
social norms and expectations for how Singaporeans should consume and produce media content. 
Even more significantly, such a pervasive and dialogical process would not have been possible without 
the use of the same media channels that the government seeks to govern, even if such media 
discourses do not persistently deliver the government a domineering hand. Indeed, this efficacy in 
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governance is achieved not in spite of, but chiefly through embracing challenges from media 
practitioners and media freedom advocates as an integral part of the debate. Such an all-
encompassing process allows the Singapore government to demonstrate its wisdom and diligence, 






“Today, over 40 years we have transformed it, because assiduously we 
attended to the politics of life. That’s what it is about. What is the 
future? If I can have another political party to look after you the way 
the PAP has, I say my job is done, finished!” 




On 10 July 2020, Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) was returned to power at Singapore’s 14th 
General Election, but with a discernible drop in both the number of seats and vote share. The PAP lost 
four seats, one previously held by a minister, and saw its total vote share dip by 8.6 percent. While 
such a result might not be remarkable in any other part of the world – particularly since the PAP still 
retained its supermajority in Parliament with 83 out of 93 elected seats – the loss can be seen as a 
major dent to the PAP’s credibility and reputation. A post-election survey conducted by the Institute 
of Policy Studies indicated that the PAP saw a seven percent drop in its perceived credibility as a 
political party since the previous elections, while its main opposition, the Workers’ Party (WP), saw an 
eight percent increase (Chew, 2020). 
Given that the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) was used heavily 
against members of opposition parties and online media (TODAY, 2020), and mostly related to 
criticisms against the government, it would have been tempting to claim that the PAP lost its credibility 
due to its misuse of the law. This is particularly so given that the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), 
another opposition party that was served POFMA correction directions before and during the 
hustings, did not see a significant drop in credibility. Indeed, a post-election survey conducted the 
Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), a government-funded think tank, indicated that those who perceive 
the SDP as ‘not credible’ dropped by 14 percent between the 2015 and 2020 elections (Chew, 2020). 
However, it would be difficult to determine if POFMA was the single deciding factor for the dip in the 
PAP’s level of credibility with citizens. For one, the values associated with credibility deals with both 
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the subject of correction directions – for instance, the benefits of public policies on the lives of citizens 
– and the specific use of correction directions. It would not be wrong to say that although citizens 
were less satisfied with the government for delivering poor education standards (one of the subjects 
that received a correction direction), they still think it had justly invoked POFMA. For another, among 
the myriad of issues that can affect political credibility, issues relating to media freedom generally do 
not figure prominently in the psyche of Singaporeans. There is little reason for the average 
Singaporean to believe that POFMA, which has thus far been used mostly against political targets, 
would affect the population as a whole. 
Considerations about political trust is less about specific issues – and of these issues, even less so the 
government’s use of POFMA – as it is about the climate of trust that the government has built up over 
time, as part of an extensive practice of relationship-building with the governed. This thesis has been 
an examination of this relationship-building effort by the Singapore government that has been about 
the media as much as achieved through the media. The Singapore government has long recognised 
the media’s ability to influence the public’s political opinion and its acceptance of social norms and 
values. Hence, efficacious media governance in Singapore is not only about governing the media 
industry through the laws, policies and regulatory regimes directed at the media, but also about 
governing the media environment through public debates and affirmation of the ‘correct’ media 
values that journalists and media consumers should embody and uphold. The two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive but work cohesively as one media governance system. The purpose of such a 
governance system is not meant to be punitive towards media practitioners as much as it is to 
entrench certain norms and expectations about media production and consumption. Encouraging 
positive consumption rather than repressive dominance projects the benevolence of the government, 
justifying its legitimacy and right to govern. As such, media governance in Singapore is a practice of 
public trust building, not a legal framework of media repression. Understanding this critical difference 
is key to understanding the government’s success in accumulating the legitimacy it has among the 
greater Singapore public. Such legitimacy is affirmed even if the use of specific laws, such as POFMA, 
misses the mark in exemplifying political benevolence, since legitimacy is grounded not in specific 
laws, but the ingrained values and norms that shape public consent and inform these laws.  
The conclusion to this thesis offers a retrospective review of my key points of analysis. It begins with 
a review of the use of POFMA, which was introduced at the beginning of the thesis but examined in 
Chapter 7 as a case study of Singapore’s media governance system. In charting its use since the law 
came into effect in October 2019, this chapter provides a summary of its effects in suppressing free 
speech, and highlights the law’s actual potency in affirming social norms and government legitimacy. 
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It then reviews the various legal processes and narratives that have been established in Singapore 
over time to entrench the system of governance that has led to POFMA. This chapter then proceeds 
to chart this practice of governance to my earlier theoretical analysis of Singapore’s media governance 
environment, drawing on Foucault’s governmentality, to give structure to my observations. The key 
argument here is that rather than use force of law or indirect coercion, it is the government’s precise, 
albeit obsessive, attention to the positive conduct of the lives of everyday Singaporeans that grants it 
legitimacy to govern. Far from being just political legitimacy that sees the PAP government win 
election after election with large majorities, it is rationalised legitimacy that grants it the seldom-
questioned right to make the call for strict media controls. This chapter concludes with some reflection 
points about my research and proposes how this thesis proffers a refreshed approach to 
understanding media governance and media freedom in Singapore. 
The post-POFMA debacle 
Following the conclusion of the POFMA debate in May 2019, as detailed in Chapter 7, the law came 
into effect in October 2019 and was invoked within two months. However, this application of the law 
was a far cry from the earlier promises of the law as an essential tool for tackling instances of online 
falsehoods, emanating chiefly from overseas sources, that sought to undermine Singapore’s social 
harmony and public institutions. The first four instances where POFMA was used saw correction 
directions issued to three local politicians and Alex Tan, a Singaporean who stood for elections in 2011 
and was then running a series of online platforms from Australia that focused on Singapore politics. 
Rather than online disinformation from foreign powers that stoked racial and religious tensions or 
destabilised Singapore elections, the alleged falsehoods were directed at government 
mismanagement. The first four instances of use received much criticism, with questions raised in 
parliament about whether “the Government was setting up ‘speed traps where opposition politicians 
drive and not elsewhere’” (J. Lim, 2020). This accusation led Information Minister S Iswaran to claim 
that the use of POFMA against politicians was “an unfortunate convergence or coincidence”, adding 
that it was “just the consequence of their actions” (Kurohi, 2020b), hence laying the blame squarely 
on those who received the correction directions. Iswaran also claimed that “the falsehoods allege that 
the Government mismanaged public funds, abused police powers, and discriminated against 
Singapore citizens in favour of foreigners” and “failing to deal decisively with such falsehoods will 
erode or even undermine public trust in Singapore's institutions, with serious consequences for its 
democracy” (Kurohi, 2020b). This indicated an attempt by the government to depoliticise the use of 
the law by appealing to the larger consequences of the ‘falsehoods’ in question, even if they had little 
to do with the original rationale of POFMA at its conceptualisation stage. 
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In spite of this justification attempt, there was likely a sense among government officials that the use 
of POFMA in the first four instances has overstepped the boundaries and breached the promises of 
measured use outlined during the POFMA debate (Channel NewsAsia, 2019a). For the six months from 
January to June 2020, the government was decidedly less political in its use of POFMA – out of a total 
of 14 instances of use, only two were directed at a politician. However, the restraint in the use of 
POFMA against political parties all but dissipated when the 2020 General Election was called. During 
the hustings from 30 June to 10 July 2020, POFMA was invoked a total of four times with a total of 17 
correction directions sent to various politicians, news websites covering the election and individual 
social media users. The use during the election, while higher in density than previous instances, was 
little different in purpose: to neutralise alleged falsehoods that criticise government policies and 
performance, more so than to prevent social strife. Table 8.1 provides a breakdown of correction 
directions and the subject for which the law was applied. 
In its totality, POFMA was prominent in precisely how much its use did not align with the originally 
stated threats of ‘fake news’ identified by the government during the early stages of the POFMA 
debate. POFMA was originally promoted as a means to tackle falsehoods from foreign malicious actors 
seeking to exploit sectarian tendencies among Singaporeans and undermine the republic’s elections, 
as was allegedly seen in Europe and the United States. This gave way to what appeared to be specific 
attempts to target the government’s political opponents and independent online media as a means 
of neutralising criticism against its policies. Of the 51 correction directions issued from November 2019 
to July 2020, only 12 were directed at foreign entities, and even this figure is debatable because 10 of 
these were directed at Alex Tan and his collection of websites. The government claimed the use of 
POFMA was essential due to falsehoods about the COVID-19 pandemic (Tham, 2020a), and media 
release records from the POFMA Office show that at least 12 out of the 23 instances where POFMA 
was invoked related to COVID-19 (POFMA Office, 2020). However, a close inspection shows that only 
four out of these 12 were directly related to COVID-19 misinformation that could potentially cause 
public harm – for example, disinformation about train station closures and the emergence of COVID-
19 clusters in schools. The other eight instances revolved around alleged ‘government 
mismanagement’ of the pandemic – for example, the public housing authority evicting tenants or a 
government agency organising a ‘super-spreader’ event (see Table 8.1). While the veracity of these 
allegations against the government is disputable, it is discernible that correction directions issued for 
COVID-19 ‘falsehoods’ tend to focus more on preventing the erosion of public trust in the government 




Table 8.1: Breakdown of instances where POFMA was used from November 2019 to July 2020 














    
2 28-Nov-2019 Minister's remarks on 
religious leanings of election 
candidates 
 STR (1)    
3 14-Dec-2019 Declining local PMET 
employment 
SDP (2)     
4 16-Dec-2019 Education grants for foreign 
students 
Lim Tean (2)     
5 22-Jan-2020 Abuse in prison during 
executions 







6 27-Jan-2020 Covid-19 death   HardwareZone (1)   
7 28-Jan-2020 Covid-19 causing train 
closure 
    "Several FB posts" 
(1) 
8 30-Jan-2020 Covid-19 cases and mask 
shortage 
 STR (2) 
AB-TC (1) 
   
9 14-Feb-2020 Covid-19 mis-management 
by government 
 STR (1)    
10 26-Feb-2020 Evictions by Housing 
Development Board due to 
Covid-19 
  TISG (2) Glibert Goh 
(1) 
 
11 18-Mar-2020 Government carelessness 
leading to Covid-19 cluster 
Lim Tean (2)    Henryace (1), 
Sebastian (1) 
12 1-Apr-2020 Budget mis-allocation     Tiffinnytara (1) 
13 6-Apr-2020 Foreign workers’ pay during 
Covid-19 
 STR (1)    
14 17-Apr-2020 Police action during Covid-19 
lockdown 
 TTR (1)    
15 19-Apr-2020 Salary of the Prime Minister’s 
wife 
Lim Tean (1) TTR (1) HardwareZone (1) 
TOC (1) 
  
16 5-May-2020 Covid-19 cases in schools  SST (1)    
17 13-May-2020 POFMA as a bad law   New Naratif (1)   
18 27-May-2020 POFMA as a bad law  NTS (1)    
19 29-Jun-2020 Singapore-Malaysia travel 
restrictions during Covid-19 
 SNS (1)    
20 2-Jul-2020 Government spending on 
foreign students 
PVP (1) 
Lim Tean (1) 
    
21 3-Jul-2020 Population planning by 
government 
  Sin Rak Sin Party 
(1) 
 Ryann Smith (1) 
Jafri Basron (1) 
Denise Fletcher (1) 




 TOC (2) 
Sin Rak Sin Party 
(1) 
 Louis Chng (1) 
23 5-Jul-2020 Government mis-
management of Covid-19 
  TOC (2) 
NUSS (1) 
CNA (1) 
New Naratif (1) 
  
Number of correction directions issued: 
TOTAL: 51 
12 12 17 2 8 
        
 Key:       
  The first four cases    
  Falsehoods directly related to COVID-19    
  During GE2020    
 
There had been a perceptible lull in the use of POFMA following the General Election in that no 
correction directions were issued in the ensuing period of six months, which was uncharacteristic 
given that it was used aggressively in the lead up to and during the election. In addition, very little was 
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reported about the use of the law following the General Election, except that its use had “backfired 
and distracted voters from PAP’s central message” (J. S. Ng & Choo, 2020), which was primarily about 
the PAP’s campaign message of saving lives and livelihoods during the pandemic. It would be 
convenient to view the silence on POFMA as an indicator of its demise, that the government’s 
reluctance to use the law signals its concerns about damaging its own image as an unintended 
consequence. This silence could also be seen as a tacit admission by the PAP that POFMA was 
prompted by a desire to quell uncomfortable debate around election time. Most notably, the hard 
stance taken by Information Minister S Iswaran against ‘fake news’ about COVID-19 before the 
elections (Fan, 2020) gave way to a significantly less strident and more circumspect response that 
favoured public education and engagement (The Online Citizen, 2021). These changes might suggest 
that POFMA has either reached its ‘use-by’ date, or that the PAP is cognisant of the perils of over-use 
of the law. 
However, this shift in tempo of news coverage on POFMA must be put in perspective. While attention 
on POFMA has waned, there is no indication that the effects of the law has been reduced. In spite of 
promises for “soul searching” following the election results (Abdullah, 2020), the government had not 
made any move to repeal or even review POFMA, particularly to address concerns about the excessive 
powers granted to the executive, an issue that surfaced prominently during the debate leading up to 
the passing of the law. It would hence be ill-advised to perceive this reprieve as a victory of activism 
over poor governance. Instead, more can be gleaned by examining the ebb and flow of legal 
instruments within the context of the broader media governance ecosystem in Singapore. 
A closer inspection of the post-election survey by IPS suggests some incongruence between citizen 
dissatisfaction with the supposed ‘fake news’ flagged by POFMA correction directions and the use of 
the law itself. During the hustings, the SDP had claimed that the government intended to increase 
Singapore’s population size to an unsustainable 10 million, a claim that saw the SDP being served a 
POFMA correction direction. IPS’s study showed that 47 percent of citizens felt the government did 
poorly in handling population growth issues, but only about 30 percent were dissatisfied with how the 
government handled ‘deliberate online falsehoods’ (Soon, 2020). It should be noted that the IPS study 
was not meant specifically to examine the effects of the government’s use of POFMA. However, it 
does suggest that while citizens were critical of the government’s handling of the topics that led to 
the use of POFMA, they did not necessarily feel that the government had used POFMA negatively. It 
would be prudent to examine the implications behind this persistent trust in the government among 
the population when it came to media laws, in light of the government’s reticence in evoking the law 
after the initial flurry of correction directions. The two occurrences might appear at odds with each 
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other – that is, increased trust should have emboldened the government to take advantage. However, 
it is in studying the longer trajectory of Singapore’s media governance system that affirms the inter-
related, even complementary, qualities of this seeming dichotomy. The effects of singular legislative 
frameworks must be examined in terms of the broader context of a society’s interaction with the 
entire media governance system. 
Integrated system of governance 
The common perception about media governance in Singapore is one based on fear (The Guardian, 
2019; TODAY, 2013), or at least a significant degree of unease, towards the government’s use of strict 
legal measures to keep media entities in check. Harsh laws governing defamation, racial and religious 
incitement and sedition have been used throughout Singapore’s short history, as detailed in Chapter 
3, and many of these instances of use have been directed at media practitioners. These instances give 
the impression that the Singapore government maintains firm and draconian control over the media, 
using punishment as a warning for keeping them in check and subservient to the state. Any media 
practitioner found to be critical of government policy or members of the ruling party can be prepared 
to face dire consequences – if not jail terms or hefty fines, then the risk of losing their jobs or, in the 
case of foreign media practitioners, forfeiting their rights to work in Singapore. This threat, even if not 
always used, has been the key factor in what was perceived to be self-censorship among mainstream 
media practitioners (George, 2007a; Gomez, 2000). 
However, the common perception that media laws and regulatory regimes stifle the media industry 
fails to account for the ecosystem of social norms and values that are more instrumental in ensuring 
media entities govern themselves. These norms are intertwined with ideals about the role of the 
media in nation-building, the need to prevent foreign interference in local politics, the need to 
maintain economic and political stability, the responsibility of the media to guard Singapore’s cultural 
core, standards of the journalistic profession, or any combination of these rationalities. This system of 
governance using norms lends legitimacy to the government, which is often presented as preferring 
not to encroach on journalistic practice and would only use legal instruments in the most extreme of 
circumstances, and always in the service of public interest. Indeed, my interviews with various 
stakeholders of Singapore’s media governance system, detailed in Chapter 5, pointed to a general 
concurrence among my interviewees: legal tools are generally not regarded by the government as the 
best – and certainly not the first – answer to keeping the media in check. It is more important for the 
Singapore government to govern with the people’s acceptance and confidence. Totalitarian rule over 
the media industry, while temptingly effective in keeping the media subservient to the government, 
does not build public and international confidence in Singapore as a technologically savvy 
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cosmopolitan state with an open and thriving media sector – essential qualities for ensuring economic 
vibrancy. Clamping down too strongly on the internet risks impacting its economic potential, given 
that an open internet environment was perceived to be a vehicle for “technological innovation and 
creativity” that are “essential components of the future global economy” (T. Lee, 2014, p. 31). Where 
legal instruments are used against media practitioners, such use must not detract from Singapore’s 
status as an attractive destination for media investors who find its “location, communication links, 
infrastructure, stability and liveability to be a winning combination” (George, 2012, p. 42). The use of 
legal instruments to curb the excesses of media freedom was a measure of last resort, whereby there 
can be no doubt among Singaporeans and potential investors alike that the government is supportive 
of a free and open economy, while mindful of its negative influences on Singapore society. 
It is this careful attention paid to the practice of convincing the governed that defines media 
governance in Singapore. Throughout its history of managing the media, the Singapore government 
has persistently and painstakingly highlighted the need to protect Singapore society and citizens from 
the vagaries and excesses of the media. This wariness was expressed in the government’s tough stance 
towards foreign media in the country’s early independence and eventually extended to online media 
as the country sought to tap on the economic potential of the internet in the 1990s. Consistently, the 
media was flagged for its potential to cause ruptures to the delicate multi-racial, multi-religious fabric 
of Singapore society, and as the floodgate for negative ‘Western’ influences that can lead to economic 
and political instability. The government unreservedly expressed its disdain for journalistic practices 
that stray outside of its nation-building agenda, which requires the media to be a partner in 
establishing social, economic and political stability, rather than serve as a watchdog of the 
government. These standards for a nation-building media was to pervade much of official government 
speeches (H. L. Lee, 1987; K. Y. Lee, 1971; Y. S. Lee, 2000; Lui, 2009), and became the code to which 
mainstream media practitioners needed to abide by (Balji, 2019; Cheong, 2013). More importantly, 
they presented the government as possessing the two qualities that affirms its sovereign and 
rationalised legitimacy to rule over its own citizens: wisdom, or knowledge of the population; and 
diligence, to think and act as if always in the service of the population (Foucault, 1991). 
Such an integrated system of governance is often met by a spirited push-back from media freedom 
activists and online media practitioners, and such activism is often viewed as the beginnings of a new 
awareness of freedoms in the Singapore media ecosystem. Media regulatory regimes, from the 
Newspaper and Printing Press Act to the Internet Code of Practice, restricted newspapers and 
broadcasters with pointed but vaguely-defined parameters of social norms. While media practitioners 
were required to inform, entertain and educate readers, abide by local laws, refrain from stoking racial 
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and religious tensions, uphold public moral values, and give right of reply to the government, the 
subjects that can potentially fall afoul of these standards were seldom laid out explicitly in regulation. 
Online media practitioners, growing in numbers since the infancy of an emerging internet industry in 
the mid-1990s, did not feel constrained by these standards and rules. The independent funding model 
of digital journalism, which depended mainly on donations and online advertising, was also a 
departure from the model used by mainstream media, which depended heavily on corporate 
sponsors. Such corporate entities preferred the political status quo and believed that doing otherwise 
would damage the economic stability engendered by the government. Emboldened by the 
government’s promise of keeping a ‘light touch’ approach to regulating the internet, online media 
pushed political boundaries that constantly challenged the government’s policy directions, and at 
times even challenged the laws that restricted the media industry. Such was the case for the 
FreeMyInternet protest (Wong, 2013a), where activists and online media practitioners objected to the 
government’s amendment to the Broadcasting Act that sought to strengthen the regulatory 
framework on online media outlets by imposing a performance bond and instituting a content take-
down regime. 
It is what lies beyond these two fronts – the lure of co-optative economic levers that encourage the 
media to conform with the status quo, and the threat of coercive and punitive laws that focus on 
political deviance among media practitioners – that this thesis has sought to analyse. This economic-
legal combination remained an incomplete description of Singapore’s media governance system. 
Proponents of a more measured media governance system tend to see the move towards financial 
levers as reflective of a government that knows aggressive hard tactics have no place in a society that 
wishes to project itself as progressive and cosmopolitan. Critics of the multitude of legal and 
regulatory tools put in place to stifle independent online media, particularly those who advocate 
greater media freedom (Amnesty International, 2009; Reporters Without Borders, 2020b), perceive 
little to no change in the government’s march towards a totalitarian media regime. However, both 
these views miss the mark. Supporters of such views regard the practice – of curtailing media 
freedoms domestically while projecting Singapore’s status as an open economy – as either an act of 
astute governance or pure propaganda, without accounting for how such a position is arrived at. 
A more complete understanding of Singapore’s media governance system needs to take into account 
the comprehensive slate of formalised rules and regulatory regimes, informal codes and standards, as 
well as norms and expectations that surround how a society understands its media environment and 
how the media, in turn, willingly abides by the standards the government dictates (X. Q. Tan, 2018; 
The Straits Times, 1991; Veloo, 1994). Switching to this mode of understanding reveals the processes 
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that enhance the efficacy of media governance in Singapore amidst challenges posed by the online 
media environment, the central research interest of this thesis. 
A holistic approach to understanding media governance identifies a few discrepancies in this co-
optative-coercive model. For one, the often-perceived Sword of Damocles presented by the 
government’s armada of media laws and regulations did not merely present a threat to which media 
practitioners fear to fall afoul of. Indeed, various laws have been used on many occasions against 
online media practitioners (H. Lee & Ansari, 2017). These include laws governing defamation, sedition 
and the disruption of racial harmony, which have waned in use against mainstream media, but remain 
debilitating tools against online media practitioners, some whom have fallen afoul of the laws and 
suffered the consequences of heavy fines, legal damages and jail time. For another, the allure of 
economic co-optation – whereby a media outlet stands to gain from corporate support if it is seen to 
be supporting the status quo – has had minimal impact on independent online media, precisely 
because their independence eschews such a system of patronage. On the contrary, it is the immediate 
threat of regulatory regimes that indirectly restrict funding sources for online media, which set 
boundaries for what constitutes permissible, non-foreign funding. Legal limits also include 
administrative processes that require website owners to declare funding sources and details of 
editorial staff, thus discouraging all forms of local public support towards these websites for fear of 
government surveillance. The use of such legal instruments puts the government at risk of appearing 
to renege on its promise of a free and open media environment (George, 2007b, 2013b), if only to 
maximise its economic potential. Where the use of such laws stands out is the way the Singapore 
government painstakingly rationalises each use, hardly befitting the image of a dogmatic autocracy.  
Put in perspective, the contributing factors of strict regulatory limits and economic co-optation in 
Singapore matter more to independent online media in indirect terms of political reputation and social 
expectations that the government build around them, rather than the direct effects of laws and 
political economy. Such methods of reputational and social governance also revolve around 
mainstream media, portrayed as both the ‘golden standard’ to which online media can never level up 
to, and as the very discursive platform where such standards are established and constantly refined. 
The modus operandi of Singapore’s efficacious media governance system, then, is not so much 
institutional structures of control, but an intricate web of social norms and perceptions that encourage 
media practitioners and users alike to buy-into and even co-create an ideal media governance system. 
Such an approach was realised through the persistent use of narratives and public discourse to affirm 
the government’s legitimate right to impose the rules of the media game, whereby resistance to the 
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rules plays into the narrative and is an essential and complementary part of this system of governance 
(Foucault, 1980). 
Critically, such a revised view of media governance would serve as the turning point of this thesis. The 
study of these deviations in governance, supported by a closer understanding of governance processes 
through the eyes of stakeholders, detailed in Chapter 5, is not so much to debunk the co-optative- 
coercive model. Instead, this thesis had sought to revise it based on how media practitioners navigate 
a system of governance that is more pervasive in the norms and expectations it commands, rather 
than focus excessively on the punitive laws or economic levers that the government has at its disposal. 
This thesis has charted the development of media regulations through Singapore’s history, detailed in 
Chapter 3, and matched them with a recurrent practice where the Singapore government persistently 
seeks to justify tough actions against media entities, detailed in Chapter 6. These justifications were 
aimed not merely at explaining away draconian governance, but to also set out norms and 
expectations for the media industry – in effect, disciplining narratives that serve to structure social 
power by defining the power-relationships between the state, the media and Singapore society. 
The efficacy of this mode of governance was exemplified in the public debate surrounding POFMA, 
highlighted in Chapter 7, but is nevertheless a constant practice that pervades much of Singapore’s 
history of state-media relationship-building. The government has persistently and publicly justified 
any new media law and regulatory regime it has implemented. These range from the Newspaper and 
Printing Presses Act in 1974, justified as an attempt to ensure there is no foreign interference in 
Singapore’s media industry (Business Times, 1977), to the amendments to the Broadcasting Act in 
2013, justified on grounds of increasing regulatory parity and convergence between traditional and 
online media (Leonard Lim, 2013). In all of these justifications, the government had insisted that the 
tougher laws were for the benefit and protection of Singapore society, that it would use the laws 
judiciously, and no harm would be done to media freedom and the media industry in Singapore. Critics 
of the new or revised regulatory frameworks were cast as unknowledgeable, or ‘self-serving actors’ 
seeking commercial gain or narrow political agendas that would invariably destroy Singapore’s social 
fabric and economic stability. 
Reflexivity – embracing the limits of resistance 
Such a re-assessment of the deep power-relations between the state and the media has been an 
important re-alignment of my research and scholarship. I began this research effort with specific views 
about media freedom and the role of media laws that now deserves a reassessment at the end of my 
research journey. As a media freedom advocate and former digital journalist in Singapore, I was 
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acutely aware of the Singapore government’s use of public discourse to position itself on media laws 
and regulations. The government regularly used arguments that leverage social norms and boundaries 
of permissibility to portray various media practitioners as deviant, a danger to social harmony or a 
detriment to national progress. These narratives took place regardless of whether the accused 
practitioner had actually broken any laws. My initial conception of countering disciplining narratives 
had been one where media practitioners and media freedom advocates present alternative narratives 
in order to ‘reset’ public perceptions about what constitutes ‘good journalism’. Such alternative 
narratives would also serve as the basis for dismantling legal instruments of media control, as these 
instruments would have been laid bare as inadequate, deceptive and untrue. 
My interactions with my interviewees have proven this earlier position to be problematic, and these 
interactions have indeed been a case “where the production of accounts meets contexts of reception 
that seek to render events, conditions and experiences intelligible via a meeting of points of view” 
(May & Perry, 2014, p. 5). My interaction with various stakeholders of Singapore’s media environment 
– media practitioners, legal professionals, academics and activists – have revealed two key themes 
that challenged my earlier assumptions. The first theme pointed to the role legal instruments play in 
Singapore’s media environment, which has less to do with the direct effects of media laws and 
regulatory regimes compared to other factors such as the media industry’s economic environment, 
the unspoken boundaries implied by laws, and the ability of the government to demonstrate proper 
use of the laws for the most part. The second theme pointed to the desire by the government to build 
trust between itself, the population and the media industry, without which it would not be able to 
govern effectively. Identifying these two themes have provided me with a revised view of the specific 
mechanisms of media governance in Singapore, to the extent that it is no longer possible to think of 
the removal of legal and regulatory restrictions as the key enabler for greater media freedoms. 
Instead, it is more critical to regard legal and regulatory instruments as integral components of a 
broader system of governance. This system hinges on a seldom disputed, and much less challenged, 
political legitimacy that is entrenched by social norms and values, and enhanced through public 
narratives. The stakeholder insights used in my research have been instrumental in “collectively 
producing knowledge in a reflexive ethos… while maintaining concern to contribute to the possibilities 
of transformation of the world to which we belong” (May & Perry, 2014, p. 17). 
Reflecting on my personal beliefs and biases have been fruitful in decoding and dismantling some of 
the issues identified in the POFMA debate, of which I was involved as a participant in the public 
consultation process, where I submitted a paper proposal and provided my inputs during the public 
hearings. Being involved in the consultation process that led to the passing of POFMA allowed me to 
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document my “theoretical and reflective thoughts that develop through immersion in the data” and 
this evaluation has extended to my “values, interests, and growing insights about the research topic” 
(Nowell et al., 2017, p. 5). It has led to a better appreciation of the problematic position in which media 
practitioners and media freedom advocates invariably find themselves in when attempting to expand 
the boundaries of journalistic practice. As the case of POFMA demonstrates, the vocal and engaged 
effort by media practitioners and media freedom advocates to push back against laws often appear 
as a strong, even successful, resistance to the government’s attempts at increasing media restrictions. 
A clearer understanding of the limits of such efforts at resistance led to a better appreciation of the 
more intricate mechanisms involved in Singapore’s media governance framework: that resistance 
resides within the ambit of the efficacy of legitimised governance, rather than against it. The Singapore 
government had been efficacious in its ability to govern the media, but this was not done through 
draconian imposition of governance regimes. Instead, it was the public discourses and the formation 
of norms, to the extent of risking failure when its narrative was challenged, that affirms and 
strengthens the government’s position of power in the state-media relationship. Appreciating this 
development was not simply born of dismantling my previously held notions of media freedom. On 
the contrary, it was a desire to understand why media freedom advocacy has not worked thus far in 
Singapore that permitted this discovery through “exploring the themes that emerged and identifying 
the patterns that underlie them” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 6). 
Limits of research and future directions 
Gaining this appreciation of a renewed perspective about media governance in Singapore – what 
effects it creates and how it succeeds – is perhaps the most crucial takeaway for this thesis. It invites 
future scholarship on media governance in Singapore – and more broadly, in other societies that seek 
to replicate the media governance approach taken in Singapore – to re-evaluate previously held 
positions and to challenge conventional wisdoms, particularly those that relate to ‘the powerful state’. 
These efforts can no longer see media freedom advocacy as one about conflicting positions between 
the government and media freedom advocates, but as one of conflating values and norms that lean 
towards a desired outcome that are eventually reflected in laws, regulations and policies. In the 
context of Singapore’s media governance environment, laws are but mere tools through which the 
government expresses its legitimacy and right to govern, a tactic in the system of governance. There 
remains a need to pay closer attention to such systems of governance, highlighting social norms and 
values as critical points for evaluation and deconstruction. Such an approach lies outside the scope of 
this thesis, which was fundamentally an attempt at tracing the formation of this system as a complex 
genealogy that feeds into the formation of state-media relationships within Singapore. 
195 
 
Three possibilities for future research have arisen in the course of producing this thesis. They point to 
potential directions for a study of media governance, in Singapore or elsewhere, that has arisen from 
an examination of disciplining narratives. The first possibility is for a more intimate look at the 
reputational risk for journalism in a governance system that is typified by ‘governance by discourse’. 
Singapore’s online media practitioners are no strangers to public narratives that cast them as the 
enemy of the state, and this comes from both the government and mainstream media channels. The 
effects on media reputation, however, go beyond the risk of eradicating or neutralising online media 
platforms through economic pressures that favour maintenance of the political status quo. 
Mainstream media are not spared the same disciplining narratives that they have been party to 
throughout Singapore’s history. Such narratives have the effect of affirming the government as the 
only legitimate body when it comes to defining the ‘right’ media environment for Singapore. As the 
case of POFMA has demonstrated, such narratives also risk marginalising anything that the 
government disagrees with as outside the ‘correct’ norms and values. Research needs to be conducted 
on the extent to which media reputation has been culturally entrenched, which in turn guides the way 
journalists practice their craft. Doing so serves to better uncover the dynamics that inform media 
governance systems rather than specific legal or economic tactics and promotes a more 
comprehensive approach to evaluating state-enabled efforts at undermining media freedoms. It 
would be an attempt at a “counter-history” that reveals the “divisive light that illuminates one side of 
the social body but leaves the other side in shadow or casts it into darkness” (Foucault, 2004, p. 70). 
The second possibility is for a detailed study of the effects of disciplining narratives on media 
audiences in Singapore. For reasons of expediency, budget constraints and researcher expertise, this 
thesis had focused on governance of the media industry, not how it impacts citizens as media 
consumers. It presumed that such a system of governance would have an influence on the Singapore 
population due to the media’s potential in setting social norms and the government’s astuteness in 
deploying such pervasive tactics. An in-depth study on the effects of disciplining narratives, 
particularly surrounding specific instances where media laws and regulatory regimes have been 
implemented, would yield a more accurate understanding of the efficacy of media governance on the 
population, going beyond what this thesis has covered. Such an effort would also permit the 
examination of resistance that manifests at the point of personal contention with social norms and 
values, rather than resistance from media practitioners at the point where laws are implemented. 
Attempts to study effects on audiences have been undertaken during specific instances of media 
governance, such as during the POFMA debate (The Straits Times, 2018b). However, these studies 
look more at the effects of the subject of governance (in the case of POFMA, the effects and 
perceptions of disinformation on Singaporeans) rather than the effects of the public narratives on 
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Singaporean’s understanding of media governance. Taking this approach will encourage research to 
move away from peripheral issues of media governance and provide in-depth evidence on the 
experience of governance from below. It would be an attempt at “explaining them in terms of what is 
most confused, most, obscure, most disorderly and most subject to chance”, that which has been 
obscured by the “long days of order, labor, peace and justice” that we experience (Foucault, 2004, p. 
54). 
The third possibility is for the examination of the efficacy of specific media laws and regulatory 
regimes. Doing so in no way puts doubt on the efficacy of the media governance system. As the case 
of POFMA has suggested, the misuse of a single legal instrument can, at most, shake public confidence 
in the administrative ability of the state, not so much the benevolence and legitimacy that the 
Singapore government has established over the years. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the intent 
of a law versus its actually delivery and use – in effect, its genealogy as realised through public 
discourse – serves to uncover the evolutionary narrative process that highlights its disjuncture. In 
other words, as would taking apart a building first by its fittings, its roof, then its walls, pillars and 
eventually its foundations, extracting a law or regulatory regime from its discursive process serves to 
lay bare the constructed nature of what we assume to be ‘normal’. In reality, the formation of laws 
offers no such ‘normalising’ effect beyond the narratives that inform them. In alignment with the 
purpose of this thesis, such an effort would not be a critique on legal rights and wrongs, but an ethical 
deconstruction of legal discourse. Rather than approach media laws from a legal perspective, which 
was never the intent of this thesis, such a research effort will instead approach media laws from a 
social-normative perspective. It would be an attempt to unravel “the continuity of the law” which has 
been used to “establish a juridical link between those men and power, because power and its workings 
were a demonstration of the continuity of the law itself” (Foucault, 2004, p. 66). 
Closing remarks 
It is worth noting that attempts to analyse any media governance system would invariably have to 
contend with deeply entrenched social norms and values. These norms and values are specific to 
Singapore’s context, relating to issues like sovereignty and foreign interference in the media, racial 
and religious harmony, and nationhood and survival, which are constantly repeated and reaffirmed in 
public discourse. These values are far more potent in shaping the media environment than other 
spheres of public life, be it in economics, healthcare, national security or politics. This is partly because 
they appeal to the core instincts of a particular national identity that neither citizens nor media 
practitioners deem appropriate or logical to deny. However, it is primarily because journalistic media, 
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the subject of governance and the field of interest for this thesis, is often a participant of the same 
discipling narratives that subjects it to governance. 
Dismantling such a system of governance requires a reckoning with the established ‘truths’ of media 
responsibility and freedom, which the journalistic profession of any given society hardly have the 
opportunity to debate about. The complexities of such established ‘truths’ have been compounded 
by a relentless effort by the political elite to establish specific standards on the profession, which might 
or might not become crystalised into legal instruments but are no less powerful as tactics of 
governance. These standards become ingrained as what is expected of journalists – in the case of 
Singapore, the responsibility to uphold political and economic stability and social harmony – in which 
any attempt to extricate from is seen as a betrayal, deviance or going rogue. Such a system of 
governance affirms itself in the very practice of the profession. Yet media freedom advocacy would 
not gain much traction unless such dismantling and reassessment of the media governance 
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Transcripts of interviews with 15 stakeholders of Singapore’s media environment, including past and 
present media practitioners, media freedom activists, media academics and legal professionals: 
• 12 interviews conducted at various locations in Singapore 
• Two interviews conducted using teleconference with interviewees based outside of Singapore 
• One interview conducted via email as an institutional response 
All interviews were conducted between 2 August and 1 November 2018. Ethics approval (number 
2018/033) for the conduct of fieldwork was granted by Murdoch University Ethics Committee on 24 
April 2018.  
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Appendix A – Transcript of interview with PN Balji 
Date: 3 August 2018 
Time: 10am 
Location: Café in Junction 8 shopping centre 
1:40 HL I’ll start by asking, what are your general perceptions of media regulations in 
Singapore? In particular, any laws that you find are too strict or too lenient. You 
can use your personal experience as well, as a former journalist and also 
previously from The Independent. 
1:52 PB The first point is that the whole media licensing system – the Newspaper Print 
Presses Act which I think came into force in 1974 and has been updated many 
times – I think in a modern world and society is totally irrelevant. If you want to 
start a newspaper in Singapore, you have to get a license. It’s an annual license, 
you have to apply for it every year to renew it, and if they don’t renew it they 
don’t have to give a reason. I find that in the twenty-first century, it is totally 
unnecessary. 
2:40 HL Is it also because a lot of the things that we have now are really going online? 
2:46 PB Well, partly that. And partly, I use the term “modern society”. Is this the kind of 
laws we need? But I don’t see any activism to get that law (removed). Nobody 
talks about the 1974 Newspaper and Printing Presses Act and the licensing of 
media. I’m talking about mainstream media here, I think the focus has been on 
online media. 
3:21 HL But we do have people – I mean, the human rights groups do occasionally call for 
the abolishment of the NPPA. 
3:32 PB They do, but I’m talking about a more sustained way. They will stop and go. And I 
also don’t think that the opposition people are focused on this – not in 
Parliament, not outside Parliament. And I think that is a very fundamental part of 
Singapore. 
3:53 HL How about journalists? 
3:55 PB I don’t think so. I think if you ask journalists about it, they might not even know 
that there is such a law. I won’t be surprised. And maybe because they think it is 
a futile exercise – no point, it’s the government, it will never change, once you 
have a law in place why would they change it? I mean look at the ISA. I am 
personally convinced that after what happened in 1987, the Marxist arrests, 
there will never be such kinds of arrests anywhere. ISA will be used for terrorism, 
but not for people who will be speaking against the government. 
 
Why do I feel that way? A number of things. The most important is that, even in 
Cabinet, there was dissention. Danabalan left Cabinet because of that. They have 
not proved it in a court of law. Some of the people arrested were very respected 
members of society. The lawyer Teo Soh Lung who was arrested – I read her 
book Beyond The Blue Gate and I’m a friend with her on Facebook. You can see 
the bitterness in her, and it has been twenty-one years ago. 
5:36 HL It’s a hidden scar on our society. It’s not one that people look at regularly, but the 
pain is real. 
5:44 PB The pain is very real. [discussion on Soh Lung’s Facebook posts and what 
happened during Operation Spectrum]  
6:24 HL In certain parts, ISA also impacted journalism, right? 
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6:26 PB In the early 1970s, maybe 1980s, you are right, but not English language 
journalists. I think it impacted the Malay Berita Harian journalists and, of course, 
the Chinese newspapers. Why do you ask that question? 
6:49 HL I’ve been reading about the ISA, and it is (regarded as) one of the laws used to 
curb dissent, and that also included journalists. 
7:01 PB I think more than to curb dissent, it is to create fear, which then make you a bit 
more mindful and careful. 
7:11 HL In that sense, there are a lot more other laws in place? 
7:14 PB They have enough laws. 
7:18 HL Ok. So how do you think this situation can be improved?  
7:25 PB I think that can only happen when there is a change of government. Or a kind of 
2011 election situation, when the PAP’s vote went down to a historical low of 
sixty-point-one percent. And if you noticed immediately after that, look at the 
changes they immediately instituted. Migration was the biggest issue, so they 
begin to crack down on migration. As a result of migration and the high number 
of people in Singapore, there was a squeeze on housing and transport. 
Immediately they started tackling these two issues. So this is a government that 
will never want to give up power. Even the smallest indication and they will try to 
do something. And of course, the Pioneer Generation package after the general 
election. 
8:45 HL But the interesting thing is that after the GE, while there were a lot of these so-
called softer policies being rolled out, it appears less friendly on the media front. 
Because one of the first things they came out with was the 2013 amendments to 
the Broadcasting Act. 
9:04 PB Yes, have they announced the details already? 
9:09 HL Oh no, they are going to review it, but the 2013 (amendment) was the one that 
included Yahoo. So in that sense, on the media front, there hasn’t been that 
much of a change. 
9:22 PB Yes, but those were not the issues of the 2011 elections. So if you want to change 
the laws, you have to campaign on those laws, to change them.  
9:40 HL Do you think there would be any success if people were to campaign on things 
like freedom of the press? 
9:48 PB No. Our population is like that, we are one that (wants) instant gratification. They 
got what they want after 2011, They were very angry before 2011, then what 
happened in 2015? (The PAP’s vote share) went back to seventy percent, right? 
And it is a small segment of the people who want freedom of the press. Even the 
younger people that we have – if you go out and ask them, “do you know how 
credible the press is? Do you think we need it?” I think you will be surprised at 
the answers you will get. So I’m talking about the majority. There is a significant 
minority that is very focused on it, but you are not going to win an election based 
on that.  
10:44 HL It’s still more about the bread and butter issues. 
10:46 PB Yeah, very much so.  
10:49 HL And I guess that is also partly the reason why a lot of the opposition parties do 
not campaign on them. 
10:54 PB They do not campaign on it, and the PAP knows that, too.  
10:58 HL I did remember that the SDP, when they started off with Chee Soon Juan, he was 
quite strong on that point, but now you don’t see them mentioning it that much. 
11:05 PB Because if they do it they won’t win votes. Chee Soon Juan cannot do all the 
same things he did before. The public is either not ready or they don’t want what 
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is popularly known as confrontational politics. Anyway, what is wrong with 
confrontational politics! 
 
So I think you raised a very important point. I think it is our society – I don’t think 
they are keen on this. It is a very very stressful society. People hardly have time 
to think. If you look at most families, it is just basically putting food on the table, 
making sure the children get educated properly, stressful school life, two income 
families. 
 
But I think that there is a group – and this, I’m just basing it on anecdotal 
evidence – the pioneers, when I mix around with them, I get the sense that they 
are getting very upset and very angry. First, our longevity is about eighty-five. By 
sixty-two you retire, and the government is trying very hard to get old people to 
work. But are the businesses prepared to take them? And the government is not 
prepared to change the retirement age to seventy, for example. Why? Because 
we are a very business friendly government. The argument is that without the 
businesses, we will suffer. 
 
So it is that group (that feels unhappy). I mean, I’ll give you an example, and I’m 
talking about journalism here – why can’t The Straits Times and Mediacorp bring 
back some of these senior journalists, whether it is Cheong Yip Seng, Peter Lim, 
Kwa Chong Yew, Bob Ng, myself, and get them to train journalists? You don’t 
have to pay them that much, so why? 
14:07 HL I think I know why. [laughs] 
14:09 PB Why, do you think? I think I have a reason. 
14:12 HL Well, my guess is that they might see some individuals are practicing a kind of 
journalism which is not aligned with the commercial focus (of mainstream 
media). 
14:28 PB Exactly. Not just commercial focus, but also they may take a position that is not 
totally pro-government.  
14:39 HL Which then affects the commercial value (of the media). 
14:41 PB So it could be that. And we are also not a pro-aging society. Look at the suicide 
rates. Suddenly the story came up, but it has been progressively going up – 
whether it is linked to the state of affairs, or they have nothing to do. So that is 
one group, and this group will go, if my analysis is right. And that is why they are 
trying very hard to find jobs for them. But the issue is not just jobs, but whether 
employers are prepared to accept them. And salary is not big an issue. I think 
people just want to get occupied and feel a sense of self-worth.  
15:46 HL Ok, I think we have delved into some of the negatives of media laws and 
regulations. Any positives that you can think of? What do you think has worked? 
16:03 PB Good question. Can I come back to that, because it doesn’t come to my mind. I’m 
sure there is something. 
16:10 HL Sure, that’s ok… I’ll then move on to the issue with the Select Committee on fake 
news. What are your immediate views on that? 
16:30 PB Fortunately or unfortunately, it was all focused on the six-hour grilling of PJ 
Thum. I think more unfortunately. I think many other things were discussed, but I 
don’t think many of them came out in detail. 
16:48 HL So you think it was too focused on that session with PJ? 
1:50 PB It became just too focused, and the public focus was also on that. People saw PJ 
Thum as standing up to Shanmugum and the way Shanmugum interrogated him. 
And at one stage I still remember him saying, “Just give me a yes or no answer.” 
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That’s not a court, and you are not a public prosecutor. This was the most 
“celebrated” case. 
 
But for me, the issue about fake news is – and here coming from an idealistic 
position – if you have very knowledgeable, educated and thinking society, do we 
need laws on fake news? I know it is not ideal, there is no utopia in this world, 
but shouldn’t that also be a focus of the law? How do we get our population up 
to speed, from primary school. And this role has not just to do with the 
authorities, but the home. The home has surrendered this role to the school.  
18:42 HL Do you think what the Select Committee is doing, as well as the debate 
surrounding it, has contributed to this more knowledgeable society? 
18:54 PB No, I don’t think so. Knowledge is not something that you can just get out of a 
committee hearing, Knowledge has to be built up over years, your own readings. 
You have to have debates, discussions, watch news very closely. That cannot be 
done at the press of a button. 
 
We’ve lost that already. When I go to India, I see the people there, they are so 
vociferous, sometimes they talk nonsense, but you know that they are very 
engaged and most times they have read up on the news. Here, I don’t find that. I 
talk to people and they ask, where was that? Oh, it was in The Straits Times. And 
unfortunately, most of their news is coming from the internet. I mean, I also get a 
lot of news from the internet, and I can more or less say, hey, can this be true or 
not? Why didn’t they ask the other question? Maybe it is because of my training. 
 
But I think a lot of people take what they have in the internet and Facebook, and 
believe it without mounting a challenge or asking themselves certain questions. 
But having said that, I think (new media) has made the people and the 
government think about whether the news they are getting from official media is 
something they need to find ways to tweak. Let me give you an example – this 
(SingHealth) cyber-attack. Go and ask people what they think of it and see what 
they say. They will say, it is so bad, my record was taken, will anything happen to 
me. Or some people might say, so what, let them take my data, I have nothing 
private. But they don’t realise the impact of someone taking that information and 
using it for your bank account details and all that. Then, do they also think about 
why they took such a long time for the service to come out with the information? 
Today, Gan Kim Yong came up with an answer that can be challenged – oh, it was 
still very early stages, we have to get the full details. I mean, 101 crisis comms 
would tell you, you just have to go in there first with whatever information you 
have! [elaboration on other issues with SingHealth crisis communications] 
 
So, the public’s knowledge – and this I blame on the mainstream media. If you 
look at this [refers to newspaper] – “SAF tightens measures to prevent heat 
injuries”. Isn’t this [refers to sub-header] the story? If you were in the parents’ 
shoes, what would you think? The Straits Times is giving it a positive spin. People 
read the headlines, and they don’t see the big picture, don’t read the story in 
detail. Maybe they don’t have the time. It all goes back to the media and the 
government.  
24:57 HL But why does the media do that? I mean, a couple of things. This is quite clearly a 
public issue, so your attention should be on what the public wants to know. And 
the other thing is, there are very few things that actually control them. The laws 
you have described have not been used against them. 
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25:27 PB There is not need. They are such good servants! 
25:32 HL But using the (other) headline – there is nothing controversial about it as well. So 
why? 
25:39 PB I think it is because of self-censorship. There is a tremendous amount of it going 
on. “Will I get into trouble if I use the other one? Will they come after me?” All 
this goes into your mind, and as you are editing, what would you do? Go for the 
safe option. The headline is not wrong, but it gives it a positive spin. So they 
don’t need laws anymore. 
26:22 HL Ok. In that sense, when it comes to the issue of fake news, do you think there is a 
use for laws? 
26:32 PB I think in Singapore, at this stage, we need the laws. But it is also how you define 
it. I think one of the most important criteria is that people don’t use fake news to 
make money. Is that possible? Can you prove it? I’m sure you can. But if it is 
something they did without seriously thinking about it, or just to make fun – I 
mean, I read Kenneth Jeyaretnam’s blog, he should be taken to court every other 
day! But why did they not take him to court? They don’t want to give him the 
publicity, maybe. But he makes some very good arguments – he’s an economist, 
so he knows the issues. But it is when he enters the political part that the fake 
news comes in. So I think you need laws on fake news, but how do you define the 
laws? 
 
And then the second point: can the government be taken to court? I think they 
should. How can it be for only one party? And not giving the full information – 
would that be fake news as well? I think so! So there was one part in Mindef’s 
statement that says “there was a significant delay” in attending to this guy. 
What’s a significant delay? How many hours? Why don’t they want to give the 
number? 
 
But my counter-point to that is, there are enough laws. Is it really a necessity to 
have fake news laws, when you have sedition laws and libel laws? And this 
couple who ran the website, they were taken to court with fake news, then? 
28:21 HL You’re talking about The Real Singapore? 
28:27 PB That’s right. Under the Sedition Act. And they made a lot of money, right, to buy 
a house in Melbourne?... So I’m totally against people who use (fake news) for 
making money. And second point is that it should be all-encompassing, 
everybody. And I think the law should be defined a bit more clearly. Because if 
you send me a Whatsapp (message) and I send it to a group of friends without 
checking, does it make it fake news? I think it can, but it will have to depend on 
what the news is. For example, this news about Vivian Balakrishnan collapsing 
during a UN meeting that was spreading like wildfire – can those spreading it be 
charged? I have a problem with that. People may be doing this with concern, 
maybe not deliberately.  
 
And this is the point: is it deliberate? Is there a deliberate intention to create 
chaos, tension? 
31:05 HL So just to recap, you key points are: it should not be used to make more money, 
is it deliberate or not, and it has to applied to everyone. Ok, I’d just side-track 
slightly: when you say deliberate, you are looking at intent? 
31:26 PB Yes. Which I know in a court of law is not easy to prove, but then you have to. In 
the investigation it can come through. I think it is not that impossible. 
31:41 HL But there is then a need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt? 
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31:43 PB Of course, of course. 
31:46 HL Ok, let’s go back to what we’ve started on – public perception of media in 
Singapore. How do you think people generally perceive media to be? Both 
traditional and online media. 
32:05 PB I’m not sure how the public perceive. I can tell you how I perceive it. I must read 
The Straits Time every day. I get angry every time I read it, but there are gems 
hidden in the stories. So you need a certain kind of skill to unearth the gems, 
polish them and see the value of it. 
 
When you just read the headlines and the first couple of paragraphs, you will go 
away with a different impression. But if you read further – I mean the Straits 
Times do inject some of these things into their reportage, but that’s all hidden 
somewhere. And I think those kinds of things will give you a better perspective of 
the story and event. But I don’t think people have the time, patience, and 
perseverance you go through with it. So from that perspective, I think it is good. 
But I would think that given the stage of development we have come through, 
that we are a first world society – I think it needs to be bolder, more up-front. 
 
And finally, my point about The Straits Times and Mediacorp is that everything 
the minister says is an important point, even though he has said it ten times 
before. Why so? And that’s where the media begins to lose credibility – at least 
with a segment of the population. 
 
I mean, all you have to do is read Bertha Henson’s Facebook posts… because she 
really picks up the faults. Of course she is very caustic – the language and 
grammar, why didn’t The Straits Times do this or that – but I’m so glad we have a 
Bertha Henson. I’m too tired to do it, and of course I won’t write it the way 
Bertha writes it.  
35:11 HL You still write for Yahoo, right? 
35:13 PB Yes, but now I stopped because of my book. But they want me to write 
something on the SingHealth issue… And I don’t think my articles in Yahoo are 
that caustic, right? But of course, the government will say that I’m anti-
government! [side jokes about being anti-government] 
 
So there is much more scope for the media to be true to its calling. But I won’t 
say that it is there. I get some very good pieces… [elaboration on a few writer] So 
there are some people, and of course there is also Christopher Tan. And this is 
the strange part of The Straits Times: how does he survive? Is it because he 
knows the scene so well, his sources are so good, he’s been in the transport beat 
for so long, that nobody can challenge him? [elaboration on Tan’s articles] And 
very seldom has SMRT wrote against him officially. 
 
Then, Han Fook Kwang, another person I read. And of course, the recent case of a 
letter from a permanent secretary about his article asking the government to say 
things simply. But he’s still there! So why?... So there are good points, but on the 
whole, I think there is much more to be improved. 
38:31 HL I noticed that you made references to the more senior writers. How about the 
new crop that is coming up? Do you think they are able to take this on? 
38:41 PB I hope one or two will emerge, but my own view is that I don’t think so.  One, 
they are under editors who are always questioning them – this one cannot, that 
one too sensitive. And over time, it will be embedded in them. It becomes a part 
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of you that you cannot get rid of, part of your DNA. Second part is that they are 
fearful of losing their jobs. That happens, right? Peter Lim lost his job. Han Fook 
Kwang has lost his job as the editor of The Straits Times, after the 2011 election 
coverage. And they have seen all this, and The Straits Times and Mediacorp pay 
good salaries, would they want to sacrifice that? So when you say there is no 
corruption in Singapore, there is a different kind of corruption. They may emerge. 
When people grow, they become older, they may think, “Hey, what have I 
done?” If you read Cheong Yip Seng’s book – I’ve worked with him a long time, 
and he’s a fantastic news editor, but he is extremely pro-government. There are 
some who called him a government lackey. Why did he write this book? 
40:40 HL Fed-up? 
40:41 PB What is there to be fed-up about? He had a good life, the longest-serving editor-
in-chief in Singapore media history. Maybe he was set up with the younger 
ministers, which I think comes through in the book. But the government was very 
angry with the book. He was a roving ambassador, and they took away the job.  
41:20 HL Actually, I read nothing for them to be angry about. [Discussion about Chong’s 
book and how Lee Kuan Yew’s blurb was removed from the back cover of the 
second edition] 
41:50 PB Lee Kuan Yew praised the book without reading the manuscript. Cheong Yip Seng 
just sent him a summary of the book. What the government was very unhappy 
with was that, now they cannot go out and say that we don’t control the media. 
There are enough examples there, but there are at least two I can think of – one 
is the Chiam See Tong and Mah Bow Tan education record (incident). 
[elaboration on the tussle over publishing the men’s academic records] 
 
So can the government now say that we don’t control the media? Then there is 
one line that said Chong Yip Seng went to cover Goh Chok Tong in Myanmar. In 
the plane, Chandra Das goes to Chong and said, “The boss wants to see you.”  So 
he went to see him, and he said, “We want you to be the next editor-in-chief”. So 
who appoints the editors? So there is clear government intervention. 
[elaboration on the Chong-Lim editorial switch] 
 
So coming back to the younger generation – some may suddenly see some light, 
and it can happen. I’m hoping for that, but who are the younger people, Elgin 
Toh? I don’t think so. Mui Hoong? She does some decent pieces, but she is not 
young. So who do we have? I have not seen any. And this culture of control 
sitting on you is very severe. You will be totally inclined to believe in them, to 
give their point of view. And sometimes, they have very good arguments, so it is 
not difficult to be convinced by them. 
45:24 HL Ok. Then how about perceptions of online media? 
45:27 PB The online media will continue to do what they are doing, not in a very serious 
way, unless they can fix the business part of it. That’s not going to be easy, and 
I’m saying it in an understated fashion. Where are they going to get the money 
from? 
 
When we started The Independent, there were three (issues). Before we were 
launched, we were called by MDA for a discussion. When we went there, they 
took out a press statement that was already done to show to us, with a line that 
said some foreigners have shown interest in wanting to fund The Independent. 
Does that become a crime (to show interest)? We didn’t ask for any money as far 
as I know. I said this is totally unnecessary. What are you trying to do? And in our 
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shareholder agreement, it was stated explicitly that we won’t take foreign 
money, so why did you come to this conclusion? 
 
Second one – a mutual friend who is quite well connected said, so-and-so told 
him to tell me to stay off The Independent. Why? I told him to tell him that I’m 
not going to stay away. 
 
Third one – at least two people who were on the verge of giving us money pulled 
out at the last moment after the announcement (of foreign funding). Why? And 
they said, you know, I have a lot of government contracts. 
 
And finally, a good friend of mine sent me a text message to say, so-and-so told 
him to tell me to stay away from The Independent. Why? If not, you will be 
arrested. I know that will never happen – well it can happen, but very unlikely. So 
you can see the kind of threats that are used. 
 
So with that kind of a situation, where the businessmen are especially dependent 
on the government for contracts and money, who would want to go against the 
government? If you support independent media, which will be seen as anti-
government – why would they put their money there? 
 
Then the next question – how come Inconvenient Question and Six-Six News 
were started with good funding? They were started soon after the 2011 elections 
and were disbanded soon after the 2015 elections. So this was an operation via 
the government to muddy the waters of the internet. Just look at the two 
websites, and the kind of people that they interviewed. Shanmugum was 
interviewed in both websites. Has any other website interviewed government 
ministers? When we started The Independent and tried to interview government 
ministers, all said no. What does that tell you? This is a very sophisticated 
government. 
50:38 HL But subsequently after the general elections, they closed down. 
50:45 PB Yeah, they have reached their run-out date! 
50:52 HL Ok. I take it then that you are wrapping it around the economic environment? 
51:00 PB Yes. I mean without it, how are you going to sustain it without the benefits of the 
business model? That’s where we come to the point about what I call 
philanthropy journalism – and I don’t think it will work in Singapore – but in 
America there are people, businessmen and organisations that believe in the 
cause of journalism. They will fund you – I think the Guardian is losing 
proposition, but people will fund them. Would Lee Rubber fund an online 
website? Maybe, like what was done with Six-Six News and Inconvenient 
Questions. I think both tried to be very balanced, but you can see that the whole 
purpose was to muddy the waters, so that there will be more players. 
 
Second point – where do you get the talent? We are so short of journalism 
talent, because there are only two players.  
52:35 HL I think you probably experienced it with TISG as well – you found it difficult to get 
writers from like NTU to join? 
52:47 PB Well, you can get them to join the team, but it could be back-breaking work. Not 
just teaching them, but re-writing, language skills. After one year, I said I cannot 
tahan this anymore – I was editing all the stories, and I was having a backache. 
Their knowledge base was horrible. But there is a silver lining, and that is the 
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older journalists who have retired. So I’m glad Tan Bah Bah is being used in TISG, 
and there are many others floating around – look at all the people retrenched by 
SPH, it’s a pool to be tapped, but I don’t see their names in the online websites.  
54:05 HL Ok, I think you touched on this a little, but let’s talk a bit more about how the 
media industry in Singapore is going forward. From both mainstream media and 
online media. 
54:19 PB Well, I think the mainstream media will continue to lose money from their print 
operations. If you look at Mediacorp, if you take out government subsidies – 
their only publication that doesn’t get government subsidies is the TODAY paper 
– it will be red ink all over. So the government will keep that going. 
 
SPH is still a billion-dollar company, but it’s sales of newspapers and advertising is 
dropping and will continue to drop.  
55:24 HL Quick clarification, by government funding, you are talking about the public 
broadcasting funds? 
55:31 PB Yes, and also other things like MDA wanting them to do certain programmes of 
which they will pay. Sometimes, Mediacorp will go to them and say they will do 
certain programmes, will you fund it. There is a direct and indirect subsidy. The 
SPH print publications will continue to go down – in my generation it will still be 
there, after that is anybody’s guess. 
 
Because the revenue is dropping, profits are declining, they will be more sceptical 
about recruiting talent. At the end, it is a business decision.  Lee Kuan Yew was a 
genius to make sure that there was no competition for SPH, as SPH will prosper 
and want the PAP in power – I mean it is because of the economy that SPH is 
prospering, right? And of course, then they could have good talent, which they 
did. There was a period where they recruited some of the best people, whether it 
is from government or not – people like Vikram Khanna who was from the World 
Bank, Ravi Veloo from Bloomberg and Asia Week, and many others. But I think 
the value of SPH as a media group will go down, that’s why they are going into 
shopping centres and other investments. [elaboration of other investments] It is 
the right decision, and hopefully they will use the money to fund editorial.  
 
But the bottom line is that if SPH loses money as a company, the government will 
fund it. They need The Straits Times. Will they have another “credible” platform? 
They will find different ways to fund it. 
58:47 HL You mentioned just now that they are sceptical about recruiting talent. But like 
you mentioned, if SPH has no competition, technically there should not be an 
issue? 
58:58 PB No, it is a money issue. If the profits are going down, will they be prepared to 
invest in talent? The recent retrenchment exercise – of course, you can argue 
that they are getting rid of the deadwood, but it shows where the focus is.  
59:22 HL So you are suspecting it is going to be a hire cheap, hire fast kind of thing? 
59:25 PB It could be that, or they could be much more selective and a bit more careful. 
59:35 HL Ok, how about online, then? 
59:38 PB Online, without the money, it would be no use. It would then be done by people 
who – I know it is an unfair phrase – shoot from the hip. And unfortunately, I 
have to refer to The Online Citizen. I saw a video of a guy talking about Mustafa… 
[elaboration on example] and it is a one side story. It may be true, but there is no 
rigor. The editor might say, “I don’t have the people, I have wrote to them and 




You remember the Benjamin Lim case? They wrote that story, and Shanmugum 
made a ministerial statement just on one case like that. But The Online Citizen 
wrote the story, quoted a lot of people without verification, some which were 
proven to be false, but they still went to town (with it). The editor wrote to MHA, 
said they didn’t respond and he went with the story. There must be a way 
somewhere in between, it is how you write the story, and for that you need a bit 
of skill. You can get around the story without being so in your face. I mean, you 
can disagree with me! 
 
At the same time, you can say that it did have some good effects. But because I 
have been trained in the hothouse of mainstream journalism, for me it is very 
difficult to take that approach.  
1:02:27 HL In terms of profitability, the Mothership model seems pretty good. 
1:02:29 PB Yes, but who is in charge of Mothership? Who are the funders? George Yeo and 
Philip Yeo are there. So that’s the model that you can try, get a good public face. 
Tommy Koh, for example – if he decides to front online media, you might be able 
to get the people that you want. Other than that, I can’t find a way out. 
1:03:00 HL Given this situation, do you think it will change the way the government’s 
position on regulation, when it comes to media? 
1:03:10 PB No. This government is known for regulation. Why should they repeal any 
regulation? But I think they will blow hot and cold.  Look, the regulation of 
putting a deposit of $50,000, has it changed anything? No. And why is it that the 
government cannot control the online media too much? They can do a China, but 
they won’t. Two reasons – China can rely on its own given it is a big country, and 
their domestic economy is enough to keep them going. But what domestic 
economy do we have? We are so interconnected to the world that let’s say we 
decide to shut down websites and totally get rid of Google, there would be 
pressure from America. [elaboration of chewing gum workaround for American 
FTA] 
 
Singapore is very sensitive to the outside world, in the sense of trade and money. 
So it cannot be too harsh, but at the same time it cannot be the other way and be 
a free-flow, and I think this will continue. And they will hope that these people 
will just drop dead and disappear, which I’m so glad is not happening. 





Appendix B – Transcript of interview with Cherian George  
Date: 1 November 2018 
Time: 9.00am 
Location: via Skype 
0:00 HL  I’ll start by asking you for your general views about media governance in 
Singapore. You have written quite extensively about this, but just to get your 
updated views on this. This have certainly changed, with the way the internet is 
going right now. Maybe just a general sense or whether you think things have 
changed since you last wrote about it. [brief recount of publications] 
1:00 CG Yes, I guess things have changed since then (2012). I have written articles here 
and there, but not so much on the press, more on freedom of expression issues 
in Singapore. You’re looking specifically at journalism or media freedom in 
general? 
1:34 HL Actually, both if you have anything to say on it. Particularly in relation to some of 
the laws that we currently have right now. I will also be asking you about how 
you think these are affecting both mainstream and online media. Or rather, how 
old laws have been used recently. 
2:06 CG There have been some new laws affecting the larger internet players. These go 
back to 2013. But it is hard to say that those have made a big difference.  
2:41 HL You’re talking about the Broadcasting Act, right? 
2:44 CG Yeah. Can we say that the scene is substantially different since those laws were 
introduced? Probably not. Regardless of the laws, it is still economically very 
tough for independent online outlets to survive. So I think the problem for the 
likes of The Online Citizen or The Middle Ground and so on have been economic 
sustainability more than legal. The government’s actions can raise the cost of 
doing business, so to speak, by tying up groups in legal battles now and then, or 
putting then on the defensive, but I don’t think it is really an existential problem. 
The main existential problem is still financial sustainability. 
4:08 HL You mentioned tying them up with legal battles and putting them on the 
defensive. Are you referring to the same thing? 
4:30 CG The legal battles I’m referring to are the occasionally threats of defamation, or in 
the case of The Middle Ground, it was the charge that they have violated the 
Elections Act with a street poll. These at minimum can be considered acts of 
harassment that certainly do tie up the editors and publishers unnecessarily, 
which gives them less time to do their journalism. More seriously, of course, is 
that there is a chilling effect that discourages players from entering the field. Like 
I said, I wouldn’t consider these as life and death problems, but (more of) how to 
get advertising and get people to pay for your product. 
 
For the alternative media website that was targeted by the new internet 
regulations – Yahoo was a victim of that, they were the only non-national media 
required to post the 50,000-dollar bond. Of course, since then, Mothership has 
also been included. Yahoo certainly did scale back considerably, and it had a 
much larger team a few years ago; but that scaling back, I don’t think has much 
to do with the political environment. It is largely an economic decision. 
6:56 HL Would you then say that the current situation, be it in terms of laws or any kind 
of regulation that the government has thrown out, is ideal, and if not what do 
you think are the other things that we can do instead? 
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7:16 CG It’s ideal from the government’s perspective…? 
7:20 HL The industry’s perspective! 
7:28 CG There are several laws that are highly undesirable – starting with defamation, 
which at the moment is too plaintiff friendly, and therefore has a significant 
chilling effect on journalism. Related to that is what I would consider an over-use 
of contempt of court, even in cases where there is no significant risk to the 
administration of justice in Singapore. By international democratic standards, the 
threshold in Singapore is far too low. The Official Secrets Act has also been used 
against mainstream media more recently. The Internal Security Act, although not 
actually used for more than decades against non-violent critics of the 
government, is still a constant reminder that the government has virtually 
unlimited power against its critics. 
 
The Sedition Act has been used to deal with, not so much criticisms of 
government, but of perceived offence to racial or religious roots. The Penal Code 
equivalent also holds the same terms in Section 298. The other side of the coin of 
the Official Secrets Act is the absence of any freedom of information legislation. 
It is actually quite a long list of legal reforms before Singapore can have anything 
approaching an open environment. 
10:47 HL I’ll move on to fake news at this point in time, because – I’m not sure what your 
views are, but it does seem that they will throw out new laws. Just wanted to get 
a sense, particularly after the report of the Select Committee is now available – 
what did you think of the process, and where do you think this will take us? 
11:19 CG Yeah, about the process… This is a government that is pretty good at observing 
certain democratic forms, but often with the spirit hollowed out from it. 
Although the Select Committee process was certainly controversial and 
extremely unpleasant for some participants, it is not outside of the norms in 
liberal democracies for politicians, broadly, to use legislative hearings in highly 
political ways. Whether you are talking about congressional hearings in the US or 
House of Commons hearings in the UK, it is quite a common problem. It is not 
right, but it is quite normal that politicians will use the opportunity to 
grandstand, to target and vilify opponents. Just look at how Rupert Murdoch was 
treated in the select committee a few years ago concerning the violations of his 
newspapers. Some of the MPs did not treat him very politely! 
 
So this is normal. In Singapore, though, this political process takes place in a 
context that is not liberal democratic. What I mean is that, in the case of 
functioning liberal democracies with adequate checks and balances, in the case 
of a very plural society, politicians – even ministers, prime minister and 
presidents – can go after individuals. Trump can call the New York Times the 
enemy of the people, British parliamentarians can be extremely rude to whoever 
they are questioning in the House of Commons. But there is no effect beyond 
that. It is not as if, when Trump calls the New York Times the enemy of the 
people, the Times has to be worried about being arrested or subject to military 
takeover or being blacklisted nationally. Neither is anyone who is given a hard 
time by the MPs in the UK House of Commons, whether it is an academic or a 
journalist, worried the next day that he will be deprived of a livelihood. You may 
be attacked by one politician, but in a plural society, if you need godfathers, 




And ironically, this is even true in relatively authoritarian societies. In Malaysia, 
for example – which in many ways even more authoritarian than Singapore – 
under the old government, Najib can declare a cartoonist like Zunar as enemies 
of the state and throw the book at them, but their economic livelihood is not 
taken completely away from them. It is not as if the entire society shuns them. 
Most authoritarian countries, let alone liberal democracies, are quite fractured. 
There are multiple centres of power. If you burn your bridges in Kuala Lumpur, 
you can still go to Penang, which is opposition held – you can set up your think 
tank and media there and you will be fine. This is less so under Xi Jingping, but to 
a certain extent also true in China. There are multiple godfathers that you can 
hitch your wagon to! If you burn your bridges with people relatively high up, that 
is still okay, because you can still depend on other economic and power centres. 
 
Singapore is unusual even among authoritarian regimes, because power is so 
unitary, that if a few people at the top blacklist you, you are in serious trouble. 
There are very few options left for you. That’s what I find alarming about the 
Select Committee process – not that the process itself was so out of the ordinary, 
but it is taking place in this context where for someone like PJ Thum, the signal 
being given is that he is declared as an enemy of the state. There are serious 
consequences outside of the state, even outside of politics and within his 
profession. In that sense, this is extremely problematic. 
18:58 HL Right. So I guess what we are looking at is the wider ecosystem beyond the 
consultation process, and for that matter, for media itself, it is not what the 
media is allowed or not allowed to do, but fundamentally the bigger ecosystem. 
 
I’m not going to ask you about what you think is the best solution to tackle fake 
news, you mentioned that quite a fair bit in your paper. But judging from the 
report that came out, what do you think would be the likely direction that we can 
see moving forward with regards to fake news? What does the state plan to do? 
19:53 CG I guess there is very little indication, because as predicted, the report opens the 
way to legislation, but the report is also careful to espouse a very holistic 
approach. So in that sense, it says all the right things. If you go by the report 
itself, it looks like the government is not going to over-depend on legislation, it 
looks like it has heard the cautionary notes struck by many of the representors. 
But I’m sceptical about whether that would be the tone of the eventual bill. 
20:44 HL You don’t believe it will be? 
20:46 CG There is no reason to believe that the bill itself will be that nuanced. 
20:55 HL Do you think that it will be used, in that sense, to curb media freedom? 
21:01 CG Oh yeah, of course! 
21:10 HL Okay. I’ll just move on to ask you about what you think are the public perceptions 
of media in Singapore. I’m also asking for both online and mainstream media and 
how you think these perceptions will affect their operations moving forward… I 
mean, we have this situation where online media is seen as a challenge to 
mainstream media. Has that changed people’s perception of media, and if so, 
how will it affect their operations? I think we are already seeing some changes in 
the mainstream media industry. Do you think that has a great part to do with 
public perception, and how do you think that would affect both online and 
mainstream media? 
22:27 CG Well, there is no single perception. We are talking about very different groups of 
Singaporeans. If we are looking at the general media habits, without going into 
the numbers, I think it is safe to say that there is still a very large number of 
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Singaporeans who depend on the service provided by Mediacorp and SPH. At the 
same time, most of them consume these media with open eyes. On many 
contentious issues, they are fully aware that the mainstream media leans 
towards the official point of view. If they want views that are matching their own 
or reflect their own scepticism, they would supplement that mainstream diet 
with alternative sources, which would include word-of-mouth, through social 
media, as well as more organised types of alternative media. That will probably 
persist. 
 
The key thing is that there is no one Singaporean. Clearly there is a sizeable 
number who are fairly conservative or pro-PAP, pro-law and order, pro-stability, 
who are uncomfortable with the kind of radicalism shown by government critics. 
On the other end of the spectrum, there are those who are extremely cynical 
about government and instinctively suspicious of what the mainstream media 
says, and more trusting toward word-of-mouth, social media and blogs. 
25:10 HL There is a lot of talk about credibility, particularly around the fake news hearing. 
What is your perception of that? Do you think it is an issue with media, and how 
do you think it will affect readership, or how people approach media outlets? 
25:30 CG I think it is more complex than most people assume. First of all, we need to 
understand that credibility is quite situational and contextual. There is no single 
credibility score, there is no such thing as a particular media outlet being credible 
about all things. The same outlet can be credible for some things and less 
credible for others. 
 
Secondly, there is no automatic link between those certain kinds of credibility 
and people’s willingness to pay for it and consume it. You have to start from the 
assumption that most media consumers are actually quite complex or 
sophisticated in the way they consume media. I think that for a large number of 
Singapore media consumers, they continue to rely on mainstream media as a 
credible source for government-related information, which is a big part of their 
lives. If you start from the knowledge that the Singapore state is very big, there is 
no running away from it! Anyone who wants to just get by in life needs to have a 
very clear, straightforward factual understanding of the things the government is 
doing. If you want to buy property, you need to know about the latest cooling 
measures by the government. You want to marry and set up a family, you need 
to know the latest rules for housing. You want to buy a car, you need to know the 
prevailing quota premiums. You want to send your kid to school, you can’t afford 
to miss the primary one registration date. You want your kid to do PSLE, you 
need to have, very early, an idea of whether there are changes to the way PSLE is 
organised. It never quits, right? You want to bury your dead, you need to know 
which cemeteries are still open and which are going to be exhumed. Even after 
you die, you need to know when, 50 years later, your family members need to be 
dug up! If you are in business, you need to know all the different tax breaks you 
could get. 
 
There is no running away from the state in Singapore. And, of course, you want 
to have (the information) from the horse’s mouth, but sometimes the horse’s 
mouth is very hard to understand, because bureaucrats are not very good at 
communicating, although they have become much better. It is good to have a 
news source that is very close to government, because you can trust what they 
say. If I am preparing my kid for PSLE, I’m not going to go to The Online Citizen, I 
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will go to The Straits Times. And if you know of anyone who has a kid taking PSLE, 
they will not want to know anything else for that year! And the media that is 
going to serve them in a credible way would be The Straits Times. And this 
includes so much of life. So for a very high proportion of the questions that 
ordinary citizens have to get by in life, The Straits Times is the one that provides 
the most credible answers. 
 
Then of course there is a relatively small part of their lives where The Straits 
Times is not credible. And this has to do with, say, what is the real agenda of the 
government for going after Workers’ Party, what is the real tenor of the hearings. 
Am I given a real depiction of what Sylvia Lim is saying? Those kind of political 
things, you know that The Straits Times is not the best source. But that is just a 
small part of their lives! What I’m getting at is that it is perfectly consistently for 
Singaporeans to say, we really don’t believe The Straits Times when it comes to 
the Workers’ Party but we will continue to read The Straits Times, and it will 
continue to do well because The Straits Times is more than political news. 
31:30 HL But do you think that it could be situation where even government policies that 
could affect us on a day-to-day basis could be treated by mainstream media in a 
way that, whether it is credible or not, could actually impact our decision-making 
process? If let say we were to look at something like CPF or housing, could there 
be a way where the media is covering it, let’s say, in favour of the PAP or the 
government that actually makes it difficult for us to get information or to make 
the rights decisions? 
32:16 CG Yeah, but again, I would say that it is a kind of two-tier question. It would be a 
mistake to underestimate how important basic information is. For most people, it 
is the basic information that they want to ensure they get right. If you have a 
more critical mindset, then of course you want to think deeper and ask questions 
like, is the CPF well-managed? Is the government hiding something with regards 
to the management of CPF? These are, I think, second order questions. The first 
tier questions would be, how are CPF rules going to affect how I use my money? 
It is not a policy question, it is almost like a consumer question, and this is a more 
universally asked question: what are the actual rules I have to follow right now, 
regardless of whether I agree with the rules or not? To put it another way, even 
Roy Ngerng or someone who is a hard-core critic who doesn’t believe a word the 
government says about how it manages CPF will still need to know factually what 
the CPF policies are. 
 
As an activist or a very critical citizen, yes of course we have very critical 
questions that we wish The Straits Times would answer. But day to day, we also 
don’t need to know the state of affairs. We do need to know when we get to 
withdraw our CPF, and we need a factual answer there. This applies to many 
things. You may have fundamental disagreements with health policy, but you still 
need that factual information: if I fall sick now, what policies can I use? Or if my 
family members are in need, what do I need to know about the way the 
healthcare system operates now that I can use to my advantage? 
 
Basically, the mainstream media does a good-enough job to help people navigate 
the pretty complex environment of dealing with the public sector for day-to-day 
practical things, which is a huge part of how citizens relate to the state. What it 
fails to do, of course, is to cultivate us as knowledgeable citizens who can 
exercise our democratic rights and responsibilities to monitor the government, 
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and so on. But I think it is unrealistic for us liberals to assume that that is the only 
thing that people want newspapers and the press for, it is only some people who 
want the media for that! And even the people who want the media for that still 
can’t get around the fact that they need the media for very practical things. This 
practical service is still done better by the mainstream media than any of the 
alternative media. Basically, the mainstream media has more full-time bodies, 
the alternative media don’t have the bodies to go report what the latest HDB 
policies are.  
36:20 HL Very quick question on this tier two kind of thinking – do you think we are 
improving as a society in terms of asking these kinds of questions, or are we 
getting worse? 
36:34 CG Well, definitely not improving. It may depend on the particular issue. In some 
areas, we may be improving, but I don’t think it is because of what the press 
does. It is because of other actors like activists, but there is no improvement in 
the media, certainly. Or to put it another way, there is no improvement that has 
been generated by the media itself. If there is an improvement in the media, it is 
only because someone else did the job for them. For example, if there are 
tougher questions being asked about CPF, it has to do with the activists and not 
whether The Straits Times has more aggressive reporters. 
 
That’s number one. Number two, considering that life only gets more complex, 
and life is getting more challenging simply because it is harder for countries to do 
a little bit more, the need for tier two thinking has increased. So even if the 
media is just maintaining its standards, it is actually falling behind in terms of 
people’s needs. We do need to think harder as citizens because there are bigger 
issues facing us as a society; and in that sense, media is falling back. 
38:23 HL Okay. I just have one last question about the evolution of the media industry in 
Singapore – where do you think it is heading, for both the online and mainstream 
media? Just some general views. 
38:44 CG By online media, you mean the media not owned by mainstream media? I mean, 
the main online media in Singapore is mainstream media! 
 
So alternative online media versus mainstream media… The main change in the 
last few years has been what Tarn How calls the normalisation of the online 
space. Up to the 2011 elections, it was generally the case that the online space 
was disproportionately anti-government. Since then, the online space has 
actually tilted very much in the government’s favour. The so-called alternative 
online discourse is now much closer than it was to offline discourse, which is 
dominated by the government. This is partly because of social media. Facebook is 
just so universally used in Singapore, it stands to reason that Facebook actually 
reflects the general political profile of the offline population in Singapore. Real 
Singaporeans are by and large conservative, and Facebook similarly has become 
by and large conservative.  
41:10 HL What do you think are the causes for normalisation, beyond Facebook? 
41:18 CG Partly just the numbers. In the first 15 years or so, the internet largely belongs to 
the early adopters, the techies, people who were non-conservatives. As more 
and more people came online, such as now when Facebook is fairly ubiquitous, 
social media in particular is something that most Singaporeans use. The internet 
is no longer just something that a segment of Singaporeans participates in. Now, 




That is one reason. The second reason, of course, is not so organic. It has to do 
with the fact that post-2011, the government entered the internet in a big way. 
One of the things it did was to use information more constantly. The other big 
thing it did was to extend its own reach – its own Facebook accounts, internet 
brigades and so on. [Clarification on distortion] 
 
So it wasn’t really only about more regulation. They moved in to occupy the 
space. They became competitors on the internet, not just regulators. In 
hindsight, we were quite naïve to think that power and money wouldn’t really 
matter online. The internet post-2010 is very different from the internet of the 
1990s and early 2000s. In the earlier internet, even if you have all the money to 
blow on your internet platform, there is actually not much you can do. So it was a 
much more level playing field. It is no longer so, because now if you really want 
to stand out from the crowd on the internet, you have to pour money into 
everything from search engine optimisation to hiring consultants to website 
designers. It’s actually become quite an expensive prospect. 
 
And of course, the government is the one with relatively unlimited resources! 
Who can compete? This is a global phenomenon – if you look at most studies of 
the internet in authoritarian regimes, I have noticed a shift from about 2010, 
around the time when Morrizon’s book, The Net Daily, came out. He was one of 
the first to signal this. Around 2010, you suddenly found that authoritarian 
governments weren’t only investing in regulation, punishment and censorship. 
They were also moving in as big players on the internet. In those societies, 
nobody can compete with those resources. 
 
Part of it is also technological – it is no longer the young people. The internet 
today is mostly on mobile, a lot of it being rich media – video casts and audio 
casts. A single blogger simply cannot compete with a large organisation backed 
by marketing, advertising and consultants, which is what governments do. Some 
of the evidence of this would include the fact that PAP ministers, as well as 
statutory boards and government (ministries), have much a bigger Facebook 
presence than anyone else. 





Appendix C – Transcript of interview with Kirsten Han 
Date: 2 November 2018 
Time: 2.30pm 
Location: café in Buona Vista 
0:00 HL [Brief run-through of research topic] 
I’ll just start by asking you for some general perceptions of media regulations in 
Singapore – what you think is good, what you think is not so good, and how it can 
be improved. 
1:02 KH In a way, I suppose if you look at the UK, you might be relieved that we do not 
have an oligarch like Murdoch owning everything. But at the same time, if 
avoiding that issue means allowing the government so much control, I don’t 
know if it is a trade-off that is worth it. I know they say we do this to prevent 
foreign influence and people with agendas using and owning the media. You can 
look at the UK and US and see how that is a problem. You can also look at 
Indonesia, where people who are running for office own TV stations and such. 
Yeah, I can see how that is a problem, but it is not really that different from the 
PAP having this sort of power over our mainstream media. In fact, it is even more 
skewed for Singapore. 
2:11 HL But I guess the fundamental difference is that, if we look at it from the 
perspective of media being state controlled, it does lend some stability to the 
media environment? Do you not think that is necessarily a good thing? 
2:28 KH I mean, stability how? Even The Straits Times and Mediacorp have done massive 
retrenchments recently. Clearly, even the bottom line is not that much more 
stable even though it is state controlled. It is not like the BBC, that is directly 
state funded, where there has to be some major catastrophe for the BBC to fail. 
The Straits Times and Mediacorp also seem to be struggling, their profits are 
shrinking. In fact, my worry is that The Straits Times might not be actually that 
viable, but because the party wants it as their mouthpiece, the party will 
somehow prop it up. But if we are talking about entering into such a situation, 
then the paper will become even more so a propaganda publication. 
 
I feel it is not in our interest for The Straits Times to fail in a way that the only 
thing propping it up is the ruling party. But at the same time, I’m also not that 
interested in them being the one propping up The Straits Times while they are 
not improving themselves. 
3:42 HL You mentioned the BBC, which is essentially state funded but at arm’s length. Do 
you think that is a workable model for Singapore? 
3:56 KH Not at the moment. If you look at the artists, the state funding – the NAC type of 
funding – doesn’t come at arm’s length. We’ve seen the way they implement this 
in other sectors, it shows that it is not at arm’s length like you see in the BBC. It’s 
got strings – you cannot make the government look bad, the funding can be 
pulled, you still have to go through all this MDA (administration) stuff. I don’t 
think in this current context it will work for us. 
4:34 HL What can we actually do, then, to improve it? I’m talking about liberalising, in 
that sense, the media industry, but also keeping some semblance of quality. 
4:48 KH I think we cannot talk about it separate from the broader political context, 
because the broader political context is the reason why we are in this sort of 
mess! Journalists, particularly from the mainstream media, need to be braver 
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about the sort of influence and pressure they are under. In a way, it is good that 
Straits Times journalists are willing to leak to Yahoo that this editor was 
transferred (in the recent sex scandal case). I mean, it is good that they do that, 
but it would be better if they do not have to leak it and openly come out to say 
what happened. It is such a Singapore-wide thing that, even if there is technically 
nothing stopping us, we scare ourselves into not doing anything. 
 
To improve, the media need to be braver, but in the long run what we do need 
would be that change in the politics. We need a government that isn’t so 
controlling and authoritarian that they would want to interfere or intimidate. We 
probably need to either drastically amend or repeal the Newspaper and Printing 
Presses Act and the Broadcasting Act in such a way that the government no 
longer gets a say over these key appointments of editors. They should never have 
had that say. 
6:30 HL That said, the specific laws – the NPPA and Broadcasting Act – technically, in our 
history I think, have been used only once to curb any publication, which was the 
TRS incident. Do you think they still have an impact on the media landscape? 
6:46 KH Yeah I think so, because it is not about the curbing but the key appointments. It is 
systemic – even if they don’t invoke the laws to shut you down, these laws allow 
them to entrench this power into the very structure of that media publication 
itself. 
7:13 HL Okay. Removing the laws is one thing. Anything else that we can do to essentially 
improve the environment, then? 
7:29 KH On the most basic level, the people in power shouldn’t be so thin skinned! This 
issue with the political editor (of The Straits Times being fired), reading the article 
they were unhappy about, it was nothing! So it really needs to come with that 
sort of political change. Whether that involves having to completely change the 
party in government or not, either way the political climate needs to be 
fundamentally different. There is nothing that the media can do to really 
improve, apart from fighting back. But even if they fight back, there is only so far 
they can go if we continue to have this sort of monopoly of power. If we do have 
this sort of power and the media fights back, maybe we will see the NPPA and 
Broadcasting Act being invoked to shut media down. We need more fundamental 
political change across the board, not just for media only. 
8:50 HL You know as well as I do, we’ve been in the online space long enough – a push 
back from online media against this kind of incursions, do you think that is 
making a change? 
9:09 KH I think it has made a change, but the frustration for me is that it is not 
fundamental and meaningful enough, and it is hard to make a sustained sort of 
change. We’ve pushed the mainstream media to act on certain things, but none 
of the online outlets and nobody working independently in the online sphere has 
that same level of power and resources (as mainstream media). And even if you 
look at all these alternative websites, their news agenda is still set using the 
mainstream media. Once in a while, TOC or TISG will break something that 
mainstream media doesn’t have. But most of the time, a lot of the main news is 
appearing first in mainstream media, simply because the mainstream media has 
that sort of news-gathering force that we don’t. It is not significant enough to 
challenge that power. 
10:15 HL So ultimately, it is still something that the mainstream media has to do? 
10:18 KH Well, I think it is still that underlying cause. It is about this skew and power 
dynamics. It is not like we have to wait for the mainstream media to save us, but 
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the skew is such that online media is not allowed to grow any bigger anyway, 
mainstream media is kept dominant for particular political interests, and it is 
fundamentally not a level playing field. So it is not that we need the mainstream 
media to save everything. It is actually the playing field that needs to be changed. 
11:00 HL When you say online media is not allowed to grow, what do you mean by that? 
11:04 KH So in the past it was gazetting TOC to prevent them from getting foreign funding, 
and I do not know now what kind of licensing they are under. This kind of curb on 
funding, the lack of access to information, to press releases, to press 
conferences, lack of recognition that they are doing journalism. Definitely Terry 
and I cannot get MCI accreditation, which then makes it harder to get 
accreditation to other things as well. 
11:50 HL Okay. I’m going to move on to ask about the Select Committee hearings. Maybe 
you can share your thoughts about the consultation process, what are some of 
the things you have learnt from the hearings, just some general views. 
12:10 KH Well, it does not feel like a consultation process at all! If they were truly 
interested in consulting, that was a very strange way of going about it. It felt very 
much like they already had a conclusion and it was a cross-examination to 
pigeon-hole you into either agreeing or at least caving in to that conclusion. The 
way questions were phrased, the way things were presented – one thing I 
remember was Edwin Tong quoting Tony Blair that a Freedom of Information Act 
was bad. The next morning, I googled the same article and realised that apart 
from the top two paragraphs he cited, the rest of the article actually agrees with 
me. So selectively quoting, why would you do that if you were interested in 
consulting? That makes no sense. 
13:18 HL What were some of your take-aways after all the “consultation”, as it were? 
13:26 KH That they were quite keen to have laws, and to have more power! And 
troublingly, they don’t seem to have an answer. In fact, it is quite clear they don’t 
have an idea of what exactly they are talking about. What is a deliberate online 
falsehood? Until today, they are refusing to define it. They keep saying it is 
possible to define, so define it now! But they don’t want to, and it is very 
troubling that they are going to keep it so loose, because how would we even 
know that we are on the same page on what we are talking about? [personal 
example of misinformation shared on Whatsapp] 
 
I mean, it is troubling that they are not upfront with defining what it is they want 
to exercise power over, because it keeps people afraid and vague over what they 
can and cannot do. We see it with the contempt of court laws. Eugene 
Thuraisingam writes a poem and it was contempt of court, and he was fined 
twice. When that came out, I posted an article about him being fined, and I 
decided to share the poem, because I felt that people should be able to see and 
make up their own minds. I did that and didn’t think more about it. After lunch 
when I check my messages, there were friends who were asking if I should have 
shared it as it might be in contempt of court for republishing it. Maybe you 
should make it friends only, maybe you should take it down. That is the sort of 
environment that we create – people are afraid because they don’t know what it 
means to be in contempt of court. And if we have another law where people 
don’t know what it means to be posting or sharing a deliberate online falsehood, 
then you are going to get another layer of self-censorship. 
16:31 HL On self-censorship, do you think that is still prevalent now with the online 
environment that we have? 
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16:41 KH I think so. There is still a lot of self-censorship. When I was on a panel with Tarn 
How after a performance of Press Gang, and he was saying how very little post-
censorship there is from the government, in the sense of a government official 
calling and demanding to take a story down. He said that there is a lot of pre-
censorship or self-censorship, editors taking things out. And I heard from other 
friends who have worked in mainstream media that there are layers and layers of 
self-censorship. The journalist will self-censor once, the desk editor will censor 
another time, the section editor will censor again. 
 
I think among regular Singaporeans, there are things that we don’t want to say or 
do because we don’t know if it is possible. I know from trying to do vox pop in 
the streets or meeting students who tried to do vox pop. Singaporeans can’t do 
vox pop very well, because they basically clamp up and nobody wants to say 
anything, even for very basic things. I tried doing vox pops about how people feel 
about SG50, and even then people don’t really want to talk to a journalist, 
especially if you are holding a recorder or camera.  
18:18 HL Let’s go back to fake news. I’m not asking about what happened to PJ during the 
hearings. What happened afterwards, which you were involved in as well, the 
whole thing with New Naratif. What is your take on that? 
18:39 KH Actually, New Naratif is owned by a parent company called Observatory 
Southeast Asia that is registered in the UK, and it was always our intention to 
open as many offices in as many Southeast Asian countries as we would be able 
to. We thought we would start with Singapore because that’s where we are, 
what we know best and we are Singaporeans. We applied to register a subsidiary 
of Observatory Southeast Asia called OSEA in Singapore that would also do all the 
editorial services for New Naratif. We submitted the application in February, 
which was before all these hearings. Registration with ACRA is usually very fast, 
but ours was pulled out for a supposed random check. They came back with 
more questions – can you tell us more about your activities, what funding you 
have. We answered all their questions, and were okay to answer them. Then we 
didn’t hear back from them. 
 
After the Select Committee thing, I think it was a week after, they sent the 
response. They informed us that the registration was rejected. I think they sent 
an email to PJ maybe about one hour before it came out in the news. I was at 
work, and got a text from PJ saying that they wouldn’t register us. I saw that over 
Whatsapp and haven’t read the email yet. Then I got a call from the journalist 
asking about what I thought of the registration thing. I vaguely know from 
looking at a push notification that we were not allowed to register, but how did 
you know? And we realised that they had issued a press release, which I never 
see them do for any other company. Surely ACRA rejects companies all the time, 
but how many companies get press releases to say that they were rejected? 
 
It was quite interesting, because that particular day I had complained that ST 
reported on the Select Committee stuff without contacting me. In that afternoon, 
the ST journalist messaged me to ask for my phone number in case anything else 
comes up. I thought it was all finished, but I gave it to her anyway. And in the 
afternoon they called me to ask about the registration. Wow, you seem to know 




So the press release was really a surprise, and the amount of media coverage – 
considering there was really nothing to it, it was on the front page, inside pages 
with a big photo, but nothing happened! They added a photo of George Soros, 
who until today I have never met anyway, so I don’t know why the photo was 
there. I don’t think he knows we are alive! 
22:55 HL Do you think that the, what I would call over-coverage (of New Naratif), is due to 
some kind of manipulation, or is it part of the news process? 
23:04 KH I think they were told to. Why would you cover so much? It is so clear that there 
is nothing new to it editorially. The Mahathir thing also, my sense is that they 
were told to cover it. You know, when we went to visit Mahathir and Seah Kian 
Peng said PJ and the rest of us were not patriots? 
23:17 HL Yes. But I’m pretty sure that at that point in time, you guys were closely 
monitored (by the media), so it wouldn’t be a surprise if they jumped to it. 
23:35 KH Well, it wouldn’t surprise me if they had reported that we went to see him. They 
did report that, and that was fine. What shocked me was that Seah Kian Peng 
made all those claims on Facebook and the mainstream media covered it, and 
from what I could tell, there was no attempt by them to fact-check what he had 
said. Their idea of balance is to quote from my Facebook page. There was no 
independent verification, which would have been pretty standard for any 
experienced news reporter. And apart from quoting from my Facebook, nobody 
contacted me either. They just quote from my Facebook page and call it 
balanced. That is really stupid… But my sense was that they were directed to 
cover it. 
24:50 HL Okay. On that point, I’ll ask you about the quality of media in Singapore. Let’s talk 
about both mainstream media and online media. What are the areas where they 
can improve? I think you spoke briefly in the beginning about the need to break 
out of that political stalemate. Beyond that, what is it that mainstream media can 
do? And if we look at it more broadly, the way that online media has developed, 
what is it that they can do as well? 
25:21 KH I think online media needs to professionalise, but I understand why they haven’t, 
because they have so little resources to do it. If you professionalise, then you 
have to pay professional wages, and both of us know that TOC can’t do that. So 
the quality fluctuates as and when you have people who are willing to do things 
either for free or for really cheap. If you happen to have someone who is very 
committed who will do it, then it gets done well. If not, you can’t choose. I think 
that is one of the major issues – those who survive cannot professionalise, those 
who professionalise cannot survive, because the overheads are just too high. For 
those who do survive, like Mothership, people keep asking where their money is 
coming from! 
26:30 HL Do you think that is a healthy thing, for people to ask? 
26:35 KH I think people should ask where the money is coming from, who is backing what. 
Publications should be very transparent with where their money is coming from. 
For example, New Naratif opted to publish our financial statements in full, so you 
can see down to the last article how much we paid for what. There should be 
more transparency behind who is funding what and how a publication is 
surviving. 
 
For the mainstream media, I just feel that they all generally need to grow more 
balls! Recently, there was a discussion on Facebook that journalists should be 
more upfront about what (information) we tried to get and what we couldn’t get, 
and how government responded to us. Bertha was saying it and I agreed with 
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her. Carl Melinder White, who used to report at CNA and Yahoo, said that we 
should just say things like, “we contacted this ministry, they did not respond” or 
“they responded but did not want to go on the record” or “they tried to make us 
take off the record comments”. We need to be upfront with the sort of barriers 
that we run into. I don’t think a lot of Singaporeans understand the work that 
goes into journalism, that sometimes there are things that we just can’t do 
because we run into a brick wall. We need to make Singaporeans more aware of 
the brick walls. Even the journalists in mainstream media who have more access 
than most of us get stonewalled all the time. We should make the stonewalling 
visible. 
 
There could be more solidarity between journalists. That was one of the things I 
was annoyed about during the Select Committee and the Mahathir (follow up). 
They were carrying all these smear campaign type of reports. Whether you know 
me personally, whether we are friends, whether we even agree is not the point 
here. They are going after another journalist and instead of showing solidarity, 
you are writing the reports that allow them to go after another journalist. I was 
just disappointed that there was no solidarity among the journalism circle. That is 
also very defeating – if they can throw me under the bus, they can easily throw 
you under the bus. Hopefully more journalists will realise that Warren Fernandez 
will not be there to save them, he will just throw them under the bus anytime it 
is not convenient. Like the poor intern with the editors, or the political editor 
who was transferred, or Bharati Jagdish – I don’t know why she would have 
resigned if she wasn’t somehow pushed to do so.  
30:17 HL You mentioned just now about the need for the public to know more about the 
brick walls that journalists face. I ask this because I have heard differing opinions 
on this – do you think people are concerned about things like freedom of 
information? 
30:40 KH I don’t think people are that concerned right away. If you go up to someone and 
ask about freedom of information and press freedom, it wouldn’t surprise me if 
they weren’t concerned about it. But I think we need to do a better job at 
communicating why they should be concerned. That is why I say they need to see 
the brick wall, because they need to understand that when a journalist gets 
stonewalled, it doesn’t just make my day harder. The consequence is that there is 
no information that is getting to you, and your government is not accountable to 
you in the way that it should be. Stonewalling a journalist is not just the 
journalist’s problem. There is a wider impact of not being able to get access to 
information. It matters to you because you are the one not getting the 
information, if we are being stonewalled and are not able to bring things to your 
attention. 
 
Why did it have to be KF Seetoh who has to dig up these hawker contracts? 
Imagine if KF Seetoh has been stonewalled and he wasn’t allowed to get these 
contracts, if Today couldn’t do their big feature about hawkers, if nobody could 
get any information about social enterprise hawker centres, then people might 
say that people don’t care about hawker centres. But now that the information is 
out there, we can see that people do care, and Singaporeans reacted to the 
injustice. I think it is easy for people to say that they don’t care about things if it 
is something abstract and not something that you can see. So people should be 
able to see, and we should be better at communicating why it is important for 
them to know these things, what is the impact. 
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32:50 HL In terms of getting the information that they need, how do you think people are 
getting their information online versus mainstream media? Is there a difference 
and is there a narrowing of the two? Are people more discerning? 
33:05 KH I meet people who say they don’t read ST anymore because it is all government 
propaganda, and I don’t actually think it is good when they say that. This sort of 
distrust also breeds the environment that allows disinformation to thrive. People 
who completely dismiss The Straits Times say, “Oh it is just propaganda, but you 
know this States Time Review seems quite interesting!” But do you know how 
much fake stuff and skewed, irresponsible news they have at States Times 
Review? It worries me that it creates this binary in people’s minds: if The Straits 
Times is the government mouthpiece, then anything that opposes The Straits 
Times must be the hidden truth that they don’t want you to know. That is not 
good for us, because that is how people fall into disinformation, because there is 
no trust and they are just grabbing on to other things. I don’t want people to 
forgo The Straits Times and just read online news, because there is a lot of junk 
online as well. 
34:28 HL Why do you think there is this binary, that people are looking at it in these 
extremes? 
34:35 KH I don’t think our media literacy is good enough for us to think more critically and 
holistically. If we were to adopt a more media literate stance, then read The 
Straits Times but be aware of where it is coming from; and then read the online 
media and understand what they are up against; and then judge for yourself. It is 
another reason why I think people need to see how journalism is done. People 
should know that online media struggles with the lack of professional writers, 
that a lot of it is just volunteers doing what they can, not everyone can write 
perfect grammar because online media just doesn’t have the luxury of choosing 
people who can write A++ English. If you know that is happening in the 
background, you approach it with a mindset that maybe not everything there is a 
hundred percent because they don’t have the resources. And if you know that 
behind The Straits Times is all this government and political pressure, you can 
read all these sources and make up your own mind, knowing what goes into 
them and where it is coming from. That would be much better than completely 
dismissing a publication as trash. We tend to think in these binaries, and that is 
not actually how it should be working. 
36:11 HL Okay, I just want to ask you about what you think of the evolution of the industry 
in Singapore. You mentioned that the money is not coming in even for The Straits 
Times. Where do you see this heading? If we were to see a demise of media, 
particularly in how people perceive media, what would really be the 
consequences for democracy? 
36:36 KH I don’t think the mainstream media is going to go down anytime soon. They are 
reporting a drop in profits, but compared to some other countries, at least they 
have profits to talk about. SPH is still doing fairly well compared to other 
publications in the region and elsewhere. They can’t do that badly when they 
have the monopoly in so many ways. So I’m not worried about mainstream 
media imploding anytime soon, I’m just worried about the quality. In this sort of 
environment where journalists feel like they are being censored or threatened, 
or they are not allowed to do their jobs properly, you either lose your passion 
and accept that your role is to amplify what the powerful people want you to 
amplify, or you get disillusioned and you quit, and either way it is not good 
because we are losing the people with conviction and keeping those with no 
conviction. It is not good for us in the long run because it means that the quality 
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of your newsroom deteriorates – fact-checking, writing, the quality of the 
questions your journalists even bother to ask. I’m not worried that The Straits 
Times would go bust, only that the people would get fed up and leave. Then you 
would be left with people who don’t care, and we will pay the price. 
38:28 HL Journalists getting pressured – I ask this because I spoke to some people who 
mentioned this – that the 4G leadership is not really very good at engaging 
journalists. Do you think this pressuring is coming from them directly, or is it a 
problem that is inherent in the industry? 
38:50 KH It is a bit of both. Because it is so entrenched that sometimes, even when there is 
no fence, we think that there is a fence. But that gets perpetuated, amplified and 
reinforced when the leadership also does all these petty things. Every time they 
exert force, then reinforce the idea in people’s mind that there is a fence, which 
perpetuates self-censorship. It works hand in hand. I think it was Bertha who 
pointed out that nowadays they like to make announcements via Facebook and 
random press releases, because you then don’t have to take questions, because 
it is not a press conference. I think that is very bad, as they keep saying these 
things that are unquestioned and unchallenged. 
 
Some of the things they say really don’t make sense, like the IPS conference. 
Literally, all these speeches they give don’t make sense. Just think about it – we 
cannot have a minimum wage because people would work illegally under the 
minimum wage. So your solution is to have no minimum wage so that it is legal 
to pay people as little as possible? It doesn’t make sense and she is giving it in a 
speech and there is limited time and ability to question her. The media doesn’t 
seem to pick it up. They also seem to not know how to choose soundbites, and a 
veteran diplomat has to come out and call you out on it. 
40:37 HL Okay. So mainstream media has its problems. Online media – what are the 
challenges? 
40:46 KH I think it is really about training, resources and sustainability. It is really hard to 
organise in a sustainable way. I’m thinking mainly about TOC. Mothership has 
money so I don’t worry about them. TOC is something that is truly independent, 
people don’t question that they are independent, and it has been trying to do 
original stories and highlight social problems. But it is so difficult to be 
sustainable, and they are so dependent on particular personalities keeping it 
afloat. That follows the kind of training that they need. Terry is very open about 
the fact that he is not a journalist by training, and it does show. It was never 
anything that he set out to do, he just happened to fall into TOC and now it is his 
responsibility. [Details of issues TOC faces] 
 
It does mean that whoever is running an online site might be short on support, 
not just financially but practical support in terms of manpower, mental and 
emotional stress, shortage of a team to work with. I’m very lucky that at New 
Naratif we have a small team. It is not like I’m fighting lonely battles daily, but for 
TOC that might be the case. A lot of the sites that struggle for a viable business 
models find it really problematic, and it pushes them to do clickbait articles and 
sensationalise or editorialise stories that might turn out to be misleading, or it 
pushes them to do things where they just lift from social media. Like The 
Independent Singapore – some of their articles are just straight out lifted from 
other people’s Facebook post, and that is not journalism. You are just 
aggregating, that is not really value-adding for Singaporeans, nor teaching us to 
be more media literate. 
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44:02 HL Okay. That’s all the questions I have. Do you have anything else that you would 
want to add, any other views that you would like to share? 
44:11 KH I don’t know if New Naratif will fall under this, as we are technically not even 
allowed to be in Singapore, but what we are trying to do is push back against 
seeing Singapore in a silo, and to see ourselves as a part of Southeast Asia. 
Sometimes we get feedback that if we wrote more about Singapore, they would 
subscribe to us. But we are trying to show Southeast Asia, that there is 
something outside your doorstep and we are part of this region. 
 
I’ve noticed through some feedback we receive that Singaporeans have this 
tendency to equate objectivity with news, and the other way around. I think this 
is, again, detrimental to how media literate we can be. They would say that PJ 
and I are not neutral people, so New Naratif is not objective, and so cannot be 
trusted. They would say that when we do our podcasts, we shouldn’t inject our 
views. I’m quite troubled by this conflation of objectivity and trustworthiness. 
Emotional responses can also be true; what you should be looking at is whether 
there is evidence for what you are saying, and not whether we sound like we are 
objective. I can tell you fake news in the most neutral way, but it will still be fake. 
In the same way, I can write a very emotional piece about the death penalty, but 
everything I say can be backed up. This thinking that only things that sound 
neutral are more credible is problematic. You are not actually thinking through 
content, you are just looking at tone and trying to decide from it. 
 
I think because we have been taught in school to question if a person is really 
objective, if they quote authority. And then there is this idea that authority is 
always true, as if people have never seen a politician lie before. 
47:01 HL So you feel that it has to do with broader systems, like the education system as 
well? 
4:08 KH Yeah. How people learn to read things and assess the things they see. It definitely 
goes beyond the media. 
47:17 HL Do you think that politicians have a part to play in this? 
47:20 KH Yeah, I mean, the politicians are driving a lot of the censorship and control, right? 
We talked about the 4G clamping down on media and putting more pressure on 
them. Also, an unwillingness to engage, because it means that all of us 
collectively are not exercising any critical muscle – the politicians don’t engage 
critical muscle because they just spout things and they are not challenged; and 
we don’t exercise critical muscle because we don’t challenge and we just listen. 
Some days when I read the news, I’d question if we are getting collectively 
dumber. 





Appendix D – Transcript of interview with Braema Mathi 
Date: 23 October 2018 
Time: 12.30pm 
Location: via Skype 
0:00  HL I’ll start by asking you some general view about what you think of media regulation 
in Singapore. You can look at the various rules and regulations and the laws as well. 
Are they any good? Are some going overboard, and if necessary, how can we 
improve on them? 
0:26 BM I think, from MARUAH’s perspective, for the Universal Periodic Review, we have 
already said before that there must be amendments to the Newspaper and Printing 
Presses Act. The conditionality is such that the minister can step in at any time to 
withdraw permits or even state what one is not so happy with in terms of the 
particulars under the NPPA. The role of the minister is quite clearly spelt out in part 
4 Section 21 and 22, (and this applies to) even sales and offshore newspapers. We 
find that the space is really restricted, if (the government is) not happy with some of 
the reporting in print media. The minister also has a lot of control over foreign 
newspapers. I do think this points to a lot of control and authority that is given to 
the government. For newspapers, given the whole philosophy and conceptual 
understanding of journalism, it cannot operate in this kind of sphere. That is why we 
have asked for amendments – there must be a loosening of the registration process 
of newspapers and the kind of control that the minister can have. 
 
Ditto also for the Broadcasting Act. Whatever applies for the print media also 
applies to broadcasting. Broadcasting is a bit more fluid – for radio and TV, yet the 
same levels of controls are there. We’ve always found that for mainstream media, 
the freedom of expression and to information are restricted not only by the 
authority given to the minister, but also by individual ministries who can decide 
what kind of information can be shared with the newspapers, TV or radio stations.  
 
That is over all what I can say, but ask me if you need anything else before I touch 
on online media. 
3:47 HL Yes, because you said that for the Broadcasting Act, the form of the media is a little 
bit more fluid. You think that there is room for regulation for different types of 
media? 
4:07 BM I would say so, because visuals can deliver the whole story in a split second. Just 
imagine what we saw for the 2004 tsunami. I don’t even have to use any words, the 
visuals will tell you the whole story. Likewise for the internet and radio and 
everything that people are putting up on Facebook and self-podcast. You cannot 
restrict your main players like Mediacorp or Singapore Press Holdings, and then the 
online media has got lots more space. So it is better to do it the other way and relax 
on restrictions placed on the mainstream broadcasting and print media, rather than 
restrict one side so much, while many of us are relying on alternative media forms – 
whether it is The Online Citizen, The Independent SG, RiceMedia and bloggers who 
are putting up their opinions. 
 
I think a lot of the bloggers are putting up opinions rather than hardcore journalism 
and news. At the end of the day, we want news to be firm, clear and direct. We are 
not really getting that much reporting because the space is restricted. We are also 
not getting that kind of brilliance very often when it comes to opinion pieces. So we 
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have become, as readers, the nomads. We are constantly shifting to find alternative 
sources on the same stories so that we can get a better understanding of what is 
going on. I think it is time for the mainstream media to be given a lot more space. 
6:19 HL You were saying that, for opinions, we should have stronger opinions? 
6:25 BM Yeah, I do think that we should have stronger opinions in the print media as well as 
in broadcasting. The nature of broadcasting is that it comes in a snapshot, then 
there is advertising – I find that so much of that is commercial: so much of the 
advertising comes from whoever is sponsoring that you find that there is very little 
room for the deeper exploration of the issues. Having said that, I do find that CNA, 
because it broadcasts to the region, some of its documentaries are quite good, and 
all this is in the sphere of relativity. I do miss Al Jazeera – I thought that when they 
did their documentaries, when we could watch them, that was quite good, too. We 
tend to watch different broadcasts though news links or our cable TV. So why am I 
as a Singaporean relying on the BBC, reading the Guardian, the New York Times – 
some of these are expensive, and if you are not subscribed, you read what you can – 
when we should be relying on our national media? It’s a disservice, because of the 
restrictions. 
 
I know that I’m a former reporter, and I would still say that we are quite good with 
the reporting – we can go to an event and report it quite well – but it is no longer 
just event management report, press conference reports. There must be a deeper 
engagement from the journalist’s perspective with the newspaper, asking more 
probing questions that will appear in the report. But that to me is hardly happening 
at the same level as yester-years. I have grown up reading The Straits Times, and I 
find myself getting less and less from the printed press. That means that there is a 
shifting of what is appearing in newspapers, and that is the saddest part of such a 
historical newspaper that we have. And that is because of the amendments to the 
NPPA that happened – the Singapore Monitor, the drastic changes took place after 
the protest. There was much curtailing. 
9:45 HL Do you think that that kind of gap in engagement – you mentioned how journalists 
engage with the story – do you think that gap has been filled by local online media? 
10:02 BM Wow, that’s a tough question. I can’t answer it directly, because I think we have 
asked for this before – both MARUAH and online media, especially during the 
discussion on falsehoods. When I was there, I heard The Online Citizen asking why 
the government can’t answer the queries put up by online media. You can’t rely on 
online media also, because the state bodies, the ministries are not respecting the 
online media outlets enough to answer their queries. Neither are they really 
respecting mainstream media, because mainstream media waits for too long to get 
the responses. The ministries are having their own press officers and corporate 
communication division, there are three press officers for the whole of government, 
so there is beefing up at the ministerial level. If everyone has gotten in their human 
resources, then why is there a delay in answering the queries put up by the 
mainstream media? There is no winner – both mainstream media and online media 
are not getting the information they ought to, or they are getting generalised 
answers when it comes to mainstream media. 
 
So we have a whole problem not just tied up to NPPA and the Broadcasting Act. We 
are tied up because we do not have a Freedom of Information Act, and therefore 
much of it becomes generalised, or (they say) “we cannot tell you” or “this is what 
has been approved”. We are surrendering to the powers of different ministers and 




To go back and answer your question, we have a structural problem. When we have 
a structural problem, neither mainstream nor online media wins, and the reader 
doesn’t win. We are deeply reliant on press releases that are, again, managed by a 
good team, by which I mean, “that is my job as a press officer”. It is my job to 
manage the press releases, but the journalists are in the wilderness. I think it is a 
very tough fight, state powers versus what we mean freedom of information and 
expression. We are deeply under seizure by a lack of understanding of these 
freedoms because state powers operate that way, and the rest operate in fear of 
upsetting the system due to how the NPPA or Broadcasting Act can be used. And for 
online media, their licenses can be revoked. Everyone is caught, right? 
14:11 HL I’m just going to ask you this before we move on to the fake news thing. I think you 
are pointing out a fundamental lack of engagement between the state and media 
players. Why do you think they don’t want to engage, or don’t know how to? 
14:39 BM I think if we are operating in a more diversified governmental structure – that is, we 
have more actors and political parties – I think everyone will be trying to engage the 
media more openly when questions are asked. I have to speak better, speak clearer, 
I have to get my facts starker than the other politician from the other political party. 
But when we have only two political parties with a majority of one party for a very 
long time, the dictates are with the ruling majority party. Case in point is Malaysia, 
which has different mainstream media actors, many online media outlets, and they 
have it before and after 9 May (14th general elections in 2018). Before 9 May, there 
were restrictions on both mainstream and online media. Today, all politician – be it 
from Patakan Harapan, UMNO or the coalition political parties – have their say. I 
read the papers, and honestly sometimes I get a headache because there are many 
voices and sometimes the voices are at conflict with each other. But it is okay. The 
onus is on the Malaysian citizen to decipher which view the person wishes to 
believe. Where are we going to find among all the various media outlets, 
mainstream and online, a voice that I believe? There will be historical reasons to 
follow a particular media outlet because they have proven to be reliable. I would 
also go to the ministries website to look at the data that has been released, whether 
all of it has been articulated, or if the media has picked and chosen. 
 
So if we have greater democracy and freedom, I as a reader and citizen will have the 
reliability of the media outlets to depend on, and I will have my information from 
the ministries and private sector actors that are responsible for the uploading and 
managing of their own websites. But when I do not have a Freedom of Information 
Act in place, I’m not going to put everything up there. The person who will really get 
the short end of the straw will be the reader-citizen. 
 
It is democracy and diversity that is needed, but at the same time we cannot say 
that because we have more actors, we have democracy, everything is beautiful now. 
The citizen has to become the critical reader who knows how rely on information 
and find reliable sources. The good news is that the media will has to up their game 
on greater reliability for greater dependability. Otherwise, I will move. I do read 
certain online media outlets to get the other side of the coin, but I’m not going to go 
to some – I’ve made my decision, rightly or wrongly. When there are so many 
players online, with bloggers and opinion writers and everything, you are going to 




Having said that, like finds like. When I was a student in the UK, there were five of 
us sharing a flat. Two of us wanted the Guardian, one wanted the Times, two 
wanted the Independent. So we pooled our money and we got all the papers, and 
we benefitted the greater for it, because we can read different papers, get different 
nuances. The news was still the news, but the opinion writers made a big difference 
to all of us. I would still want to subscribe to the Guardian and the Observer, 
because the opinion writers are good. I would also go to the Independent for one or 
two things. That is how like finds like at the end of the day. But when you have the 
same norms, where are you going to get the likes? We all grow up with different 
philosophies and value systems, and we will align ourselves to a certain type of 
writer and paper. In Singapore, the choices are not there. 
21:12 HL Ok, I promised one question, but since we are on this point, do you think the 
Singapore reader has that ability to discern, and if not, what is stopping them from 
doing so? 
21:28 BM I think it is a very big hole to throw the Singapore reader into, when we talk about 
discernment! I know that during the Select Committee hearings we, including 
MARUAH, talked a lot about the need to have critical thinking among Singaporeans. 
I think that critical discourse is important, but the other side of the coin has to be 
done is a major overhaul of our education system, so as to have more discourses. 
We need to strengthen the arts – what are the different writers telling us through 
literature? I don’t believe in the east-west bilateral distinction. We have 
philosophers galore from different histories and geographies. We are not learning 
enough about the philosophers and thinkers. When we do that, whoever you are in 
whatever country, you will know how to address all the different things that come 
through Facebook and different writers on online media. It applies globally, that we 
are becoming glued to our mobile phones, and yet we do not think about the 
reliability of what we are reading. There is a “repetition” in the news, an instancy 
that we are all relying on. I want it fast, but what is it that we are doing fast? I’ve 
made mistakes on Facebook where I didn’t go to the source to double check, my 
friends have alerted my and I have apologised, and I leave it there to let people 
know I have made a mistake so that people become wiser when they rely on social 
media. 
 
When we talk about Singapore, we have the highest rates for mobile phone users, 
and we are very digitised. Do we still have to do more for the Singapore reader and 
say, you don’t have any discernment? I think what we have to do is build up a 
stronger value system. What matters to you as a human being? So you don’t keep 
reading the predictable food reviews and entertainment, and become a 
sensationalism follower. Why we have a big cohort of Singaporeans who perhaps 
follow this news is because the other side is too difficult, so it is a form of escapism. 
Not that the Singapore reader is not critical, we are very critical readers on food 
blogs, entertainment, films, celebrities, we are very discerning! But we do not want 
to go there because I feel that after a while, where do I go? I read and after a while I 
get disturbed, where do I root it? Do I write about it? Then I have to mind all the 
restrictions. If I don’t write about it, who do I talk to? So the best (solution) is to 
evade it. 
 
It goes back to the fundamentals of building up a society with the values, pedagogy 
that engages on philosophy, and deeper engagement with the arts. Do we really do 
critical arts studies? We leave it to SOTA. Why? Can’t a primary school kid know 




I would also add that there is an unconscious desire to please outwardly. Like that 
CNA interview with Senior Minister of State Janil Puthucheary hosting some 
students about streaming. At the beginning, I was one of the rare few who put up 
on Facebook, what is this all about? Should we have a Member of Parliament 
hosting this? Where are the social workers, the teachers, the counsellors? Are they 
all in that room, was this managed well? Many were praising how it was so 
wonderful, but how can we put students through this? RiceMedia wrote a good 
analysis, because I think we have harmed these children by putting them on 
national TV like that. I don’t know what the preparatory course for them was. Who 
is picking up the pieces after they have shared their views? And it is so stark – they 
are early teenagers, how can you throw this at them? I was disturbed by it, but the 
majority were happy to say all the pleasing things. I’m wondering if the average 
Singaporean is now unconsciously trained to be a pleaser. We feel so inhibited that I 
dare not go and say anything. That CNA documentary really worried me, I found it 
awful. 
29:44 HL Ok. I’ll just move on to talk about what happened during the fake news committee 
hearings. I’ve read MARUAH’s response. What do you think of the public 
consultation process, and now with the Committee’s report that came out last 
month, any views on that you want to share? 
30:13 BM Ok, you’ve read MARUAH’s report and response, and we never received a response 
from the chair of the Select Committee who was functioning as a Member of 
Parliament and a Deputy Speaker of the House. But they have responded to the 
academics who expressed their consternation. To the best of my knowledge, I don’t 
think they have responded to any local group that has sent in our reservation and 
our own consternation about how the Select Committee has conducted the 
hearings based on the submissions various people and the discussions that have 
been made. That courtesy needs to be done. 
 
The other part of it is that you have asked a very serious question of all 
Singaporeans, what we think about falsehoods. MARUAH read the (Committee’s) 
mandate before we submitted our first written piece, and we tried our best as 
volunteers, as with others who have to do many other things, and no one is really 
paid to do this. Out of due respect, care and concern for the state of affairs, we have 
responded. 
 
I felt that the Select Committee, in certain instances, were not fully respectful of 
how people have put themselves out to share what they wanted for Singapore. 
Where the overstepped really took place was primarily when The Online Citizen, 
Kirsten Han, yourself and MARUAH were there. I felt that there was an offline 
approach to the mandate to try to make one of them admit to certain things that 
was not part of the mandate. Now when we go to Thum Ping Tjin, we have all said 
what is said and I would not repeat it, you can refer to MARUAH’s response. But the 
after-effect is that everyone was upset primarily over how PJ was treated, and the 
state has responded, and has ridiculed his academic qualifications. What, then, is 
the state trying to do through the Select Committee, as approved by Singapore 
Parliament, that when you ask people to engage, we should not engage? What are 
you trying to say to your citizenry? 
 
Especially on an issue that affects everybody: whatever we mean by fake news, an 
adage or label that was put out by Mr Donald Trump, the President of the United 
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States. I personally have issues with the man who gave the world “fake news” when 
I feel he is always making statements that are clearly falsehoods. He is using the 
term as a weapon and a tool to dim the people resisting him. We have borrowed it – 
fair enough, there is a lot of versions of what people are saying (about fake news). 
So we engage on it and many of the submissions are saying we have to educate the 
population, yes. We are also saying, how are you going to define fake news? That 
definition is still unclear. In the recommendations that the Select Committee has 
made, the clarity of definition of what you mean by falsehoods and false news is still 
very arbitrary. 
 
So we are going to depend on the legal process of prosecution and defence to make 
their case. I think this is the part that is worrisome, and especially in MARUAH’s 
response, we have said that the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act 
(POSSPA) already gives a lot of powers to different ministries – MHA, MinLaw, 
Mindef – everyone can come in under this Act to act on anything that can seem to 
show some form of violation that will harm the peace. We felt that it is enough. If 
you look at the law itself, it really governs everything a person does. Do we still 
need something else for fake news? That is the position that MARUAH has written 
in its response. 
 
Plus, I would also say honestly that there is a deflation. The impact on us is also 
when we watch what has happened to PJ, the after-effects of that episode. Then we 
have Jolovan, then Seelan. What do you want to give your citizens in terms of 
space? It’s like the Hindu goddess Parvati with many arms, but we have a shackle 
around each of them. That is how I feel, personally, that there is a deflation, and we 
have to get over it to become more engaged. 
 
For the Select Committee, the definition is still quite arbitrary. Anyone can become 
a harbinger of fake news, which is worrisome. What are you going to do with young 
children and teens who are going to float all sorts of stuff? What are you going to do 
with an underaged Amos Yee, throw the whole hammer at him? Yes, a young 
person can kill, as has happened in America, but the person has been reading 
different websites, but are they fake news, or breeding hate? I feel that this issue is 
so complex. I worry about the modus operandi of the Select Committee. Parliament 
needs to really address this issue at the next sitting, not only on the 
recommendations, but the conduct of the Select Committee. So many people have 
written in, that they really have to address it. 
39:55 HL I’ll just move on to ask about the media industry in Singapore. Given the current 
situation right now – you mentioned that the government is not engaging properly, 
people are not thinking about the news – what, then, do you think is the future of 
the industry here in Singapore? 
40:18 BM I think that’s a good question. One of them is to follow what The Online Citizen is 
doing right now. Whenever they make a query and the reply doesn’t come, they 
have stated that at press time, no responses were received. This is what The Straits 
Times and the print media used to do. Why has that vaporised? That is 
accountability. The media houses have done their part by asking, and if the other 
side, with its human resources – every ministry and private sector today has 
invested in corporate communications and officers to deal with the press – if you 
can’t response in time, then I think we should shout it out, so that we as citizen 
readers can ask, “Why is that a problem?” Especially with a digitised economy, 
when you have to respond to ACRA, income tax, shareholders, much information is 
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already out there, what is it that is not being shared becomes the question. That is 
the good approach for critical discourse between the reader, the media and the 
news makers themselves. It is small, but I think it is important because it shows 
some transparency and it also makes the citizens wonder and ask questions. 
 
The second part is that I think the NPPA really needs to be amended. But it will not 
be in sync with what might be coming in the fake news bill. The fake news thing is 
going to restrict space. We are not harmonised now. The (amended) Films Act is 
really severe – it gives a lot of executive powers to many stakeholders to come and 
knock on your door and seize whatever you have. That is really a severe restriction, 
and now we are going to have fake news laws. What would become of NPPA and 
the Broadcasting Act? They will become small players when we have these bigger 
things to deal with. 
 
I feel that these are small things – although it is funny that we can call them small – 
that we can ask for tweaking and more freedom, but it is more plausible if we ask 
for a UN special rapporteur to come in to see how freedom of expression and 
information is restricted in Singapore and for them to do a report. The Singapore 
government should let them come in and do the report. The other stage is that 
OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) should 
ask Singapore to get onto the bandwagon of ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights) and ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), the two international core treaties that Singapore has not ratified. 
If we ratify them, all these laws would have to be amended. We are in a chicken and 
egg situation. If the government does not want to amend the laws and want to stay 
with these restrictions, they are never going to ratify the ICCPR and the ICESCR. We 
will get jammed and be caught in this situation. 
 
Third tier is that we have more political parties coming in for elections. The next 
general elections are coming, not longer than March 2021. During the elections, 
Singaporeans have to speak through the vote and say what more they want. If they 
are happy with the non-democratic space then so be it, but if we are not happy, 
then we have to ask for more democracy, and untidiness if we have more 
opposition parties. Opposition political parties need to get their act together. 
 
Lastly, I would say there would hopefully be some enlightenment within the ruling 
party to know that they are really not acting within the constitutional rights of the 
citizens, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the 
Vienna Declaration of 1993. Please look at former Foreign Minister Wong Kan Sing 
and what he has said at the 1993 Vienna Declaration. We are not in sync, we are not 
harmonised, and we cannot keep saying terrorism is at our doorstep, and therefore 
we have to do all these things. There are many countries that have terrorism within 
their borders, and yet they have not gone to such severe restrictions. And we have 
propped up the budget for the Ministry of Defence to do even greater surveillance 
so that we can go into a preventive mode for terrorism. If we are putting all that in 
that basket, do we need to do such downstream measures and impose such severe 
restrictions? 





Additional post-interview notes from Braema Mathi: 
I think the core of the problem we have here now is a high level of self-censorship by reporters 
themselves. They know where the lines are or assume in almost all cases they know where the lines 
are. So many do cut back on their energies, the investigations, the framework to draw out 
interviewees, the field work. This in turn leads to predictable opinion pieces – it is an individual's 
perspective, but rarely do you find a new thought, although they are well structured and well 
written. The other issue with self-censorship is that the same happens over and over again – for 
example, the MRT breakdowns, where the operations and maintenance chart is what needs 
examination. Reporters may have tried but have to give up as the doors by the press side of the 
organisation have slammed the doors politely.  So one gives up after a while and even if there is an 
eager-beaver reporter who believes in journalism to go further and do investigation – under disguise 
or using digital technology – where will her/his support be from her/his editor, and from the law 
when it comes to matters of privacy of the organisation and the individual? One is stuck – it is a 
spider's web. So the saddest outcome about journalism in Singapore is, a) is it journalism or 
reporting? And b) self-censorship is pervasive and systemic and done so symbiotically from inside 
the newsroom, to interviewees (data) and the organisations they represent. Freedom and 
liberalisation are abstract concepts. They are easily articulated but finding spaces – small and big – 




Appendix E – Transcript of interview with Viswa Sadasivan 
Date: 14 August 2018 
Time: 11am 
Location: Viswa’s office, Technopreneur Centre 
0:00 VS What you are looking at, actually, harks back to the issue of public trust. We are 
not saying that there should be no rules and regulations – no country can 
function that way. Hopefully, instead of hard rules and regulations, we can have 
conventions, codes of conduct, code of engagement, you know, where 
everybody signs off on a certain code. But if there is no signing off, and there is 
no clear understanding of why and where the shifts are taking place, and when 
the goalposts keep shifting, public trust ends up being the victim.  
0:43 HL Ok, you talk about signing off on a code of conduct. I get that, but it is not 
something that one party can push for, right? 
0:55 VS That’s what I’m saying, there has to be a big change in how we organise 
ourselves around these things. For example, we are very big on engagements, 
right? But engagement is seen as an activity and not as an attitude. In other 
words, as long as I fulfil the KPI of ten engagement sessions, I assume that people 
are engaged, and that has a high risk of false positives. You feel very good about 
yourself, because I have engaged 1,800 people, but 1,600 don’t feel engaged. 
1:40 HL I’ll just refine it a little bit – do you think that was what happened during the 
National Conversation? 
1:46 VS Yes. I believe that was what happened during the National Conversation, and I 
believe that was what happened during the Future Economy Committee 
deliberations. What I’m sensing – and this is purely anecdotal – is a certain 
engagement fatigue on the ground and it is leading to a very palpable sense of 
disillusionment. There are people who served on committees, people who in 
good faith went for these engagements and contributed ideas that they believe 
were important, but quite a few shared with me that they were disappointed 
that their views didn’t make it to the final report.   
 
Of course, we don’t expect every contribution to go into the report, but when an 
increasing number of people feel that their views are not really heard, and that 
this is just a numbers game, you lose public trust. The truth of the matter is that a 
lot of Singaporeans actually attend these things. They don’t go there because of 
the buffet – well, some may! But honestly, I’ve been to these and many of them 
read all the materials, they come prepared, but they don’t get a chance to say 
anything. The panellist, who is usually a minister, gives a sermon, and it is 
supposed to be a feedback session. You can see that people are disillusioned and 
many of them say, “I’m not going for it again.” 
 
The net effect of all this is the erosion of public trust. When you have a strong 
erosion of public trust, what happens is healthy sceptics become cynics, then you 
can’t get them back. Cynics just disengage. Now, if society moves in that 
direction – which I think we are already at risk of that, many professionals and 
young people I have spoken to are saying, “For what?” Because frankly, you can 
live in Singapore without being engaged – you can probably live a better life! You 
know what I mean – you just focus on work, moving up the corporate ladder, 
going home, hang out with your family and friends, and you’re done.  
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4:27 HL But the state should be aware of this, and they keep telling people you need to 
be engaged, you can’t be apathetic. Then why still continue with this mode of 
engagement? 
4:40 VS It’s a million-dollar question, right? I don’t think it is because the government 
doesn’t want to engage. I don’t think it is because the government is not sincere 
about the engagement. It is that they are actually quite clueless about how to do 
it right. Because don’t forget, many of them come from a systems and process 
orientation. We are probably the most KPI driven country in the world. But KPIs 
actually point to output, and output is not the same as outcome. So we are a 
society where everything is output-driven. You see the danger of that? 
Everything is measured by output. There is a lot of work generated, everywhere 
you’ll see people are busy bees, running around meeting KPIs and delivering 
output. There is very little thought given to whether the output is actually 
resulting in the outcome that you want. In fact, very often they don’t even know 
what outcome they want. Because they are so systems driven, KPI driven, output 
driven, that becomes an end in itself. 
 
So it is not that they are not well-intentioned. It is that all this has been 
routinised, and you just go. This is the danger that we are facing – we are just 
moving in a certain direction, not asking why we are moving in this direction. It is 
not about being anti-government or being critical of the government, it is about 
asking that inconvenient question: why are we doing this, why should we do this? 
But unfortunately, I think the government as a whole – and here I’m talking 
about the Cabinet, the civil service, the public sector, all combined – has stopped 
asking “why are we doing it”, “why are we doing it the way we are doing it” and 
third, “is there another way of doing it”. 
 
Unfortunately, when sometimes some people ask those questions, it disrupts the 
echo chamber, right? Then what happens is the whole discussion turns binary, 
you are either with me or against me.  
7:28 HL On that point, some people that I have spoken to said there was a change from 
2011, what happened after 2011, and then in 2015, it reverted back. Do you see 
there being a change? 
7:44 VS Absolutely. I think there is broad consensus on that, and we expected it, right? It 
got to their head. I also feel that there is a deliberate move to tighten things. But 
I think this is where people are confused. When Lee Kuan Yew was the head of 
government, it was very clear – everybody knew that if you overstep, you get 
electrocuted. And then Goh Chok Tong took over, there was a lot of consultation, 
and I think he was sincere about it. I was with the feedback unit back then, and I 
think there was a genuine move towards asking people. The government wasn’t 
very used to it, but they got used to it. 
 
Now, the ground has shifted a lot more, especially with the advent of digital 
media. It’s many to many conversations, so there is a lot of confusion on the 
ground. Ostensibly, what we are seeing is a lot of conversations – everything is 
out there for us to talk about, but in reality there is a very clear tightening. This is 
where people are confused, because if you listen to all the official statements 
from the government, the PM’s speeches and so on, the words are, “we are 
inclusive”, “we want everyone to share their views”, and I would like to believe it 
was sincere. But you are seeing almost every day a certain tightening – when 
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someone makes a statement there is a whacking, and then you wonder why. And 
so you have your PJ Thum, Sylvia Lim – these things have a chilling effect. 
 
I don’t think it is unintentional. The government decides which space is ok for us 
to have open conversations, and there are certain spaces where there is further 
tightening. So for example, anyone who wants to reconstruct or rewrite history, 
forget it, because there is only one version of history in Singapore. And PJ Thum 
was trying to rewrite history – you know, he has been labelled a revisionist 
historian. So when he came on board for the Select Committee hearing and he 
wanted to bring up issues surrounding Operations Coldstore and Spectrum, you 
would be naive to think that this government is going to sit down and say go 
ahead! The whole aim, in my view, was to nip it in the butt so that it doesn’t get 
to Spectrum, because between Coldstore and Spectrum, it was Spectrum that 
was actually more controversial and closer to a lot of people because a lot of 
Catholics feel it even today, and almost all of them (affected) are still alive. 
 
And it has a chilling effect. People are terrified to put their views across. This is 
not healthy on several fronts – and I’m addressing some of the questions you 
have raised – because in any society where the mainstream media is not viewed 
as a credible source of information, the entire society pays a price. When it 
comes to a crisis issue, an existential threat to the nation, the government of the 
day needs to have a platform to communicate with credibility, right? The digital 
space cannot be the platform. It can be an alternative platform. You cannot have 
the Prime Minister address the nation on Facebook, God forbid that that day will 
come! If the Prime Minister wants to address the nation because something 
catastrophic has happened, surely he will have to use the broadcaster or national 
media to say what he wants to say, because even today, everybody will look at 
that as the official version. But the official version is not trusted, and is 
increasingly not trusted by the people. 
13:08 HL Why do you think that, if the Prime Minister is to announce something on his 
Facebook page, that is not doable? 
13:19 VS It may work in other countries, but people in Singapore expect an announcement 
to appear formal and official, and they do not yet see Facebook as official. I don’t 
think it is the right way to go either. I’m not in favour of ministers making policy 
announcements on Facebook. Please, that is not your platform for doing so! 
Unfortunately, we are moving into that space, and it’s almost like it is not 
coordinated, it’s like we have multiple fiefdoms. I don’t sense that as a whole the 
government is coordinated enough. Khaw Boon Wan will come up to make a 
statement, you’re not sure if it was made because he got up and thought about 
something and puts it on Facebook or if it was something that was discussed and 
deliberated. It’s a bit discomforting – is this a policy? Sometimes, some of the 
things that are stated there are scary. And then you have Goh Chok Tong making 
that statement recently… [elaboration on ministerial pay issue] 
15:15 HL But that could be just him being silly! 
15:18 VS No, but to you and me, we analyse it and might think that way, but do you know 
how many people still view him as former Prime Minister? And you’re talking 
about more than ninety-five percent of the people falling into the category of 
very very mediocre. We are a nation of mediocrity! 
 
But that’s the danger of social media, because you can just click and send it off, 
and many of them are trigger happy, many ministers and MPs are putting it up. 
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There is a sense that things are not coordinated, because you are getting really 
weird statements here and there. [elaboration on Josephine Teo making remarks 
about making babies in small spaces] 
16:04 HL  That was in a media interview, if I’m not wrong? 
16:08 VS I don’t know where, but it was a statement she made somewhere and it was 
picked up, and it was proliferated not on mainstream media but (online). So 
people assume that this is where she made the statement. [jokes about 
Josephine Teo’s portfolio change] 
 
But what I’m saying is, if the mainstream media loses that level of credibility, we 
pay a price. That’s number one. Number two, the digital media space is not 
mature yet, compared to some other countries where it has kind of stabilised. Of 
course, you have fake news and so on, but you have systems and processes 
already in place to say, “wait a minute”. And there is a lot more wisdom because 
they have a longer runway in many countries in the West where they are used to 
open media. They are forced much earlier to discern. But we have been molly-
coddled, and suddenly you are thrown into this area where you are being 
bombarded, so we have not built that instinct or impulse to be discerning.  
17:38 HL But the impulse to be discerning goes beyond online media, right? You don’t 
need online media to be discerning. You can be discerning even with The Straits 
Times. 
17:46 VS Yes, but I’m putting it collectively. The noise, the amount of data, everything that 
is coming – even for people like us, it’s hard to discern. You’re really trying to 
figure out, who made this statement, why would he say it, is it true? It’s very 
confounding, but all that affects your public trust, your confidence in the system 
as a whole, because people are beginning to second guess. 
 
It is also because of a lack of transparency from the officialdom. You are having a 
proliferation of closed communication networks which is different from 
Facebook – I’m talking about Whatsapp chat groups. That’s a different 
dimension, because generally on Facebook, you can access it and actually criticise 
it or correct it if it is misinformation. But if the insidious and conspiratorial 
conversations are taking place in closed communication groups, now that is very 
serious, because I don’t think many of them are constructive. [personal sharing 
about school alumni chat groups] Many of them are very senior people, and you 
have some statements (from them) that is completely out of whack. And these 
are ridiculous conspiracy theories, but there are enough people willing to buy 
into it, and these are sensible people!  
 
And that is going across the board, and anyone who tries to come into it and say, 
“hey guys, give him a break”, you get walloped. Especially if you are a current or 
former civil servant, and many in my group are fairly senior, such as 
Shanmugam… [a few others mentioned] So you have these multiple 
conversations going, but all that is not good for public trust. 
 
At the end of the day, this government has to come to terms with the reality that 
one day, and not very far down the road, they are going to lose the grip that they 
have so much and that they are so used to. Because when public trust reaches an 
ebb, at that level, anything goes. Once you reach that, the current government 
might even be thrown out. I suspect that if things don’t change and continues in 
the current trajectory, in 2025 this government might be thrown out. That is a 
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prediction quite a few people are beginning to think, because it has actually 
reached that boiling point. If you look at various things that are directly affecting 
people, they don’t have the solutions. 
22:10 HL You don’t think that they can gerrymander their way out of this? 
22:14 VS There comes a point – and I think the Malaysian election does have an impact, 
and people are saying “why not”. We want change, but we don’t want change 
that is done in a manner that is disruptive for everyone. My appeal to the 
government has been to start accepting that you do not have a monopoly on 
wisdom. You’ve said it before but this time truly act on it. Truly act on shared 
governance, share the space with civil society. We don’t expect you to want to 
share the space with your opponents in politics, but civil society – nurture it, 
build it. The only way you can be assured of remaining the government is if you 
share the space. 
 
If they can come to terms with it, digital media is a very significant part of 
achieving that – all of it, including social media. Use it, use it well. That brings me 
to the issue of fake news and falsehoods. It is very instructive that the name of 
the Committee was about deliberate online falsehoods. Why falsehoods? You 
see, fake news can refer to specific news information that is fake, and often it 
suggests a certain mischief. Falsehood is a lot more insidious, it suggests intent, 
that I am propagating something that I know is false. So you are going from 
misinformation into disinformation. Disinformation is wrong information 
propagated with an agenda. Misinformation, you’re just not aware. Falsehood 
goes into the disinformation realm – there is an assumption that you are doing it 
with an agenda which is less than noble. 
 
Falsehood and deliberate falsehood reinforce the point that there was deliberate 
intention. Clearly that is the way towards legislation. What PJ Thum was trying to 
do was highlight that the government engaged in deliberate falsehood by 
propagating it with the knowledge that it is falsehood in Coldstore and Spectrum. 
It would have been a lethal argument, which was why I believe the government, 
through Shanmugam, decided to do it the way they did. 
 
But is legislation the best way forward? I was in support of some form of 
legislation, but with the proviso that you have a separate body that does the 
screening and vetting. This body must be separated from the government. And if 
a prima facie case is not established, the benefit of doubt is given to the 
(accused) party. If that body looks at a case and decide that there is no intention, 
it means you cannot be charged in court. It cannot be left to the AG, because the 
AG is part of government. 
 
This is where I’m hooking it back to public trust. If you want to recover public 
trust, you need to demonstrate that legislation is not being used as a tool to 
muzzle alternative voices. That’s why the group that actually vets this, number 
one, has to be a group that is independent of the government; and number two, 
comprising individuals whose integrity is beyond reproach. So I’m talking about 
the likes of Tommy Koh, they’ve reached a certain stage in their lives where their 
own personal integrity matters a lot more, which means they cannot be bought, 




And the deliberations should be transparent. They need to say, this case has 
come up to us, we are deliberating it, we feel that there is intent, and these are 
the reasons. When the government starts doing this, public trust will go up. If 
public trust doesn’t go up, the chances of the government continuing to have the 
legitimacy to rule goes down. 
28:32 HL Do you see them doing this during the fake news debate? 
28:38 VS I don’t think so. The manner in which they received and didn’t receive certain 
groups shows that it wasn’t as transparent and above board. That was the 
perception that a lot of people got. Of course, the PJ Thum incident just nailed it 
– it didn’t help the government. 
 
I suspect there will be more and more legislation happening, where people are 
held accountable – if you go out and make this statement, you are going to get it. 
If you look at the proposed falsehood legislation, it follows up from the other 
legislation they had two years back about the Administration of Justice Bill. If you 
openly question the judgement of the court, the AG has the final say in whether 
they will charge. Now, that is very draconian. It had a very negative effect on the 
ground, and people started asking why there is a need for something like this. 
When something like that is introduced, people start asking if the government 
has something else in mind. And it didn’t help that it happened at a time when 
the AG changed. So people are not dumb, they are looking at all these pieces and 
drawing a pattern. All that is affecting public trust, and it is happening to policy 
after policy, and all of them are about holding people accountable for anything 
that is critical of the government. That is the reading on the ground – I could get 
muzzled if I am deemed to be a threat. 
30:48 HL Ok, so if I’m getting you right, what you’re saying is that the focus on intent is 
really a good thing, but you don’t see them using any laws along those lines? 
31:03 VS I expect them to legislate, I think it is a matter of time. I think they are holding it 
back because of some other consideration, but I think sometime next year, there 
will be legislation.  
31:15 HL But do you think that, what defines intent or not, won’t be that clearly spelt out? 
31:21 VS I’m not sure, but I am stating my wish and hope that whatever legislation (they 
have) takes into account an independent way of ascertaining intent, and I stress 
independent, and the consideration must be made open and transparent. That is 
important – I am not against legislation, I am in favour of it, but do it 
transparently, so that everybody benefits. If they don’t do it this way, it is going 
to further erode public trust. The victim is the government – it will start losing 
legitimacy. People may not be openly saying it, but people are feeling it. 
 
And this is one of the rare occasions where the feeling on the ground is as strong 
as 2011, because people on the ground are frustrated. Costs are going up, it is so 
difficult to live. And Eldershield appears not to be working for the people as it 
should – the point that Sylvia brought up is true, I know of cases like that. There 
is a big question mark on what the government is doing with CPF. Why is the 
government pushing the goalpost more and more, are we ever going to get the 
money? There is this fear that has been spreading: is the government running 
short on cash? And then there is a lack of transparency in areas like Keppel 
Marine, the bribery case. Why wasn’t it out there? It was (closed) very quickly. 
Things like, how much is Ho Ching getting? No one knows, but it is all coming out 
in bits and pieces.  These are clearly sensitive and complex issues, but at some 
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point – and sooner than later – the government needs to start addressing them. 
There is this elephant in the room. We can’t ignore it. 
33:42 HL I would actually pin all this down to coffeeshop talk, so it is real? 
33:47 VS It is real, but because there is this fear, there is all this legislation, people are not 
talking about it. Just because people don’t talk about it doesn’t mean they don’t 
feel it. 
34:02 HL But will they vote on it? 
34:03 VS I don’t know. But I will tell you what I see as an interesting shift. I am seeing 
grassroots leaders who have been very pro-PAP are beginning to question. They 
are fed-up because they don’t seem to have sufficient respect from some of the 
younger MPs that they are serving. They are also saying, “Why are we working so 
hard when the ministers and MPs continue to get so much money, but we are 
supposed to volunteer for free?” It is about parity and fairness, and these 
questions are coming up. They themselves are finding it hard to explain some of 
these policies. 
34:55 HL So trust is paramount. What is the role of the media in this, then? 
35:00 VS I think the mainstream media need to go into a reestablishment of their 
relationship with the government.  
35:21 HL You don’t think it is a good relationship now? 
35:23 VS No, it is too good a relationship. That relationship was cast in stone by LKY, he 
defined what is the role of the media. Fifty years on, the time has come for a 
renegotiation of that relationship, and that renegotiation must be based on a 
broad objective of what is in the best interest of Singapore during difficult times. 
Basically, it is not to say we don’t want to support you, but we need a certain 
distance for us to support you during difficult times. It is a twisted argument in 
some sense, but I can’t be close to you if you want me to speak up for you. It 
works in real life, right? If I want to speak up for you, I can’t be seen hanging out 
with you all the time at the coffeeshop. To be a third-party endorser, there needs 
to be a certain distance, and that distance needs to be renegotiated.  
36:37 HL I take it that you don’t see it happening right now? 
36:40 VS Actually, the conversations are beginning to take place, more with The Straits 
Times than Mediacorp. This is happening because there is kind of a quiet uprising 
within the editorial groups within The Straits Times. They are saying that this 
relationship cannot go on. It doesn’t mean that we are going to be anti-
government, but it is in the best interest of the government for us to renegotiate. 
I think the conversations are happening, I know for a fact that some of the 
influential ministers are already talking to these people, initiated by the SPH 
leadership. People like Shanmugam are beginning to have conversations. I know 
that people like Gabriel Lim, who is Permanent Secretary of MCI and fairly 
influential, he is open. He is meeting with these people and asking what we 
should do. I’m not saying the entire government is shifting. They are beginning to 
listen, they might not agree yet, but the engagement is more than just titular.  
 
Mediacorp, less so, because they are seen more as part of government – if you 
see the structure, Mediacorp is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Temasek. From a 
statutory board, they became a company, but a company like SGH is. It is not like 
a listed company like DBS or SIA. Temasek’s shareholding is very small, but it is 
still seen as government-linked. 
 
I think that is beginning to take place. I think there are people within government 
who are beginning to question whether this relationship is really in the best 
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interest. So I think some of these conversations are beginning to happen within 
the media and within the leadership. How far and how strong, I don’t know, 
because there are some new people within the system who are questioning it, 
saying maybe we should have a different tact. I’m talking about next year’s 
leaders – I’m not talking about the so-called 4G leaders at the front – people like 
Edwin, Janil, Hong Tat to some extent. They are beginning to question if we 
should continue the same way. And I sense their view is different from the view 
of Chan Chun Sing, for example. There is this group that is coming up that is 
questioning it, and I find that healthy. 
40:22 HL On this group, while it is totally believable that they are talking to The Straits 
Times, but I take it that they are not talking to people in online media. 
40:33 VS Not yet. They are talking to people in online media that they feel are aligned. So 
they are talking to Mothership. They are certainly not talking to TOC and The 
Independent. But that is understandable – TOC and, to a lesser extent, The 
Independent, they don’t expect it, they have established themselves (politically). 
 
So that brings me to the question of the online space. I think I said this to you 
some time back – for the online community to be viewed as credible, they can’t 
remain in the extreme left. Just as for the mainstream media to be viewed as 
credible, they can’t be positioned as extreme right. They need to vacillate 
towards the centre-left and -right. TOC and The Independent need to move from 
the die-die anti-government, towards critical appraisal.  
41:54 HL You don’t think they are doing critical appraisal? 
41:56 VS I think they are inching, but they need to move towards your centre-left much 
faster. Until then, they will not be viewed as a truly independent and credible 
alternative. They would perhaps be seen as opposition sponsored and supported, 
almost the same as The Straits Times – if I don’t believe them, why should I 
believe you? 
42:27 HL But there is also this difficulty that, if you inch closer to the centre-left, which I 
take it also as a greater willingness to engage with the government, there is the 
view that by doing this you are also being co-opted? 
42:42 VS No, it is how you do it. What is wrong with saying I agree with the government on 
this? This is good, but maybe three more suggestions on what can be done. And 
when you are completely against the government on certain things, state it. Right 
now, ninety percent of the time, the stance is very hard-hitting against the 
government. It is almost as if, if The Straits Times is pro-government, you’re pro-
opposition. That’s the view, and I think it is common knowledge that The 
Independent is supported by Leon Perera. People know that, then you can’t call 
yourself The Independent – you’re doing exactly what The Straits Times and the 
PAP is doing. 
 
For them to gain credibility, they need to move (to the centre), but it is not easy. 
They need to come across as truly independent and pro-Singapore. That doesn’t 
mean that if you are pro-Singapore, you need to be completely against 
everything the government does. They need to be more neutral, and seen to be 
so. This is not a completely nonsensical government – they do get quite a few 
things right. If you do that, you actually put enough pressure on The Straits Times 
to move.  
44:19 HL It’s not that I’m not convinced with that argument, but I’m still doubtful as to 
how, even with those efforts, the current regulatory regimes – in terms of getting 
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funding or the kinds of registration that online media is being put through – do 
you think that would change anywhere in their favour? 
44:44 VS I don’t think so, but that is the path laid down for challengers anywhere in the 
world. Realistically speaking, if it happens, it’s a great bonus, but I’m not waiting 
for that to happen. But for all the reasons I have given above, the government is 
very nervous about this election. They know the ground is not sweet, yet they 
can’t seem to do things in a different way. It’s almost as if it is an impulse, they 
just have to irritate, and the brow beating will continue. 
 
There is this conversation going on internally, and this conversation going on with 
the SPH group, and all that is indication that they know something is not right, 
but they are not sure how to go about doing it right. This is also the perfect 
opportunity for the digital media to come in and sweep the ground. Where they 
are, they are not catching the ground, because a lot of Singaporeans don’t want 
to go extreme left either. If you want to be a lot more acceptable, you need to 
move fast, and this is the window. And if you move fast, you put the pressure on 
the government, who might say we now need to engage these guys because 
they’ve got traffic that is significant – it all boils down to that, right? 
 
Mothership has solid views, you are talking about two million in terms of unique 
readership. They got a lot of help, and will continue to get a lot of help. There is 
no reason why TOC can’t get two million given the current climate – I’m telling 
you they can, but if they remain where they are they are not going to get it. 
Because there are a lot of people in the middle. I have a lot of friends, I tried to 
persuade them, send them articles from The Independent, but they don’t want 
to read it, they say it is all an agenda from the left. They are equally critical of The 
Straits Times, and they don’t want to get sucked in. But the moment you shift 
your posture, they will buy into it, because it is taking longer for The Straits Times 
to move in. Whoever gets here faster has first mover advantage. The window is 
one year – I expect the election to be the end of next year. 
 
If you have two million traffic who are not heretics, but are mainstream, the 
government will want to engage you. Right now, the traffic that goes to 
independent media online are people with a certain bent. The government says 
to hell, you can’t convert them anyway. But if you go out into the middle and 
reach out to people who are moderates, and there is a risk that these people will 
be converted, two things could happen. The government could stiffen its 
legislation to make it harder for you to do what you are doing. Today, I think that 
is damn hard to do, because if they do that they will incur the wrath of a whole 
lot of moderates who have a sense of fairness. I think they will be careful about 
doing it too blatantly. The other alternative is, we have no choice but to engage 
these guys. I don’t think they will engage The Independent because of the Leon 
Perera connection, but TOC is possible. 
 
It all depends on the quality of writing that TOC needs to maintain. The problem 
with TOC is that the quality fluctuates. There are certain times where it is very 
good, and certain times where you don’t know where it is coming from, 
sometimes within the day. A lot of it has to do with who is leading it, what level 
of curation there is. 
49:25 HL So ultimately, it is about the quality of the publication? 
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49:28 VS Yeah. When I say quality, it even boils down to grammar – when a piece is 
written grammatically screwed up and the proof-reading is bad, you know what 
I’m saying. There was a time when all that was taken care of, and I don’t see that 
rigor (now). 
 
So that’s where I’m coming from. I think the window is right, and once you go 
there, you are part of the team that influences and shapes change. You choose to 
be either an outsider forever, pitching it to the same audience and then it 
becomes an incestuous game, or enter a new arena that means you reach out to 
the mainstream. You will have a much better chance of reaching out to the 
people who are disillusioned with The Straits Times, because technically they will 
take a much longer time to get here. They are a much larger organisation, 
they’ve got rules and an established relationship with the government. TOC can 
move a lot faster, and some other smaller groups as well.  
50:43 HL On the Leon Perera case, you don’t necessarily agree with political ownership of 
media? 
50:54 VS No, I’m agnostic about it, but they should remain where they are – that means to 
say, remain a bit on the left – but come clean. If The Independent would say 
openly that they are supported by the Workers’ Party, then take a stand. 





Appendix F – Transcript of interview with Eugene K.B. Tan 
Date: 8 October 2018 
Time: 2pm 
Location: Café in Singapore Management University 
0:04 HL I’ll start by asking you for your general views of media regulation in Singapore. 
You can take it in whichever way you want – specific laws against media, any kind 
of government regulation. I take it that you are quite familiar with constitutional 
law, so how does these laws compare to our constitution? 
0:30 ET I think we all have to go back to the starting premise that the media is not seen 
as the Fourth Estate. That, to me, colours our understanding. Right from the 
onset, the government has consciously sought to develop a difference media 
regime. If you go back to the early 70s, Lee Kuan Yew would talk about the role 
that the media plays in nation building. The whole idea here is a different regime 
where the media is not seen as the Fourth Estate, and so it is not given the same 
set of privileges and protection that you might see in other societies like the US, 
where the media is recognised as the Fourth Estate. The laws that have 
developed over the years have to work on that premise. In the 70s, you have the 
Newspaper and Printing Presses Act. While I’m not very familiar with the finer 
details, it enabled the government, through Temasek-linked companies, to 
control these media companies, particularly SPH. Mediacorp is not listed, but it 
will be interesting for you to look up the ownership structure, it could be wholly 
owned by Temasek. 
 
It is this structure which (makes it such that) the non-institutional or non-GLC 
investor would not be able to influence the direction of the (media) company. 
With this control, they appoint the chairman and members of the board. If you 
look back at all the board chairmen, they’re akin to political appointees – it is 
political in the sense that it is not really a corporate decision. It is more of a 
political choice of who they think can help to run these companies. The 
companies have to remain profitable, or at least break even. That moderates 
their mission to some extent. 
 
And it has become more acute with the onset of social media. Increasingly you 
will see SPH going into other industries – Chinese language enrichment centres, 
nursing homes, and of course property as well. All this, in a way, means that it 
does not matter if the newspaper side doesn’t make money; so long as they have 
these other engines, even if the newspaper sales go down, the company as a 
whole is still doing alright. 
6:30 HL Can I just ask – you were saying that as a company they have to remain 
profitable, and this moderates what they can and cannot do? 
6:40 ET Well, when I say moderate, what I mean is that selling copies may not be as 
important as when, say, SPH is solely a media company. Then they have to make 
sure that the media product sells. Now they have all these other engines. Yes, 
they still want to put up credible products and all. But because they are, I believe, 
listed, to me that takes away some of the pressures. Mediacorp is not listed, but 
imagine if it is only TV and radio, they have to succeed because they have no 
other engines. Yes, they try to organise seminars, but I can’t imagine those really 
making a lot of money. In fact, I suspect if you look at the amount of money 
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coming from IMDA to support their local programming, I think it is a good lot of 
their funds. So it is a unique media model here. 
8:20 HL As in, you don’t see it anywhere else. 
8:22 ET Not that I’m aware of. It is very unique in the sense that you have two 
companies, and of course in the early 2000’s there was this aim of having them 
compete against each other – SPH had some television, Mediacorp had Today. 
But we then come to the harsh reality that Singapore is a very small market. It is 
very hard for two television companies, heavily dependent on government 
funding, to sustain. So now when you look at it, Mediacorp is your sole 
broadcaster. SPH has radio stations, but in terms of TV, it is essentially just 
Mediacorp. For newspapers, it is now just SPH. I was told that there are only nine 
journalists in Today! That doesn’t include the editors, but you can imagine – 
when you go to Today online, they don’t really have that many stories. My own 
sense is that eventually Today will also close down. When they went fully online, 
what sort of advertising do we have? 
10:22 HL Quick side track: Today going online, you don’t think that would keep it going? I 
mean, print could be a liability, if you have to do the printing as well. 
10:33 ET I don’t know the business of newspapers, but I take public transport every 
morning. In the old days when Today still had its print copy, people will get a 
copy and read it on the train. If you are an advertiser, you’re very happy because 
you see people reading it and you are persuaded by the numbers. But with so 
many other distractions now, I’m not sure people do go online. I don’t have the 
figures, but it is very interesting to look at. 
 
So in a way, the who competition experiment didn’t work out. If you go back 
further, the government, in order to protect the Chinese newspapers – I’m not 
sure if Chong Yip Seng covered it in his book – (we had) the merging of Nanyang 
Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh, which formed Lianhe Zaobao. All this was tied to 
keeping mandarin alive, but the whole idea was also for the government to have 
these platforms by which it could not just provide news and information to the 
people, but also as power vehicles to mould public opinion. I mean, this was in 
the 70 and 80s, and with the onset of the internet things have changed. Now the 
concern is whether SPH and Mediacorp can continue to shape public opinion. It 
was a tremendous advantage that they had politically. With the internet, people 
believe that they had other sources of news, information and commentary, 
which I think is true. When you think about your own experience, these were 
alternative sources that people could turn to, which mean that people don’t have 
to rely solely on SPH or Mediacorp products. 
 
It is a very interesting model. The government was certainly not prepared to 
make these loss-making entities. At the minimum, they have to break even. 
That’s why I mentioned that it had a moderating (effect), in the sense that with 
SPH going into all these other businesses, the newspaper business isn’t all that 
important anymore. Even if it is loss making – maybe because their products 
don’t sell well, people find that it is slanted to one side – they have all these 
other engines keeping them afloat. Whereas if you imagine SPH relying solely on 
news, then they are going to be in big trouble.  
14:35 HL I want to then ask, given that you are essentially looking at a situation where SPH 
doesn’t depend on the newspapers to generate its own revenue or to pay for 
itself, how do you think that model has affected the quality of the news? Do you 
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think that has allowed them to be a lot more free, or restricted? I hear different 
views on this. 
15:07 ET I think in the end, whether it is more free or not may have nothing to do with the 
revenue bit, but more to do with the government wanting the newspapers to be 
more faithful to its nation-building role. Arguable, one could say that, for 
example, if SPH is not so dependent on its newspaper revenue, if it not attracting 
as many eyeballs or subscriptions, it may not matter so much, because they have 
other sources of revenue. But I think they are also very careful that SPH doesn’t 
become like a Pravda. They don’t want it to degenerate. Over the years, they 
have always tried to reach out to the readers. If you look at SPH, they are moving 
more into the digital space. That is partly because they are adjusting to the way 
the market has evolved – people are consuming their news on the go, on their 
mobile devices. But certainly, they are putting a lot more resources into the 
digital products. 
 
So if I go back to your question – has it affected their news? I don’t think it has, 
because if anything, they take the view that the mainstream media must 
increasingly shape public opinion, particularly when the average Singaporean has 
a variety of alternative media sources right now and may even dwell in their echo 
chambers. Because of that the (mainstream) media companies face the challenge 
of remaining credible as purveyors of information and opinion so as to ensure 
their commercial viability. When people have a variety of sources, and if they are 
dropping products by these two companies because they don’t find them 
credible, that is also going to affect the companies as well. 
 
When you look at the media scene – and we look at international news, local 
news, non-political news – I think they are okay sources. Just that when you read 
them for political stuff, you’ve got to be mindful of the slant. But you will also 
notice that during the elections, they are also very particular. They also try to, at 
the minimum, give proportionate or even equal airtime and print-space to the 
PAP as well as the opposition. Of course, we haven’t gone into the quality of 
reporting, the slant. But putting that aside, when you open the page, you can’t 
say that they did not report on what the opposition said at their rallies. The 
determination on the part of the government to at least maintain some level of 
credibility means that these products will not degenerate into propaganda 
mouthpieces. The day that they do means that the government has lost the plot. 
20:23 HL So you don’t think – well, I was going to ask you if you think that the likes of SPH 
and Mediacorp are essentially propagandist in the way that they push out the 
news! 
20:39 ET I don’t see them (as such). My view is that all newspapers have a slant. When you 
take into account that slant, I don’t see that ST, for example, is propaganda. I 
kind of know what is the slant that they are taking. A very good example was 
when Rupert Murdoch was questioned by the British Parliament. I forgot why he 
appeared before that Parliament… [details of incident]. But if you look back, none 
of his newspaper reported negatively about the way he testified before that 
Parliamentary committee. Why do you think that in Malaysia, UMNO wants to 
buy share in some newspapers? If you look at America now, every major 
businessman wants to have a newspaper where they can try to mould public 
opinion. I’ll be very hard-pressed to find a completely independent newspaper. 
Any media company worth its salt would try (to be independent), but they do 
have their constraints. If you are the editor, unless the owner gives you a lot of 
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latitude, you would think about whether this would upset the owners enough 
that you would lose your job. 
 
But I think it is a fair question to ask. You ran TOC and I don’t know what kind of 
constraints you were under, but you certainly had stakeholders who would have 
expected you to cover news that the mainstream news would not cover, for 
example. So yes, it is propagandistic in the sense that it often aligns its editorial 
position with the government’s stand, and most of the time, if you ask me, these 
are not problematic. For example, if you support the anti-smoking campaign, I’ve 
got no issues. When they take the view that terrorism is something serious or 
that fake news cannot be taken lightly, by and large I don’t think anyone is 
negatively affected. For political news, they might take a certain position, but I 
also don’t find that they make their position very clear. For instance, on Cooling-
Off Day, they don’t say people should vote for the ruling party. I would say that 
they do try within the constraints to be as impartial as they can. I know that is 
not saying a lot, but they do act within certain constraints. 
26:01 HL I’ll jump to online media, then. Do you think they have a particular slant and if so, 
it is necessarily good or bad for Singapore? 
26:12 ET Starting from the premise that every media publication would have a particular 
slant – especially those that cover politics and current affairs – I think the slants 
cannot be avoided. And I think that they can enrich public discourse. The 
difficulty lies in that, because people now are mainly consuming their news 
online, it becomes easier for echo chambers to form. On the one hand, yes, you 
have a greater diversity of views. But as many studies have shown, people tend 
to gravitate towards the news sources that they find the editorial slant or 
perspective more aligned with theirs. I don’t think you can avoid it. Yes, you do 
have more perspectives, but whether they do nourish public discourse, that is a 
separate question altogether. 
27:47 HL I want to go back to touch a bit about the laws, before we go into the fake news 
thing. Do you see any better examples around the world that you think has a 
preferable way of imposing laws and restrictions on media that is more suitable? 
Or do you think that Singapore is a pretty good model? 
28:23 ET I think every country needs to find its own mean, its own model. In Singapore, as 
we progress in our democratic development, I think we can do with more media 
outlets, whether online or offline. The Singapore model works well in a situation 
where the government is benign and enlightened. Benign in the sense that it 
leaves it to the media professionals to go about their jobs professionally and 
doesn’t make media outlets become propagandistic. Enlightened, in that they 
know that if a media outlet loses credibility, people are not going to consult and 
turn to it. 
 
The danger in Singapore, as with any of our other institutions, is that it depends 
on the government of the day being benign and enlightened. The moment the 
government is not benign and/or enlightened, you can have these tools and 
institutions that could be mobilised to work in the interest of the regime rather 
than the interest of Singaporeans and the country. So it works well in the sense 
that you have these publications that put out news factually. But you can imagine 
if the government is not benign and enlightened. Then many of these institutions 
could be used against public interest. 
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30:56 HL Okay, given the way that our laws and regulations are being structured now, do 
you think we run the risk of that happening should this government decide to, 
say, turn rogue? 
31:14 ET Yes. Because they privilege the status quo, I don’t think it is possible for anyone 
to mount a take-over of SPH, for example, unless a Temasek-link entity becomes 
independent. It works well when the government is benign and enlightened. The 
moment it is not, these media outlets can become completely propagandistic. 
32:02 HL  Okay. Trick question, so feel free to decline answering! Do you think that the 
current government is benign and open-minded enough? 
32:11 ET Generally so, but they would get a bit edgy when it comes to elections, when 
they might have their own view about whether the reporting is balanced. Of 
course, the views on balance might be different. One view is that, if they hold 
ninety percent of the seats, some would argue that ninety percent of the 
coverage should go to them. Others will say that we have the government and 
the opposition, so we should have fifty-fifty. I think most people will take it as 
somewhere in between. Some people will disagree and ask why there is more 
coverage on the PAP. If you think about it, if they contest in all eighty-nine seats 
and another party contests in twenty seats, it is a bit hard to argue that they 
should get the same coverage. 
 
I think by and large, the system is fine. It’s just that it may not work so well 
during general elections. I can’t prove it, but I get the sense that editors try to 
second guess whether the coverage would upset the powers that be.  
34:01 HL Ok. Let’s talk a little bit about fake news and the Select Committee. You were 
part of the whole consultation process. What do you make of it? Which part do 
you think is useful, what is your key takeaway, particularly now with the release 
of the report? 
34:32 ET There is no doubt that the Select Committee, which was PAP dominated, wanted 
to put forth a certain narrative even as it sought to solicit a variety of expert 
views and layman perspective. I know the typical description is that of a blank 
slate – they welcome diverse views, and it is the representors who define the 
narrative. But if you look at the line of questioning that was taken and those 
asked to give evidence, they obviously wanted to put forth a certain narrative. 
That narrative is, of course, clear from the report – disinformation is a real threat 
to our society. 
35:53 HL Do you agree with it? 
35:54 ET In terms of other countries wanting to use disinformation as an instrument of 
warfare, yes. But in my oral evidence, I made the point that we don’t know 
enough about our own ecosystem. Throughout the hearings, there were very few 
examples given about locally-generated falsehood that caused a lot of 
disharmony, tension and misunderstanding. We need to find out what it is that is 
working here that appears to make Singaporeans susceptible. There wasn’t a 
single (piece of) evidence. I mean, yes there was this new immigrant who was 
vilified, but you don’t have to be a new immigrant – individuals get whacked all 
the time when online vigilantes go after them. You can ask Anton Casey and 
some others! But in terms of a piece of fake news that has disrupted society, I 
don’t recall any in Singapore yet. 
37:51 HL There were a couple of people who made private representations? 
37:55 ET Yeah, these were your RSIS folks. But I wonder where they get their information 
from. Their argument was that it is an instrument of warfare, and they didn’t 
want the information out in public because they named the countries involved. 
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But that is already an accepted fact – some countries do take part in cyber 
warfare or psych-ops using fake news. 
 
My view is that the Select Committee was really there to create a consensus that 
something needs to be done. That we all know, but we don’t need specific 
legislation. We need to look at current legislation and see how they can be 
tightened. My concern with a very specific legislation is that it becomes very 
pointed. If we have laws that deals with disharmony related to race, language 
and religion, use the existing laws. Once you have a fake news law, I think it 
immediately loses its utility in some respects, because people will look at it as an 
attempt to manage the narrative or even to suppress inconvenient discourse or 
dissent rather than, say, to deal decisively with an issue that impacts upon racial 
and religious harmony, which might be what the use of the fake news law was 
intended to deal with in the first place. It has this homogenising effect, whether it 
is sedition, race, language and religion, or falsehoods, they all get lumped 
together. Any fake news law would then more likely be seen as an instrument 
that any government of the day can instrumentally use for its own particularistic 
ends. 
 
I’m not saying that what the Committee did was much ado about nothing. But I 
have the concern that, looking at the report now, they may have over-diagnosed 
and over-prescribed. What do I mean by that? By over-diagnosing, they could 
have, deliberately or otherwise, exaggerated a threat that may not be so serious 
where there is a clear and present danger. Disinformation can harm a society, 
but we still have a fairly healthy environment. In any society, we will have people 
who are gullible, but we also have people who will be careful. If you over-
diagnose, you might have large segments of society perhaps believing that 
nothing is to be trusted, and that to me is a bigger problem. 
 
When you have an over-diagnosis, then you are likely to have an over-
prescription. To put it more bluntly, the cure might be worse than the disease. In 
the end, you may take away the ability of the average Singaporean to discern and 
judge where the truth lies. For me, the premise is simple – governments don’t 
defeat disinformation, it is people (who do). If, as a society, we rely on the 
government to tell us what to believe and not to believe, then we are in trouble. 
What it means is that if people don’t believe in the government anymore, when 
they say, let’s suppose, something is black, people will interpret it as white. In the 
end we all might be worse off. 
42:28 HL There is also the other end of the scale, that when the government say 
something is white, everyone believes it is super-white! 
42:33 ET Yeah, but I think it’s less likely these days. It is not that people don’t trust the 
government, but they want to come to their own conclusions. Of course, what 
the government says tend to carry more weight, you can’t deny that, particularly 
when people think it is generally credible. As usual, I would have my own biases – 
if you say that something is politically good, I would think that, of course you will 
say that, you wouldn’t say that it is bad! So as long as you take that slant into 
account and you make your own judgement, it is fine. 
 
The report, as you might notice, doesn’t say anything new – no startling 
revelation, it is very good as comparative study as it tells you about falsehoods 
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around the world. If you try to look for significant falsehoods in Singapore, you 
can’t find. 
44:07 HL It is also a pretty much a reflection of what happened during the hearings. 
44:10 ET Yeah, the timing was, in a way, very good for the government, because it 
coincided with the Cambridge Analytica issue. Imagine if the hearings were to 
take place today, they will still refer to Cambridge Analytica but you will also have 
other news, like how the Russians and Chinese are at it again. I felt the timing 
worked in their favour. 
 
It was a process of public consultation, but it was certainly also a process of 
trying to assert the government’s narrative on the deliberate online falsehoods. 
Now, that is not unusual for any government, particularly if the government is 
persuaded that it is a threat and something needs to be done. But my concern is 
that they might wield a very big stick, and so when you have this very elaborate 
consultation exercise, some might see it as preparing the ground – you know, we 
have all these threats, so you need to give us as big a stick as possible. Again, a 
benign and enlightened government will wield that stick carefully, but it would 
also be the case that a rogue government will use that big stick against its 
opponents. You certainly cannot discount it. 
 
Of course, we don’t know what the legislation is, but it is quite clear that there 
will be some dedicated legislation. They might tighten up some of the other 
legislation, but I do think there will be a specific one to deal with DOFs, as they 
call it. 
 
I suppose your next question would be how that is going to affect the media 
landscape. At the very least, it could have a chilling effect. I don’t think we will 
have it like the German NetzDG law that will have such punitive fines and 
penalties. But we will have responsible publications, whether online or offline, 
that will be even more cautious with what they might not be able to verify. 
Hence, what I mention about the chilling effect. What if you have a statement 
that is part fact and part opinion? You have statements that are factual, or 
statements that are opinion. But what do you do when, particularly, a lot of our 
opinions are based on facts? Sometimes you may not be misrepresenting, just a 
matter of how you interpret the same set of facts, and we might interpret it 
differently. When you have media companies that are concerned about these 
part-fact part-opinion statements, they might err on the side of caution and not 
allow these statements to be published. 
 
We need to look at the legislation, but I work on the premise that, yes, we will 
have a stand-alone legislation that will give the government sufficient firepower, 
which would include things like take-own orders. What would be interesting to 
see would be whether it will give them pre-emptive powers. One of the things 
that came out clearly during the hearings was their concern with fake news that 
has a slow-drip effect. Now, what is meant by a slow-drip effect? To me, when 
you say slow-drip, you don’t what exactly it might be in the end. How do you 
show that this or that piece of news is part of a slow-drip? Maybe I don’t 
understand the issue enough, but certainly the only way to deal with a slow-drip 
is pre-emptive strikes. You’re saying that if we let this continue, that slow-drip is 
going to become a torrent of flood waters. You don’t want the flood to happen, 
so the only way is the deal with it pre-emptively.  
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52:18 HL Do you think that is good, in the sense that it might be a curb on freedom of 
speech? 
52:22 ET It could be. We go back to the earlier issue – a benign and enlightened 
government will use it very judiciously, but a government that is not could use 
this pre-emptive powers to quell legitimate criticism, on the argument that all 
this is a slow-drip effect. If we think about the courts, they might not be in a 
position to make a judgement. These guys – meaning the law enforcement 
agencies – are the experts, our job is just to ensure that the powers are used 
within the scope of the law. But whether this is slow-drip or not, it might well be 
the case whereby the courts say they do not have the ability nor expertise to 
determine this is part of a slow drip campaign. 
53:37 HL  If that is the case, then wouldn’t the courts rule on the side of caution? If they 
cannot prove that this is a slow drip effect, they could very well say, sorry, this is 
a no go, so whatever you want to take down, you can’t. 
53:57 ET Yeah, it is possible. But our courts have generally deferred to the expert opinion 
of the relevant agencies. They can say that they are not experts in psych-ops, for 
example. So long as they discover that the government’s description of these 
psych-ops, this slow-drip, being plausible and credible, their next job would be to 
see that the power exercised is within what the laws has provided for, that they 
don’t exceed those powers. If someone challenges that the government should 
give three casino licences, the courts will say that they are not the expert on 
whether Singapore should have one, two or three casinos. We leave that to the 
authorities, and if the law says that they have the power to issue casino licenses, 
so long as they don’t exceed that power, however many they want to issue, it 
would be within the purview of the executive and not the judiciary. 
 
With regard to your study, we don’t know how the legislation will take, but any 
legislation will certainly have an impact on the media governance regime. It will 
affect the non-SPH and non-Mediacorp entities more. It will apply to both, they 
can’t discriminate. But online media will be affected more because they don’t 
have the resources to do the fact-checking. I’m not saying fact-checking is bad, 
but if you talk about relative ability to fact-check, you can say that the 
mainstream media would have the deeper pockets and resources. 
56:52 HL Okay. On that note, I’m going to ask you about your views on the media industry 
in Singapore. Where do you think they are heading? Feel free to talk about what 
you think the quality of reporting is, and whether that affect democracy in 
Singapore. Fairly broad question. 
57:21 ET I think if you look at mainstream media, they are generally well-resourced. They 
don’t have money falling out of the sky, but SPH has other revenue streams and 
Mediacorp gets a sizeable sum from IMDA, because they are the national 
broadcaster. You just have to look at a typical day’s programmes, especially local 
productions, you will see that a lot of them come with the IMDA 
acknowledgement at the end. Whereas if you talk about online media, they are 
not as well resourced. We then come up against the usual constraint of the 
Singapore market – it is just too small. Generally, people say that Mothership is 
doing well. It looks like it, but the next question is, how many Motherships do 
you think the Singapore market can support? This is a problem that we face in 
the economic world. If Facebook wants to pull out of Singapore, they wouldn’t be 
too bothered. It will be nice if they were in, but the market here is so small. Why 
is it that we pay so much to watch EPL? It is partly due to the way the two 
competitors drive the price up, but it is also partly because the market is small. 
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59:43 HL  Well, the interesting thing about the small market idea is that – and someone 
mentioned this to me before – if you take a look at New Zealand, the population 
is not that much bigger than ours, but yet they have a lot more newspapers 
compared to us. Wouldn’t that be possible here? 
1:00:03 ET I think it is possible. Again, I don’t know the New Zealand model, but I suspect it 
has to do with the laws that kick in if you want to set up a newspaper here. It’s 
not that you can’t but in terms of satisfying the requirements before we are 
given that license to publish, I suspect that in Singapore the barriers to entry are 
higher. Not just financially, but also legislatively. You also have to deal with a very 
dominant player. If you want to set up another broadcaster or TV station, I don’t 
think there is any law that stops you. But so long as you don’t have government 
support, you don’t have access to public funding, and I think that puts you at a 
disadvantage. 
 
The barriers of entry are high. How do you fight against the dominant player? It 
comes back to the small market again. I know you have a valid point with New 
Zealand, and perhaps one can also look at Norway and Finland – they have 
similar population size as us, but they have more than one newspaper company. 
 
The other factor is that maybe we don’t have a newspaper reading culture. 
Maybe it is the way our society is structured right from the start. We like to say 
that we are all very pragmatic. When I was an undergraduate in England, on the 
weekend you will buy a stack of the Observer, the Telegraph, the Times, and just 
sit down at a park and read. Here, people don’t even want to spend a dollar on a 
newspaper. We can spend a thousand dollars on a new iPhone! Again, it is very 
hard to prove, but we have developed a very free-riding culture. And it doesn’t 
help that you have Today and MyPaper, which are given out free, so why do we 
need to go and buy these things? That may do us in, where we know the price of 
everything, but not the value. 
1:04:50 HL If that is the case, is there still any hope for online media? 
1:04:57 ET I don’t know the market well enough. We like salacious news – crime, wrong 
deeds – that partly explains why WanBao and ShinMin have been doing okay. 
The question then is whether you will have a new generation of readers who 
read your evening dailies. But we don’t have that culture of reading newspapers, 
of seeking diverse perspectives. That makes it very hard for newcomers. If you 
look at the online media scene, those that seek to cover political and current 
affairs, very few of them have thrived. TOC is struggling – how strong can you be 
if you are effectively a one-man show? You are everything into one: fact-
checking, news-gathering, editing, putting it up online. On an average day, how 
many pieces can you put up? Like it or not, our attention span is very short, and if 
you are not able to bring in traffic to your site, after a while people just forget 
about you. 
 
I mean, it is easy to blame the media governance regime. I think they do have a 
part to play, but the larger challenge is that the environment is probably not 
conducive. We never had this culture of seeking different perspective and views. 
It is useful to examine the creation of our media environment after 
independence. You might have heard of this concept called “path dependence” – 
what was created at the start has to a very large shaped the way the media 
environment is, and continues to shape it. People have come to accept that, so 
long as Mediacorp and SPH don’t turn rogue such that they lose credibility, 
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people will generally be quite happy with them. This is partly because they have 
no alternative, because no one is willing to come into the market, for whatever 
reasons. Do we have business people who feel that they should run a 
newspaper? Maybe they feel that there is no need to, or they are closely aligned 
with the government, they have channels to the government such they don’t 
need to worry about having a mouthpiece to promote their view about how the 
economy should be structured. 
 
It is actually a very complex problem when you think about it, but I would say 
that the path dependence from that very early model when it was first created in 
the 70s, and then subsequently shaped such that it reinforces the dominance of 
the two groups, makes it a tremendous challenge for other players to come in. So 
even if you say Mothership is doing well, I suppose that means making a decent 
profit each month, but I would be surprised if their profits are so significant that 
they can grow. Mothership’s model is also unique. They realised that you cannot 
just report on politics and do societal commentary only. They also have humour 
and advertorials. Sometimes I see government agencies working with them to 
develop stories. If you look at all the ad agencies, the government is probably 
one of the biggest spenders on PR and advertising. 
1:12:07 HL Ok. I actually have no more questions. Are there any other points that you wish 
to add? 
1:12:14 ET I actually like the fact that you are working on this. The challenge always is that 
no study has looked at the original conception of media governance in Singapore. 
People always throw out references – Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, very 
draconian and all. But I think when you look at how this law and the formation of 
SPH and that one broadcaster, how the political construct of the role the media 
should play, has actually shaped the whole media landscape. Which is why I 
believe something should be said about path dependence. I don’t know whether 
that is your interest, but what it means is that people become very socialised in 
how they look at the media landscape in Singapore. Over the years, whether you 
agree or disagree with the methodology of the service, I think generally if you 
want factual accuracy, people still go to SPH and Mediacorp. In terms of opinion, 
you may take what you read with a pinch of salt.  
 
For instance, if you look at the current debate on 377A, SPH is very careful – last 
Sunday, one view by VK Rajah on why 377 should be abolished, and then 
yesterday, one by Thio Li-Ann for why it should be retained. They are very careful 
to run that without being accused of being partisan, playing the balancing game. 
It is not that they know who is going to write in, but if someone sends in an 
opposing view and it meets the publishing criteria, they will almost invariably 
publish it. 
 
What I’m trying to say is that we have this environment where people have been 
socialised into accepting that it works. Until people are persuaded that it is 
broken, people will continue to be accepting of what we have. They might not be 
completely happy, but again it is not something that they will agitate. By and 
large, it serves their purpose. If you ask my parents, they don’t really read the 
opinions page. All they are interested in is knowing what is happening in 
Singapore and around the world. By and large, people feel that the system works 
pretty fine. Of course, with online media, they know that they can go there for a 
different perspective. So in a way they have the best of both worlds – they have a 
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model that they have grown up and are familiar with; but if they want a different 
view on a contested issue, then know that there are other sources they can go to. 
 
But I think what Singaporeans might not appreciate is that if you want quality 
media outlets, you have to invest and pay for them. I can’t prove the free-riding 
culture, but I suspect that is why very few sites have survived. If you say this site 
should try to survive on advertising, I would say that the market is very small. 
Advertisers will know – if I advertise on TOC, they will know what sort of 
audience they will reach out to and decide that’s not really for them. So you have 
a chicken-and-egg situation. I do not know whether you can use George Yeo’s 
analogy – Mediacorp and PH are like your banyan tree, so big that it blocks out 
the light and you don’t really have anything growing beneath its shadow. 
 
But I attribute it all back to path dependence. One way is to look at the 
architecture of the whole media environment. What has made it fairly resilient 
after 50 years? What has enabled this metaphorical structure to remain fairly 
robust? They may have added scaffoldings and reinforcements over the years, 
but by and large the architecture has remained relatively unchanged. It has, of 
course, evolved and adapted to market realities. But the idea of two dominant 
players providing some degree of competition; that the media does not see itself 
as the fourth estate but having instead a nation-building agenda; the need to 
ensure these two entities are not only credible and reliable by the public but also 
seen to be so. That they may be more inclined towards the government in their 
editorial slant is less of a concern, where people don’t regard them as rubber-
stamping mouthpieces or completely propagandistic. Of course, you might have 
interviewees who say that it is propagandistic, but if you take an objective lens, 
there are some things that are and some that are not, and they are not what you 
might say of Pravda where it is just strictly government lines. 





Appendix G – Transcript of interview with Kevin Tan 
Date: 2 August 2018 
Time: 9:30am 
Location: Kevin’s office, NUS (Bukit Timah campus) 
0:40 HL I’ll just start with a very broad question of, what are your perceptions of media 
regulations in Singapore? 
0:45 KT Very tight, of course. I mean, let’s contextualise that answer. I think as far as 
traditional sources of media is concerned – and I would include within traditional 
sources anything that has nothing to do with the web – be it newspapers, film, 
television, the regulation has generally been very tight. This is nothing 
unexpected, given the nature of media and access to the media. In political 
science 101, you’d know that whenever there is a military coup the very first 
thing they take over is the broadcasting station, because that’s the way you tell 
people that there is a change of regime. So quite clearly the controls of 
traditional media have always been very strong. This is particularly the case when 
you look at media which is fairly expensive to put out there. For example, TV and 
radio in a way is strong, and it doesn’t need to be as strong because you’ve a 
monopoly on access – there is only the state television studio! And it is also not 
easy in a captive market to start a new radio station. I mean, they did try from 
time to time but it was not successful. 
 
Newspapers came in much later. It was only in the 70’s where they really began 
to clamp down on newspapers. I think Lee Kuan Yew wanted to clamp down on 
media much earlier, which was why he hounded The Straits Times out of 
Singapore. So Leslie Hoffman took The Straits Times and left for KL, because he 
know that when the PAP came to power, LKY is going to fix him. So that’s how we 
have the New Straits Times in KL. 
 
So slowly, bit by bit, through the process of corporate consolidation as well as 
through a process of legislation, especially the 1975 Newspaper and Printing 
Presses Act amendments, made the traditional media extremely tightly 
controlled. In addition to that, you have this every-decade Censorship Review 
Committee, the CRC, making recommendations with respect to certain types of 
public access media. The CRC has always been concerned with free-to-air 
content. It’s actually quite a progressive committee in some stages – there was 
one time they recommended “R” rating, and then had to reverse decision and 
come down with a “RA” rating… 
4:06 HL Oh ok, that one, yes I remember! 
4:10 KT Yeah, and then they would suddenly bring in all these Amy Yip movies, and all the 
aunties were getting very fed up because all their husbands were watching these 
shows in the neighbourhood! And they were saying, look, we can understanding 
this opening (up), you can have this smut, but have it in town! 
 
So it’s fairly interesting, you find that when they constitute these committees, 
you actually don’t know how progressive or not they tend to be. There is an 
assumption that they are government appointees, therefore it is fixed. I mean, I 
sat on a couple of these committees before and actually it is fairly independent, 
quite hands off. There usually would be some government guy there giving the 
government position, but you can’t control what the others say. So in a way, the 
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government does run a risk sometimes. You never quite know what these 
committees come up with. 
 
So that’s a long way of answering your question on how tightly controlled it is. I 
think with traditional media, it is very very tight. With non-traditional media, I 
think it is only realistically tight, in the sense that they will control whatever they 
can control. If they cannot control it, they will try not to control it, they will try to 
do something else. With the internet, the regulators realised fairly early that it 
was an impossibility to regulate the internet, or to regulate it without 
tremendous cost – in terms of manpower and resources you put into the process, 
but also in terms of the economic costs that you might suffer. There was, for 
example the very famous case whereby they did not allow cable television. Cable 
television was banned in Singapore, and later on they allowed it to be installed in 
office buildings and certain places. Because the Hong Kong stock brokers got 
news of a crash instantaneously, whereas in Singapore we got the news four 
minutes late, and in that few minutes we lost multiple millions. I can’t remember 
the exact figures but if you check it up, that was when they allowed (cable TV). So 
you can see here that the regulators are very realistic. They know what they can 
do and what they can’t do, in other words the physical impossibility. At the same 
time, they also realise there is always a corresponding cost, because you restrict 
channels, you don’t restrict types of information. Once you restrict channels, 
good information gets blocked out just as well as bad information, and this is 
where the problem lies. 
7:27 HL I’d just like to go back quickly to the point where you talk about censorship. You 
said that the government runs a risk of things getting out of hand. Why do you 
think they are willing to take this risk? 
7:40 KT Not things getting out of hand. What I meant was, when you appoint people to 
the committee, they might look like fairly conservative people, but you never 
know what they might recommend. 
 
Why would they take this risk? Well, I think at the end of the day, the Singapore 
government uses these kinds of committee for all sorts of things, not just for 
censorship. I think that is their way of gaining some form of legitimacy for the 
policy that is being articulated. But at the same time, it is also a very weird form 
of elitist democratic display. It looks like it is democratic because it is not all 
“zheng hu”, right? But they tend to pick people who you think belong to or are 
part of the establishment, or at least are not anti-establishment. They might not 
be pro, but you’re not going to see a Chee Soon Juan on one of these! 
8:55 HL No, they would not… I get the part about regulating traditional media and why 
they tend to be a little bit more relaxed (with non-traditional media), so it is 
really more for practical reasons… 
9:06 KT I think so. It is really practical. So you have your mandatory one hundred 
websites, and that’s just to make a political statement, a moral statement, that 
we do not condone these kind of actions. This is the state speaking from a moral 
high ground, but they know that they can’t control this. Anyone can get in and 
get all kinds of stuff online. The way they go about it is really the harm principle… 
9:50  [Technical issues with recorder] 
10:25 HL I also want to ask, have you also taken a look at some of the other models used in 
other countries and compared them to Singapore? 
10:35 KT I must say, I have not taken a look, and for very simple reasons – every country is 
different. The first question you ask yourself is, what is a good model for 
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Singapore, rather than what other people have done. You then decide if you 
want to go one way or the other way. I’m a realist, we work with the realities on 
the ground. If this is what the law is, well, you’re not going to change it, so what?  
11:18 HL You can change the laws! 
11:20 KT It’s very difficult! I mean, there are certain things that are immovables. So 
newspaper licensing is an immovable. For certain things like the internet, we are 
freer than most countries already. I mean, you’ve been to Australia, you know 
how much Australians spend on proxy servers. I just came back from Indonesia 
and they spend a lot of money blocking websites that they think, whether it’s 
fundamentalist, pornographic, gratuitous violence, they spend a lot of money 
doing this. Or you end up being like China, where you blanket everything and it 
gets jammed, like Facebook. You could do that, but Singapore knows that we 
can’t cherry-pick the channels we want, because good things and bad things 
come through the same channel. 
 
In terms of the internet, our regulation is already very low. The way you regulate 
is where your assets are. If you have a website in Singapore, I can shut it down. If 
you post something on a server outside Singapore, then things become very 
difficult. You have someone like Gopalan Nair who keeps writing on his blog, 
Singapore Dissident, and what can you do? Nothing! 
13:00 HL Because it is hosted overseas. 
13:02 KT And the regulators know well enough that if you try to block a blog like his, then 
people will just use VPN. You’d just make it more popular. It’s like a banned book, 
it must be something you don’t want us to know! That’s the logic. 
 
So it you want to look at models, then it must be to specific areas. I think there 
are models that the regulators have looked at in terms of things like film 
censorship and regulation and the classification system, and you come up with 
your own classification system. That’s worth looking at, but you know, there are 
things that are very different. Simple things like age of majority – ours is 21, 
Malaysia’s is 18. Once you pitch that as your benchmark, a lot of things can and 
cannot happen at that age. Is Singapore going to change the age of majority? No, 
not in the foreseeable future, I don’t see how that is going to happen.  
14:35 HL But that’s the interesting thing. Some would say that if a guy serves NS at 18, 
even 16 years old, and if they are old enough to give them a gun… 
14:47 KT You ask them to die for the country, then why can’t you vote, right? Sure, you 
can make that same kind of argument, that if I allow you to drive, then you are a 
danger on the road, then why can’t you vote, right? 
 
You can make that kind of argument, but I think it is neither here nor there. 
There is attribution of responsibilities, so it is not just rights. There is 
responsibility and culpability, so as an adult you will be treated as an adult, 
whether you sign a contract or whatever, and that must be the position. I don’t 
think it is an entirely bad thing. I mean if you look at the law of contract, I think if 
I ask you at 18 years old to be signing a contract and to be fully responsible for 
everything, and the same at the age of 21, I think it would be a little bit different. 
I think you would take it a little more seriously, so that’s why all these scholarship 
guys have guarantors. They sign a bond, but that is only an agreement and 
enforceability becomes quite a difficult thing. 
16:16 HL I’d just like to go back to the bit on how they enforce what is available on the 
internet and how you cannot target specific media, and that goes into my next 
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question of the fake news thing. Do you see that changing with what they are 
trying to do with any fake news laws? 
16:39 KT I don’t think you can really control fake news. If you do it in a draconian way, in 
the way that they seem to want to do it, then what is going to happen is that you 
will simply go against your policy of allowing certain things to go in. I mean, how 
does fake news go around? People forward it, it appears on somebody’s 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram. What do you do, you kill Facebook? That’s not 
logical. If you target specific channels, you throw out the good with the bad, and 
there is a lot that comes through it, and the state acknowledges it as well. 
 
So I can’t target channels, so how do I target fake news? I make it incumbent on 
the person receiving and transmitting the news to go and verify, but it is 
ridiculous! How am I supposed to verify? Someone sends me something: new 
discovery, eating ten mangoes a day will keep cancer away. Can I know? You 
want me to verify, but how? Eat ten mangoes a day but I don’t have cancer, so it 
is counterfactual, right? How am I supposed to verify anything? 
 
And I’m talking about a very simple example, I’m not even talking about major 
political events, or information that is fairly sensitive about security, the health of 
the President, things like that – how do you verify? Without saying, what you 
received, don’t forward it along, but that is precisely how you use Facebook – 
you want to share what your heard or noticed and thought was interesting. 
19:34 HL So you don’t think that they will go down that path, or they might? 
19:37 KT They might! I mean, they have already done it with the Films Act. 
19:43 HL Oh ok, because if you’re sharing it, is it? 
19:46 KT Yes. I mean, it is ridiculous what they have done with the Films Act, because if it 
is an unclassified film, and you possess it… 
19:58 HL You can’t even possess it right? That’s the latest changes a couple years ago? 
20:02 KT No, that was just last year. This was the one that I wrote this critique about, and 
how ridiculous it is. I got Peng Hwa, and we wrote this thing to the committee, 
and then we posted it online as well. It is so ridiculous. So if you can go that way 
with the Films Act, which is traditional media, what more… 
20:31 HL That was also the one that allowed IMDA to enter premises to confiscate stuff… 
20:40 KT And detain people and seize anything they see. It is ridiculous, right? 
20:46 HL But going that route, like you say, goes against current policy. 
20:56 KT Yes it would. So how else can you regulate fake news? To me, this whole story of 
fake news is like any other news – can you regulate news, fake or otherwise?  
21:06 HL Then if you don’t mind me asking, why do you think they have this whole thing 
with the Select Committee in trying to identify all this? 
21:16 KT Your guess is as good as mine! But if you think about it, the only thing that a state 
can control is anything that happens within its territory. So, if I want to go after 
somebody for fake news, it must be somebody who has no other channels but to 
do things locally. In other words, I cannot host my thing outside of Singapore, 
because there are implications. Who do you think these people are? Opposition 
political parties. Regulation is territorial – what’s in my territory, I can regulate. 
What happens outside of Singapore, who are you to regulate? You can’t. Unless 
you want to regulate the effect here, but what’s the point? You can jam the 
airways, or you go after the person who has assets in Singapore. I mean, you get 





But you understand what I mean. What I do with laws is that I can only regulate 
what is within my territory. So if you ask me who can this be targeted at, I must 
ask the counter question: who are the people I can regulate? You know most of 
the others, you can’t. You can regulate CNN, Yahoo, Google, but you have to be 
in the territory. I mean’ if I’m the Workers’ Party, I have to put my site in 
Singapore, then you will say, ahh, you are receiving CIA funding an all that! 
23:35 HL Although technically, there is nothing you can do to stop them hosting it 
overseas, the only thing is that they are physically located here…  
23:40 KT Located here, you have assets here, so I go after you here! So I’m guessing, doing 
a process of elimination of those who have no choice. So broadcasters, you want 
to set up a new station, like a BBC, they probably don’t want to touch those guys, 
but why do you want to touch the BBC – they probably broadcast more accurate 
news than most other people. So what if you have a political agenda? Say CNN 
might be anti-Trump, for example, that’s fine for American politics. But the 
moment you start saying anti-PAP (things), and you start spreading fake news, 
they probably will jam you because you’re here and you have assets here. 
24:29 HL Which also ties in to what you are currently talking about, people with a political 
agenda, foreign influence using local proxies in that sense… 
24:41 KT That has always been the case, like with the Singapore Herald and so on, going 
back to the 1970. But who else can you regulate? Not your man on the street, 
right? You try that and your political cost will be very high. So that’s probably not 
how you want to go. 
25:05 HL And that is also fundamentally near impossible to do – well, you can but… 
25:12 KT Well you can, but the fall out will be tremendous. So, just by process of 
elimination, I suppose those would be the people you target. 
25:23 HL Just one last quick question on fake news: what do you think should be the best 
solution? 
25:29 KT Fake news is always a problem. But it is not possible to jam it. The only way is to 
establish credible avenues of news. Credible avenues for news must, I think, be 
sufficiently hybridised and relegated such that it is not Pravda… [brief explanation 
of the Soviet news agency] 
26:46 HL So by that, I guess you mean we should have different kinds of sources of… 
26:51 KT In other words, look, people don’t read The Straits Times as much today as in the 
past, because I have alternative credible sources of news. For instance, I don’t 
just read The Straits Times, I also want to know what South China Morning Post is 
saying, I also want to know what the BBC is saying, what the Economist is saying. 
The more accommodating the media is, the more credible it will be, because it 
will not just sound like the government line. The facts will still be there, the 
opinions will differ because there is always more than one way of looking at an 
issue. And that is the only way to combat fake news. Here we have facts, A says 
this, B says this, D says this, and well I make up my mind. But I will keep going 
back here, because that would be deemed to be a source of fair news, rather 
than believe the next bad thing. Because someone sends it to me and you know 
you are not getting the story from a credible source. I think that is the only way 
you can do it. There is no other way. Because to regulate fake news is to regulate 
all news.  
28:32 HL Well, they are very specific about deliberate online falsehoods – I mean, what are 
your views on that? 
28:39 KT Yeah, but I mean, what does that mean? 
28:41 HL So it is still a problem with definition! 
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28:43 KT Of course, of course! It’s a problem. Deliberate – ok, you need proof. Now that 
sets the bar very high. So who are you going to catch? The deliberation comes in 
the act of forwarding a piece of news, or the act of creating that fake news? I 
mean, I don’t think they are making a distinction. 
29:13 HL On that point, I’ve been hearing varying understandings of what it means by 
intent. I’m just wondering if it is possible for the law to catch it, in your view. 
29:29 KT Well yes, because intention is always circumstantial – unless you catch a guy who 
was saying, ok tomorrow I’m going to put this fake news out – short of that, it is 
always circumstantial. But there is a burden of proof. If it is a criminal 
prosecution, I must show beyond a reasonable doubt that you did intend. So the 
test is always beyond reasonable doubt that there was manifest intent. If I have 
doubt about intent – the guy could be thinking about it but not really thinking 
about it, or he is not really serious about it, then I think it becomes very hard to 
say it is beyond reasonable doubt, there is some doubt about his intent. 
30:14 HL  I didn’t get to watch Press Gang…  
30:18 KT I didn’t, Tarn How’s thing! Yesterday I was just talking to two guys and they said… 
[brief discussion about the play] 
30:31 HL But I was reading some reviews, and I get the sense that, even for journalists – 
should they go with the story, should they not go with it, how credible a news 
source…  
30:42 KT I think it has become so awful these days, that the so-called journalists are no 
more than collectors of quotes. That’s all they do these days! Nobody has a view 
of his story. I get so fed up, because I get called up all the time, and they want to 
quote you on the most mundane things. Until such a point that I say, no! 
31:17 HL Well, they are looking for an expert opinion. 
31:20 KT Well no, but you bring an expert opinion after you got a basic story, right? And 
the narrative itself, nobody wants to reveal how it is written because that 
suggests that you have an opinion.  
31:38 HL It’s a fundamental issue with the news gathering process, right from the 
beginning – they are looking for quotes sometimes, to justify a certain point of 
view. 
31:48 KT Well, you can do an analysis in The Straits Times, it’s particularly bad. Actually, 
The New Paper is better, they seem to have more leeway, but maybe because 
people don’t take it very seriously, they can afford to push a little bit more. 
32:09 HL On that note, I’ll go to the next question – public perception of media in 
Singapore. Your own views on it first? 
32:19 KT Well, I hardly speak for the public… They are highly sceptical of what they read in 
the newspapers. You read it just to know what is going on. We have become… 
you can say sophisticated in the way we access news. Here, maybe I speak for 
people who have some higher level of education, you know, intelligentsia. Now I 
don’t know what other people read. For example, I never touch The New Paper 
because it’s all Premier League and I don’t bother about that. I have my daily 
subscription to The Straits Times, and I want to read it for official spin, for sure – 
it will be very reliable! I also want to know about things that are happening 
around Singapore which has no basis for sensationalising. You know, there was a 
story of a hundred-year-old tree that fell on the road, that kind of stuff. It’s still 
news and something I would like to know, but it is not engaging me in any kind of 
opinion making. And after that, ok, this looks interesting – now, the government 
has just announced some policy, and I would then go online and see if anyone is 
writing on The Online Citizen, putting up anything salacious on Sammy Boy – 
(have a) look around, see what people are saying. You can rely on some sites for 
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conspiracy theories all the time, if it attracts that kind of people. So you then 
think you have a slightly more balanced view of what is going on. 
35:21 HL  I get it that you don’t think the bulk of the people share such an approach? 
35:26 KT People I know don’t care – in other words, they will never read The Straits Times, 
some people cancel their subscription, and they would go online to read it, but I 
don’t know what type of news they are reading. Look, I do want to know how 
well Joseph Schooling is doing in the sports pages as well as what the latest policy 
on a particular thing is. So I would still read the local daily because there is 
nothing controversial, he won or lost a race… For that I would still have my 
newspaper, because I don’t have time to go and search for all this kind of news 
online. There isn’t an alternative Singapore newspaper that could have that 
coverage, it’s too expensive. 
 
So I can say I go to The Online Citizen for news, but only what (does it offer)? 
There is a certain amount of things that I do want to know, but they don’t have it. 
So (The Straits Times) remains my baseline newspaper, because I still want to 
know some of the stuff that is going on – some corporate merger takeover story 
that appears in the newspaper… So it is a good curated set of materials. I 
continue my subscription for very simple reasons – more than fifty percent is still 
useful to me, because of what I want to know. Some people don’t care about 
stocks or sports, they only care about political news, then maybe they go online, 
maybe they will get better coverage there. 
37:32 HL So I get the sense that it is not really about expecting a newspaper to cover 
everything, but about us having that kind of judgement to go to different 
sources? 
37:47 KT Yeah, and I think increasingly, from what I know, people are very sophisticated 
about these things. I have two grown-up daughters, they don’t read The Straits 
Times, but they get their feeds from Channel NewsAsia, which I suppose is still an 
official source of some sorts. And then they read around. And they are interested 
in different things from me – what some pop stars were, and once in a while 
some sensational local news. So to them, not having The Straits Times in no big 
deal.  
38:34 HL Do they see a fundamental difference in the different platforms they are using? 
Like between The Straits Times and The Online Citizen, do they see one as being 
more reliable? 
38:47 KT I think they do. So, every now and then they forward me interesting stories from, 
say, the Guardian, which is probably the most reliable British newspaper in my 
mind. So (I ask), “You read the Guardian newspaper?” and they say, “we get the 
feed from them, this one looks interesting, so you might be interested”, so they 
send it over to me. They kind of know trash news, and then they go into this 
gossip news of K-Pop – apparently very vibrant… 
39:39 HL So they know the credible sources for K-Pop! 
39:41 KT They know – don’t trust this one, (there are) always fake stories… [more 
elaboration on discerning credibility of sources] 
 
So yes, I think they have developed an almost innate (sense), because they grew 
up in this internet word, whereas we grew up with print. 
40:12 HL Ok, I’ll just move quickly to the last question I have, which is about the evolution 
of the media industry in Singapore. Where do you think it is heading, is it heading 
in the right direction, are we doing something right or something wrong… 
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40:29 KT Whose perspective are we looking at this, right? From the perspective of the 
consumer, frankly the consumer doesn’t care, because I have alternative sources. 
And it is shifting – by the time all consumers are made up of people like my 
daughters’ generation, in their twenties, newspapers would probably have all 
gone bust or have become very select, a status symbol maybe. I mean, you find a 
copy of the Financial Times under your armpit, you must be one of the trader 
types! Seriously, you walk around the banking district and everybody has a copy 
of the Financial Times. 
 
And there is a newspaper culture in certain places. You go to Vienna, the ultimate 
experience is to have a coffee in a Viennese coffee house, and a real Viennese 
coffee house – well the coffee must be good, but the more important thing is the 
variety of newspapers available… [elaboration on coffee house options and 
setups] 
43:13 HL And you think we don’t have that here? Well I mean, not the coffee culture, but 
to basically read media and have discussions about it? 
43:25 KT Here? No. I don’t think we have the culture and I think we are all too pressed for 
time. In the morning you see more people do take-away than sit around. 
43:38 HL But meanwhile they are still browsing their phones and getting their news… 
43:41 KT Exactly. I think there may be some of that going on… But coming back to your 
question (of where our media is headed), I think it has to be a state-based 
question – in other words, is this good for Singapore? I would think of it 
holistically, as opposed to whether it is good for a newspaper company – I really 
don’t care, frankly, so long as I can get my news. 
44:14 HL Sorry, “is it good for Singapore” in the sense that we are not looking at news, or… 
44:18 KT No, I am a strong believer that you have to have your home-grown sources of 
media. Look, even the BBC, which has always been the gold standard of news 
reporting around the world, you learn so much just listening to the BBC World 
Service. Even the World Service has suffered a lot of cuts since the 1980’s. A 
number of services are gone – they still maintain a very high standard, and that is 
a great service. But even the BBC World Service, even the Singapore division, 
cannot possibly cover all Singapore news. And if this is going to thrive as a 
society, you need local news and stories. It cannot just be syndicated news, 
because it will then be like walking down Orchard Road, which is you see the 
same kind of stalls from around the world. There is nothing interesting.  
45:30 HL Two things on that point. The Straits Times is talking about having a regional 
focus. They are in a way syndicating content overseas? 
45:40 KT I don’t know how they are going to do it, because a lot of the content is so poor, 
why would I buy it? They are not getting good people, or if there are good people 
they are not allowed to flourish. I think the quality of newspaper is quite bad 
nowadays. 
 
But I think I know what The Straits Times is getting into: property. [elaboration on 
various real estate projects] 
46:28 HL But it is a way to, I guess, finance the paper using other sources of revenue? 
46:33 KT Why would they want to finance the newspaper? The newspaper makes money 
alone on its revenues. 
46:43 HL Well, it’s declining, though. 
46:44 KT It’s declining, but that just means profits are declining, that doesn’t mean you are 
not profitable. So there is no reason for cross-subsidising. In other words, at 
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some point as a group The Straits Times might say, well forget it, we’re not 
publishing newspapers anymore, it’s not profitable. That may not be a bad thing! 
47:04 HL Well, that may be a separate discussion on whether they should do it or not! 
47:08 KT Well, they are so profit driven that they are so worried about shareholders, that’s 
the logical thing to do. 
47:14 HL But there is also a political reason for keeping it? 
47:16 KT So will the government allow The Straits Times to shut itself down? Because you 
still have the management shares holding it there. But then you’ve got to have a 
different model, you cannot make money.  
47:34 HL Which need not be wrong. It could be a public service paper. 
47:40 KT In which case, then it will be a different story. Then it will be like reading Pravda! 
Then I know what it is all about! 
47:48 HL Well, not always. If you look at BBC, it is not really… 
47:51 KT Yeah, but you see, who else can do what the BBC does? And they have a whole 
line of very independent director generals, so on and so forth. And now, people 
around the world believe that they deserve the BBC World Service. So Britain has 
to find a way to keep it afloat, even though its economically unviable. 
 
You then have to calculate it in non-tangible terms. Britain may be in decline, we 
may be inconsequential, and may be even less consequential when we exit the 
Euro, but we are still the BBC! 
48:49 HL Local sources of news – do you see the viability of sites like TOC, TISG, 
Mothership? (They are) the three highest-grossing readership for the online 
world. Is it viable for them, or what do they need to do to keep afloat? 
49:29 KT I think if you run it well – Mothership is turning a profit already. I don’t know 
about The Independent – I knew a few people putting money into it, but whether 
they are getting a return on it, I don’t know. TOC actually started really really 
well, but I think they made a few errors. 
 
The trouble with a market like this is that it can flip just like that, especially with 
online media. I mean, The Straits Times, people can say they will cancel their 
subscription, but it is not that easy. I may not read it for political insight, I 
certainly don’t expect any, maybe just for the heck of reading what the 
government has to say, but I do want to read the other pages that are interesting 
to me, where a sale is happening. I’ve got no time to go online to search for this 
kind of stuff, or clog up my phone with membership from every other store. So it 
is an omnibus kind of media that serves a particular purpose. And because you 
are able to appeal to these various segments of audiences and interests, it is 
viable. I mean, if you start a dedicated music magazine online, and you are really 
good in what you do, the go-to site for anything regarding Led Zeppelin, you will 
be able to garner readership and you will eventually be able to attract revenue. 
 
Coming back to news media, all these sites thrive because people are looking for 
alternative political news, not other kinds of news. I will not go the Mothership to 
find out things about sports. [discussion on different types of news coverage] 
52:38 HL So your thinking is that, for these online channels to survive, the idea is to 
specialise or to diversify?  
52:46 KT I think they need to diversify. You see, what you want to be, in terms of both 
readership and therefore corporate advertising, you need to create enough 
niches for people to rely on you as the omnibus Singapore website. The way I 
would do it is to link up with other local websites to partner up, so you don’t 
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have to do everything yourself. You go find a guy who is big on the pop scene in 
Singapore and you do a link up – that might work.  
53:35 HL Well, to jump back to laws and regulation, do you think there is a hindrance 
there, because in terms of funding, we heard what happened recently with New 
Naratif, they were slammed for taking foreign funding. Do you see this kind of 
diversifying – not just content, but sources of funding – meeting with regulatory 
problems? 
53:57 KT If you don’t operate out of Singapore, no problem. You see, this is the way you 
control it. If you have a foreign source, they can always accuse you of some kind 
of infiltration. But if it is local source, then I go after your funder, right? So yes, it 
will of course be a problem. That’s why you can make a lot of money online if you 
don’t do political stuff.  
54:39 HL Is it a reflection of our society, that we are less political? 
54:45 KT No, because the government can’t regulate you. It’s not political, so you cannot 
talk about political donations, or anything else, right? I mean, if Unilever wants to 
give me a million bucks to advertise their shampoo, what does the government 
care? Xiaxue, doing cosmetics, she’s making a ton of money. But you don’t go 
there for any major insights. 





Appendix H – Transcript of interview with Martino Tan 
Date: 4 September 2018 
Time: 12pm 
Location: Restaurant in Aperia Mall 
0:07 HL I’ll just start by asking you broadly about what you think of media regulation in 
Singapore. You can look at it in terms of laws, policies, or any kind of decisions 
the government might have made. Maybe just share some general opinions? 
0:26 MT I guess I’ll share my views in terms of where I come from in my professional 
capacity as managing editor of Mothership. In terms of rules and regulations, the 
two laws that affect us the most would be the Class Licensing Scheme and then 
having to apply for a bond for our Individual License, that was in 2015. From our 
own experience, when we met up with the regulators, it was somewhat different 
from what we read. I think TMG – or then Breakfast Network, with Bertha – and 
with the folks from TOC as well, we learnt from those encounters. What we 
noticed is that when they informed us and we went down, in terms of the 
process, it was quite straight forward to be frank, but quite onerous still for a 
small team. 
 
If we come from the basis of trust, over the last three years we haven’t been 
contacted by the regulators except to renew our online license. That was every 
year and about one month before the license ends they would contact us, to ask 
us to update our details – is it still the same founders, location of our company 
and things like that. When we first started and were running a website with three 
people, I think the paperwork can be quite troublesome. We didn’t have an 
administrative person, and we have to be the ones reading all the rules and 
regulations. If I were to be sceptical, I think the regulations that are stated under 
the Class License can be open to all sorts of impositions. This also means that 
there is a possibility for one to think of the most negative imposition that can be 
of how an online site can be regulated. 
 
But from our own experience so far over the last three years, I can see that it is 
quite a light touch approach. It was just about informing us when we had to 
renew our license. Obviously, the regulators will say that it is just a straight-
forward process. I would disagree from outside looking in, because while the 
regulator would say it is straight-forward, I recall that when we met up with them 
in 2015, we weren’t meeting a paper pusher or a manager, we were meeting the 
director, we were meeting the then-assistant CEO. That to me is not something 
simple and straight-forward, unless you are telling me that the regulators have 
the service attitude where they get their senior management to meet us. 
 
I guess there were some questions we asked during the meeting where I felt 
clarifications were as clear as we would like. That was in 2015, and that was the 
only time we met them in person. Over the years, it was just informing us via 
email for updates. When we have clarifications, there were times where the 
regulators will be reading from the various policy that already can read. I forgot 
some of the details, but if I were to ask them what they mean by this line, they 
may just repeat the line back to us. You’re not quite answering my question! 




That was in 2015, about a month before we announced that we have gotten an 
Individual License, I remember it was just before the general elections. 
7:12 HL  Yes, so that was after what happened with The Middle Ground and The 
Independent, that was in 2013, right?  
7:26 MT If I recall correctly, 2013 was when The Independent started around August. I 
remember meeting up with Balji before as I knew him before he started The 
Independent. [details of conversation with Balji] I also remember quite vividly 
that The Independent launched before Mothership… [details of launch dates] 
And I remember 2013 was also when The Independent was contacted by the 
regulators to get their Class License. A year later, we were contacted also to get a 
Class License, so that was in 2014. And a year after that, we were informed to 
apply for the Individual License because we were covering politics and – I don’t 
know how they did it, but they managed to track that Mothership has reached 
more than fifty thousand views. [details of tracking mechanism] 
9:27 HL Ok, so I gather from you that the process was as straight-forward as it should be. 
Do you think then there is, for lack of a better term, a valid reason for doing this? 
Either to impose the Class License or the level of details that they required from 
you. 
10:01 MT I’m not sure. I sympathise with them since I was formerly from the civil service. 
When I first started Mothership, many of my friends from the civil service asked 
me, “What’s your political agenda? Are you going to be pro- or anti-government? 
What do you stand for?” When we published one of our first articles – I can’t 
even remember what the article was about – people contacted me to say, “Is 
that Mothership’s stance on education?” It’s just the three of us, what do you 
mean by stance! Using that as context, I felt that sometimes, the regulators do 
not enter that relationship on the basis of trust. They are wondering who these 
people are, are they Singaporeans, why are they doing this? I think that’s where 
they are coming from. If you are someone who has quite prominent online, it is 
fairly easy for them to find out who you are, from LinkedIn or something. Then 
they will have more questions, they will make certain judgements. 
 
I think it is quite ironic, in some sense. If the regulators are informing the 
publishers about the regulations, they are hoping that the publishers will trust 
the regulators to do the right thing. But from their perspective, I find that there 
isn’t that basis of trust when we first started, or even from our observation of 
TOC and TMG – there is usually the “what’s their agenda, why are they doing 
that, where are they getting their money from?”, and all the various questions 
before they even make a certain judgement about you. When we first started, 
the first two years was probably the most challenging. Just speaking to my ex-
colleagues, everyone is asking the same thing – why are you doing this? I guess it 
takes a while for people to understand us. After a while, they know us from our 
track record. Maybe after three or four years, the relationship gets easier 
because they kind of know where we stand, what are the things we will do. 
 
But it is a challenge to seek that kind of clarity from publishers who are setting up 
a new site, in terms of your editorial direction and vision. It is a challenge for the 
publisher to tell the regulator this, because the regulator will be thinking what 
your agenda is, why did you start this, and all you can do is point to your editorial 
statement – which I think is what Balji did for The Independent. But for them, 
even that may not be enough, they want to look at the articles because that may 
not be similar to Balji’s interpretation of The Independent’s mission and vision. 
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Here lies that tension – the relationship going in is not based on trust. They 
wonder what is the true agenda and interest of the publisher. 
15:05 HL But they never asked directly what your agenda is? 
15:07 MT No, they won’t ask. I don’t think so. 
15:11 HL But you get the sense that they are concerned about what your agenda is? 
15:19 MT I mean, for the regulator, they don’t ask such questions. Perhaps the most 
leading question that reveals where they stand is, they want to know who the 
founders and shareholders are and if they are Singaporeans. That was quite a 
direct, specific question. I’m not sure what would have been their follow-up 
question if I had someone who is not a Singaporean. For us, when we declared 
that all the founders were Singaporeans, they did not continue. For us, it was 
straight-forward, but imagine if your publisher who has a supporter or friend 
who is Malaysian, for instance, I’m not sure how it would have been. 
16:29 HL If you look at the way we run regulation in Singapore versus any other part of the 
world, do you think we could have done any better? Fairly broad question, if you 
are not sure, it is ok. 
16:56 MT Yes, of course. I… I’m not sure. I wonder if there is a need for so many different 
regulations. I guess I’m speaking more in the context of upcoming legislation on 
deliberate online falsehoods, or fake news. So, do you really need so many 
regulations? For instance, if I’m looking at the impending regulations, there are 
already so many different regulations that would make us think twice or act more 
responsibly. I have an online licence and know that I shouldn’t be publishing 
anything that would disrupt religious harmony because there is a Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony Act. Of course, there is defamation, POHA – so many different 
things already! If the government is concerned about election coverage, because 
that was what we saw with Donald Trump and Russia, then during that period 
there is also a Colling Off Day and I think some election rules that govern how we 
report. I wonder whether there is a need to have so many rules and regulations. 
 
But do I have a proposal to make it better? I’m not sure. I just think that if you 
are an aspiring media professional who wants to start a site, you want to cover 
current affairs and politics, maybe the underlying implication is that you need to 
do a lot of homework. There are a lot of regulations, and if you want to cover 
politics in Singapore, you better make sure you know all of these regulations, or 
else it would be quite problematic for your website. 
19:43 HL Do you think that is a barrier for entry? 
19:45 MT I think if you are very focused and passionate about it, it shouldn’t be a barrier to 
entry. It wasn’t a barrier for me and Belmont. When I speak to some young 
freelance writers, that could be a barrier, but maybe they are also second-
guessing too much. There are times when your website might not even make it! 
It sounds a bit harsh, but why do you think so much! But this could also be seen 
as what some politicians would also say – just do it first. But people are scared as 
there is a fear factor. 
 
It is the same when I discuss with my writers about what kind of topics to write. 
They will say they are not sure, but I say, “Why are you worrying about all these 
things? Let us worry!” Not a lot of people will have that sense of confidence to 
take ownership. For us, it comes from very unique experiences that we have – 
Belmont was involved in the GE, We King was helping Mr George Yeo, I was at 
PMO managing PM’s Facebook page. We understand from a macro level the 
286 
 
sentiments, and think that with our experience we can try to do something. For a 
young writer, we’ll tell them to write first, don’t worry about all these things. 
 
Maybe some people will say that it is easy for us to say as we have the 
experience, so the same goes for setting up a website. There are so many rules, 
what if I don’t know all of them? But if so, then you will never start! It is the same 
mindset as setting up a company – do I have enough funds, auditing, income tax. 
I prefer to be more positive – just set it up, if you are not sure, the online 
community is actually quite helpful. If you were to ask any publisher, they won’t 
say they won’t help you. If you are someone who knows nothing about the local 
online space, maybe there is this worry that the regulations are too many for me 
to follow and understand, therefore I choose not to do anything with politics 
online. So that’s a roundabout way of answering your question! 
23:35 HL No worries. I’ll just ask you about the Select Committee hearings. What do you 
think about the process, what do you think is useful, what is your sense of where 
it is heading?  
23:55 MT I think definitely there would be legislation. If the definition of the issue is what 
the Select Committee is trying to tackle, which is deliberate online falsehoods 
and is defined so clearly, it is hard for me to disagree. When we submitted our 
paper and were there for the hearings, my question was, how do you define 
intent? That is not easy. Our key argument was a bit different from the rest. It 
was about creativity. Will that stop young story-tellers from creating content that 
might be seen as unlawful? The funny thing is that a lot of folks, even 
government, think of us more as a media platform – we are, but we think of 
ourselves more as story-tellers. We are always seized by the story and the 
narrative and how we package the information for our readers. How do we value 
add? Is it to inform, to entertain? That’s how we create our content. And when 
we are working with clients, running advertorial campaigns with them, the key 
thing is also about creativity. Having an additional regulation, I don’t think it will 
help, so that is where we were coming from. 
 
But for the Select Committee members, they always go back to the worst-off 
case, do you agree or disagree? It’s a very lawyerly way of questioning. Do I agree 
that that kind of image is wrong? I would say yes, that’s just me. But to package it 
in such a narrow way of questioning doesn’t allow our own interpretation of the 
laws to be addressed fully. 
 
In terms of how the hearings were organised, you can see where the government 
is coming from. First, they define the problem by interviewing academics. They 
then bring in the religious leaders, because they help to support the 
government’s view on the potential impact that fake news could have on a 
society like ours. They then move on to interview the tech companies, because 
they are indeed the main purveyors of disinformation. They then move on to 
Mediacorp and SPH, telcos, and then finally the activists. I guess that’s how they 
were trying to sell the whole thing. My take is, from the whole process – and it 
was pretty long, about one month – I wonder if the Committee members were 
really open enough to take feedback. While they had those interactions, there 
was a sense that – maybe I am wrong to say that – perhaps they have already 





I mean, it is great that they want to hear from practitioners and experts, they did 
a call for more papers as well, I’m quite sure they read the papers, they wanted 
some clarifications and they called up many of us, you and me included. But were 
they really, truly open in accepting most of our views? I’m not quite sure about 
that, but we do not know yet. Let’s see, with the first reading of the bill. That’s 
my sense now – I’m not sure if they were really open to accepting different 
views, or if they have already made up their minds. 
30:22 HL I’ll just go back to the point you made about definitions. Do you think they have 
defined the issue clearly enough during the process? For you personally, what do 
you think? 
30:38 MT They could have defined the issue narrowly enough that it is very difficult for any 
sane person to disagree. And I assume that all of us are logical folks, so it is very 
hard to disagree with that very narrow definition. Now, I guess the concern is, 
while most of us can agree with the very narrow interpretation, can we all agree 
with a potentially vague definition of that narrow interpretation in the future, 
right? 
31:30 HL Ok. I’ve read what Mothership has put up. I want to get from you the most direct 
interpretation of what you think is the best solution to tackle fake news. Would 
you think it is laws, do you think they are still necessary, and if not, then what do 
you think is useful? 
32:00 MT I know it sounds very cliché, but public education, of course. I think we also have 
to understand how different segments of the population are impacted by online 
falsehoods. I do think that an older generation may be more persuaded by 
falsehoods. For example, when your parents or grandparents share things on 
Whatsapp, when I speak to someone younger, they instinctively know what is 
fake or what needs to be checked. I think the younger folks, maybe in terms of 
online literacy, is higher than the older folks. For a law like that, I wonder who 
the government is trying to target as well. 
 
I can see why some form of public education is needed even more so for the 
older generation than the younger one. Could that be the reason why they want 
a legislation? I’m not sure. For me as a publisher, I don’t think more legislation is 
needed, if I want to be as clear as that. However, if I were to make some 
assumptions – I think the legislation is targeted at the American tech companies. 
For them, while their HQ is based in Singapore, we are not a big market for them. 
How is the government going to get Facebook, Twitter or Google to play ball? 
Small market, nice place for expatriates, but they can move out anytime. I 
remember when Minster Shanmugam was questioning Simon Millner from 
Facebook. I remember Shanmugam specifically asked him if Facebook will follow 
the rules of the land, and I suspect that could be the main intent. I don’t think 
they were targeting Mothership – we didn’t spend five hours with him – or SPH, 
Mediacorp or the telcos. I suspect it is for that purpose, although I’m not sure 
why poor PJ Thum had to spend six hours, but that is another matter! If we take 
out that portion, I think that is the government’s main target. They have no ways 
of getting US tech companies to appreciate the unique characteristic of the 
Singapore online space. So that could be the real intent of the legislation, that is 
my assumption. 
 
But if you are talking about the local folks, people like us, then I would say that 
some form of public education working with academic institutions, maybe with 
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the Media Literacy Council or some form of collaboration will help. You don’t 
need another law to make sure that people are well educated about fake news. 
36:53 HL Ok. I’m going to move on to ask you about the public perception of media in 
Singapore. Feel free to talk about both mainstream and online media – where do 
you think they are heading, what do people think about them, and how do you 
think such perceptions will impact the industry as a whole? Any perceptions from 
running Mothership, do feel free to share. 
37:35 MT Many young people that I spoke to probably have very general views about 
mainstream and online media, which is a bit too simplistic. Mainstream media is 
very pro-establishment and pro-government, and therefore not credible. But in 
some sense I think their credibility has to do with their political reporting. They 
still trust mainstream media in reporting the daily home news. 
 
Then for online media, (they think) they are all pro-opposition, maybe we can 
trust them in terms of political coverage – not trust them completely, but to 
cross-check with other sites. But they are not quite sure about the quality of their 
reporting. 
 
The thing is, most Singaporeans don’t care as much. If I were to ask a young 
Singaporean where he gets his news – which is what I usually do ask during job 
interviews – most of them are getting in on social media, mostly Facebook. They 
don’t care quite as much as media academics and practitioners about the 
industry in general, or where they are getting their news from, whether The 
Straits Times has an agenda, or so on. No, I think for them it is just a site 
providing them with the latest information. If The Straits Times can do so, fine, 
but if The Straits times is irritating me with the premium thing and I can’t read it, 
I will go to Channel NewsAsia or Today. When we were tracking the numbers, 
you can see that CNA has started to close its gap with The Straits Times. Online, 
the two of them have the most traffic. The Straits Times is still in the lead, but 
CNA is catching up. I’m not sure if it has to do with the premium content, or due 
to a certain perception of the credibility of The Straits Times, but I think the facts 
are there that CNA is catching up. 
 
That’s usually how people will think, and local news is in some sense quite 
boring. When I ask university folks – I don’t know if they are trying to impress us 
or something – they will say they read Financial Times or Wall Street Journal. 
Sure or not, really? “Or yeah, I read The New York Times, the Economist.” I don’t 
know, but they are not so seized by the publication, that’s my own sense. If it 
appears on their feed, they will make a quick judgement on the site, whether it is 
something they want to click and open. The key thing could probably be the 
headline and the photo. 
 
This also means that, if I’m looking at the media industry, especially the online 
space, it has become kind of saturated or stabilised. I haven’t seen any new 
players for a while. People kind of know where the different sites stands on 
different things. Say, if Mothership were to write something more sensational, if 
they trust us they will still click on it because they are curious and want to know 
the story, more than just the platform. If it something really new and very 
sensational, they might not click on it. I don’t think folks have a really strong view 
on various sites. Why do I say so? If I were to speak to some younger folks, they 
might still think that Mothership is a social-political site. They made up their 
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minds maybe a few years ago, and I don’t know how they understand 
Mothership to be, but I just think people don’t take the time to think about the 
online media space. I wonder if it is due to the fact that most of the sites have a 
very short history, not like the New York Times or Washington Post. We don’t 
have that kind of story for our own local sites.  
44:20 HL So you’re saying that, essentially, for the media outlets who don’t have that kind 
of branding, it will lead to that kind of expectations? 
44:30 MT Yes, that’s my own sense. 
44:42 HL Ok. I’m just going to move on and ask you about your view of the evolution of the 
media industry in Singapore, both mainstream and online. Where do you think it 
is heading, and how do you think that will change the government’s position in 
terms of how it interacts with media. 
44:59 MT I think when Lee Kuan Yew made that speech in Finland about the media, media 
and politics in Singapore always have that strange relationship that is at times 
quite tense, and I use that as a context to understand how the media platforms 
are thinking and working. For now, the key issue is the lack of clarity in terms of 
political leadership, especially among the 4G leaders. The space has become 
increasingly tense. TOC may not feel it, but if you are a site like Mothership 
where I think the government can appreciate our influence, then they will tend 
to maybe over-interpret every single thing that we write. There is that sense of 
unease, nervousness. That’s my own sense. There is always this narrative that 
you will get a call from someone, but it doesn’t always work that way. It’s 
probably more about hearing from my ex-colleagues about what’s happening. It 
might or might not be true, I don’t really know, so that’s my own sense when I 
speak to my ex-colleagues and the ministries and MCI. You don’t get a straight 
call from someone saying we have to kill an article or something. 
 
I think over the last few months, things have changed a little bit. We also observe 
what is happening in mainstream media, like the very strong rebuttal towards 
Han Fook Kwang. The 4G leaders are not clear, perhaps a lot more conservative 
for now. It might sound very new to you, but my take is that the 3G leaders are 
actually quite ok. If you look at our coverage over the years, obviously there are 
some articles that have irritated them, but nothing really happened. Now, if I  
look at Mothership’s political coverage, we have also changed, but I seem to hear 
more murmurs – what is the intent of this kind of article? I don’t hear that in our 
initial years, but it could also be due to the fact that we were small and no one 
cared about us back then. Now, we have a larger audience, and a piece that 
might have been ok is now not ok anymore. If I were to imagine myself a 4G 
leader, why would I want Mothership to make fun of me? I would look bad! 
49:57 HL You get the sense that they are a little bit more sensitive? 
50:02 MT Yeah, that is my own sense, but it is hard to prove. No one has told me that they 
are unhappy. So I guess that is how ‘small town’ Singapore work. Singapore is 
small, your friend’s friend is someone or in the civil service, you hear things and 
you speak to people. Is it true, I’m not sure. But over the last few months that is 
at least the sense that I got.  
50:41 HL Do you think that the government is keen to resolve this as an issue? And also, it 
wouldn’t really be about laws, but more about engagement. Resolving, about the 
image of the 4G leaders. It is not really something that regulations can resolve, or 
do you think they can legislate this? 
51:11 MT No, of course not! How do I put it… Is that a concern for them? I’m also not sure. 
I wonder if some politicians still view media as a tool to communicate with the 
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masses. Some politicians may not even have an understanding of media in 
general, in the sense the Western concept of the media being the Fourth Estate. 
Or perhaps some politicians are just not very good politicians, so they find it 
quite difficult to persuade people, especially if you are in the military for a while, 
you give orders a lot more, so it is harder to even have that one-on-one meeting 
to talk it out and persuade the journalist – even from mainstream media – about 
your point of view. 
52:54 HL You don’t see them doing that? 
52:56 MT Well, I see them doing that, but I’m not sure they are doing it well. They 
definitely do engage the mainstream media journalists – I have friends there and 
they do have lunches and all that. They do engage Mothership – over the years, 
Minister Yaccob has visited our office before. [details and jokes about the visit] 
Chee Hong Tat, when he was in office at MCI, he visited us as well. But does that 
count as engagement? I guess it is better than TOC. But we have been around for 
five years, and I’ve only had two office holders visiting us, we’ve done a couple of 
interviews, but they were done during general elections. I think that is a strange 
period, because during GE, things are decentralised. Maybe there isn’t a 
government approving things, so what you need is just to speak to some GRCs, 
and if their anchor minister is a lot more open towards engagement, that is a yes 
and it’s an interview already. You don’t have to go through a ministry or press 
secretary. After that, we did interview a couple of ministers – Chan Chun Sing, 
Ong Ye Kung, still waiting for Minister Heng to be open to be interviewed. 
 
That kind of engagement with Mothership, I think, is not so deep. There is that 
outside perception that, oh Mothership is quite mainstream to get information 
and news from government. But even if we get it, talking about our own 
engagement with the political leadership, I guess it can be better. We get visits 
from two office holders at MCI, and during the interviews. At least they accept 
the interviews, because it is almost impossible for TOC to get the interviews with 
any of the ministers. We sent the requests, sometimes we get it, sometimes we 
don’t, but at least they are open to being interviewed and through it we get to 
know them better. But it is always through some kind of work, but never over a 
cup of coffee or anything. 
57:17 HL So it is set up as an interview, to talk about a specific subject. 
57:21 MT Yeah, and if I were to compare us with mainstream media, that is very different, 
because I have friends there who would meet some of the ministers quite 
regularly and they would have their own lunches, and besides doing those 
interviews there are also more briefings. 
57:45 HL Ok. I actually don’t have any more questions per se, but I’ll just invite you to 
share on your views of the future direction of media in Singapore – kind of a 
crystal ball moment – and anything you might want to add to what we have 
discussed. 
58:08 MT Actually, I’m not that optimistic in terms of having new players emerging, if I 
define new players as online social political sites that are big enough to make an 
impact. Why do I say so? If I were to observe when most of the websites started 
to emerge, I think there was a gold rush period – from Yahoo becoming more 
mainstream, TOC, Temasek Review Emeritus, The Real Singapore, Mothership, 
The Independent. Even the non-political sites, like SGAG and SmartLocal, all came 
out during that period. If you track back now, from 2015 to 2018, almost nothing, 




And if you look at what mainstream media is trying to do – SPH has STIRR, but it’s 
not quite working out. Zaobao trying to do something with Little Red Ants, what I 
heard was they wanted to create a “Chinese Mothership”, but I don’t know what 
that means! 
 
I guess I’m looking at it not just from a social-political point of view, but as a 
publisher who has a stake in this space, I wonder if the industry is like that 
because the market is small. For instance, when I look at Mothership and think of 
it as a business, and we are doing sponsored content and advertorials, I’m always 
competing with SGAG and SmartLocal. After a while, it’s like the telcos – just 
three companies – and it just became like that over the last two years. 
 
When we made the pivot to cover lifestyle content as well, that was an important 
moment for us. We entered mainstream consciousness probably during 2015 
when we were covering the last election. That didn’t make us viable as a 
business. What has made us viable was growing our offerings beyond current 
affairs type of content. Over the last two years, that was what made us viable as 
a company and as a project. That was probably the switch that TMG couldn’t 
make – they were going for subscriptions and donations. 
 
Looking at all this, what I’d be concerned with is business – competitors, where 
they will come from. My own sense is that, if there is going to be something that 
would disrupt Mothership or SGAG, it would be a group of young people coming 
together – definitely not from the mainstream media – creating even an app that 
works, or something that is so different from what we are doing. I don’t think our 
competitor would be Rice, or a site that will just emerge like that. I was at Civil 
Service College yesterday, we were invited to talk. They asked us whether sites 
like Little Red Ants would be viable. I told them that, actually, you won’t 
gradually become big. When we first started Mothership in 2013, Belmont’s first 
article went viral and it crashed our site. There is no slowly making your mark. I’m 
not sure if things like that happen in our industry, especially among young folks. 
There is always that huge explosion, and you stay. Therefore, I think the disruptor 
may not come from any of the established players. It may be someone out there, 
a few folks with the passion, maybe they are running an events company, and it 
captured the imagination of younger folks. 
 
This means that the online landscape is going to be not very interesting, if you 
want new things and new players to come up. In fact, I sense that there will be 
more consolidation. If I look at mainstream media, I don’t think Today is viable. If 
I’m the boss at Mediacorp, I’d probably merge Today and CNA, because Today is 
losing money. Then you would only have CNA, ST, and I’m not sure if BT is viable. 
MyPaper is gone. TNP is struggling to be a Straits Time lite – I thought TNP would 
be a Mothership competitor, but they just died because there is no real value 
add. At least the TNP under Balji was interesting. I don’t know, it seems that the 
established players are running out of ideas, and I see a lot more consolidation in 
the next few years. So if you are someone looking for new things, then it will be 
somewhat boring. Is it too harsh? I don’t know, but that’s my take. 
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0:32 HL The first one I want to ask about is, what are your perceptions of media 
regulations in Singapore?  
0:38 ET I mean, media regulations in Singapore are tough. First – without going into the 
details – you have the Printing Presses Act which deal with newspapers. The 
government has a say on who the major shareholders of these companies are 
going to be. They need to be approved. That by itself influences the ownership 
and therefore the editorial-ship of the newspapers. 
 
In so far as the online media is concerned, there are laws as to how funding can 
be raised. You cannot have foreign funding, and again, without going into the 
details, there are a lot of restrictions on what online media can and cannot do. 
There have been attempts at using existing laws to stifle free speech. One 
example would be the Online Citizen case, where the government tried to use 
Section 15 of the Harassment Act, which was essentially an Act to protect lay 
people, ordinary people from harassment. They tried to use that section as a 
means to regulate what they perceive to be false news. However, the court of 
appeal disagreed that that particular section was meant to cover government 
regulating news that is perceived by the government to be false. 
 
So that’s one instance. Right now, I think you would be aware of the Select 
Committee hearings on the possibility of further regulations to target news which 
the government may perceive to be false. 
3:02 HL It would sound as if there is a whole bunch of bad stuff. Any positives that you 
can find? Cases where media law is properly done, or good for the nation? 
3:16 ET I think if you look at what is online now, Singaporeans – and Singaporeans who 
do not receive foreign funding – can be critical of the government online. So long 
as you do not go into contempt of court areas, so long as you are not defamatory 
of individual political leaders, I think there is enough opening up of space in 
terms of being able to criticise without actual legal ramification. 
 
However, there is a sense that, if you are seen as critical of government and 
government policy, you are out of a circle of business in Singapore, if you know 
what I mean. 
4:15 HL “Out of a circle of business”, meaning in terms of generating revenue? 
4:22 ET In terms of the way the country is structured. Business is controlled by a certain 
group and type of people who are generally very pro-establishment. If you are 
seen as critical of the government, it is very difficult for you to get into that circle, 
or to get business from that circle. It’s just an informal thing. 
4:48 HL So essentially, it is about the survival issue of mostly online media entities? 
4:53 ET Yeah, but I mean not just that. It is the people who are critical, you are not going 
to be viewed favourably by the establishment or by the government. Although 
there are no legal steps taken against you, but there will be a clear reluctance 
shown when trying to do business with these people, presuming you have 
another life apart from what you do online. 
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5:31 HL I’ll ask you for your opinion, probably more than anything else: do you think it is 
more of the legal environment that is restricting the media (entities), or is it more 
of such things as the perceptions of those who are more critical towards the 
government? 
5:48 ET I think now it is the second. I think the legal impediment is less so. There is still a 
very strong sense that if you are critical, you are out of the circle.  
6:03 HL Ok. I take it from you, then, that there could be areas whereby the laws – are 
there any ways that they can be improved? With the view of opening up speech 
in Singapore. 
6:20 ET I think how the courts interpret what is contemptuous or not is going to be 
important. There are two cases pending before the courts right now – Jolovan’s 
case and John Tan’s case. It would be interesting. I think as far as the government 
is concerned, they are aggressively prosecuting for contempt. What Jolovan has 
said and what John Tan has said is, in my view, not very serious. And it would be 
interesting to see whether the court is going to agree with the government and 
find them guilty of contempt, or whether it is going to be part of free speech. So 
that is something interesting to watch. 
 
Defamation law, which is something used recently against Roy Ngerng – I mean, 
having said that, he accused the prime Minister of criminal breach of trust, which 
objectively would have been difficult to justify. Apart from that, there has not 
been recent instances of defamation laws being used very freely. So I think in 
terms of the law, it is not so much of an impediment, save for media companies 
who want foreign funding. I think an instance would be Kirsten Han and Thum 
Ping Tjin who tried to get New Naratif going and as part of it they were looking to 
the Soros Foundation – I don’t know the exact name – that has been 
disapproved. It is difficult to form an online news agency to compete with the 
mainstream newspapers. 
8:35 HL Ok. I’m going to ask you to go out on a limb here: the New Naratif case of foreign 
funding – maybe your comments on whether is it just? And for that matter, do 
you see it as a valid concern when it comes to foreign funding? 
8:56 ET I don’t think it is a valid concern. If Kirsten and Ping Tjin are serious, they don’t 
need to be based in Singapore. This is a democratically elected government, they 
can make the rules. It’s a global world now, you don’t have to be in any one 
jurisdiction, you can pick the jurisdiction to operate out of which is most 
favourable with what you want to do. I mean, that’s the beauty of being online. 
9:32 HL I thought you were going to say, that’s the beauty of having Malaysia as a 
neighbour! But I guess it goes back to the question, if we see ourselves as a 
media hub, among other things, and we want to draw in – I mean, New Naratif 
pitches itself as a regional publication – perspective wise, it would make sense 
for them to be based here. 
9:57 ET Yes, and the government would know that and they would have done their 
calculations, and they feel it best, and it is their prerogative to decide what 
business they want and what they don’t. 
10:08 HL Ok, I’d just ask you if you might have studied any kinds of laws and regulations in 
other parts of the world that you think could be applicable to Singapore or that 
we can learn from. 
10:21 ET Well, I mean, in England you have this Derbyshire Principle that the government 
should always be subject to criticism. The Derbyshire Principle acknowledges that 
a lot of the time, when one makes accusations against the government, one may 
not have full access to the information and documents. That is because you have 
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the Official Secrets Act and of course, the government being the government, it is 
not obliged to give you information. Because of that, before the government can 
take action against an individual for criticising the government, one has to bear in 
mind that it is unfair to make you prove the truth of what you are saying. So that 
is why under English common law, one cannot be sued for defaming by the 
government. So that’s something that we need to think about, especially if we 
are going down the route where we are going to criminalise false news. What is 
false or not, and who bears the burden of proving whether it is false or not, and 
how, I suppose, the courts approach it, bearing in mind that individuals who 
makes a certain assertion may not have the full documents to prove that what 
they are saying is true or not true.  
11:53 HL So I’ll talk about the fake news issue, then. So you think that the Derbyshire 
Principle should be applied if we are to consider legislation? 
12:04 ET We have to bear in mind the rationale for the Derbyshire Principle when we 
enact our own laws. 
12:12 HL I have heard of this principle being mentioned in some cases that I have covered. 
How effective has it been to argue from that perspective? 
12:20 ET Well, the Singapore courts have thus far avoided the issue. I don’t think they 
have really commented on the Derbyshire issue. Because one must remember 
that what Derbyshire means is in terms of criticising the government. It doesn’t 
cover instances where you defame a particular politician. So English law also 
recognises that, although they apply it a bit more liberally, but they recognise the 
fact that defamation laws apply to individual politicians. But what it states very 
clearly is you should be allowed to criticise the government as a whole. You 
cannot single out particular politicians and call them dishonest unless you can 
prove it, I mean that’s defamation. But when you want to be critical of the 
government, you are allowed to under the Derbyshire Principle and the 
government cannot sue for defamation. They recognise that as part of any 
functioning democracy, the government must always be subject to criticism, 
even if documents are not available to prove what you are saying, because it is 
what it is. The individual does not have the same access to information as the 
government. 
13:48 HL I’m going to assume, as you have mentioned it a few times, that you have been 
following the (Select Committee) hearings… Do you think they are edging 
towards something that will broaden the scope of what is legal or illegal to 
criticise the government? 
14:13 ET I think there will be laws where the government will be able to commence 
proceedings against individuals who put out something which is fake. You have 
the obvious cases where people claim fake natural disasters, or fake terrorists 
attacks – things which I think most rationale people would agree that such 
actions should be criminalised. But of course, then we come to a more difficult 
area where I give an opinion or what the government does or does not do. When 
you enter into that realm, it is difficult to talk about what’s a fake opinion or 
what’s a true opinion. I can state an opinion that I honestly hold which everyone 
else may disagree with, but does that mean it is fake news? Where fact and 
opinion conflate – there is always a bit of fact mixed with opinion – I think that 
would be a challenge of how far the government goes to clamp down on that. 
15:42 HL I note that the law minister did mention that what they are trying to do is not to 
curb opinions, in that sense. Your take on it? How confident are you that it is 
going to work? 
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15:54 ET I mean, I’d keep an open mind. We need to wait and see as to what details there 
are in the legislation, how the court process is going to work, who is going to bear 
the burden of proof, what is the burden of proof, and how much evidence – and 
that’s going to be really a question which the courts take – how much evidence 
do they expect someone to produce to prove their case. 
16:23 HL And also in test cases, I mean, assuming that eventually that someone will… 
16:28 ET Yes, there will be cases, and that is how we will see the approach of the courts. 
16:35 HL Ok, right. I’ll just go a little more broadly about the entire consultation process 
that the Select Committee did. What are some of the views that you might have 
about this? What do you find relevant? Did the whole consultation process help 
you to clarify on the issue? 
16:55 ET I think what was missed was a chance for a discussion on how the actual court 
process is going to be played out. There should be more emphasis, from a legal 
point of view, about what the burden of proof is going to be, what is the amount 
of evidence which is necessary, more emphasis on how we distinguish between 
opinion and fact. I think more could have been done in discussing these issues.  
17:31 HL So, distinguishing between opinion and fact, are you thinking of a clearer 
definition of what fake news should be? 
17:37 ET That’s correct.  
17:40 HL Right. In your personal or professional opinion, what do you think is actually the 
best solution to tackle fake news? Are laws really necessary? 
17:51 ET  I don’t think laws are really necessary, because – I mean I don’t have the details, 
you can check them up – there are already existing avenues for the government 
to issue take down notices. So I think existing laws would already cover situations 
where you have obviously fake news. I would see these regulations as really 
targeting where there is going to be a mix of facts and opinions. That is where 
perhaps existing laws don’t deal with. That’s what these laws are going to 
address. As to whether that is going to be good or bad thing, the devil is in the 
details. 
18:53 HL Ok. I’m going to ask you a little bit more broadly about public perception of 
media in Singapore. What do you think are the public’s perception of mainstream 
and online media – any difference, and why do you think they hold such views? 
19:13 ET In so far as to the mainstream media, I think the consensus in Singapore is that it 
is pro-nation-building. I think all Singaporeans will be of that view. The majority 
of Singaporeans generally believe that it is good for the country. Then you have 
the online media, which has a strong following but, in my opinion, would make 
up thirty to thirty-five percent of the population which are keen on it and see it 
playing a larger role in Singapore. But I don’t think the majority of the population 
are very supportive of the online media playing a more critical role. We are not 
there yet. 
20:17 HL As in, we don’t see a need for a more critical media? 
20:21 ET Yeah. I think the majority are prepared to follow the government narrative, that 
you need a nation building media. I think that is the stage that Singaporeans are 
in at the moment. 
20:34 HL There was this study that was published, about Singaporeans not caring too 
much about freedom of speech, for instance. 
20:45 ET Yes. I think things like freedom of speech, right of assembly and all are irrelevant 
to the majority. While you see a lot of people advocating these things very 
strongly on online media, realistically – not to dampen anything – it is really a 
thirty to thirty-five percent of the population who are keen on these things. I 
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think the majority are indifferent. To them, economic achievement outweighs 
these interests. 
21:22 HL Do you see that as having an impact on issues of democracy in Singapore, or how 
people can get access to information? Will it eventually impact us in the long 
run? 
21:38 ET Well, it will come to a point of time where the gulf between the haves and the 
have-nots become too wide. The majority will start to realise that they have been 
left behind, and that is when these issues will surface. But it has not come to that 
stage. 
22:09 HL Will it be too late when it comes to that stage? [laughs] 
22:11 ET No, it will not be too late. Societies go through this all the time in history, and life 
goes on! It’s a cycle. 
22:27 HL Ok, you have worked with a number of media players in Singapore… Would you 
be able to share on what you think is the evolution of the media industry in 
Singapore?  For both the mainstream and online players – where do you see 
them heading? 
22:46 ET The mainstream media will always be there, because it would be in the interest 
of the government to subsidise it, although I see it coming to a point where they 
will no longer be profitable. I think that is quite clear – despite the fact that SPH 
has branched into property business and other streams of business, it is quite 
clear that their revenue is declining and declining fast. 
 
Online media will catch up and eventually, as the younger generation grows up 
and demographics change, people will go online to get more and more 
alternative sources of news. That’s how it is going to evolve… [clarifications on 
question] 
23:57 HL My only question to that would be, in terms of the quality of the information that 
they do get, where do you see that heading? 
24:09 ET Well, first it would depend on the individual. Someone who is well-educated and 
well-informed will know where to look for the objective facts. There are so many 
newspapers around to world, so many online sites, if you are educated and 
informed, you will know where to get it. Then there is a second type of news that 
you want – you want opinion. Again, if you are well-informed you will know that 
particular types of media will provide an opinion from a particular slant. You have 
different media that will give you different slants of opinion, and then it is up to 
you to make up your mind. 
 
But of course, not everyone is going to be in that category – being able to 
discern. I think it may be difficult for some people to discern between fact and 
opinion, that different types of media will be skewed from a different viewpoint. 
There is a danger of people putting themselves in an echo chamber, where they 
keep looking for opinions that they want to hear and nothing else. And that’s 
dangerous whichever camp you fall in, if you keep looking for the same kind of 
opinion to reinforce what you think, when you start shutting yourself out from 
different points of views. And I can see that already happening – there are people 
who just want to hear one side of the story, be it from a pro-establishment or 
pro-government point of view, or from a pro-opposition (point of view). 
26:25 HL Do you think this distinction – you can call it a bubble perspective – is enhanced 
because of online media? 
26:41 ET  Yes, I think it is. From what I also understand, the way Facebook and the 
algorithms works, it tends to put the kind of articles which you usually look for, it 
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tries to guess what you want to look for, and you see more of those appearing on 
your feed. Also, your friends would generally be people who share the same 
viewpoint as yourself. So you will see more of what you want to see, and the 
danger is you shut out considering the other perspective. You end up not having 
an open mind anymore. 
27:30 HL The state has already started to roll out some laws with regards to online media. 
The latest would really be the Broadcasting Act in 2013, which there are 
proposals to further amend, probably by this year. I think the previous 
information minister did mention that he will wait until after the fake news 
legislation has been rolled out (before amending the Broadcasting Act). Do you 
see that intensifying given what you just described – that online media will 
become more prevalent. If it does intensify, in what ways do you think they will 
beef it up, or what might then change? 
28:24 ET Broadcast, it would be dealing with television? 
28:28 HL [Explanation on what is covered under the Broadcasting Act] 
28:40 ET Right. The way I see it, the fake news legislation would be the main legislation. 
The amendments to the Broadcasting Act will just make it relevant and 
consistent, to enable the fake news legislation to work. So I think the fake news 
legislation will be the main source of law, and amendment will make the 
Broadcasting Act in line with the goals of the fake news legislation. 
29:14 HL I see. One of the things the Broadcasting Act (does) is to grant certain powers to 
IMDA to act on exiting laws. And so far, IMDA’s position is that they will take 
action if websites contravene certain laws. 
29:30 ET Yes, correct. So it is going to go back to the primacy legislation, which is going to 
be the fake news law. 
2:37 HL Well, one thing, though – the case with The Real Singapore, they came in to shut 
down the website, although the court case hasn’t been closed. Do you see that as 
an issue? 
30:02 ET [Confirming on the TRS case] Yeah, but I mean, that was extreme falsity, which 
you might be able to fairly take a position with or without a court case! 
30:22 HL I see. So in your view it is in a way justified.  
30:25 ET It is justified, and if it was unjustified, it would have been challenged. Say, if a 
website was closed down based on voicing an opinion based on true facts, I 
would be very surprised if the authorities were to do that. First, I don’t think the 
authorities would do that, and second, it would be very challengeable. 
30:51 HL But wouldn’t you consider that they actually did that with Amos Yee? It was an 
opinion, and they tried to shut him down. 
31:01 ET Well, when the opinion involves religious text… I mean, if you put extreme 
examples out in that way, how they dealt with other websites is to take down 
that article with a take-down notice and not seek to close them.  
31:22 HL For TRS, it was a case where they tried to shut down the whole website.   
31:29 ET Yes, because first, the most objective thing – the news was obvious false. There 
could be other repercussions from that news. Of course, more subjectively, the 
government felt that they were using false news to raise revenue. But of course, 
that is subjective. Objectively, the news was just far out! 
32:01 HL Ok, I won’t debate about that! But if you are talking about take-down (notices), 
because in my experience we have received take-down notices and it was never 
to the extent of shutting down the website.  
32:14 ET That’s correct. So if they perceive you’ve made an honest mistake, there is no 
intention or malice, they will give you a take-down notice for the article. If they 
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sense that its an intentional falsehood and it happens more than once, I think 
they will shut down the website. And some people will say rightfully so.   
32:38 HL But the rules on what constitutes malice wouldn’t be very clear?  
32:42 ET No, I think the government has a very broad discretion to do it, but so far from 
their behaviour – to be fair to them – it has not been exercised unfairly. 





Appendix J – Transcript of interview with an activist from a human rights group based in Singapore 
Date: 3 August 2018 
Time: 2pm 
Location: Café in 112 Katong shopping centre 
0:45 HL [Confirmation of representation and background of human rights organisation, 
explanation of interview] 
I want to ask you about your general perceptions of media regulation in 
Singapore. Are they too strict, too lenient, do you find them useful, what can be 
improved? 
2:24 A6 I’m not that familiar with all the media regulations, but what I can is that they are 
definitely very strict. Too strict – in fact, I would say they are draconian. We are 
interested in the advancement of free expression - speech should be free, only 
speech that incites hatred and violence should be banned, Well, not say banned, 
but there are legitimate grounds for restriction or criminal prosecution against 
someone who incites hatred or violence. But everything else is pretty much fair 
game. So we do not think that all the media broadcast regulations are necessary. 
What you need are regulations to penalise people who are making speech to 
harm society. Like the Broadcasting Act – the minister can just gazette anyone, 
and after gazetting say that you have to close down, like what they did with TRS. 
 
The other thing which I think can be regulated is when it affects national security, 
which also has to be clearly defined and not just, oh everything is under national 
security! So in our view, these are the only grounds in which you can restrict 
speech. Like the MDA regulation, naturally all these have to be scrapped. 
4:24 HL So your position is that a lot of the laws that we currently have should actually be 
removed? 
4:27 A6 Yeah, and what should actually take its place is just legislation that penalises 
those who harm society. 
4:36 HL In other words, laws that a bit more targeted towards hatred, violence and 
national security, and you are recommending changes to laws to reflect this 
position. Can I get an understanding of how you came to this position? Is it based 
on studying other countries? 
5:10 A6 Well, it’s just based on looking at our domestic legislation and how it is being 
used to silence speech. All speech should be free, and we shouldn’t be prevented 
from broadcasting or saying anything, and the only thing to consider should be 
those three things. Of course, how that works out in terms of the details of 
legislation can be discussed and consulted with the public, stakeholder, and look 
at how other countries do it. 
5:52 HL The risk of that, of course, is that ultimately it will still be the state that is calling 
the shots. What is legal and what is not, even for something like hate speech. Do 
you have any concerns with that? 
6:06 A6 Well, it depends on what kind of state does it, you see. If you have a government 
that is democratic, then we wouldn’t be in a situation where we are so scared of 
what they can do, or that they will use it to clamp down on us. State intervention 
is also important – the government has a role to protect vulnerable individuals in 
society. I wouldn’t say that just because I gave the government this kind of 
power, it is bad. The question is what kind of government we have now, and the 
extent to which laws reflect the views of stakeholders and society. Say, 
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vulnerable groups, civil society, media professionals, bloggers – especially those 
who have a stake in this, those that the laws will affect the most. 
7:30 HL Just a very quick question on this particular point – would you consider press 
councils, for instance, to be particularly useful? Say, a group of people who come 
and decide on what a media organisation is doing, is it doing it right or wrong. 
7:58 A6 Yes, I think that would definitely be useful, especially if the press council has the 
authority, right? I know a lot of other countries have press councils, (acting to) 
censure the media. There is this impression that if you have free speech, 
everything will go wild. The legislation of the press, again, has to come through 
things which involves causing harm. A press council need not just deal with things 
that cause harm, but also if you sensationalise, for instance – I think that is also 
problematic. Or you present certain groups in a certain way – like you say all 
Malays are lazy. So if you propagate such views, then yes the press council does 
have a right to come in to censure. They do have a role for that. 
9:16 HL On the note of causing harm, I’m going to move on to the discussion about fake 
news, because that is one of the things that cropped up more recently. They 
were basically trying to talk about how deliberate online falsehoods caused harm 
to society. I want to get a sense of your views about this process – what the 
committee discussed, what you gathered from the hearings, what you find 
agreeable or not so agreeable. You can also take it broader and talk about the 
very publicised debate about fake news. 
10:17 A6 We are very sceptical – in fact, very cynical – about the process. Why are they so 
interested in having such a wide-ranging consultation to the extent that they 
have a select committee for this issue? We find that quite interesting, because 
they often bulldoze through things that they want. For instance, we had the 
Administration of Justice Act, they didn’t have a select committee hearing for 
that. The reason behind it is still not clear, which makes us suspicious. 
 
And until now, they haven’t been able to show what are the real threats to 
Singapore. They get all these witnesses to talk, but when we read the news about 
what these witnesses said, we are still not convinced that Singapore faces this 
threat. It is what perhaps other countries are facing – maybe France, Russia or US 
– and it is all linked to elections anyway. But we haven’t seen this happening in 
Singapore at all. 
 
But then, they will say, “Do you want to wait for something to happen and only 
then do something about it?” The thing is that, if you look at our existing 
legislation, it does provide a lot of power for the government to do something if 
you have other countries undermining our security. The Computer Misuse Act, 
the Internal Security Act – very broad powers for what the government can do. If 
security is an issue, then why do you need a fake news law? Shouldn’t you 
strengthen your laws on national security? I did look at those laws, and they do 
give the government a lot of power. So what is it about these laws that you feel is 
not good enough? The analysis by the government is also very weak, as there is 
no attempt to look at how existing legislation cannot do the job. They did a 
Green Paper to show how threats are significant around the world, but the paper 
doesn’t talk about how our existing legislation isn’t able to deal with it. 
13:09 HL There are some people who submitted and identified issues with the current 
legislation. They tend to centre on the inability of current laws to remove the 
specific pieces of disinformation. 
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13:31 A6 It can, actually. If you look at TRS, the government was empowered by law to 
shut them down. They have very broad powers to gazette, which is what you 
need to do to order a shut down, and they did that. So I don’t understand why 
they say that the laws are not good enough. TRS was the perfect example of how 
they got it shut down within a matter of hours! If not they had to face severe 
penalties. That’s why we are all very suspicious. 
14:30 HL If that is the case, do you think it is actually necessary to have laws to tackle fake 
news? 
14:39 A6 No. I’m sure you know where we come from. No laws needed! Only laws needed 
are, like I said, those that incite harm, violence and threaten national security. 
14:55 HL There were a few instances where the committee brought up a few examples 
during the hearing, saying that these can potentially cause harm, either to incite 
violence or others. So for those cases, you would agree that there should be laws 
against them? 
15:15 A6 Yes, if you have someone using specific language – like LGBT people need to be 
killed, they are the scum of the earth, we need to get rid of them. I do believe 
this kind of speech deserve to be sanctioned, definitely. 
15:39 HL  Would you make a distinction between something said at the spur of the 
moment versus something that is a bit more intentional? 
15:46 A6 Yes. I think something done at the spur of the moment, perhaps a warning (will 
suffice). But then we are talking about the degree of culpability, and this will then 
have to reflect what is fair and what isn’t.  
16:02 HL What do you think is the best solution to combat disinformation? 
16:12 A6 Education, media literacy, critical thinking. [laughs] 
16:22 HL Possible in Singapore? 
16:24 A6 Not at the moment, when the government controls everything. You see, critical 
thinking is about approaching issues sceptically. This kind of thing needs to be 
taught, and you don’t need a high IQ to be able to think critically. It’s not an 
elitist kind of thing. But the problem is that it’s not prized in Singapore society. 
17:06 HL There is a lot of talk about it, and also some of the schools are trying to do that. 
17:15 A6 It is good if we are going in that direction, and we definitely should. Also, 
teaching people to check sources, not to believe everything at face value. You 
see, this whole online falsehoods thing, I think a lot of it is happening on 
Whatsapp, especially for a certain generation, like my mom. I noticed that a lot of 
seniors receive their news through Whatsapp, not even Facebook. I suppose 
Facebook is a bit more complicated for that generation, whereas Whatsapp just 
comes to you. 
 
So yes, critical thinking is important. Media literacy – this is something that the 
Media Literacy Council is supposed to do, and I’m not familiar with their activities 
and what they are doing to mainstream their work, but I don’t see them doing 
anything. You see, Singapore wants the easy way out – we don’t like deals that 
are not convenient for us. And we have seen this through history – Yaccob 
Ibrahim famously said that we must “read the right thing”. So you can tell from 
the history of how they perceive these issues that what they want is just an easy 
solution. Then, an easy solution is one that just cracks down on everyone. The 
democratic process of building institutions and trust, and developing a critical 
citizenry, is troublesome and might work against them. So it is not in their 
interest, and getting very blunt laws to deal with it is the best solution. But in the 
long run, I don’t think Singapore is going to benefit. 
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19:22 HL Ok. On that note, I’m just going to move a little bit broader again. Let’s talk about 
your views on public perception of media in Singapore, for both traditional and 
online media. What do you think people perceive these institutions to be? 
19:39 A6 I think the majority of Singaporeans still trust mainstream media and still rely on 
it for information. But in that majority, there is also a significant number who 
believe that mainstream media is one-sided and is a government mouthpiece. I 
don’t think Singaporeans are consuming news that uncritically. There is some 
kind of acknowledgement, but the only problem is that Singaporeans are ok with 
that. It has not reached the stage where they say, oh the mainstream media is 
like that, so this is part of the PAP problem and we need a change of government. 
I don’t think it is that simple, people don’t think in this way. 
 
I also read mainstream media a lot, especially if you want a source of news about 
Singapore. You have to read it, there is no choice, but you read it with a pinch of 
salt. Sometimes when I read it, I can vomit blood, but you need to know what is 
happening here.  
21:09 Hl If that’s the case, then do you think people see the state of the media and relate 
it to laws and regulation, and try to call for change? 
21:32 A6 I don’t think people make that leap or that connection. Most people will say, if 
you have problems with mainstream media, you can set up your own website, 
nobody’s going to stop you from doing that. I don’t think people see that there is 
something wrong with the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, for instance. 
21:55 HL And for the fact that it hasn’t really been used? 
22:00 A6 Yeah, but what is problematic about NPPA is that the minister has to approve 
who sits on the board. But these are things that Singaporeans don’t really care 
about. 
22:18 HL Ok. Online media, then – what do you think are the public’s perceptions of it? Or 
what have you heard so far, when people tell you about online media? 
22:40 A6 It depends. You have to break it down because it is hard to generalise. If you talk 
about The Online Citizen, people increasingly don’t see it as reliable... I’ve heard 
that from many people. But they do produce some quality pieces from time to 
time.  
 
If you look at Mothership, I think a lot of people go there and want to read stuff 
from there. But Mothership doesn’t seem to have a very clear editorial line, and I 
find it a bit confusing. They seem to be working on the basis of whatever they 
think can create as many views as possible and get away with it, but not to the 
extent at least that they are desperately click baity. What I mean by editorial line 
is that you have a position on certain things, so we know what to expect, the 
same way that when I read the Telegraph or the Guardian, I know what to 
expect. Some of the stuff is interesting and has a bit of a novelty element, but I 
won’t take it seriously as a news source. 
 
Then if you look at RiceMedia, their pieces tend to be more personal and 
reflective. There are also others which are more socio-political in nature but they 
seem to be few and far between. Some of their articles can be interesting but 
they’ve also got some bad ones which in my opinion are a bit unethical. They 
profiled this guy, Kurt Wee or something… [details of the storyline] So they did 
this full story of him which kind of makes him look bad, and the point was to 
mock him. I mean, why do you want to do a story like that, what is the point? 
They also do silly stuff like write fake letters to ST Forum, and analyse what kinds 
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of letters will get published – sure it attracts eyeballs, but for what? You have a 
lot of shares, good for you, but I don’t see the point of doing that! 
 
[Discussion about the popularity of Mothership and RiceMedia and how they 
reach out to millennials] 
 
I want to read social and political news, and these two sites are not going to give 
it to me. 
27:25 HL I’ll just go to the last one on the roster, which is The Independent, since you have 
all of them already. 
27:30 A6 Honestly, I don’t read The Independent that much. It is also quite problematic. It 
has a lot of promise, but it also does a lot of this click-baity stuff. I can’t give you 
specifics, but (there were instances where) after I read the title and click through, 
cheh! I mean, why do you do that? [discussion on specific articles] 
 
Again, the standards are lacking. Sometimes they will take stuff from Facebook 
and publish, which is fine. But if you are a proper news site, for it to be a proper 
article, you need a response from someone (who was referred to in the post). 
You at least need to write to them, and if they don’t answer, at least say they 
didn’t answer. But they take what I say wholesale and publish it. TOC is also a bit 
guilty of that. 
 
This comes back to your question of what people feel about these websites. Sites 
like TOC and The Independent, because I still support sites like that – I think that 
social-political dissent is precious and important in Singapore – I would still 
support them. But I’m not like your ordinary Singaporean, who are probably are 
like Bertha Henson, you know, the middle-ground types. The majority of thinking 
Singaporeans belong to that camp, and most will say that TOC and TISG are not 
reliable. So I don’t think online media, especially the social-political sites, have a 
good reputation. 
30:45 HL Well, two things, then: Do you think that has impacted how these online 
channels operate?  And how is it possible for them to get out of this? 
31:00 A6 TOC and TISG tend to attract those who are strongly oppositional figures, for 
want of a better way to phrase it. You say anything that is bad about the 
government, they will amplify these sentiments. You see it in their comments. 
But then you will only cater to that kind of crowd. 
 
There is also the other one, which I suspect is way more popular than TOC or 
TISG but worse than them – States Time Review! [discussion on STR’s operational 
standards, or lack thereof] 
 
Then you will only continue to attract that kind of audience, which I don’t think 
does you any service. 
32:18 HL Ok, I’ll move on to the next question and ask you how both mainstream and 
online media can improve? What do they need to do? 
32:34 A6 Online media, I think they need to start with basic journalistic standards. Where 
some of the good pieces appear is when they get people to write opinion pieces.  
The opinion pieces in The Straits Times are too careful. You can almost sense 
they are very afraid of transgressing some kind of boundary, and as a result the 
opinions lack punch. You don’t feel like someone is trying to persuade you to 
their point of view, you just see that they are trying to appear balanced so they 
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don’t get into trouble with the government. When I compare the opinion pieces 
from overseas sources with those of The Straits Times, it is so clear – the quality 
of the writing, the way they substantiate their arguments is just so much better. 
Straits Times editors, you can almost feel their fear. It is like they are holding 
back on something, and they say “to be fair…”. No need! If you feel strongly for 
your case, just argue for it. Of course, you should take the other side’s argument 
into consideration, but you should be able to address it if your central thesis 
holds up.  
35:14 HL I’ll just go back to your point on establishing basic journalistic standards. What do 
you think needs to be done? 
35:20 A6 Ok, I gave you the example of ripping stuff from Facebook posts and publishing it 
wholesale, without any attempt to clarify or contacting the parties involved. No, 
it cannot be a cut and paste job. It’s a practice issue. 
 
[Specific discussion about how the lack of resources should not be justification for 
not aiming for higher standards] 
36:49 HL You mentioned no money. Is raising funds an issue, and given the way online 
media is going right now, do you think that this will continue to be a problem? 
37:00 A6 I think yes it will. I think the demand for critical news is not strong enough for 
people to want to pay for it, unless you can produce really good quality stuff. I 
think New Naratif is moving in that direction, but they are not producing enough 
local stuff at the moment, although I’m not privy to their subscribers. They have 
a more regional focus, and I can understand why. In terms of sustainability, 
they’re probably thinking that focusing on local audiences only is not going to get 
you far. 
 
I believe that the majority of Singaporeans tend to be those who subscribe to the 
middle ground… Because her level of criticality is the sort that most people are 
comfortable with – which is yes, we must critique the establishment, but at the 
same time we also need to be fair to them. Most people are like that.  
39:21  [Discussion on readership figures of the various websites] 
42:10 A6 Yahoo, in terms of standards, yes it is higher, but i don’t feel as if they are hard-
hitting enough. TOC in its heyday, probably peaked during the 2011 general 
elections. Back then they had a lot more quality stuff. They had a more diverse 
field of writers and they commissioned people in their fields of expertise to write. 
So Alfian would talk about theatre and race, and I think Andrew had a big part to 
play in it. What I really admire about Andrew is his ability to piece all this 
information together, then you have no choice but to agree with him! [brief 
discussion about Andrew’s writing style and getting more people into TOC] 
44:41 HL I’ll just jump back to Mothership. It is quite clearly a different model compared to 
the other websites. It has the critical mass. If it were to take a more politically 
critical position, what would happen? 
44:59 A6 I suspect they will lose their audience. Most people are not so politically inclined 
or want to read in-depth articles about social-political issues. Part of their success 
is that they publish stuff that isn’t too heavy or that can be consumed in bite 
sized pieces. If they were to start going in that direction, they will lose 
viewership. I suppose the only way for them to improve is to, once in a while, 
throw in some in-depth stuff.  
46:02 HL Last question – given the way the online environment is moving, what do you 
think the government will do in terms of the regulation that they can throw out? 
What changes do you see taking place? 
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46:21 A6 The fake news law is probably going to come. It is a matter of time, maybe after 
the next elections? They might want to use the elections to justify the need for 
this law, or they could want it before the elections to do something about people 
who are critical! I don’t know, but I do believe it is a matter of time.  
46:57 HL Broadcasting Act, do you foresee any changes? 
47:00 A6 Not at the moment. If you are talking about TV, they don’t see any threats. But 
the Broadcasting Act also regulates internet sites.  
47:19 HL So you think that if any regulation would change, it would more or less target the 
online environment?  
47:24 A6 Yeah, definitely, that’s where the threats are. 
47:29 HL Ok. Any other views that you might have about the Singapore media 
environment? 
47:34 A6 Right, the reason why I say Mothership will lose its audience is because, I look at 
other sites like SGAG, its pure rubbish! It is easy to consume, it is funny, and that 
attracts a lot of people. If you look at SMRT Feedback, you see that a stupid post 
can have a few thousand shares. The appetite is not for political and social news, 
because it is serious and boring. The majority of people don’t think like that. 
48:40 HL  Do you see that as a problem for society? 
48:42 A6 It is, because you want a more politically literate society, right? But the reality is 
that people are not interested. The education system is also partly to blame for 
producing people who are not politically and socially conscious. So I’m not 
surprised that sites, if they want to survive, will go in that direction, because you 
need revenue. 





Appendix K – Transcript of interview with a media academic in a Singapore university 
Date: 2 August 2018 
Time: 2:00pm 
Location: Interviewee’s office 
1:30 HL [Introductions and explanations of the options for anonymity] 
So, maybe what I would do is to get a sense of your perceptions on media 
regulations, then we work our way down to it (the fake news issue). So, 
regulations more broadly, you can think of it in terms of laws, any acts of 
Parliament that we have, or a specific government policy as well, if you want to. 
2:01 A1 I have to admit that I’m not that hundred percent on top of things for specific 
legislations. My research focus has really been on consumer perceptions. I do 
know fleetingly about certain kinds of regulations, I probably should know them 
better! I know that for particular cases in the past with The Real Singapore, for 
example, people were charged under the Sedition Act, and I think that’s where 
the limitations of that bit of legislation became evident. You seem to be using a 
very harsh, if you will, regulation to police online content. And if you speak to 
certain academics or people who have a vested interest in this topic, they would 
say that we should not allow online content to be regulated with a law such as 
the Sedition Act. You should have something that is more targeted at the 
medium of expression, you should have something that is a little bit more well-
delineated in terms of its reach. So, in that sense, I think this whole conversation 
about having new legislation to specifically deal with online disinformation is 
actually answering to these kinds of criticisms. 
 
But yes, the Sedition Act is the one that would immediately come to mind. I think 
that is the one that has been the most problematic in terms of public perception. 
Like what, all you do is post something and you can be charged with sedition? So 
that has been the most salient one in my mind. 
4:07 HL Just to get a sense, do you think that it was a deliberate policy decision to look at 
the whole issue of fake news as kind of a means to “scope down” the issues 
relating to the Sedition Act? It being too harsh, in that sense. 
4:28 A1 I’m not sure. That one, you would need someone in that policy space to 
comment. I’m not sure, but it could be a response to these sort of perceptions 
that you are killing an ant with a sledgehammer, and also something that is 
specifically more catered to the medium of expression. If you think about the 
Sedition Act, going back historically – I mean for The Real Singapore, you could 
argue that it was a form of sedition, but it also seems out of sync with the original 
spirit of the Sedition Act.  
5:14 HL Yeah, I mean the whole idea of using the Sedition Act is basically to target 
treason – it is that broad a scope, or it should be that narrow a scope, and it is 
not very clear. And the editors from TRS have also said, for what we are doing, 
why do you call us traitors?  
5:36 A1 Yes that is correct, but I have to say, on the issue of the regulations and the sorts 
of deficiencies, if you will, with regards to online disinformation, I thought that 
the submission by Goh Yihan from SMU – if you get to speak to him – I thought 
his analysis was fairly sound. And he goes through blow by blow – 
Telecommunications Act, this and that Act, and how they have particular 
weaknesses vis-à-vis online disinformation. So like I said, I’m not a legal expert, 
but he is! 
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6:24 HL Ok. So I guess if you are saying that there are limitations to current regulations, 
the fake news legislation might be able to target it. Any view on what can be 
done to the current laws as they are? Because there were also some proposals 
during the fake news (hearings) about how it is that we can amend or change – 
maybe have a relook at some of these laws. I think one of them was Eugene Tan. 
He kind of echoed the sentiments of some who said that the current laws we 
have actually do deal with fake news, and it’s a question of how they can be 
better refined to deal with it. He also cautioned against the sledgehammer kind 
of concept. 
7:20 A1 I think one of the issues with online disinformation was expunging, if you will, the 
fake news from the media ecosystem, and the fact that the current legislation 
does not permit the removal of the content. And that was Yihan’s point – that if 
you look at the current legislation, it does not allow you to remove the content.  
 
But of course, there is the whole issue surrounding, you know, what does 
removal do, and is removal necessarily realistic? And what can you do besides 
the removal of content? So that is another whole different conversation. 
8:24 HL [Elaboration on specific submission points] 
You mentioned literacy, and a whole gamut of literacy that we need to take part 
in with the audience. Can you share on any specific points? If we were to 
compare that to legislation, what are the pros and cons? 
8:57 A1 If we are talking about legislation to remove, I think the problem is that, the 
legislation can say one thing, but the technology can circumvent the legislation. 
And that can be a little bit problematic if there is an outright removal of 
something from the Singapore cyberspace, but it crops up, nevertheless, from 
some other country. Or even then, it can be shared by person-to-person 
dissemination. So that’s obviously where the legislation has more of a 
demonstrative effect, where we say that X article must be removed because it 
has seditious content or it has a deliberate intent to mislead, and therefore 
everybody be alerted to the fact that this story must now not be repeated or 
shared. If we should have legislation that allows for that to happen, I think the 
law and the pronouncements of these kinds of inappropriate content will 
essentially have more of a demonstrative effect rather than necessarily being 
able to remove the content from cyberspace. 
 
Which is then where media literacy is still the more powerful inoculator, so to 
speak. It doesn’t matter if something is considered online disinformation and 
whether it has been removed from the space or not – people, if they should 
encounter it serendipitously, should be able to tell if something is suspect. 
10:59 HL But if want to look at laws having a demonstrative effect, is it then required to 
have laws? 
11:09 A1 I guess so, for the symbolic value, to signal that this is something that we do not 
condone, this is something that we discourage, and this is something that given 
the circumstances, can invite punitive action.  
11:45 HL So in other words, you are thinking of the law as a placeholder-threat kind of 
thing? 
11:50 A1 Yeah, having the deterrent effect. So if you think about... property prices, for 
instance. Someone who is deliberately setting out fake information to 
manipulate property prices, and obviously in a country where these kinds of 
things matter a lot to people who are trying to upgrade or move to their next 
home. If someone is able to profit unfairly from the dissemination of this kind of 
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incendiary content, then we need to have some kind of legislation that can signal 
the ramifications if you should engage in this kind of harmful activity. Because 
obviously there is an intent to cause harm, and furthermore there is that benefit 
from the intent. 
 
So if you think about it, The Real Singapore, they deserve it! They deserve the 
punitive action, it’s just that the Sedition Act at that moment seems to be the 
main thing that can be mobilised against them.  
13:23 HL I’d reserve judgement on that! So in your view, they did something wrong. It’s 
just a question of whether the law that is applied reflects that wronghood? 
13:31 A1 Yes. I mean look, I find it hard to believe that someone as educated as you would 
say that you don’t necessarily think that The Real Singapore did not deserve what 
they got. If you think about it, they were very deliberately fabricating news 
stories that clearly capitalised on visceral attitudes that people hold towards 
ethnic differences. And they were milking all these stories for eyeballs and they 
generated a lot of income. I think that’s highly harmful. 
14:26 HL So, essentially, I noted that it is, in that sense, about better couching the terms of 
what we perceive to be good or bad, lawful and unlawful. You also mentioned 
about the ethics with how some of these social media platforms are using the 
data that has been given to them. Wouldn’t that be something that has more to 
do with privacy? I mean, to me, the privacy issues are stronger compared to any 
issue of propagating fake news. The classic example would of course be 
Cambridge Analytica, where Facebook was taking some of the data from its users 
and basically selling it off, in a way, to a third party organisation that can 
effectively use it for certain marketing or propaganda purposes as it deem fit. 
Would the issue be about the privacy of individual Facebook users, rather than 
an issue of propagating fake news? 
15:54 A1 Oh no, of course it is an issue of propagating fake news. I mean yes, in the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, there was a clear breach of privacy in the sense 
that they milked individual accounts in order to profile people of different 
demographic characteristics so as to know what kind of information to push to 
them in order to sway their allegiances, political affiliations and so on, right? So 
that was clearly a privacy issue. But if you look at the entire machinery of 
Facebook as a whole, or even the other big tech companies, it’s more than just 
privacy. It’s about a very deliberate attempt to milk your users for the most 
amount of traction in order for them to spend the most amount of time on your 
platform. That goes beyond privacy, it goes into infrastructures that you create 
on your site, it goes into the kinds of affordances you introduce. It goes into the 
kinds of algorithms you design that determines what kind of content attracts the 
most eyeballs, garners the most shares and drives up traffic in the shortest 
amount of time possible. So that is way more than a privacy issue. It’s 
manipulation of the platforms. 
17:27 HL Fair enough. I’ll just move a little bit beyond the fake news issue and get your 
views on public perception of media in Singapore. Feel free to interpret it 
whichever way you want, but what I’m currently thinking of is what people 
consider to be qualities of mainstream media versus online media. We can also 
trust quotients. What are your views? 
17:55 A1 It’s actually quite complex because I think there is such a hodgepodge now – I 
mean, there is tremendous fragmentation. If you look at the elderly, you might 
think that they are more on mainstream media, but at the same time you are 
also increasingly seeing a lot of elderly people – because of the turning off of 2G 
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and smart phones being the defacto phones in Singapore. And then you are also 
seeing the rise of tablet devices that are more user friendly, and also much more 
language agnostic, because for every smart phone now, it doesn’t matter if you 
are a Malay or Chinese speaker, you can immediately set the language to your 
preferred language. So I think among the elderly, there is also a very discernible 
shift away from mainstream media. 
 
Among the young, the digital natives, obviously they grew up with all this online 
media and I think for them, they don’t see reading The Straits Times as 
something that everyone must do. Our TV is not even used for used for 
broadcast, we just (use it to) watch DVDs. 
 
When you look at news consumption, it has become so complex because it has 
become very much socially mediated. And people are reading news not because 
it is something from a source that has to be read, but it comes from someone 
who has shared with you interesting things in the past… and so you should read 
it. 
 
In terms of perceptions of mainstream media, if you believe the online chatter, 
clearly there are no more redeeming qualities to mainstream media, that it is 
essentially a government mouthpiece! Then if you look at studies done by IPS, 
they will tell you that during election time, online media took a backseat to 
mainstream media because people still saw mainstream media as bastions of 
quality and reliability. I would say that the picture is very complex now. And to 
ask a general question like “what are the public perceptions”, it’s very hard to 
answer. 
20:45 HL That’s fine, no worries. So I get the sense that right now, it is less clearly defined 
as to the role of traditional media versus online media… Do you think there is a 
blurring of distinctions between what is good quality and bad quality? 
21:16 A1 Yeah, there is. It is really just what comes up on the feed. And it is becomes, 
again, that social mediation, because what comes out on the feed is determined 
by what people in your network are liking and sharing. So if you think about the 
network that we curate for ourselves, that to a large part determines what we 
think is good quality or bad quality. And then of course, the social buzz 
surrounding specific stories – sometimes you will find something from a less 
credible source going all the way up, and something from a highly reputable 
source not appearing on your feed at all. With people of my generation, we grew 
up on these blue-chip brands, so we will actually specifically go and look out for 
these things. But for (the younger generation), none of this really matters. It is 
about what comes up first and what people are talking about. 
 
So that whole business about something being higher quality or lower quality, 
that is part of the media literacy education process. We should be able to tell 
people not to use virality as the sole determinant of the import of the news, but 
look at quality indicators. My kids are more conscious of these kinds of issues 
than their peers, and I can say this because I know what my daughter’s friends 
are sharing with her, and I would tell her, yes but have you seen this? The peer 
dynamics obviously is a huge determinant. 
 
And even for the elderly, when you think about Whatsapp groups, there is a lot 
of sharing in these closed groups. And within groups it is also problematic, 
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because there is the element of “face”. So even if someone has shared 
something that is highly dubious, you may not necessarily call them out. Whereas 
on Facebook, which is a little bit more open, people who are not necessarily 
direct friends might say that this is (dubious information). There is that self-
correcting, self-regulating mechanism in the open social platforms that the 
closed social platforms may not have. The closed social platform add to the 
virality of things – things are being shared because of the buzz surrounding them, 
and not because of their innate quality or lack thereof. 
24:32 HL In your view, people are generally not able to distinguish between – back to the 
question on the quality of news – they are not able (to do so)? 
24:45 A1 Let’s give everyone the benefit of the doubt. We need to trust that over time, 
and because our population is highly educated – we need to trust that people 
have the ability to discern. But whether then they have the time to do that is 
another story. And this is where… [anonymised content] When we have this 
deluge of information coming at us in multiple platforms, and coming via social 
mediation where I’m getting it from people whom I trust, I let my guard down, 
right? And we make snap judgements because of the time famine that we are all 
suffering from in a highly informationalised society. 
 
I have seen very educated friends sharing things that are clearly dubious, but it 
was just that at the spur of the moment, you take a glance, the stuff is very slickly 
packaged, it seems fairly legitimate, you think other people should hear about it, 
and you share it.  
26:03 HL Do they actually believe it? 
26:06 A1 Thereafter when we correct them, they are like “oh yah!” And these are friends 
whom I know would have been able to tell, if they have taken two more 
moments to read it. 
 
So coming back to your question about whether people are discerning, I think 
people are, but the landscape, because of the time pressure, over proliferation of 
content, we are very much strained in our abilities to be as discerning as we 
should be.  
26:40 Hl  So if I might just summarise the points you made: that people are seeing less of a 
distinction between mainstream media versus online media, or for that matter 
credible versus non-credible media. It is really about the content that they are 
most familiar with, which generally comes from social networks.  
27:01 A1 Not most familiar with, but the content that seems to have the most buzz at that 
time. 
27:08 HL Ok, so in essence, the viral content. And the question of discernment, it is 
possible, but for time-sensitive issues, for instance, people might not pull the 
faculties in to make that kind of discernment. 
27:30 A1 Yup. And it also doesn’t help that when you look at the disinformation, clearly 
the purveyors know how to push the right buttons. They will write stories in 
particular ways that really resonate, that they have tried and tested over time 
and found to have worked. They use strategies that arouse people’s interests and 
motivate them to share very quickly. So these techniques that the purveyors of 
online disinformation employ further undermine our ability to be as discerning as 
we should be. 
 
And then of course, they play on your biases, whether you are a far-right 
conservative or a left-wing liberal, if they are trying to appeal to whatever camp, 
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they know how to write a story in such a way that it speaks to you and resonates 
with you. 
28:31 Hl On that point, what is happening in the UK now, they had a similar Parliamentary 
Committee to study (fake news). And I think the interim report is that, with the 
increasing focus on the issue of fake news, people are more aware of such 
content. Do you think that would help in order for people to develop those 
faculties that, whatever information they receive, to say hang on, it might not be 
true? 
28:10 A1 I think so. When you look at the low-hanging fruits in media literacy education – 
look out for the grammar, check the “about us” page, look out for dubious URLs – 
all that has already been done. But the more complex stuff to explain to people 
is, look, you are not perfect, you’ve got biases, and you’ve got to watch out for 
these biases when you are consuming media content. So I think the discourse 
surrounding biases being employed by purveyors of news, whether fake news or 
otherwise, has become a lot more salient with the growing discussion on fake 
news, and that certainly has raised awareness. I think not only in Britain but in 
Singapore, I’m seeing more public education platforms which are talking about 
these issues of cognitive biases, and that certainly is something that has 
enhanced public understanding. 
30:26 HL Alright. I think I’ll go out on a branch here… I want you ask you about what you 
think of the evolution of the media industry in Singapore. I think there is a shift 
towards the online medium, both among the traditional media and of course the 
current online players. How do you think these changes will impact the way the 
government deals with regulation? 
31:10 A1 The two don’t necessarily relate, right? Let me answer it part by part. So if 
evolution, I think with the demographics and eyeballs shifting online, there is of 
course the emergence of more independent media producers – the likes of Rice 
Media, New Nation, Mothership, SGAG. In the first instance, then seem to be 
more entertainment driven, but I also see them delving much more into the 
social political space. To me, that’s healthy, because for the younger generation, 
they need to be educated about social-political issues. If they are educated 
through these somewhat more accessible channels that resonate with them, so 
be it. 
 
In as much as I despise some of them, I see these platforms as being valuable, 
because they do highlight certain social political issues and remind young people 
that there is a broader community out there beyond celebrity influencers! That 
there are deep-seated social issues that we as citizens need to think about for 
the long road. So that part of the evolution is certainly positive and healthy, and 
also adds diversity to the whole media landscape. 
 
On the issue of regulation… [clarification on earlier question] I think that the 
existing legislation is already sufficient vis-à-vis what these platforms that I have 
mentioned are doing. And then when we come back to the issue of online 
disinformation, if these players or anyone else should engage in online 
disinformation, then we need to think about whether the more refined 
legislation that is possible being proposed could come into play. 
 
I would say that these existing platforms are very similar to The Online Citizen, 
which has been around for eons, in terms of their operating models. 
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34:26 HL Well, just to share… [clarification of differing operating models between 
websites] 
 
That would be the extent of my questions. Is there anything that you would want 
to add? 
35:45 A1 No, I think you covered quite a lot of ground. I think you had some questions 
about what I thought of the Select Committee process? 
35:53 HL Yes! Feel free to add your views. 
35:57 A1 In its totality and from the get-go, I thought that the whole Select Committee 
process was highly educational. When you think about how a lot of policy-making 
in Singapore is done by policy-makers, and thy are the one who trawl through the 
literate and survey the policy landscape worldwide, and then they propose a Bill 
and the Bill becomes legislation – I don’t think a lot of public eyeballs are trained 
on these processes. 
 
But in the case of the Select Committee, the fact that the hearings transpired 
over a whole two-week period – you had people from all across the media 
industry from mainstream media to big tech, from academia and members of the 
public – and the amount of media attention that was trained on the whole issue. 
I thought that as a matter of public education it was something that Singapore 
has not seen in recent history, that to me was very valuable.  
37:40 HL There were other instances (of Select Committee public hearings) as well, but if I 
remember correctly, they did say that this was by far the greatest number of 
submissions and hearings.  
37:54 A1 And it is also the era in which it took place. I think the previous Select 
Committees hearings, you would not have had the social media buzz. [Exchange 
on the history of Select Committees] 
 
And the other thing also is that… for the longest time media literacy is see as the 
preserve of educators and students. Because of this whole online disinformation 
and the Select Committee, and the mobilisation of a huge swath of stakeholders, 
I think one of the significant effects of the process was the recognition that this 
was a problem that everyone must take ownership. To me, that was another 
positive effect of the Select Committee process. 
39:15 HL So your view is that, one of the key take-aways is that people are generally more 
open to the idea that this is everyone’s problem. 
39:37 A1 Yeah. And you had cyber security experts from the US, fake news activists from 
central Asian republics – and it was such a huge diversity of perspectives that in 
Singapore, we hardly get to see. But everything within two weeks, that was 
pretty remarkable. 
39:53 HL  My next question to you, then would be, do you think all of it is relevant? 
39:58 A1 I think that’s a tough call. When you get the submission and you are trying to 
cover every aspect of a very complex issue, if I was the civil servant who was 
trying to get everyone on board, I would try to be a little bit more inclusive, 
right? Clearly some submissions are better than others. 
40:23 HL Ok. I guess in your view, the educational value is a good thing. Anything that you 
find negative about it? 
40:31 A1 Well, I guess certain sessions needn’t have been the way they were! [no mention 
of specific sessions during interview] 
40:47 HL For these sessions, what were some of the issues that you fond (were not ideal)?  
40:52 A1 I guess… ok, let’s not go there, the whole issue was really complex.  
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41:13 HL So in your view (these session) didn’t really add much to the conversation, which 
you mentioned was having the diversity of opinions, as well as a better sense of 
the ownership involved with media literacy? 
41:49 A1 They detracted from it, yeah. 
42:10 HL Ok. Just one more thing, and I’m not sure if this is part of your study… In terms of 
regulation from other parts of the world, is there anything that we can learn 
from? Be it fake news or any other kind of regulation, policy or practices. 
42:26 A1 I think if you look at the countries where the civic activity around the calling out 
of fake news – so for example, I’ve had the benefit of meeting people of such ilk 
from Indonesia and Philippines, where these activists feel that the state is not as 
proactive as it should be. My sense is that these countries where there is civic 
space for citizens to be directly involved in the calling out of fake news has very 
beneficial public education value, and again is consonant with my earlier point of 
it being everyone’s problem and people taking ownership. So I think Singapore, 
maybe not having such a rich history of civic activity, hasn’t necessarily seen as 
much efforts in that realm. But if such efforts do grow, or are allowed or 
encouraged to grow, it would also be very positive.  
44:03 HL You sound uncertain as to whether they would be allowed to grow! 
44:09 A1 [Laughs] But also the whole business of resource constraints. When I look at the 
people I met in the Philippines, there was this organisation called Fake Block, and 
these were former journalists who were deeply passionate about the fact that 
the news environment has become so deeply polluted. They draw on a lot of 
their personal energies to do this, and I’m not sure you can find people that 
selfless anywhere in the world, not to mention Singapore. 
44:45 HL But it could be because – now I’m guess – in the Philippines, it is born out of a 
necessity to counter policy statements made by the current President. 
45:03 A1 Well yes, its goes back to the issue of bad actors. 





Appendix L – Transcript of interview with a media academic in a Singapore university 
Date: 16 August 2018 
Time: 9:30am 
Location: Interviewee’s office 
1:48 HL [Introduction to topic] 
I’ll just start with a very broad question of what are your perceptions of media 
regulation in Singapore. You can take it in terms of laws, some of the Acts (of 
Parliament) that we have, and any kind of government policy that you might 
have come across. 
2:04 A2 I think in terms of media regulation in Singapore, there are two types of effects. 
One is the direct effect, by circumscribing the out-of-boundaries markers, what’s 
tolerated and not tolerated online. The other effect is indirect, in terms of the 
possible kinds of signals that laws may send to users that come from different 
backgrounds, and which may subsequently influence their discourse. 
 
Let’s talk about the first, the more direct kind of effect. If you look at the existing 
slate of regulations that we have in Singapore, we really have quite a 
comprehensive set of laws. We have laws created to govern speech in the offline 
context, a lot of which had been put into place post-independence, some even 
handed (down) from the colonial times, to govern speech prior to internet days. 
Some well-known examples would be the Sedition Act or the Defamation Act. 
The Sedition Act has been used in the online context in the past couple of years – 
for example, the two or three young men in I think 2009, who made remarks 
about the minority groups, they were charged with the Sedition Act. So these 
were laws that were actually created for the offline context, but when the 
internet became more widespread, these laws were then extended to cover the 
online space. One notable example was fateha.com, when the website was 
ordered to shut down and the editor Zulfikar was charged under the Defamation 
Act. You can see how this set of laws for offline extended to online. 
 
And then we have certain kinds of regulations that are specifically crafted for the 
online space. So you have regulations like the Class Licensing Scheme which is set 
up to promote certain kinds of content norms in cyberspace. You also have the 
internet licensing scheme which stipulates that online content providers and ISPs 
will need to meet certain content requirements or adhere to certain types of 
standards. All this will have implications on the kind of discourse that is produced 
and subsequently disseminated online. 
 
Then of course, in more recent year, we see laws such as the licensing of news 
websites, which happened in 2013 where we had a fair bit of discussion when 
the government introduced individual licensing for news websites, that saw a 
protest at Hong Lim Park that saw the involvement of various bloggers. 
[telephone interruption]. That was when the government came up with 
regulation to license online news providers and it has a certain set of criteria to 
define which kind of sites need to be regulated and which kind of sites do not 
need to be regulated. We also see other Acts such as the Protection from 
Harassment Act which covers both the online and offline space. I think the 
premise for that was that harassment takes different forms and different 
contexts such as workplace, schools and increasingly in the online space. So we 
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see different types of Acts and, in that sense seen in totality, currently for the 
local media space there are many different types of laws to govern speech. They 
act directly by stipulating directly what is and is not tolerable. Cases when the 
Sedition Act was used, for instance against The Real Singapore – what they did 
supposedly inflame tensions between different communities in Singapore, which 
does fall under the ambit of the Sedition Act. Hence, the two editors were 
charged and the website was shutdown. 
 
So this is direct working of regulations. The indirect way in which regulations 
work would then send certain signals to the users of technology, which 
sometimes may lead to certain amounts of self-censorship, where it may cause 
people to be a bit more deliberative and more careful with what they say online. 
In some of my discussion with other academics and policy makers, one of the 
observations is that we are seeing people being perhaps a bit more circumspect 
online in what they say. One possible reason could be that they are concerned 
with the consequences. They may have very critical or alternative views, but they 
may not be putting their views out there. I don’t think there has been research 
that specifically address these issues and to elicit people’s opinions on what they 
post and do not post and why. But if you look at the studies conducted during the 
general elections in 2015, people typically use social media to find out what 
other people are talking about, what other people online and their colleagues 
and friends are talking about. There is a lot of information seeking, but when it 
came to creating and posting content, there is a much smaller number of people 
posting and expressing themselves online. So there could be a few factors, one of 
which could be a correlation between the use and application of laws and what 
they say. 
10:06 HL I’m getting the sense that what you are saying is that the direct effect are 
instances where the laws have been exercised to kind of curb what I would 
perceive to be dissenting voices, but in talking about indirect measures, you are 
talking about instances where the laws might not even be used, but people sense 
that certain debates or the passing of news law, what the new laws are supposed 
or not supposed to cover – that kind of has a chilling effect and make people feel 
less open? 
10:47 A2 I think for some people there could be a chilling effect, but for others it could be 
that they realise that the laws apply for a particular reason, so I should adhere to 
that, and also I don’t want to get into trouble. So it probably works differently for 
different kinds of people. I’m not sure if you are familiar with Lawrence Lessig’s 
work, a law professor from the US, when he talked about the code of cyberspace 
and how law can work directly and indirectly. I think that clearly applies in 
Singapore’s space. 
 
But one thing that I would like to comment on – I know that there has been a fair 
bit of concern and criticism with the existing legislature as regulating speech, and 
certainly every time when a new phenomenon comes out or a new law is tabled, 
or the government says we are looking into this area, the immediate response 
from usually online users would be, “ok, another law to clamp down on online 
discourse that infringes on free speech”. 
 
But if we look at the kind of laws that have been used, whether the application of 
existing laws that have traditionally been used in the offline space or the creation 
of new laws, I personally feel that there has been a fair bit of consistency and 
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constancy. The OB markers are always the same, they have not really changed – 
race, language, religion. Even when we are looking at the current debate on fake 
news and disinformation, I think some of the signals or messaging that the Select 
Committee or ministers have talked about is the concerns with how fake news 
can affect social stability and cohesion in Singapore. So in that sense, the 
consistency has been there. While online technology has evolved, the different 
kinds of modality and platforms have seen greater diversification, people’s usage 
have also grown and changed in different ways – but the laws and their 
application I feel have always been quite regular. 
13:28 HL But if you don’t mind I challenge that a little, when some people talk about the 
OB markers, and even Cheong Yip Seng mentioned in his book, that sometimes 
these OB markers are not very clear. You have these fairly broad guidelines about 
social mores and racial and religious harmony, but specific instances where they 
are applied suggests that the boundaries are quite porous. The clear case is you 
have TRS – a lot of the people I talk to don’t support what they are doing, 
because they are stepping over a boundary where you deliberately or mistakenly 
try to manipulate content to suit a particular purpose. But you also have the case 
of Amos Yee, who is basically mouthing off, but both of them are taken to task, 
even if under different laws, for inciting civil unrest of racial and religious 
harmony. It’s not that clearly defined to the extent where people can say for sure 
what they can and cannot do. Just wondering how you would view that? 
14:45 A2 No, I think here we are not talking about agreeing or disagreeing with the 
application (of laws). So if you talk about TRS, I feel the case is a bit more clear 
cut. In the past, you talk about the Sedition Act, which basically acts against 
speech that promotes tension and ill-will between different communities in 
Singapore. In the past where it was brought up, there were lines where racial 
speech was crossed. In the TRS case, the two incidents that were brought up did 
not specifically have to do with race or religion, but they were potentially going 
to cause a certain tension or conflict between two specific communities – the 
locals and the foreigners. So in that sense, I can see that the application of the 
Sedition Act – whether or not it is too harsh, I think that is a separate debate. 
Here we are talking about the earlier point I made, which is the constancy of 
application. 
 
Amos Yee’s case — the justification for taking action against a sixteen-year-old is 
for another discussion. Charges were brought up against him – the Penal Code 
and the Harassment Act which was dropped quite quickly, and I think it was very 
apparent why. That thing that caught him was the remark against Christians, 
right? In that sense, wounding the feelings of another community, that is not 
exactly new. So that is what I mean by the constancy, you see. So I could see why 
that was applied to him, but as to whether it should be used, that is another 
matter. My disagreement would not be with the irregularity of application, but 
the harshness. Would other measures have been more suited especially for a 
young man his age?  
17:17 HL So am I right to say that your sense is that the overall approach that is taken by 
the state towards dissenting voices – that is very broad, I guess a more 
appropriate term is, things that fall out of social norms – has been fairly 
consistent, it’s just that the exact laws that apply to it would vary, and it is 
possible to question whether laws are suitable or not, and you feel that the 
general approach is still sound? 
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17:53 A2 Constant and consistent, and I think in 2009 the government amended Section 
298A of the Penal Code so that they don’t have to use the Sedition Act all the 
time, because the Sedition Act can be quite harsh. So the Penal Code and its 
subsidiaries can be a more appropriate legislative response to tackle some of the 
similar problems. 
18:33 HL Ok. In your view then, do you think that some of the laws are overboard, or any 
that you think are inappropriate for their use? I’m talking, of course, about media 
laws. 
18:50 A2 I think in terms of application, if we go by the definition of what is and is not 
tolerable, they have been used not just consistently, but also in the relevant 
context. But should they be used? I think that is the question that needs to be 
asked. I personally and professionally feel that people need to learn how to 
disagree. They need to learn how to engage. So, speaking up to engage – 
whether with the government or fellow Singaporeans, certainly with people who 
disagree – is not something that we are born with. Increasingly, I think it is 
becoming obvious that it is a skill and competency that needs to be learnt, right? 
 
My concerns with the application of laws is that, where they are applied too soon 
or at the slightest provocation, does it then dissuade people to speak up, and in 
so doing actually limit the number of opportunities and their ability to learn how 
to engage in discourse? So I think… [anonymised content] perhaps we should give 
more opportunity for community regulation where people online step up and 
correct one another. And we have seen instances of that, (such as) the case of 
the axed NTUC employee who made remarks about the Malay-Muslim 
community holding weddings in void-decks. I think the criticisms against her and 
what she said came on online fast and furious from within the community. Of 
course, her employers stepped in and removed her from her position. The 
government didn’t have to step in at that point and no charges were brought 
against her. So I think we should give Singaporeans (who go) online the 
opportunity to engage in what is right and wrong. Let them do the censuring, 
criticism and stepping up, and perhaps for the law to step in when it is more 
egregious. 
 
Then of course, the problem is how you define egregiousness. I think perhaps 
sometimes policy makers feel that if you wait until something is egregious then it 
is too late, right? So we should perhaps see whether we can allow more time and 
space for members of the community to step up first. 
22:24 HL On that note about be egregious, I think let’s talk about the case of fake news, or 
what they call deliberate online falsehoods. I think some people will find it rare 
for the government to convene such a committee to discuss this kind of issues. 
I’ll just like to get your sense about the public consultation process, what you 
think were some of the discussions that were relevant, and the suggestions that 
have been made throughout the hearings – any that you find particularly useful? 
23:04 A2 When we started talking about fake news – and this was no secret because it was 
also reported in the press – the Minister for Law at the WAN-IFRA Straits Times 
forum in June last year actually said that fake news was a problem and 
potentially harmful for society, so the government is looking to legislate in the 
first quarter of 2018. It seems that the signal is very clear – the government will 
regulate an in the first quarter. But I think a lot of work and consultations have 
gone on during that period, which probably sent a very clear and strong signal to 
policy makers that fake news is a very complicated and complex problem. In fact, 
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fake news is only a part of a larger problem of misinformation and 
disinformation. The term itself has been misunderstood and abused. How do you 
come up with regulation to tackle a problem if you don’t understand it well 
enough? So when news broke that the government was convening a select 
committee to look into this issue, I mean, I thought it was a positive sign. Of 
course, some critics said it is for show; but for us to do our job and contribute to 
the process, we want to think that it is set up to do what it is supposed to do, and 
that there is a possibility of the process making a difference. 
 
Subsequently, we have many people who made their submissions and were 
asked to appear before the Select Committee to talk about their submissions. 
What I thought was quite heartening was the wide array of people who were 
involved in the process. It wasn’t just media and law academics, but also people 
from mainstream and online media, and even foreign experts working in various 
areas such as fact checking and disinformation detection. Even among locals who 
participated in the process, we saw different types of discussions put forth from 
various angles –regulation, education, fact-checking, media literacy, looking at 
what online and mainstream media can do, etcetera. I think these are very very 
important discussions, because if you talk about fake news, it is what public 
policy scholars will call a wicked problem – it is very complex, can be defined in 
many ways, and many people hold very different and often time strong views 
about how the problem should be tackled. There are also many intervention 
points and solutions that can contribute to countering the problem. 
 
So the process in itself – the initiative of convening the Committee, getting 
submissions, deliberately soliciting the views of foreign experts – was a good 
move, and I really hope that the submissions that were given to the Committee 
will go some way in informing policy making. 
27:30 HL I get the sense that you are saying the process itself shows a willingness to 
engage on a fairly complex issue. 
27:39 A2 Number one, I think it signals a recognition that the problem is very complicated 
and legislation may not be the best and certainly not the only solution. That I feel 
is quite clear. Number two, the process in itself, in terms of soliciting a wide array 
of views, is a sound move. Of course, how it was done probably saw varied 
opinions from different people. 
 
The process was twofold – we saw the written submissions which are currently 
still available on the Parliament website. I think that’s great, because for anyone 
interested, people who may or may not be studying the problem, there is 
actually quite a wide body of work that is put up there, about 140 submissions. 
The publication of all these expert views is definitely laudable. So that is one area 
of it – the soliciting of views and the dissemination of recommendations. 
 
The other aspect of the process is the actual hearings that were conducted. What 
came out from there really saw quite varied responses. I think in some instances, 
some of it was clarifications of proposals that were submitted. But of course 
there were some instances where the tone taken was a lot more challenging, 
some would say contentious and debate-like. Maybe that really ran to the 
contrary of what people’s expectations of the whole process. Some of the 




30:30 HL I think contentious is probably a very mild term, because if you remember after 
all the hearings were conducted, certain civil society groups put out statements 
to say that certain sections (of the hearings) seems to them that the government 
was trying to interrogate these people, for whatever reasons that they had. They 
didn’t get the sense that the government was trying to solicit views from these 
people. What are your views on that? 
31:12 A2 I’m not speaking for the government, because I don’t know how they think, but it 
seems to me that some of the submissions they felt were problematic. For 
instance, the submission that clearly made the argument that the government is 
a perpetrator of fake news. Then how would we have expected the government 
to respond, when almost the entire submission was saying, “you are one of the 
biggest producers of fake news”? I really couldn’t quite imagine how that 
particular hearing could have unfolded otherwise. Now, did they have to be so 
protracted? I personally felt that may not have been necessary. Because in that 
particular submission, the main thesis really was, yes fake news is a problem, this 
needs to be done, but the bulk of the submission if you have read it was that the 
government was one of the biggest producers of fake news in the historical 
discourse of Singapore. If that is the accusation in the thesis, then when the 
submitter appeared before the Select Committee, I think there was probably a 
compulsion on the part of policy makers to clarify, when then went on to 
something that was more heated. That particular instance, which was probably 
the landmark hearing, was a bit difficult. 
33:25 HL After the entire process, what then do you think is the best solution to tackle 
fake news? Do you think laws are still necessary? 
33:45 A2 So I think it was just in July where a conference was held in Singapore, and 
Minister Janil was cited in the media saying that they are not rushing legislation 
because it is a very complicated issue an they are still studying it. I personally feel 
that when it comes to fake news (we should) look at existing laws, because we do 
really have quite a comprehensive set, and where exactly are the gaps? 
Currently, the gaps could be, for instance, relating to take down, and there are 
one or two regulations that look at taking down content that breached certain 
standards. But the question is how you enforce it and work with the various 
partners – for instance social media platforms, to ensure timely removal of 
incendiary content. 
 
I think that is something that needs to be address, but regulation aside, 
increasingly the problem of fake news and disinformation is becoming a lot more 
sophisticated – recently I read that people are not just doctoring images and text, 
but also audio messages that are disseminated on Whatsapp. To be honest 
regulation, while important, will always play catch-up with technology. I really 
feel a lot more can be done in terms of media literacy and maybe encouraging 
collaboration when it comes to fact-checking. 
36:26 HL Ok. I’ll just broaden it a bit and ask you about public perception of media in 
Singapore. How do people see mainstream and online media? What have you 
heard and see so far? 
36:55 A2 This is interesting, because there seems to be a contradiction between 
perception and reality. Say, people’s reaction towards mainstream media – if you 
look at online discourse, often times people’s perception of the media in 
Singapore typically views mainstream media as the voice box of the government 
and policy makers, it is one-sided and biased against the opposition, and it 
marginalises view and opinions that do not support the government, political 
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office-holders and the policies that they enforce. When you look at the 
discussions online, that comes out a fair bit. But when we look at the reality… 
[anonymised content] we talk about usage of mainstream media versus online 
media, you can see that mainstream media still enjoys greater usage. A few 
studies have been done during election and non-election times, and that has 
been consistent. 
 
When we say mainstream media, we are talking about print, broadcast, TV, radio, 
as well as the online websites of these channels. Then the online media would 
be, very broadly, your social media, blogs, discussion forum. Mainstream media 
still see greater eyeballs and readership. In addition to that, they also enjoy 
greater trust. And I wonder if this is something that is unique to Singapore, 
because if you look at some of the other surveys that have come out of 
institutions in the UK or surveys commissioned by think-tanks in the US, there is 
this trend of a swing back towards mainstream media. And I partly wonder if this 
is also because of the phenomena of disinformation and fake news, which could 
have unfortunately led to people’s stereotypes and bunching of online media as a 
whole. So there is an apparent swing back towards traditional or mainstream 
media. 
40:52 HL But do you think there is also an unfortunate conflation between social media 
platforms and some of the blogs and news websites – for instance The Online 
Citizen, The Independent, Mothership, The Middle Ground – do you think that 
conflation is happening, and if so what are the impacts on people’s perceptions? 
41:20 A2 I think to a certain degree there could be a conflation, and also in part due to the 
nature of cyberspace. For example, people no longer read blogs by going to the 
blogs. I don’t have to go to TOC to read an article on TOC, there are so many of 
TOC’s articles sent to me either through Whatsapp or on my Facebook. You see 
the cross-over, the almost greying of boundaries across different platforms, 
because of the hyperlinked nature of cyberspace. The conflation is also partly due 
to the structure. When people read online, unfortunately they think about where 
they read it from, whether it is from Facebook or the blog in itself, as opposed to 
the actual source itself. 
42:18 HL So in your view, it is kind of like an inability to distinguish the source because of 
the mode of delivery? 
42:29 A2 I wouldn’t say inability, but that is not their instinctive response. And with the 
deluge of information, I think people are not reading widely enough. The issue of 
echo chambers and filter bubbles is very real and happens to the most intelligent 
lay person. But because of our work, we make a more concerted effort to read 
broadly and form different factions of the media space, but most people don’t 
have the time. 
 
Then there is the issue that whatever people read, it is usually the headlines – if 
we are lucky, the headline plus the lead paragraph. When they get past these 
things, they usually forget where the source is from. Maybe they can remember 
if it is The Straits Times, but if it is something online, I can’t remember if it was 
TOC, Mothership or someone’s personal blog, unless it is a piece that left a very 
deep impression. 
43:50 HL Side question: do you think that has something to do with our approach to the 
information environment, where everyone has a right to make an opinion and it 
is all more or less equally valid? Do people have that perception? 
44:05 A2 You’re talking about from the perspective of the information consumer? 
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44:10 HL Yes, the consumer. Do you think that they do not pay attention to details 
because every other piece of information is equally valid? 
44:21 A2 I don’t think they think that every piece of information is equally valid. They just 
feel that there is a lot of information out there. Which is why when you do polls 
or survey, clearly the differences in say trustworthiness demonstrates that they 
do not perceive every piece of information to be equal, be it in terms of quality 
or credibility. I think people still have perceptions that certain platforms and 
media sources are more credible than others. I just think that increasingly people 
are kind of set back by the deluge of information. It is more of a capability and 
competency issue – they are just struggling to cope with the information sent 
their way through both open and closed communication platforms. That’s when 
they are less able to judge the quality of content more accurately. 
 
I mean, how do you gauge when you are not reading an article in its full, when 
you are just reading the headline and at best the few lines after that? 
Unfortunately, the proxy for arriving at the conclusion on whether something is 
good quality or not would be the publisher: who is the source.  
48:01 HL Ok. So we get the sense that the media industry in Singapore is evolving. 
Especially the online environment, by also the mainstream media, my sense is 
that there are changes underfoot. How do you think these changes will affect the 
way the government approaches regulation? 
46:32 A2 In Singapore, our market is so small. You look at what happened with TODAY 
going online only. Even for your established main players like SPH, they too are 
trying very hard to stay competitive. I think there is this general mindset among 
information consumers that if I get so much information free online, why do I 
have to pay? The work is cut out for both mainstream and online media, to 
attract eyeballs and retain and hopefully attract more readership. 
 
The implications for policy makers are how to make the environment conducive. 
Is there something that they can look into promoting through less regulation? 
But I think in Singapore we are already quite constrained by the market space, 
right? I think that the other important thing is the diversity of media. In terms of 
the online space, over the past few years, we see a smaller and smaller number 
of players who attempt to provide serious commentaries on current affairs and 
social and political issues. One of the key things is the economics, which is also 
linked to the politics of it, the regulations, which sometimes make it quite 
cumbersome and quite difficult for online news sites to get creative financial 
support. I think that is something that the government should really consider, in 
terms of wanting to see greater diversity of players. Are there somethings we 
should free up? 
49:01 HL I tend to disagree that there are fewer players, actually there are more, but I do 
agree that the quality is something else to talk about. So you think it is possible 
for the government to take certain actions to widen the space that we have 
available. Anything that you think the media can do? 
49:28 A2 You see, it is a conundrum. While trying to make ends meet or stay financially 
viable, we see the use of paywalls. I’m not sure how sustainable that is. We see, 
for instance The Straits Times, a lot of articles are going behind the paywall as 
premium articles, and a lot of it are commentaries and other features. I can 
understand the impetus for that, but I’m not sure that is sustainable, because 
there is so much information out there that is free, and good quality too. Because 
of the borderless nature of cyberspace, local media consumers are not just 
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restricted to local news produces, but also foreign news producers. I think the 
use of paywalls is something they should think about. 
 
Also, to reach out to more people and continue to establish themselves as a 
credible leading news provider, the mainstream media really do have to cover a 
wide variety of information but from different angles, to shed its image as being 
a government spokesperson. For the mainstream media, that could be a way to 
draw greater eyeballs, followers and supporters. 
 
For online media, it is really tough. We see what is happening with TOC, quite a 
few have gone offline, simply because of issues with financial viability. I think two 
things will need to happen. Firstly, information consumers in Singapore will need 
to change their mindset. They have to see that they do need to play their part to 
support media providers and content producers. And number two, hearkening 
back to my earlier point, if the government can see the economic side of it, in the 
long run it may be good for us, as a burgeoning media production house, to 
enable and promote greater entrepreneurship even in the online media space, 
and to see what it can do with deregulation. 





Appendix M – Transcript of interview with a former editor with various mainstream news 
publications in Singapore 
Date: 28 August 2018 
Time: 11am 
Location: Café in Bedok Point shopping centre 
0:05 HL The first thing I want to ask is for you to share some of your perceptions about 
media regulation in Singapore. You can take it in terms of laws, policies, any kind 
of statement that the government makes. Basically, what do you think is or is not 
suitable, and how it can be improved. Just some general views. 
0:26 A4 I think I agree with what some have said, that media regulation is a lot more 
sophisticated than people give it credit for. We may moan about the regulations 
– Newspapers and Printing Presses Act, Broadcasting Act, laws on defamation 
and what have you, and the ISA – in fact, the government never really has to 
resort to these sorts of laws to get its way with the media. It’s a very 
sophisticated cultivation and co-optation of media, and placing people within 
media organisations. Leave aside the regulations – that is a very last-resort kind 
of thing. 
 
If you discount all that, it is really the culture and climate that they manage to 
build over the years, which is the more problematic thing right now. If we can 
settle that, then maybe we can go and talk about those last-resort measures. But 
we haven’t even gone past the climate and culture issues. 
1:50 HL Yes, and that’s the reason why my broader topic is about the governance of the 
media environment, because that also involves that kind of climate and culture. 
So I take it that you tend to agree with what Cherian has written about. When it 
comes to the online environment, then, it clearly does not apply, I presume? 
2:09 A4 It does not. In fact, I think the tendency is to ignore it – ignore the online 
environment, from an official point of view. I mean, the government may choose 
to take on some aspects of online reporting or columns if they feel that it has 
really overstepped the boundaries. I mean, I write far more controversial 
columns that Han Fook Kwang, but he is the one who gets knocked, not me! So 
basically, it is the media – what The Straits Times has portrayed. The online sites 
can go and be a bit more cowboy. The tendency is to cut the online side a lot 
more slack, ignore it, and just make sure that the mainstream media side is very 
cloistered. 
3:14 HL Ok. Why do you think they are doing that? 
3:16 A4 Because they don’t know how to handle online media. There are too many 
variables, too many varied voices. They are ignoring not because they don’t care 
– they care very much, but they don’t know what to do. Increasingly, I’m 
beginning to realise that there is really not much of a space online for the 
government to engage. All the outlets are alternative or anti-establishment, so it 
is very hard for them to come in and engage and discuss things on neutral 
ground. I find that a dilemma – if they keep focusing on the establishment 
(media), then they risk the online space festering on its own, which may not be 
very good for them. 
 
I think it is quite pitiful for the government. You see, they can’t keep the 
mainstream media in the state that they want it to be. There are too many 
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alternatives that people will be looking at. Do you seriously think they can retain 
good people in the mainstream media if the journalists keep being denied the 
ability to do certain things that the profession should have done?  
5:10 HL Well, but in terms of getting talent, or even getting funding to keep operations 
going, mainstream media will still have it in spades compared to online media. So 
why would that be a concern? There would not be a real need to be too harsh on 
mainstream media? 
5:37 A4 No, I don’t think so. It has always been the case that they want to control 
mainstream media, and now even more so. It is not a question of the resources, 
it’s just that they are not happy if the media can’t get their messaging right. 
Mainstream media must always get the government’s messaging correct. This is 
an old problem. 
 
And I’m a bit biased here – in the old days, when the government wants us to do 
something and they get angry when we don’t, we will ask them to cool down and 
tell them we know what we are doing. And we do it in a way that satisfies us as 
professionals while you still get what you want. Everyone is happy, the story 
comes out and it is still ok. But these days, I don’t think the current media 
(practitioners) know how to do this anymore. 
6:40 HL The negotiating bit? 
6:41 A4 Both the negotiating bit and the doing bit. You try to spin something, but you 
don’t know how to do it (right). It’s very worrying for me. If you say you agree 
with something the government wants, then of course, no choice. But you don’t 
even have the professional ability to do it in a way that doesn’t make it look like 
some propaganda rubbish. There must be a way to satisfy both ends. 
 
You get what I mean? I’m talking about basic competence here, not any political 
ideology, or that we are unwilling to listen – you just need to do things 
competently! That must be the first basis of journalism – if you can get that right, 
ninety-five percent of the stuff you do is ok. Just a small thing, and you want to 
worry about the big stuff? Get the small stuff right, you learn, and later you can 
go do the big thing, and you will know how to play the game.  
8:09 HL Ok. This ability for the government to manage its relationship with the media, 
why do you think the government can’t do it? Do you think it is an issue with the 
media or the government? You said that you don’t see that kind of negotiating 
and trade-offs happening, and the ability of journalists to handle the story. 
8:39 A4 I think the issue is with both sides. The media increasingly doesn’t know how to 
handle it, and the government is increasing becoming more… I’ll give you an 
example. Journalists would tell me this is what (the spokesperson) said, but why 
can’t you ask some more? Oh you mean we can? But this is Parliament! So, after 
Parliament? Pick up the phone and ask! You see, they don’t even know what is 
allowed and not allowed, what can and cannot be done. 
 
[Anonymised content, views on the conduct of public officials] 
 
So you see, the things that we can do which we used to do are now not being 
done. I don’t know if it is because the values and skills are not being taught, or 
that people like me have left so there is no passing-down of these skills, or that 
the government is so good that when they say no, you just roll over and play 




I have a reputation in government for being very hard on them, and they are all 
very frightened of me, and I frankly don’t mind because they will still talk to me. 
Just that they will be super prepared, which is good. But (the journalists today) 
don’t know what’s doable and what is not. For example, if I go for a closed-door 
briefing in the past, they tell us that certain things cannot be reported. Everyone 
just walks out, but I don’t – I ask them what can go on the record. If I can’t get 
anything on the record, I’d tell them to share and I’d write it in such a way that 
we don’t know where the information comes from. It takes at a certain skill to 
find the information we need. 
 
Now, the fourth-generation leadership is coming on board, and they did this 
multi-ministerial visit. At the first visit, does anyone realise that the dialogue with 
residents was closed-door? And future dialogues will also be closed-door? I was 
totally stunned. I read the story and saw “closed-door” very innocuously 
somewhere, I asked the journalist and they don’t know anything about it. I said 
that they must insist that it be open, but they are not sure that they can do that. 
The line of least resistance, that is where it is. They just don’t want to create 
trouble and step across the line. But who is asking you to step across the line? 
You’re just doing your job, within your ability and responsibility. 
13:24 HL Ok, but why do you think the government is not increasing the level of 
engagement?  
13:29 A4 Because it is much easier if I tell you to just write your story – this is the angle, 
just write the angle, everybody is happy. If you come up with a different angle, 
then I will ask you what you are up to.  
14:00 HL Do you think this is healthy in the long term, though? 
14:02 A4 Of course not! But then again, I would add that hopefully, the journalist would 
also know what to do. Doesn’t mean that if they say so, you have got to fight. 
Sometimes, they have good reasons (for withholding information). So the 
journalist must be armed with the ability to tell what is good and right, and that 
requires a lot of wisdom and experience.  
14:37 HL How about online media, then? There are clearly no bars holding them back. Are 
they able to do that? 
14:43 A4 No, I think they cannot. You know me. When I see that what they have is not 
really journalistic, I get disheartened. Even I can rant and rave, for instance, 
about consumer issues, and from one Facebook post it becomes a consumers 
movement. Their idea of journalism is three different people talking together and 
you get a story. 
 
[Anonymised content, views on the standards of reporting in online publications] 
16:17 HL I’d just ask you about Mothership as well, do you think they are doing it right? 
16:21 A4 I don’t read Mothership as often. I mean, it seems to have taken a more 
explanatory approach to policy decisions, and it was something that I tried to do 
too. They do it in a more fun way. I like that approach, because I think policy 
nowadays is getting too complicated and you are not getting it explained well 
enough in mainstream media. They sometimes take it for granted that you 
already know something. To have something that pulls it together and make it 
readable, it is also not bad, and I think we need more of that. 
 
They also focus on reporting on what is happening in the internet community. 
Beyond that, I don’t see much commentary work, it is more of piecing together a 
story in a different manner. But if they do a good job of explaining things, I think 
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it is very good. They can try to have a bit more heft – write weightier columns, 
and a bit more reporting as well. 
 
There is a lot of reporting that can be done in Singapore, but it is just not done. 
You must explain the significance of things, not just throw stuff at me. If there 
are more journalists who can keep doing that, that is good. But if you are just 
writing your story on one piece of information, then no. 
19:04 HL Ok, I’d probably come back to this point about the quality of media, but let’s talk 
a bit about the fake news issue. You were following the hearings, so how did you 
find it, did you find anything useful, what do you think went right or wrong, 
anything that we can learn from it? 
19:46 A4 So many things went wrong. Basically, they picked certain people because they 
felt that these people can highlight or debunk certain points. Some points I found 
useful was when the SMU dean who came up with the plus-and-minuses of the 
laws, but I also found that his statements seemed as if he was trying to distance 
himself from it, but I learnt a lot from his views. 
 
I thought the mainstream media was a damp squib. I cannot imagine the 
mainstream media not calling for more freedom instead of asking for online 
media to be tightened. Chia Yong Yong asked them if they meant that the playing 
field should be levelled, and they agreed that it should be brought to their level. I 
thought this was a prime opportunity for the mainstream media to say, get off 
my back, if you want me to do a good job. 
21:09 HL I thought they mentioned it somewhere – “it doesn’t pay for us to be pro-
government”? 
21:16 A4  Yeah, it is ok for you to say that, but it is definitely paying, and you are definitely 
doing it! Why do you even want to say something like this? Just say it like it is: I 
think the mainstream media should be given more credibility and greater space, 
and we can only do it if you get off our backs. 
 
People will see me as having more credibility if I do what I’m supposed to do. This 
whole sighing at the government for supporting online media – I just cannot 
believe it. Actually, the submission that was closer to my thinking was the paper 
by TODAY. They practically told the government to get out of their face. 
[clarification of the two submissions by the Mediacorp group] 
23:12 HL That’s the thing, because during the process, I found that the Mediacorp group 
came out to be a little bit more independent that SPH. Why do you think that is 
the case? 
23:32 A4 I don’t know. Maybe Warren just decided that he must open his mouth more, 
and Walter decided that he should stay quite a bit more! I don’t know, but I 
doubt there was anything conspiratorial about it. 
24:02 HL Ok. The rest of the hearings – is there anything else that you want to talk about? 
24:08 A4 I was at PJ Thum’s and also yours. Evidently, I was very annoyed that the Select 
Committee seemed more intent on turning it into an interrogation than a proper 
solicitation of feedback. I think they keep referring to the (US) Senate Committee 
and the Congressional Committees – these committees have a very specific role, 
usually it is to question someone to death about something. This is a feedback 
role, so I’m a bit puzzled as to why they chose to see it (necessary) to debunk 
your points when it should have been more to seek understanding. Contrast it to 
the way the Constitutional Committee did the Elected Presidency. The way 
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Sundaresh Menon and Chan Heng Chee conducted those hearings was very 
different. So I didn’t like the approach at all. 
25:25 HL Yes, it was quite clear that from the terms of reference, you get the sense that it 
was supposed to be a consultative process. Why do you think they didn’t do it 
that way? I don’t think it was just PJ, a few others as well. 
25:38 A4 Yes, you begin to think that they might already have something in mind. I am 
blunt. This all adds to the perception, if you do it this way. In the first place, I was 
so disappointed with their Green Paper. It didn’t even tell me about the laws that 
were involved, and just went on about what is happening this and that country – 
you don’t give me any information to chew on. [anonymised content, referring to 
the lack of information on the usability of current laws to tackle fake new] I 
expected the Green Paper to have a lot of that. But instead, we have to wait for 
Goh Yihan! 
27:07 HL So in that sense, were you satisfied with what Yihan has? 
27:11 A4 Yeah, it was not bad. It was quite balanced and it covers various things. It was 
very factual, he didn’t really make a comment about it, but just laying it out. 
27:26 HL So in that sense, do you think that we do need laws against fake news, or are 
there better solutions? 
27:32 A4 I have no idea. I think it is basically the same thing: the government has to keep 
its hands out of the media. We need to build a consensus around something in 
the media. It used to be that The Straits Times could do that because there was 
no online media. Whatever it is, your package still needs to gravitate around 
something, get a consensus, that huge thing that people can all rally around. You 
can’t do that if people can see that the mainstream media is under your thumb. I 
see a need to build up that group where people will read and coalesce around, 
but there is nothing like that now, so I don’t know how you are going to police it. 
28:41 HL  So you don’t think it is in either mainstream or online media? 
28:46 A4 No, so it is very fractured. I’m more worried about the fracturing of the space 
than about fake news. Do we need laws? I don’t like it at all, I am very wary of 
laws that are too open-ended and too discretionary. I have a feeling that our 
current parliament has really done us in. So many of the laws have been changed 
to tilt the balance of power towards the executive – the Public Order and Safety 
(Special Powers) Act, Films Act, the Elected Presidency – too many things. The 
balance of power has been shifted and our Members of Parliament do not fight 
enough for it. 
29:53 HL Ok, just to play devil’s advocate – because you mentioned earlier, which is 
Cherian’s point, that the government is becoming more sophisticated and the 
use of laws has lessened. So why worry then about this shift of power? If we have 
law and regulations that are increasingly placing more power in the hands of the 
government, but they are able to exercise this responsibly, then is there an 
issue? 
30:27 A4 I’m never comfortable with power in the hands of just one entity. I mean, you are 
basically trying to guess that they will exercise it responsibly. I don’t like to leave 
things to guess work. Our laws are so open-ended, and they tell us not to worry, 
we won’t use it, I don’t like it. I’m not a homophobe, nor am I pro-LGBT, but I’m 
against 377A for that same reason. I don’t think laws should be in the book and 
then I have to depend on your promise. Is this a rule of law, or not?  
31:05 HL  Would you see how the ISA has been used in our history as an example of it? 
31:10 A4 No, so far the ISA has been used more sparingly. In any case, it’s a whole 
different ball game – how much do you want the government to use security 
laws? I think they need some discretion on that part. So if you want’ I’d give you 
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your ISA, but the rest should be left out of your hands. I think they do need some 
tools, but if I give you these tools, it should be a trade-off, and you don’t disturb 
me for anything else. I agree you need some room to manoeuvre, not it is not 
everything that you need room to manoeuvre. 
 
Talking about regulation, the biggest ones that have an impact is the NPPA’s 
ability to appoint the chairman and members of the board (for media 
organisations). It is from that law everything stems, where this whole culture 
comes about – a particular board can pick the right editor, it is enough already 
and you don’t need to do anything else. 
32:48 HL Do you think it has that kind of influence on online media? For instance, we talk 
about the Broadcasting Act. Do you think it has that same kind of influence on 
online media? 
33:01 A4 No. I mean, sometimes they call me up and demand certain things, but I tell them 
to go away. And then they would realise that they can’t treat me the same way 
that they treat mainstream media, because who are they going to complain to, 
my boss? I have no boss! I’m in a very wonderful position, and I don’t feel it. In 
fact, I think they were quite glad that I was around – I was not as rabid as other 
outlets, and I will give them their say. I tell them that I have played with the OB 
markers for a long time and probably know how to deal with this. They were 
actually quite good to me. 
34:09 HL I see, why do you think that has not continued? Clearly, they are ok with you, 
why not continue with what they have with you in the online space now? 
34:24 A4 You have to look at who. It’s a question of who they trust. [anonymised content] 
34:38 HL Ok. On that note, I’m going to talk about the public perception of media in 
Singapore, either by the government or the public as a whole. What are your 
view on this? 
34:51 A4 Ok, I don’t know who to believe. If you read all the Nielsen survey results, 
technically the mainstream media is rated very high. I don’t know whether that 
has changed in recent times, since I no longer have access to these studies and 
the full results. When I was there, it was very high – if it does not appear in The 
Straits Times, it is not true. Even now, I’m not sure if the online space is a 
proportional reflection of the sentiments. So if the online space really hates the 
mainstream media, I don’t know how representative, if it is a minority or 
majority. I think one thing that really struck me was how so many people got it 
wrong at the last general election, because we were basing it mostly on what we 
hear online. 
 
I don’t know what is the public perception, but I do know that increasingly, there 
is a disenchantment with the way mainstream media is going, and I don’t blame 
them. I’m not even talking about a political point of view – professionally, I think 
they are terrible – but the media space in Singapore is an elephant in the room. 
Why isn’t anyone talking about why, in spite of having so many newspapers, they 
only project one view and one voice? In the past, we could fight with Business 
Times and The New Paper because they all had separate editors and they are all 
keen to out-do the other and get more stories. Now, I subscribe to different 
papers and I read the same thing in all of them. This is a travesty! 
36:39 HL Yeah, but they do newsroom pooling, that’s the issue, right? Best use of 
resources. 
36:44 A4 Yes, that’s the problem. I remember way back in the past, we tried to do it when 
they wanted to count pennies, but the stories still have a different focus based 
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on their audience. Nowadays they don’t even bother – it is the same story. 
Maybe they will take different stories to feature for the first page, but it is the 
same type. I used to be able to read BT for the economic story, then I turn to ST 
for a different one. Now the choices have become flat. There is no competition 
anymore. Some may say this is the case with SPH working a one group, but that 
was not true. In the past, the competition was near acrimonious, we never gave 
chance. 
37:49 HL But that also led to reporters finding a unique angle? 
37:55 A4 Yes, and that gives more perspectives. Now, they have one angle, and it is in 
every story, every newspaper, every medium. There is no diversity. Basically, it 
has become a factory – they just package it and put it in different boxes. That to 
me is a grave problem.  
38:27 HL But it has more to do with the way the business is declining, compared to 
government regulation. 
38:35 A4 Yes, I agree. SPH has a lot money, just not as much as before. I know the 
company – the profit margin is that big. We would argue, how much is enough? 
The usual thing like with SMRT – how much profits can you take? In the past they 
will threaten to cut our bonuses. The CEO will tell you that we have a fiduciary 
duty to shareholders and we have to get as much value as possible. If it means I 
have to cut more head, I would have to. If you want to be efficient, it does look 
like you should have a common pool of reporters. It sounds efficient, but this is a 
newspaper business! 
 
They tried to do that as well at Mediacorp, what they called the big desk concept 
but it failed. If you want to do something like that, your people at that table must 
be really good, able to do different things. It seems as though intelligent people 
are giving less respect to the profession. [side discussion about the challenges of 
the integrated newsroom] 
 
I don’t know. They think they can repackage it for radio and TV, bit I think it is not 
that easy. From the corporate point of view, that part is so difficult to handle. For 
individual journalists, the scoop can be negotiated, but this whole concept is hard 
to achieve. To spin something for different publications – it takes a lot (of skill 
and effort). 
41:35 HL  Yes, I understand what you mean, and unfortunately it has been going on for 
quite a while where you see reports in TODAY repurposed for CNA, which is a 
significantly different platform. That’s the way it is. How about online media, 
then? What people think of it. 
42:06 A4 I think a lot of people think it is a lot of rubbish. My perception is that there is 
very little journalism and a lot of ranting, a lot of people trying to shore up their 
own agendas and biases – if you call that reporting. It is pretty one sided in terms 
of its reporting and analysis. It is very emotion-driven rather than facts-driven. 
43:09 HL If you were to look at it as a counter to what the mainstream media is today, do 
you think… 
43:14 A4 Yes, some people say that. You need that end because this end is like that. But 
it’s not balance, it’s a division! I don’t like such division. If you have two opposing 
views, you can’t have a consensus anywhere. That is what I mean by there is no 
playing field for people to argue. They are at extreme sides, how would they be 
able to come together to argue? 
43:41 HL So you are saying that between mainstream and online media, it is quite polar. 
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43:47 A4 Yes. There is a huge gap in between. You cannot talk to each other when the 
differences are so diametrical. There must be a calm room somewhere, you 
know. 
44:00 HL Do you think it is affecting our views on politics? I mean Singaporeans as a whole. 
44:06 A4 Yes, I think so. 
44:09 HL Do you think we are able to take the extreme views and discern for ourselves? 
44:13 A4 No. I think first of all, people don’t read enough, or at least most people. And 
secondly, it is just a lot less stressful for the brain to go one way or the other. We 
are not a people who think deeply, so we hang on to certain views. 
44:44 HL Is it possible for media to help us think more deeply, in that sense? 
44:49 A4 You need money! At the end of the day, it is always money and talent. You need 
money and to get good people together, and I don’t mean getting journalists. 
Journalism is a skill that can be learnt, but the cognitive ability must first be there 
– to be able to see everything, cut to the chase. That must be there.  
45:28 HL  Do you see that talent pool available in our universities, as in journalists who are 
coming up? 
45:38 A4 Please, no. Journalism is not the place where the best students go to. Maybe in 
the beginning with the Wee Kim Wee School. But most students don’t go to 
journalism, and I’m very sad about it. 
46:14 HL Why do you think they don’t go there? 
46:17 A4 First of all, journalism doesn’t have a great name. Basically, they have a feeling 
that you should accept what you are supposed to do, get decent wages. But 
people online complain about you, then how are you going to deal with it? You 
know, when the online era came and we were in print, my journalists used to cry 
to me because they have been slammed online. I told them to ignore it, but it 
takes something out of people.  
47:04 HL Well, given the way the online environment is moving now – of course, right now 
possibly only Mothership is capable of hiring to that degree – do you think that 
will change things? 
47:27 A4 They really need to pay. I look at the young team, maybe it is possible. It looks 
like they can support people with talent. People often tell me that online, you 
don’t need a lot of people. I agree, but you need very good people. To operate 
online, you need a few good reporters, get a couple of good editors, and 
someone who can handle the artwork and pictures, it is enough. 
48:15 HL  But I take it that you are speaking from experience in mainstream media running 
smaller outfits as well. 
48:22 A4 Yes, and that has worked. Some of the people I pick to join me – some of them 
pro-bono – are very good people. It was a dream come true. I tell them one thing 
and they already know what must be done. [anonymised content] 
50:01 HL I’m going to come back to the media industry in Singapore, how the online 
environment is changing. Do you think it is necessarily going the good or bad 
way, and how do you think that will impact the way the government approaches 
media regulation? Let’s just focus on journalistic news media. 
50:29 A4 I think I would have a better idea if I get to see the fake news laws. I don’t know 
what it is going to do and how it is going to squeeze the space for online 
expression.  
50:56 HL Do you believe it will squeeze the space for online expression? 
50:58 A4 I think it will. It must be, if not why do we have any laws? I have no problems 
abiding by codes of conduct for online media, but I think it is so fragmented that 
people cannot come together anymore. Even within the online space, it is so 
fragmented. I’m a firm believer that when you write about something, these are 
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the key elements that you abide by. But it seems to me that some people are 
actually quite happy not to be good journalists. They rather break all the rules of 
journalism and say this is the way to go. 
 
If you are writing something that is totally refutable, I will never let it through. 
But online media will say that we should, but are not doing so because we are 
scared. But according to the rules of journalism, I will not let it through, because 
my credibility is important too. If the journalist doesn’t do his thing, then I will be 
affected and that is wrong. There are reasons for attribution and verification, but 
the online media doesn’t seem to think that these are the things that should 
happen. There are some things that mainstream media don’t do, and I totally 
agree with them. If they cannot get someone to speak to them, then what do you 
expect them to do? There is not even enough understanding of what the job is 
about – from online practitioners and also from their readers. 
 
So if online media want to do a good job of reporting the news, then there must 
be certain standards that they abide by. These standards need not be as rigorous 
as what we have for mainstream media, but there must be standards. For 
example, it doesn’t mean that if one person is complaining, the whole world is in 
peril, and you start pitching apocalypse now. 
53:26 HL Do you think there is anything that the government can do to try to encourage 
this? The formation of this kind of standards. 
53:45 A4 Whenever they tried, they get killed! You know, the Internet Code of Conduct, 
during Yaccob’s time, the FreeMyInternet protest. 
 
You see, the FreeMyInternet incident – you know, the registration and the fifty-
thousand-dollar bond – I don’t like things that are so heavily weighted in favour 
of the executive, that I don’t know when the axe will fall, who is next, and even 
why. I don’t like all this opaqueness, what we can do and whether it applies to 
me. I know ignorance is no excuse for breaking the law, but how do you know the 
pit-falls? 
 
The online people themselves that I see, sometimes I wonder if they can come 
together to get it done. But nobody wants to acknowledge any kind of 
leadership. I give you an example. During the last general elections, Viswa tried 
to bring all the media together to share information. [anonymised content] We 
talked about how we can share information on the elections, but it didn’t take 
off. [Details of disagreements within the group]  
56:20 HL Ok, so in your opinion, the issue in government regulation is that there is no 
transparency involved, and you don’t see that changing anytime? 
56::32 A4 I’d see what they have on the fake news laws before I decide. Maybe it will be 
very draconian, or everything is transparent! [Side conversation on status of 
Select Committee report] 
57:13 HL Ok, that is actually the end of my questions. Do you have anything else that you 
wish to add? About anything that we have discussed so far, be it how the 
government approaches media or how the media approaches government. 
57:27 A4 I think the approach of either parties is bad for this country. When you try to tell 
mainstream media what to do and online media goes on its own merry path – I 
don’t know how the fourth-generation leadership is going to command the 
confidence of anyone if it doesn’t get most of the media on its side.  
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57:56 HL  You think they don’t already have most of the media on their side?  Because 
technically speaking, the mainstream media is “with them”, in that sense.  
58:04 A4 If they are, they are not doing a very good job. It’s back to the professionalism 
thing – if I want to praise you, I need to know how to do it right. When I do it in a 
ham-fisted manner, then clearly I have been forced to praise you! And if you 
don’t want to cheer, then just say so and fight for it. 
 
Currently, there is no fight. It is even worse. It is my job to ask questions, which is 
why I was so angry with the OSA incident – I can’t even ask questions! They broke 
an unspoken rule in media, where I am allowed to ask questions – the difference 
is whether I will publish or not. You can throw the book at me for what I publish, 
but you can’t throw the book at me for asking questions! [Discussion on HDB-OSA 
case] 
 
That’s the problem I have with this case. I follow the rules that have been set up 
over the years – I get something from a source and I go to you for confirmation. I 
mean, I would have gotten into trouble a million times for doing this, then. 





Appendix N – Transcript of interview with a senior editor from a mainstream news publication in 
Singapore 
Date: 4 September 2018 
Time: 9:00am 
Location: café in Serangoon Gardens 
0:20 HL [Explanation about research] 
Maybe let’s start with your views on media regulation in Singapore. Feel free to 
look at it in terms of laws, regulations, things like NPPA and the Broadcasting Act, 
and to some extent also some of the statements made by the Singapore 
government.  
0:41 A3 Well, I suppose the first thing to say about media regulation in Singapore is that 
the thinking behind them was formulated very early in Singapore’s nationhood 
soon after independence. The main architect was our founding Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew who had very strong views about the role of the media in what he 
would say is a newly emerging independent country – vulnerable, no natural 
resources. So he saw the media as playing a particular role in a society like 
Singapore – very different, in his view, from the role the media played in the 
West, especially the US. Obviously, he was very much against how Western 
society saw the role of their media as a watchdog of the government, the fourth 
estate and so on. He made many speeches on this, the most well-known being 
the speech in Helsinki at the International Press Institute in 1971. 
 
That was his thinking, and arising out of those views, Singapore’s press laws were 
formulated. So you have to understand the background of it. I won’t go into the 
details of the press laws, but obviously we are governed by it, and for us the 
important features of the law would be the renewal of licence from the 
government every year for us to operate, the introduction of management 
shares and ownership laws, and so on. But I would say that the nitty gritty of the 
law affects us less than the thinking behind them, which shapes the 
government’s response to whatever they see in the papers. I think those are 
more significant markers and has a real effect on the way the press operates in 
Singapore. 
 
I mean, to give you an example of the difference between the law itself and the 
overall environment and thinking – they have never withheld giving the 
newspapers a license, they have always renewed it. The management shares 
have never been put into operation – they never had to use the power that the 
shares bestows on the shareholders. The law itself has not been used, but of 
course other laws have been used in the past, whenever the government felt 
that the media in Singapore has overstepped the boundaries – as you know, the 
Chinese editors who were detained under the Internal Security Act. 
 
Whereas the thinking of the government as to the role the media should play in 
Singapore society – I think that has been much more significant in the way it has 
shaped the press. So what are the main features of that thinking? In Lee Kuan 
Yew’s view, the media must play a constructive, nation-building role, right? I 
think in that Helsinki speech, he did elaborate on this: that the press, as he sees 
it, must help the citizens who were readers of the papers understand the realities 
facing a vulnerable, struggling third-world city trying to make it in this part of the 
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world. The media has an educational role in doing that. It is not a watchdog of 
the government, meaning he doesn’t want to see newspapers campaigning on 
issues, all the time taking on the government as they do in the West. 
 
I suppose if they see such behaviour through the stories in the papers, they 
would respond, and they have in the past. Cheong Yip Seng’s book, OB Markers, 
highlighted many instances in which the government acted, and how The Straits 
Times responded. I think over the years, if you look at those incidents, I think 
you’d get a fairly clear idea of government-press relations. 
 
So I would say that the laws are there, but in practical effect, it is not something 
that we feel day to day, What we feel more is outside the law – the political 
behaviour of the government, shaped by their thinking on the role of media in 
Singapore society, which was formulated very long ago in the early days of 
Singapore’s independence. 
7:15 HL Do you think that back then, when these laws were formulated, do you think that 
they were justified? And if we put it in today’s context, do you think it is justified 
and do you think that the current crop of leaders are doing it right? 
7:37 A3 Well, justified – to whom and by whom? So the laws were formulated based on 
this thinking. Whether they were justified or not – for example, if you want to 
answer the question based on how well Singapore has done as a country, 
supposing that is my yardstick, and given that the press plays many functions in 
society such as to keep citizens informed, that becomes very hard to measure. 
How do I measure how well my citizens are informed as a result of the press that 
they have? What do I measure? 
 
In terms of the overall performance, supposing we take Lee Kuan Yew’s view that 
the press is these to help society do well. On some yardstick, we must say yes. 
We are one of the best-performing economies, we have been very stable over 
the last fifty to sixty years, all the public indicators – whether it is health, security, 
law and order. How well the press has done in relation to how our newspapers 
have thrived and prospered, I think we must be one of the tops! At one time, The 
Straits Times was one of the most profitable newspapers in the world. And The 
Straits Times is a paid paper, we don’t force people to buy it.  They made the 
paper very successful commercially, so on that yardstick, you can’t say it has 
done terribly despite the limitations, especially if we compart it to the West, 
where the limitations are not so severe. 
10:11 HL Do you think it is partly due to the fact that there is very little competition in the 
media space? 
10:20 A3 You can’t say it today. There is competition everywhere. I suppose in the 60’s and 
70’s, you could give that as a reason. There were some papers that tried to come 
into the market. All of them failed for one reason or another, some of them as 
the result of government action. Others may be for other reasons. At that time, 
The Straits Times was very dominant, and I suppose it is very tough to take on a 
paper like The Straits Times. The newspaper business is not easy – the entry 
barriers are very high, printing presses cost hundreds of millions of dollars, you 
need a distribution network, and so on. You could say the lack of competition 
was one reason, but on the other hand I read somewhere that in many American 
cities, they are actually one-paper towns. Maybe it is the nature of the 
newspaper business, that the dominant player will always try to kill the others. If 
you have two papers, they are in direct competition – they are perfect 
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substitutes, which is why the competition between newspapers is very fierce, 
especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
But today I would say that is completely untrue. As you know better than most 
people do, there are so many alternative sources of news and information. 
12:20 HL I guess you are referring to both international media that has a presence here in 
Singapore as well as… 
12:28 A3 And the online media as well, yes. 
12:30 HL My question, then, also would be, when we talk about nation-building, do you 
think that concept has changed over time, and if so how has media responded to 
it? 
12:46 A3 So nation-building is obviously a very broad term. If you define it in terms of 
economic success, even some of the social indicators like healthcare and 
education, I think Singapore has done quite well. But if it is about a more well-
rounded citizenry which possesses qualities of critical thinking and analysis, the 
ability to do things on their own without over-relying on the government, the 
ability to mobilise for certain worthwhile causes – whether it is for the 
environment, education or whatever – then on that score, my view is that we 
would have done less well. 
 
The arts and culture, I think we are doing quite a bit, looking at the way local 
theatre and writing has developed over the last ten, fifteen years, probably much 
better than the early years. But we are still fairly far behind many of the 
advanced societies. So I would I say it’s a mixed grade. Certainly, on the non-
economic softer aspects of nation-building, we still have a fairly long way to go. 
14:58 HL Ok. So I get the sense that if we are looking at a more holistic concept of nation-
building, then we would have some differences. Do you think that the media is 
still performing this role well? Both mainstream and online media, if we were to 
look at (nation-building) holistically. 
15:35 A3 I think on many of the so-called performance indicators, (the mainstream media) 
is no longer doing as well as it used to in the past. Obviously, circulation has 
fallen. It is not a uniquely Singapore thing, I think it has fallen worldwide. Young 
Singaporeans are no longer reading the papers very much. I mean, they never 
read it as much older people before in any case, but I think even then the 
proportion has fallen. I think the quality of mainstream media hasn’t gone up in 
the way you would expect it to as Singapore society develops. We have a more 
educated and literate population, a more mature society, our education 
institutions and much more developed these days, your theatre and cultural 
scene is much more developed. So considering all that progress and development 
in Singapore, and looking at the quality of mainstream media, I would say that it 
has not up its game as you would hope it would as society progresses and 
develops. 
 
As to whether it continues to play this role… Ok, the government’s view on the 
role of the media in Singapore society has not changed, I think. They still feel very 
strongly that the media has a particular role to play in society, and despite all the 
progress and changes that has happen, the fundamental views has not changed. 
As a result, the laws have not changed. I mean, if their views change, the laws 
may or may not change, although if the laws do change then it reflects a change 
in their thinking. But the laws have not changed. Not just the laws, but the 
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response to media when they do certain things, I don’t think that has changed at 
all. 
 
In my view, it would create a problem. Singapore society has changed quite a bit, 
and the biggest change is obviously amongst its people, and it is totally to be 
expected. Singaporeans are more educated and more exposed to the world. 
Especially with new media, they are more exposed to what is being said, both 
inside and outside Singapore. [pause to change location due to ambient noise] 
 
So the greatest change to Singapore is the people – their thinking, the expose 
and so on. Which is why I think Singaporeans have taken on so much to what is 
happening in online media and have quite different expectations of the 
government and their leaders. 
19:59 HL So do you think that the mainstream media, and also the online media, are they 
meeting these challenges of the people seeking for more diversity of views? 
20:15 A3 Not quite. I mean, it’s not because they don’t see that they need to do so. I think 
they try. The mainstream media operate within a certain context, and they 
internalise what is allowed and what is not, and what would go over the OB 
markers, and try to have the ball in the fairways. But they also believe that they 
need to serve their readers. It is a commercial enterprise, and they know that if 
the readers don’t find the paper useful for them because it is not credible or 
whatever, then they will stop reading it. So they have to balance the two, and I 
suppose they try to do it as best as they can. The final test would be the market – 
if they are so bad and not credible and of such poor quality, then people will stop 
buying and reading them, and then they know they have to change. 
 
Obviously, we have not reached that stage, although circulation has fallen. The 
smaller papers could be in a different position, but I think The Straits Times is still 
profitable, although not as profitable as before. They still have quite a significant 
readership, and they will take their cue from there. 
 
Online media, frankly, has been very disappointing in Singapore. Many have 
tried, but for some reason or other, have failed and have to close down – The 
Middle Ground, Inconvenient Questions, Six Six. And even the ones that have not 
closed down have basically remained more or less the same. They have not made 
that huge an impact as one might expect in the environment they are in, where 
people are very connected, highly educated and literate. We have not had a 
flowering of the online media as you see in some other societies, and certainly in 
the commercial sense, none at all. The few that we have – I mean, I don’t know 
the financial details, but I will be surprised if they are doing very very well. Maybe 
one or two are doing ok. I was told Mothership might be one of the more 
successful ones. 
 
And if you look at the online media today, in a sense, it’s not surprising. They are 
quite different from mainstream media obviously, but you don’t get the sense 
that, wow, this is a great product that I would want to read every day. It is 
meeting my needs only in a very narrow sense: I may get some things that I may 
never get in mainstream media, but the quality of the content, analysis, writing 
and so on I would say is very patchy. The better stuff are done by individual 
persons who so happen to have a blog or Facebook page – once in a while you 
get some really good pieces on the issues of the day. But on the dedicated 
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website put out for news, you get it once in a while, but not on a consistently 
regular basis for me to want to go in there every day. 
22:50 HL Some people have mentioned that there could be a funding issue. Do you see 
that as having an impact for online media to do well? 
22:57 A3 Well, I suppose it is a chicken and egg thing. You need funding, but you also need 
to be good as well so that you attract the funding and advertisers. If you are no 
good, then obviously the marketplace out there is very harsh and cruel. If you 
can’t build up a sizeable readership, then the funding will dry up in no time. 
26:22 HL So I get it from you that we are looking at two fairly different approaches 
between the mainstream and online media. Over all, the media ecosystem that 
we have, do you think it is beneficial to citizens? 
26:40 A3 Beneficial… all these words are a bit hard to (explain), it is very general! So we 
have a very peculiar situation in Singapore, I think, where a sizeable portion of 
people feel that the mainstream media is not meeting their information needs, 
for all sorts of reasons. So they go to the online media for alternative views, and 
people who operate some of these online media believe that this is their niche. 
That’s what they are there to do, and maybe they believe it is the formula to 
make them successful. 
 
We get this situation – which is not very healthy and the reason why I think they 
are not doing very well – where those who operate online media think they have 
to be as different from mainstream media as possible; and a large part of that is 
to be anti-government and very critical. Many of them go overboard, and I think 
that damages them. They lose their credibility, because they are just being anti 
for anti’s sake. 
 
Somebody made this comment to me, and I don’t know if it is true, and this is 
really his view, not mine, and he is maybe exaggerating it to make a point… that 
the people who are reading online media are not really the educated sort. They 
are not too concerned with quality, they are not the people who do well, they 
have a chip on their shoulder or axe to grind. If you go into online media, it is full 
of all this venom and the language used can be quite abusive. So why would a 
well-adjusted and balanced person want to go into it on a regular basis? So it is 
very different from your regular newspapers, whether it is the Times, the New 
York Times or whatever. There is no quality online media as such. 
 
His view is that, because of that, there is a certain perception that online media, 
especially those that are anti-establishment, have readers who gravitate towards 
that kind of mindset. If you continue to be like that, you will never be successful, 
especially in the commercial sense. Advertisers will not want to be associated 
with you. 
 
In that sense, I would say that it is not a healthy development. Also, I don’t see a 
light at the end of the tunnel. Let’s say three or five years down the road, would 
we have a thriving online media scene, plenty of commercially successful sites, 
catering to different interests, and it becomes a well-established and developed 
part of the media landscape in Singapore, with a bright future and one in which 
people who want to do it can build on? I don’t see it. 
31:25 HL The key reason for that view is because of the quality that you just mentioned? 
31:30 A3 Yes, I think so. The quality, and the fact that there are not enough people in 
Singapore who think that this is something that is worthwhile doing and putting 
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money into, either because it can be a commercial success or because this is 
good for Singapore. There are (some), and I shouldn’t be unfair. Obviously, there 
are people who want to do it, but they have not quite succeeded, and you have 
to ask why they have not succeeded. 
 
I mean, some people say Singapore is just too small a market, and it is very hard 
to make a commercial go at it when the market is so small. I’m not sure whether 
that is a viable reason. At one time, Malaysia was cited as a country where 
because the mainstream media like The New Straits Times were doing such a 
poor job, that it basically lost its credibility at the height of the Mahathir-Anwar 
dispute. I think Mahathir and UMNO basically used the paper, and as a result the 
circulation collapsed. The Malaysian online media then exploded, like 
Malaysiakini and Insider. Now they are doing less well than they did at the height 
of their popularity. People argue that the reason why online media there 
flourished was because the mainstream media was doing such a poor job, and 
obviously because a lot of things were happening in Malaysia – the so-called 
skeletons in the closet and corruption – and online media had a field day. People 
wanted to read all the stuff that they couldn’t read in the mainstream papers. 
 
In that sort of society, where you have a lot of exciting things happening that the 
mainstream media is not reporting, I think that would be one condition for online 
media to flourish. And maybe you could argue that we are not in that sort of 
situation yet – not so many skeletons in the closet, and the government is not 
like the Malaysian government, and so on. So there isn’t those underlying 
conditions, you could make an argument on that. 
34:50 HL So I get the sense from you that what is really inhibiting online media, to develop 
that kind of conversations, partly has to do with the quality of the publication, 
partly to do with economic factors, how the readership is responding, and also 
the opportunity in being able to open into new markets that the mainstream 
media couldn’t fulfil. In this equation, is there any role that you think government 
laws and actions (have played)? Has that impacted the ability of online media to 
do so? 
35:28 A3 Well, like the earlier point I made, I don’t think the government’s thinking has 
changed. I believe it also applies to online media. If the government had its way, 
it would want to control online media in the same way it controls print media. 
The instincts are exactly the same. But obviously it knows it can’t – it’s a very 
different animal, the servers may not be in Singapore, or it’s a totally different 
medium, so you can’t replicate the controls you had with mainstream media in 
the online world. But it doesn’t mean that they will then throw their hands up in 
the air and say this is impossible, I can’t do it, I give up. That’s the last thing they 
will do! They have tried, and you know better than I do, all the different things 
that they have done to online media, the registration and all that. So those are, I 
would say, indications that they will try, they want to control as much as 
possible, so whatever they can do that is practicable and realistic, they will. 
 
Does that crimp online media, I think obviously it does. But is that the main 
reason why online media has not flourished? I would say it’s just one of the 
reasons. There are other reasons, like the ones we discussed just now. 
37:34 HL Ok. I’ll just move over now to talk a little bit about the fake news legislation, the 
Select Committee hearings that we saw earlier this year. Would you like to share 
your views on it, what you thought was useful, what you think was not? 
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37:51 A3 First of all, I don’t think fake news is a huge problem that it requires this 
tremendous effort that we are seeing. I think it is a problem if there was a really 
large-scale effort by a foreign government to undermine your society in whatever 
way. It may or may not happen, but that phenomenon may present a problem in 
the future, so I grant that it could. If a foreign country wanted to undermine your 
country, and it uses all the facilities and powers that it possesses in the digital 
world, whether through disinformation, undermining your cyber security or 
infiltrating your cyber defences – I grant that that can present a real danger, and 
the government then has every right to protect the country, because you are 
under attack from a foreign country. 
 
But fake news, with respect to concerns about what ordinary citizens do when 
they disseminate information that they receive through Whatsapp – I don’t see 
that as such a big problem that it requires tremendous effort on the part of the 
government, whether by way of laws or whatever. It’s part of a very new 
phenomenon that we are facing today, which is the digital revolution, social 
media, and the ease with which we get information; and not just consume 
information but the ability to pass it on and disseminate it. So it is a very different 
information environment which we are living in, and there are many 
consequences to that digital revolution. Fake news is just one very small part of 
it, and there so many other larger pieces, such as the demise of mainstream 
media, which is a consequence of this digital revolution.  
 
My view is that we are only at the beginning of this digital revolution. Many 
things are happening and fake news is only one small part of it. Many other 
things will happen as the revolution unfolds, and if we just narrowly focus on this 
fake news phenomenon, developments will just completely overtake us – by the 
time laws are enacted, other things would happen, and they will be totally 
irrelevant and outdated. And other new developments might come on board 
which you might have a problem with as well. Today, they already struggle to 
define, grasp and understand it, and I think it will just get worse as new 
developments take place. In any case, I don’t see it presenting such a big problem 
to our society, apart from the attack by a foreign government. 
42:47 HL You mentioned defining or scoping out the parameters of what should or should 
not be governed. Do you think that during the hearings they managed to do that? 
43:00 A3 No, I don’t think so. In fact, I read that the UK Parliament was also looking into it, 
and two or three months ago the decided not to pursue this because it was too 
hard to define. I think we will face exactly the same problem. 
43:30 HL So you think the government will not pursue this? 
43:32 A3 No, I think they may pursue it, but in pursuing it, they will face the same 
problems in trying to define it and keep up with developments in the digital 
world. 
43:47 HL Ok. Why do you think the government embarked on this then, to begin with? 
43:51 A3 Why? Well, I think it arose from what I mentioned earlier, that fundamentally 
their instincts are to control information and they will try to do it in the online 
world as much as they did in the non-virtual world, even though they know it is a 
very different medium. They will try. 
44:25 HL In your opinion, what is the best solution to tackle fake news, then? Not the 
foreign government thing, but the social aspect. 
44:35 A3 Ok, I’ll fall back to what everyone falls back to, which is education! I mean, you 
have to trust your citizens, right? After you have educated them and developed 
340 
 
society – you have to ask yourself what this development (means). Ultimately, 
developing Singapore means developing your citizens so that they can be 
thinking citizens who can discern truth from falsehood – not one hundred 
percent, but at least to the extent that it won’t create serious problems. They 
may be taken in once, but over time they will be able to know. Ultimately, your 
citizens are your best defence. If your citizens cannot do that, then all the laws in 
the world and all the things you do, you might as well give up! You have to have 
faith that what you are doing, whether it is education or whatever, must 
ultimately produce Singaporeans who understand these things. 
 
But the digital world, I think, presents an especially interesting problem in that 
aspect, which the Singapore government is not to be blamed, although it can 
help. I feel that many of us do not understand the way the digital world acts and 
operates well enough. Maybe it is because we are still quite early in this realm, 
and over time we will develop that understanding. 
 
I am a media person and I’m supposed to understand this better than most, but I 
didn’t know all the things that are happening in Facebook with all these fake 
identities and accounts until it all started spilling out in the US with the 2016 
elections. I didn’t know that they were creating thousands of fake identities on 
Facebook. This lack of understanding is a large part of the problem, which is why 
we fall for fake news, because it is not just fake news but fake identities. 
Whatever you are reading, the person is not real, it’s a machine or somebody 
else. We have to understand it better, and maybe as we go along we would 
understand it better and it helps in our ability to manage some of these things.  
47:57 HL Ok. I’ll just ask you, looking at how the direction the mainstream media and 
online media are going, leaving aside the fake news thing, how do you think this 
will impact the government’s response to it? Do you think they will be a lot more 
strict, or will they try to, for instance, give more leeway to mainstream media in 
order to manage this? 
48:30 A3 The biggest problem facing media is not fake news. It is its very survival. It is a 
huge issue. If you ask me, I can’t say for sure if mainstream media will survive in 
ten years’ time. Looking at the numbers, like I said earlier, I don’t see light at the 
end of the tunnel, I don’t see a solution. They will continue to be impacted by 
online and digital media. They will continue to lose readers and advertisers. 
 
The biggest issue is the commercial viability of mainstream media. If it is not 
commercially viable, the government has a big problem, because mainstream 
media is the main platform for disseminating their speeches and policies. I don’t 
know whether it is something the government can prevent or help, but certainly 
they will try. You can think of many solutions that might be possible. In the case 
of Mediacorp, for example, it is a government-owned company, so I suppose 
they can continue to pump money into it. In the case of The Straits Times, I don’t 
think the solution for government would be, oh because you’re struggling, we’ll 
now widen the fairways! They will think of some other solution. 
50:34 HL Will they pump money into The Straits Times? 
50:36 A3 Maybe. Some people are saying maybe the new business model for newspapers, 
looking at the trend that so many papers are dying, could be some kind of public 
funding or a trust. I mean, The Guardian is funded by a trust, but even that trust 
is slowly being depleted. I think I read somewhere that the funds will be gone in 
five to ten years’ time, which is why The Guardian is now actively soliciting funds 
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– every time you read it, this thing pops up, that they need money. Something 
has to be done, but I’m not sure what. 
 
So some people say that may be the solution, I don’t know. Or maybe you need 
someone, like Alibaba, to buy over your paper like they did for South China 
Morning Post, or like how Amazon has bought over Washington Post, right? 
51:38 HL Yeah, but we have rules against foreign funding! 
51:42 A3 Yeah, that could change, or it could be Singtel (doing the buying-over). 
51:50 HL Ok, I’ve actually come to the end of my questions. Do you have anything to add 
that you think can help me with my topic, or anything you wish to add? 
52:02 A3 What is your actual thesis, again? 
52:04 HL [Explanation of topic, including how OB markers and public discourse, such as the 
fake news debate, can be means of governance] 
52:49 A3 [Short pause] 
Ok, I would make just one point. I would say that, with respect to government, 
even though the fundamental thinking has not changed with respect to media, 
their role and how they operate, obviously the whole environment has changed. I 
feel they need to manage it in a different way. But to do that, you need a very 
deep understanding of media and how it operates – what are the really 
important issues, how media in Singapore can be successful, thrive, retain the 
journalists, what motivates them and all that. You need to have that deep 
understanding. I don’t think there is that deep understanding in government 
today, and that is a big problem. 
 
They need to develop that relationship with people in the media, and through 
that relationship develop that understanding, and find a way of establishing 
maybe a new relationship, a new way of looking at media, and taking in the 
changes that are happening in Singapore society and the challenges that are 
facing mainstream media – and they are tremendous life-threatening challenges 
actually, mainstream media may not be around in ten years’ time. Taking in all 
this, and then hopefully being in a better position to develop a new 
understanding of how the media can operate successfully in a place like 
Singapore. I don’t think there is that understanding at the moment. It is still very 
much governed by the old thinking. 
55:34 HL So, in your view, they don’t understand, but do you see them trying to 
understand? Even if it is very hard. 
55:46 A3 Yeah, maybe they’re trying to understand, but I think the old instinct to control is 
still very strong. 





Appendix O – Transcript of institutional response from Think Centre, a human rights advocacy 
group based in Singapore 
Interview date: finalised via email on 19 September 2018 
 
1. What are your perceptions on media regulation in Singapore? 
a. Are there specific laws that you find are too strict or too lenient? 
b. Which do you find appropriate to purpose, and why? 
c. Which can be improved, and how? 
d. Are there any examples of laws, regulations and policies from other countries that 
you would consider useful for Singapore to emulate, and in what ways? 
While every country includes guidelines for public consumption of media, Singapore seems 
to suffer from a dearth of options when it comes to broadcast. Mainstream broadcast 
licensing rules greatly dictate the sort of media that are available to a local audience.  For 
instance because of the Films Act, all films publicly screened in the country must first be 
reviewed by the Government's Board of Film Censors, which can sanction the banning, 
seizure, and censoring of film and video if it is deemed to be obscene or against public 
interest. 
Broadcast, print, and online content are closely monitored by the authorities who are given 
wide-ranging powers to remove and censor content that is deemed to undermine public 
security, racial or religious harmony, or public morals. Artistic and creative expression fall 
under this purview which makes it difficult for alternative critique, ideas and expression to 
thrive since the criteria for censorship is vague and up to the discretion of the Board of 
Censors. 
Printed materials are regulated by the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (Cap.206) and 
requiring annual renewals. Foreign newspaper circulation is limited and penalties are 
imposed for unregistered print media.  
A recommendation is to amend Undesirable Publications Act, Newspaper and Printing 
Presses Act and Films Act to revoke or curtail powers of the government to censor and ban 
content outside of constitutional freedoms accorded to speech and expression.  There are 
already laws dealing with public disorder, sedition and religious disharmony all of which are 
onerous without having to further clamp down on media expression. 
 
2. What are your views on the recent discussions and debates about “deliberate online 
falsehoods”, better known as “fake news”? 
a. What do you think of the public consultation process? 
b. Which part of the discussion do you find the most relevant to the issue? 
c. Do you agree with the use of laws to tackle fake news, and why/why not? 
d. What do you think is the best solution to tackle fake news? 
 
While a green paper on deliberate online falsehoods was presented to Parliament and a 
Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods set up to examine how the government 
should deal with fake news and online falsehoods, print and online media articles seem to 
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suggest that adequate outreach and public consultation by government agencies on this 
issue had been conducted and that the results were predisposed towards having laws to 
deal with deliberate online falsehoods.  This has neither been challenged nor independently 
verified.   
What is pertinent to the proposed “fake news law” is that the proposed regulations aim to 
shrink even further the space for freedom of speech specifically on social media networks, in 
addition to existing laws in Singapore against libel, sedition and harassment.  The online 
sphere is seen as one of the last bastions of freedom of expression where governments 
around the world are desperately trying to control with varying degrees of success.  Under 
Singapore law, class-licensing of websites is compulsory and an Internet Code of Practice 
must to be adhered to. 
The Info-communications Media Development Authority (IMDA) also has the power to 
censor content without recourse to the courts.  There are specific rules and conditions set 
out for individual licensing for websites.  Websites under licensing rules are also to 
undertake not to receive foreign funding for fear that foreign interests might politically 
influence domestic affairs. 
While there are laws in place to prevent incitement of violence and public disorder, over-
regulation of so called “fake news” ultimately leads to a reduction in a marketplace of ideas 
where discussion, dialogue and constructive criticism are not the norm and citizens cannot 
learn to discern fact from fiction, which becomes ultimately self-defeating.  This leads to 
reliance on a small minority to dictate to everyone else what constitutes “fake news” and 
the common man is none the wiser. 
 
3. What are your views on public perception of media in Singapore? 
a. Specifically, what you think are their perceptions of mainstream media? 
b. Specifically, what you think are their perceptions of online media? 
c. Why do you think they hold such views? 
d. What impact do you think such public perceptions have on the media industry and 
how they operate? 
There is a growing sense that members of the public desire transparency and honest 
reporting in mainstream media.  However, because of how the media is tightly controlled 
over the years, scepticism and suspicion have built up against local mainstream media as 
alternative sources of news become more readily available. People were more willing to 
trust in mainstream media previously because there is little avenue to resort to a different 
news source in Singapore, particularly in the wake of state-controlled broadcast and printing 
press.   
The advent of online media has in many ways helped to shape public perception by offering 
different viewpoints and highlighting different nuances in local reporting and journalism.  
Comments on online media criticizing government policy, the ruling party and organs of 
government are more freely exchanged with the exception of critique surrounding the 
judiciary.  To-date, two individuals have been taken to task and charged for writing social 
media posts which could be deemed to risk lowering the reputation and challenge the 
impartiality of the judiciary.  These charges are widely seen as warnings against the posting 




Shaping of public perceptions in turn leads to some media houses sensationalizing or putting 
forward unobjective viewpoints to allow readers to feed their scepticism of mainstream 
media.  Due to limited alternative media exposure, readers who grow suspicious of 
mainstream media tend to buy in more easily to media houses purporting to offer a 
different view, regardless of whether it can be measured for factual accuracy and truth.  
 
4. Please share your views on the evolution of the media industry in Singapore, in both 
mainstream and online media. Specifically, how do you think these changes will impact 
media governance? 
As the government struggles to contain and limit discussions online that put it in a bad light, 
its attempts are increasingly being seen as desperate grasping at straws. On the one hand, it 
needs to project a sense of openness and semblance of democracy to attract foreign 
investors to set up shop here and not to alarm those who are already here that we are 
turning into a police state and on the other hand to come up with even more creative 
solutions on how to tackle criticism. This careful calibration of the noose around civic space 
is extremely delicate and we are waiting to see how the Select Committee on Deliberate 
Online Falsehood will play out. 
 
Follow up questions: 
 
5. You mentioned in Q3 that some online media houses are sensationalising news as a result 
of public perceptions/expectations of them as a source of alternative viewpoints. How do 
you think this sensationalism affects the overall health of democracy in Singapore, and in 
particular the health of the media industry? 
6. Apart from government regulations and laws, do you see any other factors that will have 
an impact on how media outlets operate? 
 
Sensationalism has always been a tool of the media to gain more viewership. The broadsheet's 
approach is to calibrate it to such an extent that it does not descend into the style of the 
tabloids. The choice for media owners has always been whether they want to be perceived as a 
respectable news outlet where readers go to be educated on issues or as just a platform to 
inform and entertain? We would like to think and hope that Singaporeans are mature enough to 
differentiate the wheat from the chaff and to respond accordingly to the materials published. 
We must also believe that Singaporeans are savvy enough to call out disinformation and 
misinformation when they encounter these. It would be unfortunate if the authority takes over 
this role and continue to nanny the citizens over what they feel is appropriate for them. A strong 
and robust community of netizens cannot develop if they are always weaned on sanitised news 
or materials. The vibrancy and creativity of the media industries requires that it be free, 
unrestrained and unfettered, from chasing a story or advocating a point of view. The credibility, 
reliability and trustworthiness will emerge in time and those that are left standing would be 
those that are supported by the people. One caveat is that should a threat of unrest of violence 
be likely to emerge, then the authority should step in to regulate. But the criteria of what 




We hope media outlets will also set up standards of their own to self-regulate and come up with 
best practices for the whole industry to aspire towards. Coming together as an association also 




Appendix P – List of interview questions used for all interviewees 
Note: The following list of broad interview questions was used as a guide to ensure that the key 
research interests of this thesis have been adequately addressed by all interviewees. Sub-questions 
indicated below each main question served as prompters to cover all possible angles of the main 
question. Not all questions were verbalised – these questions were used mainly as prompters for the 
interviewer to help keep the interviews on topic. 
 
1. What are your perceptions on media regulation in Singapore? 
a. Are there specific laws that you find are too strict or too lenient? 
b. Which do you find appropriate to purpose, and why? 
c. Which can be improved, and how? 
d. Are there any examples of laws, regulations and policies from other countries that 
you would consider useful for Singapore to emulate, and in what ways? 
 
2. What are your views on the recent discussions and debates about “deliberate online 
falsehoods”, better known as “fake news”? 
a. What do you think of the public consultation process? 
b. Which part of the discussion do you find the most relevant to the issue? 
c. Do you agree with the use of laws to tackle fake news, and why/why not? 
d. What do you think is the best solution to tackle fake news? 
 
3. What are your views on public perception of media in Singapore? 
a. Specifically, what you think are their perceptions of mainstream media? 
b. Specifically, what you think are their perceptions of online media? 
c. Why do you think they hold such views? 
d. What impact do you think such public perceptions have on the media industry and 
how they operate? 
 
4. Please share your views on the evolution of the media industry in Singapore, in both 
mainstream and online media. Specifically, how do you think these changes will impact 
media governance? 
 
5. Please share any other views that you might have about Singapore’s media environment. 
 
 
